Title
Mate Choice Mechanism for Solving a Quasi-Dilemma
Abstract
Saijo, Okano, and Yamakawa (2014) showed that the mate choice mechanism for a symmetric prisoner's dilemma (PD) game implements cooperation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), and it attained almost full cooperation in their experiment. First, this study shows that the mechanism works well in the class of quasi-dilemma (QD) games such as asymmetric PD games and coordination games. Second, the class of BEWDS- implementable games is exactly the same as the class of QD games. Third, the mechanism cannot implement cooperation in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Finally, we confirm that the mate choice mechanism works well experimentally for an asymmetric PD game.
Inquiries
Tatsuyoshi SAIJO
Research Center for Social Design Engineering,
Kochi University of Technology
Junyi SHEN
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration,
Kobe University
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe
657-8501 Japan
Phone: +81-78-803-7036
FAX: +81-78-803-7059
and
School of Economics, Shanghai University, China
Research Center for Social Design Engineering,
Kochi University of Technology
Junyi SHEN
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration,
Kobe University
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe
657-8501 Japan
Phone: +81-78-803-7036
FAX: +81-78-803-7059
and
School of Economics, Shanghai University, China