RIEBセミナー

15:10 ～ 16:10

論題

The Arbitrage Pricing Theory in Incomplete Markets

報告者

Michael ZIERHUT (Institute of Financial Economics, Humboldt University)

概要

The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) is traditionally viewed as a descriptive theory: If asset prices are decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic components, the latter are negligible for almost all assets in large markets. This paper analyzes its role as a predictive theory: When prices of systematic risk factors are estimated by means of linear regression, these estimates are a lower-dimensional representation of a pricing kernel. Such estimates can be used to predict arbitrage-free prices for new assets. Market structure matters: When markets are complete, there is a unique pricing kernel and factor pricing is always arbitrage-free. When markets are incomplete, this method may select a nonpositive pricing kernel. This leads to a problem that is robust in a topological sense: For an open set of arbitrage-free markets, estimated factor models do not assign arbitrage-free prices out of sample. The critical assumption is therefore not that markets grow large, but that markets grow complete.

16:20 ～ 17:20

論題

Third-Party Sale of Information

報告者

In-Uck PARK (School of Economics, University of Bristol)

概要

We study design and pricing of information by a monopoly information provider for a buyer in a trading relationship with a seller. The profit-maximizing information structure has a binary threshold character. This structure is inefficient when seller production cost is low. Compared with a situation of no information, the information provider increases welfare if cost is high but reduces it if cost is low. A monopoly provider creates higher welfare than a competitive market in information if the prior distribution of buyer valuations is not too concentrated. Giving the seller a veto over the information contract generates full efficiency.