RIEBセミナー（六甲台セオリーセミナー共催） RIEB Seminar（Jointly supported by Rokkodai Theory Seminar）
| 日時 (Date&Time) |
2010年10月18日（月）午後3時00分から （Monday, October 18, 2010, 3:00pm～） |
|---|---|
| 報告者 (Speaker) |
[3:00pm～4:00pm] 森田 穂高（Hodaka MORITA） |
| 所属 (Affiliation) |
ニューサウスウェールズ大学オーストラリアン・スクール・オブ・ビジネス 経済学部／神戸大学経済経営研究所 (School of Economics, Australian School of Business, The University of New South Wales / RIEB, Kobe University) |
| 論題 (Topic) |
FDI and Technology Spillover under Vertical Product Differentiation |
| 概要 (Abstract) |
This paper explores consequences of technology spillover that is accompanied by a Northern rm's FDI in the South and enhances a Southern rm's product quality. To this end, we explore an international duopoly model of vertical product di erentiation in which a Northern rm and a Southern rm compete in the Southern market. By undertaking FDI, Northern rm can reduce its production costs and avoid tari , but its advanced technology spills over to Southern rm and enhances Southern rm's product quality. We nd that, under certain range of parameterizations, Northern rm strategically reduces the level of its product quality upon FDI. In such cases, the level of spillover rate that maximizes global welfare could be strictly higher than North-optimal level and strictly lower than South-optimal level. This result supports the roles played by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in reconciling North-South con ict concerning Intellectual Property Rights. |
| 報告者 (Speaker) |
[4:10pm～5:10pm] 伊藤 秀史（Hideshi ITOH） |
| 所属 (Affiliation) |
一橋大学大学院商学研究科 (Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University) |
| 論題 (Topic) |
Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships |
| 概要 (Abstract) |
Transacting parties sometimes write contracts that are unenforceable in courts. Why do they write such contracts despite of "ink costs"? To answer this question, I analyze contractual relationships in context in the sense that there is a large population of principals and agents, a principal and an agent are randomly matched and engage in transaction, and at the end of each period, they can choose to continue or terminate the current partnership. I adopt an extreme assumption that written contracts are never legally enforced. I then show that writing a contract can help relational contracting between principals and agents more enforceable than relying on tacit understanding of their agreement. |
| 会場 (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室（兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象 (Intended Audience) |
教員，院生，学部生，および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 (Language) |
日本語 Japanese |
| 備考 (Note) |
論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。 Copies of the paper will be available at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. |