Kanematsu Seminar (Jointly Supported by: Rokkodai Theory Seminar)
| Date&Time | Monday, July 29, 2013, 3:10pm- |
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| Place | RIEB Meeting Room (Annex 2nd floor) |
| Intended Audience | Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| Language | English |
| Note | Copies of the paper are available at the Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. |
3:10pm-4:40pm
| Speaker | Nobuyuki HANAKI |
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| Affiliation | Aix-Marseille University |
| Topic | Strategic Uncertainty in an Experimental Asset Market (joint work with Eizo Akiyama and Ryuichiro Ishikawa) |
| Abstract | We investigate to what extent the deviation of forecast prices from the fundamental values (FVs) in experimental asset markets is caused by strategic uncertainty (uncertainty about others behavior) and by individual bounded rationality (or confusion). We have compared the initial, as well as subsequent, forecast prices submitted by subjects in two call market environments a la Haruvy et. al. (2007) -- one where all six traders are human subjects (6H), and the other where one human subject is interacting with five computer traders who submit orders at the fundamental values (1H5C). Subjects in the latter environments are all told how computer traders behave and the fact that other traders in their markets are computer traders. Our analysis shows that about 1/3 of the median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental values is due to strategic uncertainty and remaining 2/3 are due to individual bounded rationality. |