RIEBセミナー(科学研究費補助金(基盤研究(A))「デフレ・円高・財政危機:バブル経済の後遺症に関する包括的理論・実証分析と政策対応」/神戸大学金融研究会/神戸大学社会科学系教育研究府共催)
RIEB Seminar (Jointly supported by: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A): Deflation, Strong Yen, and Financial Crises / Monetary Economics Seminar of Kobe University / Kobe University Interfaculty Initiative in the Social Sciences)

日時 2013年6月21日(金)午後3時30分から
会場 神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室(新館2階)
対象 教員、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方
使用言語 日本語
備考 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。

セミナー・アフターセッションへ参加を希望される方はお手数ですがご氏名、ご所属、ご連絡先(メ-ルアドレス)を6月17日(月)までに共同研究推進室へご連絡下さい。アフター・セッションの参加費は一般3000円・大学院生2000円です。
If you would like to attend our seminar and the aftersession, please email us at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration your name, affiliation and email address by June 17. The fee for the aftersession is 3,000 yen for adults and 2,000 yen for graduate students.

3:30pm~5:30pm

報告者 清滝 信宏
所属 プリンストン大学経済学部
論題 Banking, Liquidity and Bank Runs in an Infinite Horizon Economy
要旨 We develop a variation of the macroeconomic model of banking in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) that allows for liquidity mismatch and bank runs as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As in Gertler and Kiyotaki, because bank net worth fluctuates with aggregate production, the spread between the expected rates of return on bank assets and deposits fluctuates countercyclically. However, because bank assets are less liquid than deposits, bank runs are possible as in Diamond and Dybvig. Whether a bank run equilibrium exists depends on bank balance sheets and a liquidation price for bank assets in equilibrium. While in normal times a bank run equilibrium may not exist, the possibility can arise in a recession. We also analyze the effects of anticipated bank runs. Overall, the goal is to present a framework that synthesizes the macroeconomic and microeconomic approaches to banking and banking instability.

5:30pm~

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