RIEB Seminar

RIEB Seminar (Jointly supported by:Rokkodai Theory Seminar)

Wednesday, January 30, 2019, 3:10pm-4:40pm

RIEB Seminar

Jointly supported by:Rokkodai Theory Seminar

Date & Time Wednesday, January 30, 2019, 3:10pm-4:40pm
Place Meeting Room at RIEB (Annex, 2nd Floor)
Intended Audience Faculties, Graduate Students Undergraduates and People with Equivalent Knowledge
Language Japanese
3:10pm-4:40pm
Topics
Job Matching under Constraints
Speaker
Ning SUN(Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University)
Abstruct
In a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, we consider arbitrary constraints on the sets of doctors that hospitals can hire. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a "genealized interval constraint," which is a slight generalization of an" interval constraint" that specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of doctors to be hired. If all hospitals' demand correspondences satisfy the substitutes condition, then the set of competitive equilibria is nonempty under a mild auxiliary assumption, the equilibrium salaries form a lattice, and a\fk{the?} rural hospital theorem holds. We obtain a general comparative statics result and apply it to the case of varying interval constraints. We also show that instead of compelling hospitals to obey interval constraints, the government can entice them through appropriate subsidy and taxation.
ENGLISH