RIEBセミナー(六甲フォーラム共催) RIEB Seminar (Jointly supported by Rokko Forum)
| 日時 | 2011年6月3日（金）午後3時30分から |
|---|---|
| 会場 | 神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室（兼松記念館1階） |
| 対象 | 教員、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方 |
| 使用言語 | 英語 |
| 備考 | 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意しております。 |
3:30pm～
| 報告者 | Ngo Van LONG |
|---|---|
| 所属 | マギル大学経済学部／神戸大学大学院国際協力研究科 |
| 論題 | Strategic Separation from Suppliers of Vital Complementary Inputs: Toward a theory of vertical disintegration |
| 概要 | In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its intermediate-input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of independent suppliers decrease when their number increases), the assembler's marginal return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than its market value as an independent supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm's initial number of upstream subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads to a mixed strategy whereby it keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability. |