RIEBセミナー(TJAR Workshop共催) RIEB Seminar (Jointly supported by: TJAR Workshop)

日時 2015年7月14日(火)午後3時30分から午後5時30分まで
会場 神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室(新館2階)
対象 教員、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方
使用言語 日本語
備考 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。

3:30pm~5:30pm

報告者 首藤 昭信
所属 東京大学大学院経済学研究科
論題 The Role of Accounting Conservatism in Executive Compensation Contracts
要旨 In order to test the implication of Watts's (2003) argument that accounting conservatism can increase the efficiency of executive compensation contracts, we investigate the relationship between the adoption of accounting conservatism and the use of earnings-based executive compensation contracts in Japanese firms. We focus on executive compensation practice in Japan because the demand for accounting conservatism is likely to be larger for Japanese firms than for U.S. firms due to the Japanese predominance of earnings-based executive compensation contracts and the lack of explicit compensation contracts. Consistent with the proposed arguments, we find a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and the compensation earnings coefficient. We also find that the positive relationship is greater for firms with poor ex-ante information environment. These results suggest that the demand for accounting conservatism is higher for firms that use more earnings-based executive compensation contracts and that have a more serious ex post settling up problem.