RIEBセミナー

RIEBセミナー(六甲台セオリーセミナー共催)

2019年1月30日(水)15:10 ~ 16:40

RIEBセミナー

六甲台セオリーセミナー共催

日時 2019年1月30日(水)15:10 ~ 16:40
会場 神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室(新館2階)
対象 教員、院生、学部生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方
使用言語 日本語
15:10 ~ 16:40
論題
Job Matching under Constraints
報告者
孫 寧(南京審計大学社会与経済研究院)
概要
In a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, we consider arbitrary constraints on the sets of doctors that hospitals can hire. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a "genealized interval constraint," which is a slight generalization of an" interval constraint" that specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of doctors to be hired. If all hospitals' demand correspondences satisfy the substitutes condition, then the set of competitive equilibria is nonempty under a mild auxiliary assumption, the equilibrium salaries form a lattice, and a\fk{the?} rural hospital theorem holds. We obtain a general comparative statics result and apply it to the case of varying interval constraints. We also show that instead of compelling hospitals to obey interval constraints, the government can entice them through appropriate subsidy and taxation.
日本語