Image and Identity
— Rethinking Japanese Cultural History —

Edited by
Jeffrey E. Hanes
Hidetoshi Yamaji

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The Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration
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謝 辞

本著の出版では多くの方に多くの点を負うている。まずは、各寄稿者には最大の感謝の念をささげる。平成14年11月に神戸大学経済経営研究所で開催されたトピ教授を中心とした第2回神戸歴史フォーラム「Rethinking Japanese Cultural History」での議論が核となって、ポスタモダン的な方法を基礎とした日本史の研究という本著の構想が生まれ、トピ、ヘインズ、陶、カーリン各氏をはじめとするフォーラムへの参加者はもちろんのこと、多くの内外の研究者に声をかけて論文を寄稿していただくことによって、今日の出版となったわけである。

また、編著者はヘインズと山地になっているが、歴史研究者である藤村聡（神戸大学経済経営研究所）および加藤慶一郎（流通科学大学）両氏には実質的な編集作業で大変お世話になった。ほぼ共同編集者であることを明記して感謝の念をささげる。

ジェフリー・ヘインズ
山地秀俊
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The essays collected here challenge the metanarrative of transhistorical progress that has long reigned supreme in the field of Japanese history. Which is to say that they are postmodern in the best and most basic sense of the word. The authors arrived at their postmodern skepticism via different routes, yet they have all managed to escape the objectivist straitjacket of historical truth-seeking and to embrace the subjectivist relativity of postmodern interpretation. Their shared thematic interest in images and identities issues from the common understanding that history is about life and lives, both lived and living, and that historical discourse should properly seek to capture the subject(ive) positionings that continually animate human experience.

Not to put too dramatic a spin on the critical turn exemplified by these essays, it must be said that they do not overtly seek to break new theoretical ground. Nevertheless, even the most stolidly empirical among them, seeks to break new historical ground; and, whether explicitly or implicitly, all of them proceed toward that objective from a postmodern vantage point. Their approach to historical discourse—namely, critical theory interrogating empirical research; and empirical research, in turn, interrogating theory—has permitted the authors both to unpack facts and to dissemble theories. The happy result of this methodological exercise in “point-counterpoint” is new historical insights, new interpretive trajectories, and newly captured meanings. While other historians in other fields are certainly following a similar trajectory, it is important to note the relative novelty of this approach within the field of Japanese history. Although there has been a promising outpouring of postmodern interventions in recent years, most of these have been much longer on theoretical imaginings than on historical evidence: As a whole, the field remains at once ploddingly empirical, prosaically positivistic, and dismayingly hermetic. These essays, by contrast,
stand and deliver new historical insights grounded in solid, imaginative re-
search. Their engagement of images as subjective representations of human
experience, rather than objective reflections of it, compels readers to con-
front the contingent nature of historical discourse. And their exploration of
identities as protean cultural constructions, rather than immutable social
facts, commands those same readers to interrogate Japanese culture in
promising new ways.

The quiet postmodern skepticism that informs these essays, as well as
the sonorous exchange between critical theorizing and rigorous research
that animates them, resonates especially loudly with the scholarship of one
historian in particular: Ronald P. Toby. As a number of the authors explic-
itly acknowledge—authors pursuing subjects as diverse as medieval Bud-
dhist cosmology and contemporary jazz festivals—the path-breaking trajec-
tory of Toby’s work has served as a beacon for their own. In the course of
an academic career focused on the history of Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868),
Toby has helped breathe new life into an era long consigned by modern-
conceited historians to “feudal stagnation.” At times adamant in his effort
to track its forward movement—and hence an early advocate of the “early
modern” label now commonly affixed to the era—at other times he has as-
siduously traced its premodern roots. In the end, it would seem, what he
has really been promoting is a wider appreciation of the lively distinctiv-
ness of Tokugawa Japan, and a deeper respect for its diverse inhabitants in
all their subject–ive multiplicity.

Long interested in social interaction and cultural connectivity, Ron Toby
first engaged the subject in a deceptively pedestrian way: by taking a close
look at early modern Korean-Japanese diplomatic exchange. Stunned by
the electric current of diplomatic interchange that he discovered—and well
aware that historians of Japan still labored under the false assumption that
Japan had somehow thrust itself into splendid isolation with the so-called
sakoku (closed country) edicts—Toby invited readers to experience the
surging energy of foreign relations. Paradoxically, the publication of State
and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan¹ did little to disabuse historians of
their cherished myth of sakoku—except in Japan. There, the work trig-
gerated a historiographical paradigm shift.

