A Search and Bargaining Model of Non-degenerate Distributions of Money Holdings
We study a standard search and bargaining model of money, where goods are traded only in decentralized markets and distributions of money holdings are non-degenerate in equilibria. We assume fixed costs in each seller's production, which allows an analytical characterization of a tractable equilibrium. Each Nash bargaining solution satisfies pay-all property, where the buyer pays the whole amount of cash as a corner solution, and the seller produces goods as the interior solution. In the stationary equilibrium, the aggregate variables, such as total production and the number of matchings, are expressed by given parameters, i.e., determinate. On the other hand, individual-level variables are indeterminate. Distributional monetary policies are eective in both the short-run and the long-run.
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration,
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University