Workshop on: Trade, Wages and Political Relations in East Asia
（RIEBセミナー／六甲フォーラム／科研基盤研究（B）「国際的買収による世界市場への参入とその動学的影響」共催）
Workshop on: Trade, Wages and Political Relations in East Asia
(Jointly supported by: RIEB Seminar / Rokko Forum / Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B))

日時 2016年3月8日（火）午前10時00分から午後5時20分まで
会場 神戸大学経済経営研究所　会議室（新館2階）
対象 教員、院生、学部生、および製造企業などで技術・製品開発に関わりを持たれている方
使用言語 英語
備考 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。

10:00am～10:50am

報告者 Miaojie YU
所属 北京大学国家発展研究院
論題 Measured Wage Inequality and Input Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Chinese Firms
概要 This paper investigates how input trade liberalization affects within-firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. Using Chinese firm-level production data, we first develop a Mincer-type approach to estimate the impact. After controlling for output trade liberalization, we find evidence that input trade liberalization widens within-firm measured wage inequality. Such effect is more pronounced for importing firms. Moreover, we also find wage polarization in China: the middle range of workers in the skilled distribution has gained relatively less in real term compared to less and more skilled workers. Such findings are robust to different measures of wage inequality, as well as different empirical specifications and data spans.

11:00am～11:50am

報告者 Yingyi TSAI
所属 国立高雄大学応用経済系
論題 Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Labour Mobility and Wage Inequality
概要 This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model, we show a negative relationship between wage inequality and IPR systems in the home country. We also investigate whether cross-border mobility of the skilled labour is affected by the standard of IPR. And we show that a stronger foreign IPR system can drive the increase in wage inequality of home country if the output effect dominates the revenue effect.

11:50am～1:30pm

昼休憩

1:30pm～2:20pm

報告者 Xiaopeng YIN
所属 対外経済貿易大学国際経済貿易学院
論題 Choosing Global Markets
概要 After Melitz and others (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple，2004) reveal the role of productivity in firms' strategic choice of sales and distribution in global markets, Lu, Lu, and Tao (2010) (i.e. LLT, hereafter) provides other evidence for foreign affiliates of multinational corporations (i.e. MNCs) made on global marketing that are greatly different from domestic firms and could conflict with those Melitz and others mentioned, with the different model. This paper expects to adopt original Melitz's 2×2×1 model (Melitz, 2003) to provide an alternative explanation for such counterfactual question, and provide some more general choices for MNCs' exporting strategy. We find the best strategy of global marketing for MNCs in order, which is different from LLT (2010) but the extension from Melitz to explain same phenomenon. That is, they will choose to (1) produce globally (domestically and in foreign country, i.e. FDI) and sell for local market only, (2) produce globally and sell at oversea only, (3) produce domestically and export to oversea, and (4) produce and sell domestically, in order. This result, firstly, finds there is not any constraint, such as financial constraint and/or production capacity's constraint, affecting such exporting behaviors. Secondly, it shows there exists a kind of strategy of "market switching" in their exporting strategies, and it will be followed by the strategy of "market expanding" people intuitively expect. Such result will be robust with data from China and other related countries. Furthermore, we show the counterfactual evidence shown by LLT (2010) is only a part of complete picture of reality incurred in China.

2:30pm～3:20pm

報告者 Wei TIAN
所属 対外経済貿易大学国際経済貿易学院
論題 Outward FDI and Domestic Input Distortion: Evidence from Chinese Firms
概要 This paper examines how domestic distortions affect firms' investment strategies abroad. The study first documents puzzling empirical findings concerning Chinese multinational corporations, which include that private multinational corporations are less productive than state-owned multinational corporations. A theoretical model is built to rationalize these findings and yields additional empirically consistent predictions. The key insight is that discrimination against private firms domestically incentivizes these firms to produce abroad, which results in less tough selection into foreign direct investment for them. A calibration exercise shows the quantitative impacts of domestic distortions on gains in aggregate productivity after investment liberalization.

3:30pm～4:20pm

報告者 Baomin DONG
所属 河南大学経済学院
論題 A Signalling Model of Loss Leader Pricing Strategy
概要 The traditional theory of loss leader pricing strategy suffers from ad hoc assumptions such as high consumer search cost, product complementarity, and short-sighted consumer rationality. We argue that with the rise of internet consumer search cost is extremely reduced, and in many realistic situations, loss leader goods have no obvious complements. It is shown in both monopoly and oligopoly settings that firms may use loss leader pricing strategy to signal the quality of its advance goods, which is only known to some informed consumers if otherwise. Therefore, loss leader pricing strategy is socially desirable because the lemon problem disappears. Our model is robust to consumers' cherry-picking and deliberate stockoutage problems.

4:30pm～5:20pm

報告者 Cheryl Xiaoning LONG
所属 厦門大学王亜南経済研究所
論題 Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Investment Growth
概要 Using prefectural level monthly data between January 2013 and August 2015, this paper empirically studies the impact on investment growth of falls of officials due to corruption investigations. We find that the report of such a fall is correlated with a significant decline of 2 percentage points in investment growth rate in the following month. In addition, the negative impact above is stronger for prefectures with lower governance quality. The findings provide support for the "greasing-the-wheel" theory of corruption where anti-corruption campaigns reduce short-term investment growth due to the failure to grease the wheel of cumbersome regulation. Improved governance and streamlined regulation, on the other hand, will reduce the negative impact of corruption investigations on investment growth.