What Japanese historians of Japan readily recognized was that State and
Diplomacy was not simply a study of regional diplomacy, but an explor-
atation of the ties that had alternately bound and divided the different peoples
of East Asia. In this respect, among others, the book was far ahead of its
time. It was about “border crossings,” after all, that had drawn the coun-
tries of East Asia into a kind of “proto-transnational” cultural dialogue. As

¹. Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the
Kevin Doak astutely observes in his contribution to this volume, *State and Diplomacy* was deceptively cultural in its historical thrust: “[It] can be, and often has been, read merely as a case study in diplomatic history that challenged standard assumptions about how ‘closed’ Japan was during the Edo period. Yet, it should be clear from Toby’s earlier work—and especially from his many publications since—that the main thrust behind this work was not so much diplomatic or political history, but an anthropological concern with how different groups of people construct collective, especially ethnic, identities.”

The “anthropological concerns” that pounded away in the background of Toby’s early work, as its *basso ostinato*, have since been drawn into the foreground as its melodic refrain. In more recent monographs and articles focused on popular culture rather than state ritual—ranging from *Gyoretsu to misemono* (*Parades & Entertainments*) to “Performing Portugal”—Toby has claimed culture(s) as his central concern. The author himself has attributed this scholarly shift to a deepening appreciation of the cultural “discourses” that lurked in the background of his earlier examinations of diplomatic exchange: “I was both explicitly and implicitly aware that ‘actors’ were subjectively motivated, that their actions were taken in response to their beliefs about self and other, about what ‘Japan’ and ‘the state’ were; what ‘Korea’ was; what the connections between Japan and Korea ([as well as] China, Ryukyu, Ezo, the ‘west’) were and should be, both historically and in the present.”

The essays in this volume all owe something to Ron Toby’s historical and methodological ingenuity. That most of the authors acknowledge his intellectual influence with appreciative nods, rather than gushing praise or epigrammatic excess, is a fitting tribute to his scholarly example: reading critical theory, doing basic research, and bringing the two together in searching essays and books written in two different languages (English and Japanese). What the wide-ranging essays here witness about that scholarly example is that Ron Toby has not merely helped to rewrite the story of early modern Japan, but helped in the process to put a new and more human face on Japanese cultural history more generally.

The release of this collection of essays owes ultimately to the inspiration and persistence of its lead editor, Yamaji Hidetoshi. Somehow convincing his colleagues in the Institute of Economics and Management at Kobe University to support two linked symposia on Japanese cultural history, this economist turned historian guided the discussions and debates that inspired this volume. These conversations, anchored by Ron Toby’s path-breaking


ethnographic scholarship, were centered on the salient theme of image and identity. When it became clear that historians of Japan had some compelling things to say on the subject, Professor Yamaji took on a co-editor to help pull together an appropriate collection of essays. This volume on *Image and Identity: Rethinking Japanese Cultural History* is the happy result of that process. The editors wish at the outset to thank the historians who contributed essays, and to add a special note of thanks to Fujimura Satoshi for his work in preparing the papers for publication. Lest we be accused of residual chronophonism, we would like to note that the essays are arranged in roughly chronological order by topic—though for no other reason really than easier reading. The central purpose of this introductory essay, accordingly, is to elicit some of the historical, theoretical, methodological, and interpretative connections that hold the collection together.

In Chapter One, Haruko Wakabayashi’s stimulating study of “Sangoku Shisô and Japan’s Identity in the Buddhist Cosmology,” we are transported backward in time to a medieval moment when Japanese mapped the world according to a religious cosmology that traced the “eastern progress” (*bukkyô tôzen*) of Buddhism from India, to China, and finally to Japan. This is the so-called “three peoples cosmology,” or *sangoku shisô*, that appears in the twelfth century folktales of the *Konjaku monogatari*. Well before Japanese ever imagined a diverse world inhabited by “myriad peoples” (*bankoku shisô*)—or went on to project a diverse, but Nippon-centered, world dominated by the “divine people” (*shinkoku shisô*)—Wakabayashi contends that they carved out for themselves a comfortable niche in the universal spiritual cosmos represented by Buddhist faith. Peripheral to the Indian spiritual core and dwarfed by Chinese cultural greatness, Japan, in this account, is the proverbial mouse that roared. Overcoming its intrinsic weaknesses as a country—namely, its peripheral location and its small size—Japan marshaled its superior spiritual powers to forge a unique cultural identity. That it also took Korea out of the picture—perhaps out of rivalry and contempt for what Toby terms “the proximate other”—gives us something further to think about.

