RIEBセミナー

15：00 ～ 16：30

論題

Two-Stage Moral Behaviors: Some New Evidence from Lab Experiments

報告者

秦 向東（上海交通大学安泰経済管理学院／神戸大学経済経営研究所）

概要

Moral behavior is an integral part of economic interactions. We conducted a series of lab experiments studying intertemporal choices that conform to different paths of moral regularities. Our experimental findings indicate that the effect of "moral licensing" is significantly stronger in the "immediate" sequence of moral behavior, while "moral consistency" or "conformity" is more salient in "delayed" sequence (with a cooling period) of moral behavior. In terms of immoral choices made in the first stage, neither "immediate" sequence nor does "delayed" sequence alter the subjects' subsequent behaviors, implying strong consistence in immoral behaviors over time. Our experimental results have provided new empirical evidence to the investigation about intertemporal moral choices.