Kanematsu Seminar (Jointly supported by: Rokkodai Theory Seminar)
| Date&Time | Friday, November 28, 2014, 3:10pm- |
|---|---|
| Place | Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall, 1st Floor) |
| Intended Audience | Faculties, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| Language | English |
| Note | Copies of the paper will be available at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. |
3:10pm-
| Speaker | Makoto HANAZONO |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | School of Economics, Nagoya University |
| Topic | Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation |
| Abstract | We offer a theory of procurement auctions in which multi-dimensional bidding is ranked by a scoring rule. Our analysis allows a broad class of practically used scoring rules such as one in which price and non-price attributes are evaluated nonlinearly in score. We find that first-score (FS) and second-score (SS) auctions can be transformed into equivalent, single-dimensional score-bid auctions where the bidder's utility is nonlinear in the score-bid. Our analysis demonstrates that the expected scores of FS and SS auctions generally differ unless scoring rule is quasilinear. |