RIEB Workshop on Monotone Comparative Statics

RIEB Workshop on Monotone Comparative Statics
(Jointly supported by: RIEB Seminar / Rokkodai Theory Seminar / Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S))

日時 2016年9月27日(火)午後2時15分から午後5時30分まで
会場 神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室(兼松記念館1階)
対象 教員、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方
使用言語 英語
備考 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。



報告者 佐藤 健治
所属 神戸大学経済学研究科
論題 Almost Everywhere Differentiable Monotone Comparative Statics


報告者 上東 貴志
所属 神戸大学経済経営研究所
論題 Robust Comparative Statics for Non-monotone Shocks in Large Aggregative Games
概要 A policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial, affecting some people positively but others negatively. In this paper we extend the "robust comparative statics" result for large aggregative games established by Acemoglu and Jensen (2010, 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 3133-3139) to possibly controversial policy changes. In particular, we show that both the smallest and the largest equilibrium values of an aggregate variable increase in response to a policy change to which individuals' reactions may be mixed but the overall aggregate response is positive. We provide sufficient conditions for such a policy change in terms of distributional changes in parameters.


報告者 John K.-H. QUAH
所属 ジョンズ・ホプキンス大学経済学部/シンガポール国立大学経済学部
論題 A Revealed Preference Theory of Monotone Choice and Strategic Complementarity
概要 We develop revealed preference characterizations of (1) monotone choice in the context of individual decision making and (2) strategic complementarity in the context of simultaneous games. We first consider the case where the observer has access to panel data and then extend the analysis to the case where data sets are cross sectional and preferences heterogenous. Lastly, we apply our techniques to investigate the possibility of spousal influence in smoking decisions.