RIEBセミナー(六甲台セオリーセミナー共催) RIEB Seminar (Jointly supported by: Rokkodai Theory Seminar)

日時 2017年9月28日(木)午後3時00分から午後4時30分まで
会場 神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室(新館2階)
対象 教員、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方
使用言語 英語
備考 論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にご用意いたします。


報告者 Roberto SERRANO
所属 ブラウン大学経済学部
論題 Level-k Mechanism Design
概要 Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to the maximal set of functions that are implementable in mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. Focusing on single-valued rules, we discuss the role and implications of different behavioral anchors (arbitrary level-0 play), and prove a level-k revelation principle. If a function is level-k implementable given any level-0 play, it must obey a slight weakening of standard strict incentive constraints. Further, the same condition is also sufficient for level-k implementability, although the role of specific level-0 anchors is more controversial for the sufficiency argument. Nonetheless, our results provide tight characterizations of level-k implementable functions under a variety of level-0 play, including truthful, uniform, and atomless anchors.