Wakabayashi goes on to project the significance of this finding into early modern and modern history. She argues poignantly that the secular Tokugawa cosmologies mentioned above—cosmologies that refigured Japan’s view of the world, in Ron Toby’s view—did not in fact entirely supplant the Buddhist spiritual cosmology. Well into the modern era, and even to this day, she insists, we hear echoes of *sangoku shisô*. “Despite the rise of the unique *shinkoku shisô* nationalism,” Wakabayashi concludes, “the core elements that constituted earlier *sangoku shisô* were never eliminated, and continued to influence the Japanese view of the world in two respects—that Japan was small and peripheral, yet at the same time, it was the destination of civilizations that progressed in an eastward direction.”

Whereas Wakabayashi expresses considerable skepticism about the ex-
tent to which Japanese re–imagined and re–figured the world in the Tokugawa Era, Brett Walker harbors none. In Chapter Two, he touts the “myriad peoples” cosmology (*bankoku shisô*) as an entirely new Japanese perspective on self and other with particularly profound implications for Japan’s interaction with the world beyond its borders. His multifaceted examination of the scholarly literature in English on “Foreign Affairs and Frontiers in Early Modern Japan” defies an easy summary, but pointedly returns again and again to the work of Ron Toby. Identifying *State and Diplomacy* as “pioneering scholarship” that laid the groundwork for a “new historiography on early modern Japan’s foreign affairs and frontiers,” Walker goes on to dismiss the hackneyed stereotype of a seclusionist Japan that recoiled from foreign contact and retreated into splendid isolation.

From the outset, Walker pointedly affirms Ron Toby’s recent claim that the Tokugawa shoguns exhibited a distinctly “national consciousness” that they injected into foreign relations by way of a newly-created “Japan-centered epistemology.” Rather than dwelling on the core concerns of Tokugawa foreign relations (China and Korea)—an area that Toby and others have explored exhaustively—he draws us out to the periphery (Ezo and the Ryukyus). Here, drawing heavily on his own expertise on Ezo and the Ainu, Walker invokes the Tokugawan cultural paradigm of *ka’i chitsu-jo* (civilized center/barbarian periphery) to help explain how and why frontier relations took the forms they did. If this paradigm enabled officials to delineate state boundaries and to begin constructing a national identity, he argues, it also “extended into the popular consciousness.” Tracing the trajectory of Toby’s own work, Walker notes that, while *State and Diplomacy* led us to appreciate “the complexity of Japan’s pre-Meiji relations with the outside world,” recent essays such as “Imagining and Imaging Anthropos” have since enabled us to visualize that world in all its ethnic and historical intricacy. In this same vein, Walker urges historians of Japan to turn the field in a new direction: first, by affirming the *sakoku*-busting argument of *State and Diplomacy* and thus de-hermeticizing Tokugawa Japan; second, by “rescu[ing] the nation from history” (to borrow Toby’s telling term) by convincing fief–fixed historians of the domestic order to acknowledge some measure of national consciousness in the Tokugawa era; and third, by projecting an understanding of the “complexity of early modern affairs and frontiers” into the study of modern Japan. That this historiographical agenda so closely parallels the trajectory of Ron Toby’s scholarship speaks volumes for its path–breaking originality.

While Wakabayashi and Walker concern themselves fundamentally with images and identities of self and other—and, in particular, those related to the wider world beyond Japan—a quartet of essays follows that turns our

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attention inward once again to the intricately-layered and intermeshed social, economic, and cultural worlds of the Tokugawa domestic order. In Chapter Three, cleverly titled “Both a Banker and Poet Be,” Brian Platt pays homage to “Both a Borrower and a Lender Be,” Ron Toby’s path-breaking study of early modern rural banking.\(^5\) In the latter essay, Toby compellingly laid to rest the lingering image of Tokugawa economic backwardness by demonstrating that mid-Tokugawa village lenders created and employed a nascent credit system to transform themselves into regional bankers and thus also to forge regional socio-economic networks. This finding becomes Platt’s point of departure, as he proceeds to examine other activities that might have accelerated the “formation of regional networks among village elites.”

