One-day Workshop on: Trade and IO（RIEBセミナー／科学研究費補助金（基盤研究（A））「フラグメンテーション、タイムゾーン、およびその動学的帰結」／ 科学研究費補助金（基盤研究（B））「国際的買収による世界市場への参入とその動学的影響」共催） One-day Workshop on: Trade and IO (Jointly supported by: RIEB Seminar / Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) and (B))
| 日時 | 2013年5月28日（火）午前9時30分から |
|---|---|
| 会場 | 神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室（新館2階） |
| 対象 | 教員、院生、学部生、および製造企業などで技術・製品開発に関わりを持たれている方 |
| 使用言語 | 英語 |
| 備考 | 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。 |
9:30am～10:20am
| 報告者 | Ben LI |
|---|---|
| 所属 | ボストン大学経済学部 |
| 論題 | Offshoring, Learning, and Industrialization |
10:30am～11:20am
| 報告者 | 趙 来勲 |
|---|---|
| 所属 | 神戸大学経済経営研究所 |
| 論題 | Saving Good Jobs under Global Competition |
11:30am～12:20pm
| 報告者 | 柳瀬 明彦 |
|---|---|
| 所属 | 東北大学大学院国際文化研究科 |
| 論題 | Free Trade Areas, Consumption Externalities, and Environmental Standards |
| 概要 | This study considers endogenous determination of environmental standards on products that cause negative consumption externalities in the presence of a possible free trade area (FTA) in a three-country world, and examines how an FTA affects the optimal levels of (external) tariffs and standards chosen by each country and national welfare. We demonstrate that under an FTA, member countries' standards become more stringent than under a tariff-war equilibrium based on the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause. Member countries' welfare may or may not be higher under the FTA than under the MFN equilibrium, whereas the nonmember country unambiguously become better off after the FTA formation. We also compare two regimes, cooperative and noncooperative solutions, regarding the choice of standards by the FTA members and show that in comparison with the noncooperative solution, cooperation on standards will lead the member countries to choose less stringent standards and make the formation of the FTA more favorable. |
2:00pm～2:50pm
| 報告者 | Biswajit MANDAL |
|---|---|
| 所属 | ヴィスヴァ・バラティ大学政治経済学部 |
| 論題 | Time Zone and Inflow of Educational Capital |
3:00pm～3:50pm
| 報告者 | Cheng-Hau PENG |
|---|---|
| 所属 | フー ジェン カトリック大学経済学部 |
| 論題 | Quality Licensing in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly |
4:00pm～4:50pm
| 報告者 | 澤木 久之 |
|---|---|
| 所属 | 岡山大学大学院社会文化科学研究科 |
| 論題 | Redistributive Politics under Incomplete Information |
| 概要 | This paper develops an electoral-competition model in which an incumbent and a challenger compete against each other, and where their ideological pref- erences for economic disparities are private information. The incumbent may bias his rst-period transfer policy to signal his preferences to the electorate. When the possible ideology types of the two candidates partially overlap, a policy bias can be created in an extreme direction. Speci cally, policies leading to extremely large disparities may be predicted in wealthy countries where income transfers are publicly perceived to create large distortions. |
5:00pm～5:50pm
| 報告者 | Sugata MARJIT |
|---|---|
| 所属 | 社会科学研究センター |
| 論題 | Trade Between Similar Countries- The Role of Credit Market Imperfection |