兼松セミナー（六甲台セオリーセミナー共催） Kanematsu Seminar (Jointly supported by: Rokkodai Theory Seminar)
| 日時 | 2014年11月28日（金）午後3時10分から |
|---|---|
| 会場 | 神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室（兼松記念館1階） |
| 対象 | 教員、院生、学部生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方 |
| 使用言語 | 日本語 |
| 備考 | 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。 |
3:10pm～
| 報告者 | 花薗 誠 |
|---|---|
| 所属 | 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科 |
| 論題 | Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation |
| 要旨 | We offer a theory of procurement auctions in which multi-dimensional bidding is ranked by a scoring rule. Our analysis allows a broad class of practically used scoring rules such as one in which price and non-price attributes are evaluated nonlinearly in score. We find that first-score (FS) and second-score (SS) auctions can be transformed into equivalent, single-dimensional score-bid auctions where the bidder's utility is nonlinear in the score-bid. Our analysis demonstrates that the expected scores of FS and SS auctions generally differ unless scoring rule is quasilinear. |