兼松セミナー (Kanematsu Seminar)

日時:
(Date&Time)
2008年2月28日(木)午後4時から (Thursday, February 28, 2008, 4:00pm〜)
報告者:
(Speaker)
Ngo Van LONG
所属:
(Affiliation)
マギル大学経済学部 (Department of Economics, McGill University)
論題:
(Topic)
Conspicuous Consumption and Resource Exploitation 
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概要:
(Abstract)
This paper studies the role of envy in the over-exploitation of natural resources in the context of a dynamic game. We abandon the standard assumption that agents are atomistic. Instead, agents take into account strategic interactions. Envious agents play a dynamic game among themselves, each knowing that, under certain conditions, he can indirectly influence the level of consumption of others by affecting the stock level of a private or a common-property resource. We show that, both in the case of privately owned resources and in the case of common property resources, an open-loop Nash equilibrium under envy can be Pareto optimal, under certain assumptions. In contrast, in the case of Markov-perfect Nash equilibriums, the equilibrium outcome when everyone is status-conscious is inferior to what would be obtained if nobody were status-conscious. In particular, we show that in the case of a common-access resource, there exists a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium where an increase in statusconsciousness leads to a worsening of the common property problem. In a final section, we introduce heterogeneity, and show that social welfare decreases as the degree of heterogeneity in envy becomes more pronounced.
会場:
(Place)
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 (兼松記念館1階)
Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor)
対象:
(Intended Audience)
教員、院生および同等の知識をお持ちの方
Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge
使用言語:
(Language)
英語
English
備考:
(Note)

論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。
Copies of the paper are available at Research Assistant Room.