One-Day Workshop on: Trade and IO
(Jointly Hosted by: RIEB Seminar / JSPS Kiban Research (A #22243024, B #24330079)
| Date&Time | Tuesday, May 28, 2013, 9:30am- |
|---|---|
| Place | RIEB Meeting Room (Annex, 2nd Floor) |
| Intended Audience | Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and Managers for Technology and Product Development at Manufacturers |
| Language | English |
| Note | Copies of the paper will be available at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. |
9:30am～10:20am
| Speaker | Ben LI |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Department of Economics, Boston College |
| Topic | Offshoring, Learning, and Industrialization |
10:30am～11:20am
| Speaker | Lex ZHAO |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Reseach Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University |
| Topic | Saving Good Jobs under Global Competition |
11:30am～12:20pm
| Speaker | Akihiko YANASE |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Graduate School of International Cultural Studies, Tohoku University |
| Topic | Free Trade Areas, Consumption Externalities, and Environmental Standards |
| Abstract | This study considers endogenous determination of environmental standards on products that cause negative consumption externalities in the presence of a possible free trade area (FTA) in a three-country world, and examines how an FTA affects the optimal levels of (external) tariffs and standards chosen by each country and national welfare. We demonstrate that under an FTA, member countries' standards become more stringent than under a tariff-war equilibrium based on the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause. Member countries' welfare may or may not be higher under the FTA than under the MFN equilibrium, whereas the nonmember country unambiguously become better off after the FTA formation. We also compare two regimes, cooperative and noncooperative solutions, regarding the choice of standards by the FTA members and show that in comparison with the noncooperative solution, cooperation on standards will lead the member countries to choose less stringent standards and make the formation of the FTA more favorable. |
2:00pm～2:50pm
| Speaker | Biswajit MANDAL |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Visva Bharati University, JSPS fellow |
| Topic | Time Zone and Inflow of Educational Capital |
3:00pm～3:50pm
| Speaker | Cheng-Hau PENG |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Departmaent of Economics, Fu-Jen Catholic University |
| Topic | Quality Licensing in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly |
4:00pm～4:50pm
| Speaker | Hisashi SAWAKI |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Okayama University |
| Topic | Redistributive Politics under Incomplete Information |
| Abstract | This paper develops an electoral-competition model in which an incumbent and a challenger compete against each other, and where their ideological pref- erences for economic disparities are private information. The incumbent may bias his rst-period transfer policy to signal his preferences to the electorate. When the possible ideology types of the two candidates partially overlap, a policy bias can be created in an extreme direction. Speci cally, policies leading to extremely large disparities may be predicted in wealthy countries where income transfers are publicly perceived to create large distortions. |
5:00pm～5:50pm
| Speaker | Sugata MARJIT |
|---|---|
| Affiliation | Center for Studies in Social Sciences |
| Topic | Trade Between Similar Countries- The Role of Credit Market Imperfection |