Noting that Tokugawa regionalism was anything but one-dimensional, Platt traces the rise of cultural networks among would-be poets in the crossroads-region of Shinano, linking these to the rise of new regional networks of information and the formation of new social identities. While Platt does not question the importance that Toby and others have placed on the formation of regional networks that circulated capital and commodities, he compellingly contends that “cultural practices—namely, aesthetic and intellectual pursuits—were perhaps more instrumental to the formation of elite networks.” Equally important, he concludes that these networks were “part of a larger, longer process of cultural integration in Tokugawa society” that anticipated the rise of a modern public sphere.

Similarly fascinated by the dynamics of social change in the Tokugawa period, Fujimura Satoshi nonetheless explores a very different dimension of it in Chapter Four. In his painstakingly researched essay on “The Violation of Waterworks Regulations in the Edo Era,” he identifies a stunning trend in the early nineteenth century toward uniform enforcement of water use regulations in Fuki-han. Central to Fujimura’s argument is the observation that this telling socio-legal development occurred in a castle town—that is, a settlement with numerous residents of diverse statuses who were compelled to share a host of urban facilities. Waterworks, as Fujimura illustrates, are a key case in point. As urban infrastructures essential to the health and hygiene of all urban residents, they demanded regulation. Yet, not until the early nineteenth century were the waterworks of Fukui’s castle town properly policed. While townspeople were regularly fined for dumping garbage, washing clothes, rinsing vegetables, or cleaning fish, samurai residents appear to have remained immune from enforcement of water use regulations. That this created an untenable situation is clear. Yet, as Fujimura suggests, it was not until the early nineteenth century that the strictures and structures of Tokugawa society loosened sufficiently to re-

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move the double standard.

Things began to change in Fukui from 1814, contends Fujimura, when a new law and a new regimen of legal enforcement went into effect. This was the beginning of the end of special treatment for samurai residents of the castle town. Marshaling evidence to show that samurai were cited from this point forward for violation of water use regulations, Fujiwara then goes on to examine the historical significance of the change in policy. The finding, he concludes, compels us to ask whether Bakumatsu urban Japan experienced a pivotal contraction of vertical status distinctions that prefigured the social leveling of the modern era. Although Fujimura and Platt urge us to look at Tokugawa social change in different ways—the former stressing the horizontal integration of village elites, the latter stressing the vertical contraction of status distinctions between samurai and commoners—it is important to note that they arrive at the same basic historical conclusion: that the roots of Japan’s modern civil society were sunk well before Meiji, in its early modern villages, cities, and regions.

It is tempting to speculate that the examples of early modern social change elicited by Platt and Fujimura were symptomatic of something even more fundamental: an indigenous process of early modernization that both preceded and superceded the putatively western-led process of modernization of the Meiji era. In Chapter Five, Katô Keiichirô engages this question, asking whether currency circulation was as integrated and advanced as early modern-minded historians might like to believe. His essay, “On the Stratified Currency of Later Tokugawa”, is appropriately focused on the Ômi merchants, whose trading territory extended from their home base near Biwako to Ezo and beyond. In a case study of the merchant house of Nakai Genzaemon, one of the most prominent such houses in the Ômi network, Katô investigates the instruments of credit and currency exchange that governed commercial practice. His findings call into question Ron Toby’s bold hypothesis in “Both a Borrower and Lender Be” that local lending spawned a circulatory network of capital that extended across Japan by the early nineteenth century.

