| 日時： （Date&Time) |
2008年2月28日（木）午後4時から (Thursday, February 28, 2008, 4:00pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Ngo Van LONG |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
マギル大学経済学部 （Department of Economics, McGill University） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Conspicuous Consumption and Resource Exploitation  顕示消費と資源採掘 |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
This paper studies the role of envy in the over-exploitation of natural resources in the context of a dynamic game. We abandon the standard assumption that agents are atomistic. Instead, agents take into account strategic interactions. Envious agents play a dynamic game among themselves, each knowing that, under certain conditions, he can indirectly influence the level of consumption of others by affecting the stock level of a private or a common-property resource. We show that, both in the case of privately owned resources and in the case of common property resources, an open-loop Nash equilibrium under envy can be Pareto optimal, under certain assumptions. In contrast, in the case of Markov-perfect Nash equilibriums, the equilibrium outcome when everyone is status-conscious is inferior to what would be obtained if nobody were status-conscious. In particular, we show that in the case of a common-access resource, there exists a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium where an increase in statusconsciousness leads to a worsening of the common property problem. In a final section, we introduce heterogeneity, and show that social welfare decreases as the degree of heterogeneity in envy becomes more pronounced. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語： （Language) |
英語 English |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |