|日時||2019年3月7日（木）16:00 ～ 17:30|
16:00 ～ 17:30
- Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Evidence from School Admissions in Imperial Japan（co-authored with Mari Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University) and Yusuke Narita (Yale University))
- 森口 千晶（一橋大学経済研究所）
- We study the short- and long-run consequences of decentralized versus centralized school admissions in higher education. We analyze the world' s first known transition to nationally-centralized admissions and its subsequent reversals during the early 20th century in Imperial Japan. Both in the short- and long-run, we find an equity-efficiency tradeoff between meritocracy and equal regional access to schools. In the short term, in line with theoretical predictions, the centralization led more students to apply to the most prestigious school and make more inter- regional applications. Although the centralized system made the school seat allocation more meritocratic, it also caused high-achieving applicants from urban areas to crowd out rural applicants from their local schools. These impacts were persistent. Four decades later, compared to the decentralized system, the centralized admissions increased the number of high-income earners and elite professionals who were born in urban areas relative to those born in rural areas.