While the Ômi merchants themselves circulated actively and widely, contends Katô, the same cannot be said of currency. Inter-regional traders such as the house of Nakai found themselves caught up in a “multi-tiered” currency structure. The local staying power of different domainal paper currencies (hansatsu), in particular, continued to dictate the inter-regional commercial practice of gold-and silver-based currency exchange. Even as Kato thus casts into doubt the Toby-drawn projection of early economic modernization—contending indeed that currency exchange was not fully integrated and standardized into a “universal currency” until the beginning of the twentieth century—he also compels us to contemplate the effects of mismatched structures of local economic exchange on the formation of regional social networks, not to mention the rise of a modern civil society.
Ever the skeptic, it is safe to say that Ron Toby himself would not blink an eye at Katô’s revisionism. As he illustrates in his own contribution for Chapter Six, a new essay entitled “Mind Maps and Land Maps: the Cognitive Geography of ‘The Village’ in Tokugawa Japan,” he is more uncertain than ever about what we really “know” of Tokugawa society. In his essay, Toby explores the epistemological structures of knowledge that have dictated our contemporary images of Tokugawa Japan. Stepping back and re-examining one of the most cherished certainties about Japanese society—the existence of “natural villages”—he ends up casting this proverbial Village into the dustbin of history. Not only does Toby challenge our understanding of what constitutes a village, by revealing the radical disconnect between *mura* (juridical villages) and social villages (i.e., communities), he then challenges us to take a closer look at the social spaces in which social change ostensibly occurred.

The famous focus of Toby’s study is a juridical village known as Nishijô, located in present-day Gifu prefecture, whose extensive run of mid-Tokugawa census registers has attracted the close attention of several hard-hitting historical demographers (Hayami Akira among them) and thus rendered it virtually synonymous with The Tokugawa Village. During a visit to Nishijô some twenty years ago, Toby was shocked to discover that this seemingly unitary village was actually “a multiplicity of overlapping, layered ‘villages,’ occupying the same territory.” His typically-exhaustive investigation of the Tokugawa records revealed multiple legal jurisdictions and ambiguous social boundaries; and this led him in turn to maps—though not just mappings of the conventional sort. Following the theoretical lead of cultural geographers such as Denis Wood, Toby scoured the “land maps” of Nishijô and its environs for clues to the assumptions and interests that guided their construction. Not stopping here, however, he also launched an investigation of what he calls the “mind maps” through which villagers understood their social territory.

The result of this multifaceted investigation is a searching essay on “space and representation” that compels us first to interrogate the official “patterns of intention” behind “land maps”—that is, the conventionalized mappings of territory commonly consulted by historians today to locate “real” villages—and then to explore the patterns of social understanding behind the “mind maps” that villagers employed to make sense of their local world. “The ‘village’ was a fluid, shifting unit, comprising different elements—cognitively mapped quite differently—at different times, depending on the purpose served at the moment,” concludes Toby. “Similarly, we as historians or ethnographers need to be sensitive to this multiplicity of ‘villages’ in the cognitive geography of localities in Tokugawa Japan.”

In questioning what “villages” actually were, Toby implicitly asks who “villagers” were. And in this concern with people as subjects, as well as the manner in which people of all sorts construct identities both for them-
selves and for others, he is joined by the two authors whose essays follow his own. In Chapter Seven, on “The ‘Cantonese’ Whirlwind Brought by the Black Ships,” Tao Demin aggressively interrogates the late Tokugawa historical record for evidence of the identity of Luo Sen (Ra Shin), a Cantonese scholar and calligrapher hired on at Macao in 1854 as a record keeper and diplomatic facilitator for the famed American Mission to Japan of Commodore Matthew Perry. The shadowy subject of Tao’s study survives mainly in “virtual images” preserved in sketches, diaries, poetry, and memoirs. In the course of creating a composite portrait from these “virtual images,” Tao proposes to construct what he calls a “real image.”

What we learn from Tao’s thick description of Luo Sen is highly intriguing: that he was a latter-day *tarento* (pop star), sought out by samurai officials and common people alike, to pen calligraphic epigrams on blank fans; that he was highly respected for his classical learning both by the Americans he served and the Japanese with whom he interacted; and that he was something of a dissembler, who frequently blunted the curiosity of his interlocutors with inconsistent and disingenuous accountings of his motivations and his identity. In the end result, Tao constructs a composite portrait of Luo Sen that establishes his historical significance as an intermediary of sorts. His thick description of this mysteriously “diplomatic” figure—drawn from anecdotes in Luo Sen’s own memoirs, passages from S. Wells Williams’ diary, pictorial sketches of the subject and his times, and even poetry delivered to him by admiring Japanese officials—offers us a “real image” of Luo Sen as a kind of cultural facilitator.

