RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2026-28

Title

Simultaneous and Sequential Provision under Endowment Heterogeneity: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Abstract

We study public-good provision in a three-player environment with Cobb-Douglas preferences and heterogeneous endowments. Across treatments we vary the distribution of endowments while holding the group's total endowment constant. We conduct two comparisons: (i) within-mechanism, contrasting theoretical benchmarks with experimental outcomes; and (ii) across mechanisms, contrasting simultaneous with sequential play under the same role–endowment mapping. In the sequential mechanism, the richest participant is exogenously assigned as the leader, and the two followers move simultaneously in the second stage. Taking Varian (1994) as a testable null (sequential provision should not exceed simultaneous provision), we report both aggregate provision and role-level contributions and document alignment and gaps between theory and data within mechanisms, as well as the pure timing effect across mechanisms. This design extends the literature that has largely studied heterogeneous endowments under simultaneous play by adding a systematic analysis of heterogeneous endowments under sequential play.

Keywords

Endowment heterogeneity; Simultaneous moves；Sequential moves; Public goods; Theory; Experiment

JEL Classification

C91, C92, D63, H41

Inquiries

Xiaoping ZHAO
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University

Junyi SHEN
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe
657-8501 Japan
Phone: +81-78-803-7036
FAX: +81-78-803-7059

Ken-Ichi SHIMOMURA
College of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University

Hiromasa TAKAHASHI
Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University