Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas (Experimental Social Sciences) Seminar
(Jointly supported by: RIEB Seminar / Experimental Economics Workshop / Rokkodai Theory Seminar)
Date&Time | Friday, March 9, 2012, 3:15pm- |
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Place | RIEB Meeting Room (Annex 2nd floor) |
Intended Audience | Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
Language | Japanese |
Note | Copies of the paper will be available at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. |
3:15pm-
Speaker | Masato KAGIHARA |
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Affiliation | Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University |
Topic | An Experimental Study of the Effect of Information Structure on the Possibility of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma |
Abstract | This paper experimentally investigates the effect of information structure on the possibility of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. We modify the information structure of the usual 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma as follows: Nature chooses the order of moves with fifty-fifty chance and only the first mover's {¥it Defection} is observed by the second mover. When the payoffs of the modified Prisoner's Dilemma satisfy some conditions, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which both players take {¥it Cooperation}, in addition to the non-cooperative equilibrium (Nishihara (1997)). We find that this modification of information structure raises the possibility of cooperation when the cooperative equilibrium {¥it risk-dominates} the non-cooperative one. |