Michael Auslin is likewise interested in teasing meaning out of images. In Chapter Eight, entitled “Terrorism and Treaty Port Relations,” he draws inspiration from Ron Toby’s meditations on early modern constructions of Japanese Self vis-à-vis Foreign Other. Reversing the gaze, so to speak, Auslin instead explores the construction of Japanese Other vis-à-vis Foreign Self. Carrying us forward to a historical juncture when such concerns were cast by circumstance into high relief—the moment of an epochal clash of cultures that saw fiercely chauvinistic samurai forcefully resist the threat of foreign barbarians—he examines how the circumstances influenced western images of the samurai.

Auslin concludes that westerners were traumatized by the “terror” of the early 1860s, during which a handful of sailors, diplomats, and civilians were either wounded or killed by marauding anti-western samurai. In an essay that implicitly links the ups-and-downs of diplomatic relations to the sensationalized accounts of these incidents in western (mainly British) newspapers, Auslin explores the creation of an orientalist stereotype: the samurai as “savage killer.” In sharp contrast to the benign accounts of Japan that earlier circulated in the west, produced by wayfarers such as Franz von Seibold, in the 1860s the British media stepped in to spin the gory accounts of shell-shocked witnesses and the sober editorializing of
outraged diplomats into new cultural stereotypes. “Over the course of a
decade into the late 1860s,” Auslin points out, “the Western image of the
samurai dramatically evolved. A mélange of visions gave way under the
threat of terror to a chilling portrait of a savage killer.” That some of
the same samurai were later “rehabilitated” as misguided idealists by the same
newspapers that had condemned them as bloodthirsty assassins—the key
source being detailed accounts of ritual suicide that stressed the samurai’s
fatalistic sense of honor—only reinforces Auslin’s point about the con-
struction of stereotypical images and the attendant essentialization of cul-
tural identities.

Chapter Nine also examines the construction of images, but in a much
more literal sense. Projecting forward in time—and across a massive terri-
torial divide—Yamaji Hidetoshi confronts a concern that Ron Toby has ex-
plicitly addressed in much of his recent work on early modern cultural im-
agery: the construction of the aesthetic subject. Yamaji’s essay on “Ameri-
can Photography in the Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century” is focused
on cartographic and photographic representations of the American West.
He turns his attention first to the early maps and photographs commis-
sioned by railway companies and mining interests committed to westward
expansion. Compellingly reading the photographs as imagistic expressions
of the march of Manifest Destiny in the settlement of the American West,
he goes on to contrast them to photographs taken later by conservationists
such as John Muir. While these photographs, too, monumentalized the
natural environment, observes Yamaji, they did so in a way that exalted
the natural grandeur of the American West.

Yamaji introduces us next to a hybrid genre of American Western pho-
tography that stressed both conservation and recreation. Tracing these pho-
tographs to an unusual “strategic alliance” between the exploiters of nature
(the railroad magnates) and the defenders of nature (the conservationists),
Yamaji suggests that what joined them was their mutual interest in the
creation and utilization of America’s newly-established national parks.
While he goes on to deconstruct these new images of the American West
—observing, among other things, that they erased any trace of the indige-
nous inhabitants—his fascination with the images is multifaceted. Not in-
terested solely in the construction of these images, but also in their diffu-
sion, he tracks their passage across the Pacific. Who could have predicted
that promotional images of the American West taken by Alfred A. Hart for
the Central Pacific Railroad would one day be collected by Kume Kuni-
take of the Iwakura diplomatic Mission from Japan? And how could we
possibly project, concludes Yamaji, that these images would later be used
to construct the Japanese image of the American West?

