Kanematsu Seminar
| Date&Time | Monday, July 11, 2016, 3:30pm-5:30pm |
|---|---|
| Place | RIEB Meeting Room (Annex, 2nd Floor) |
| Intended Audience | Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and Managers for Technology and Product Development at Manufacturers |
| Language | English |
| Note | Copies of the paper will be available at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. |
3:30pm-5:30pm
| Speaker | Fuhito KOJIMA |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Department of Economics, Stanford University |
| Topic | Stability and Strategy-proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition |
| Abstract | Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a novel connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts. |