| 日時： （Date&Time) |
2005年8月29日（月）午後2時から （Monday, August 29, 2:00pm〜） |
| ・< 2:00-3:30pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） 所属： （Affiliation） |
宮川 栄一 （コロンビア大学） MIYAGAWA Eiichi (Columbia University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Optimal Menu of Menus with Self-Control Preferences 消費者の誘惑・自制を考慮した最適価格設定 |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
Standard theories of optimal pricing are based on the assumption that consumers are free from temptation. To study whether the presence of temptation has a significant impact on firms' optimal pricing strategies, we consider the formulation of temptation due to Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and study a monopoly's optimal nonlinear pricing (second-degree price discrimination). We show that if temptation raises consumers' marginal value for the quality of goods, the firm can achieve perfect discrimination, offering multiple menus targeting different types of consumers. To eliminate consumers' incentives to mimic other types of consumers, the firm adds to the menus options that are tempting and ex ante undesirable for unintended types of customers. The perfect-discrimination result is robust, holding even if the deviation from standard preferences is arbitrarily small. We also show that participation fees, which play no role in the standard problem, have an effect of reducing consumers' disutility from self-control and enable the firm to extract more surplus. |
| ・< 3:30-5:00pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） 所属： （Affiliation） |
高宮 浩司 （大阪大学社会経済研究所） TAKAMIYA Koji (Institute of Social & Economic Research, Osaka University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with
indivisibilities  分割不可能財配分問題における選好表明ゲームと強コア |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sonmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular, I consider the vulnerability to manipulation of the strong core selections. By the results of Sonmez (1999) and Takamiya (2003), any individually rational and Pareto optimal solution is strategy-proof if and only if the strong core correspondence is essentially single-valued, and the solution is a strong core selection. Given this fact, this paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games induced by the strong core selections when the strong core correspondence is not necessarily essentially single-valued. I show that for the preference revelation games induced by any solution which is individually rational and Pareto optimal (like the strong core selections), the set of strict strong Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the strong core. This generalizes one of the results by Shin and Suh (1996) obtained in the context of the marriage probelms. Further, I examine the other preceding results proved for the marriage problems (Alcalde, 1996; Shin and Suh, 1996; Sonmez, 1997) to find that none of those results are generalized to the general model. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
日本語 Japanese |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室に御用意しております。 |