The final four essays in this collection pose explicit questions about the
construction of modern identities—national, regional, local, and ethnic, re-
spectively—and carry the theme of this volume into more contemporary
Introduction

In Chapter Ten, Jason G. Karlin examines the ways in which Meiji Japanese imagined and experienced their new nation. His essay on “The Tricentennial Celebration of Tokyo” transports us to the 1880s—to a point in Japan’s modern history when enthusiasm for the new had begun to give way to nostalgia for the old. Ushering us into the debate that surrounded planning for the Tricentennial Celebration of Tokyo—during which self-styled Edokko hijacked the event and made it into a showcase for their “oppositional memory” of the old city and the old national culture that it represented—Karlin identifies this commemoration as a site (and a rite) of resistance to the “oblivion of modern change” forced on Edo/Tokyo by the developmental scheme of bunmei-kaika (civilization and enlightenment). Following the theoretical lead of Michel de Certeau and Henri Lefebvre, Karlin explores the motives and methods through which these cultural recidivists invented Edo as “the essence of Japanese cultural identity.” Paradoxically, they employed a quintessentially modern method to mobilize “ordinary life” as a force against modern change: the invention of tradition. “No longer the domain of undifferentiated repetition and ‘taken-for-grantedness,’” Karlin observes, “everyday life has become the source of invention and mystification.”

Similarly fascinated by modern imaginings of the nation, Jeffrey E. Hanes shifts our attention from the construction of national identity to the preservation of regional identity in Chapter Eleven. His story begins, in a sense, where Karlin’s ends: with a fixed national “Japanese cultural identity” forged in Tokyo. In an essay entitled “Osaka vs. Tokyo: The Cultural Politics of Local Identity in Modern Japan,” Hanes explores the modern rivalry between Japan’s first and second cities: Tokyo and Osaka. He challenges the conventional wisdom that this rivalry was merely an extension of age-old cultural bickering between the Kansai and Kanto regions. Arguing that Osaka and Tokyo were not thrust into a binaristic rivalry until state-supported Tokyo centrism raised its ugly head in the Meiji era, he explores the cultural stereotyping that ensued from the national leadership’s assertion of Tokyo-focused national cultural hegemony.

Notwithstanding the hegemonic claims of modern Tokyo, however, Hanes contends that it still took an unpredictable historical event to create an undbridgeable cultural chasm between Japan’s first and second cities. Noting the reversal of fortune that occurred following the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923), as Tokyo fell suddenly to its knees and Osaka rose steadily to its feet, he examines the cultural panic that ensued. No sooner did Tokyo crash and burn than social gadflies began to worry aloud about a loss of cultural hegemony. In the most eloquently paranoid version of this dire projection, the essays of the social critic Ōya Sōichi, the consumerist metropolis of Osaka (“Japan’s America,” as he calls it) was stealthily undermining the cultural capital of Tokyo on its way to corrupting the values of an entire nation. Rather than mystifying this regional rivalry, as Ōya
does, Hanes seeks to historicize it. He urges us, in the final analysis, to seek the roots of cultural stereotyping in the “us/them” dichotomies that hardened so acutely in the modern era, as nation-states aggressively pursued cultural hegemonization and homogenization.

Quietly removing us from the volatile realm of modern Japanese identity crises, examined in the essays by Karlin and Hanes, Chapter Twelve explores the creative construction of local identity in contemporary Japan. In an essay entitled “Inventing Jazztowns and Internationalizing Local Identities in Japan,” E. Taylor Atkins focuses our attention on an extraordinary example of furusato-zukuri (native-place-making). Whereas most such initiatives “valorize native place” by inventing a nativist tradition based on the local culture, he observes, the port cities of Yokohama and Kobe have invented an international/native tradition by domesticating a foreign cultural form. In both cities, he contends, “local governments have used jazz to authenticate their local identities and their place in a national narrative of internationalization (kokusaika).” Through their creation of annual jazz festivals—occasions where we see the “appropriation of jazz as a local artifact”—Yokohama and Kobe have attempted to forge local unity by assuming a cosmopolitan civic identity. In order to achieve this objective, however, they have not merely domesticated jazz, but also sanitized it. “Purged of the turmoil and divisiveness [that] jazz actually inspired,” argues Atkins, the “jazztowns” of Yokohama are thus doubly paradoxical. Not only are they places where “being modern is the tradition,” they are places where the modern is traditionalized.

Chapter Thirteen, Kevin M. Doak’s meditation on “the State of Ethnicity in Modern Japan,” provides an appropriate denouement to this collection. Permitting us to hear echoes of his ten-year conversation with Ron Toby about ethnicity and identity, Doak begins with a searching observation about the thrust of Toby’s scholarship: “what emerges from any careful reading of Toby’s work is that representations of ethnic identity are far more than mere reflections of a supposed social reality and, in fact, are important strategies of cultural intervention that convey, implicitly and explicitly, specific political values.” Chewing on this idea briefly, even as he continues to engage Toby’s more recent work, Doak then reveals his central concern: the contemporary rise of ethnic nationalism.

