RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2024-28

Title

Industry Dynamics with Cartels: The Case of the Container Shipping Industry

Abstract

I investigate how explicit cartels, known as "shipping conferences", in a global container shipping market facilitated the formation of one of the largest globally integrated markets through entry, exit, and shipbuilding investment of shipping firms. Using a novel data, I develop and construct a structural model and find that the cartels shifted shipping prices by 20-50% and encouraged firms' entry and investment. In the counterfactual, I find that cartels would increase producer surplus while slightly decreasing consumer surplus, then may increase social welfare by encouraging firms' entry and shipbuilding investment. This would validate industry policies controlling prices and quantities in the early stage of the new industry, which may not be always harmful. Investigating hypothetical allocation rules supporting large or small firms, I find that the actual rule based on tonnage shares is the best to maximize social welfare.

Inquiries

Suguru OTANI*
Market Design Center, University of Tokyo
Junior Research Fellow, RIEB, Kobe University

*This Discussion Paper won the Kanematsu Prize (FY 2023).