日時：
（Date&Time) |
6月26日（木）午後3時30分から （Thursday, June 26, 3:30pm〜） |
報告者：
（Speaker） |
Amrita DHILLON |
所属：
（Affiliation） |
City Universtiy of New York |
論題：
（Topic） |
Scoring Rule Voting Games and Dominance Solvability |
概要：
（Abstract） |
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of scoring rule voting games.
The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Negative Plurality
Rule, Borda rule and Relative Utilitarianism. This paper investigates the
sufficient conditions for dominance solvability of the corresponding voting
games and compares the different scoring rules on the basis of the criterion of
how easy it is to satisfy the conditions for dominance solvability and how
transparent the process of iterated elimination is for voters. We also
characterise the solutions when the sufficient conditions for dominance
solvability are satisfied. |
対象：
（Intended Audience) |
教官、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方
Faculty, graduate students, and people with
equivalent knowledge |
使用言語：
（Language） |
英語
English |
会場：
(Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階）
Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall
1st Floor |
備考：
(Note) |
論文のコピーは開催日の１週間前に研究助成室にご用意いたします。
Copies of the paper will be available one
week before the seminar at Research Assistant Room.
|