Reminding us that ethnicity, like race, is “manufactured in modern discourse,” Doak invites us to question “the presumed connection between national and ethnic identity.” He introduces us to the subject through an extraordinary Japanese example of historical narrativization that “de-coupled” the nation and ethnicity in the interest of promoting Japanese imperialism. The text in question, a popular historical ethnography of The Nations of the Far East (Kyokutō no minzoku) written in 1916, paradoxically proposed that the Chinese embrace their ethnic identity. Since it is commonly assumed that powerful nation-states, not to mention imperial states,
sought to repress and suppress ethnic identity, the text offers us a fascinating opportunity to ponder the surprising complexity of ethnic nationalism in the Japanese imperial context. Sharply distinguishing East from West—most explicitly, by characterizing “the Orient as a field of ethnic nationhood in contrast to the Western concept of the territorial state”—the text urged the Chinese to throw off their doomed western-style state and to embrace their natural state of diverse ethnicity. But who could possibly step into this political void and prevent Asia from descending into chaos? Its obvious answer, of course, was Asia’s premier modern state: the Land of the Rising Sun.

Going on to link ideas voiced in this text to the frightening rise of fascist ethnology in the 1930s, Doak means for us as well to recognize a line of reasoning in these ideas that “prefigured more contemporary postmodern imaginations of diasporic ethnic identities that allegedly float above and across territorial states.” By projecting forward in this cautionary way from his historical subject, Doak reminds us that the lessons of the past resonate with the challenges of the present. It is our hope that readers will similarly find contemporary meaning in the historical essays that compose this collection.
Chapter 1

Sangoku Shisô and Japan’s Identity in the Buddhist Cosmology as Depicted in the *Konjaku monogatarishû*

Haruko Wakabayashi

I Introduction

As Thongchai Winichakul states in his book, *Siam Mapped*, the discourse of a modern nation usually presupposes a two-way identification: positively by some common nature, identity, or interests; and negatively by the differences with other nations.¹ Winichakul further argues the importance of a spatial perspective—the territoriality or in his words, the “geo-body,” that demarcates the positive as well as the negative—in the formation of such identities. The purpose of this paper is not to argue that national identity or territory in the modern sense existed in late Heian Japan. However, the author feels that Winichakul’s study that links geography and identity is helpful in understanding Japan’s awareness of its geographical place in a larger world and the impact it may have had on the early development of its identity. This was certainly the case, especially among those who adopted the Buddhist cosmology, which placed Tenjiku (India) at the center of human continent, Shintan (China) as one of the many middle and small sized countries, and Japan as one of the myriad tiny countries on the periphery.

This paper is an attempt to identify elements in early Buddhist cosmology that helped shape Japanese views of Self and Other, some of which were reinvented and integrated into nationalist ideologies in later periods. As source material, the author has selected stories from the *Konjaku monogatarishû* 今昔物語集, a collection of more than 1000 *setsuwa* 説話 compiled in the early 12th century.² These tales, especially those that re-

² For *Konjaku monogatarishû*, I have used the Iwanami *Nihon koten bungaku taikei* (vols. 22-26), and *Shin Nihon koten bungaku taikei* (vols. 33-37).
count the exchange between Japanese and foreign Others, reveal how Japan in its early times identified its place in the world, distinguished itself from other countries, and at times, revealed pride. Of particular interest is how actual contacts with the foreign countries, or the lack thereof, have helped shape Japan’s identity within the Buddhist paradigm.

II Sangoku shisō and the Buddhist Cosmology

For Japan, it was Buddhism that introduced a geographical map that included the larger international world beyond Korea and China, with which the Japanese had had direct contact.

This cosmology placed Mt. Sumeru at the center of the universe, surrounded by seven rings of oceans and mountains, and by the four continents in the four cardinal directions. Jambu-dvīpa, the continent in the south, was believed to be the human world, where the Buddha was born and where all the known countries are located. Jambu-dvīpa consists of five Tenjiku (Indian countries divided into North, East, South, West and Central regions) at its core, 16 big countries, five hundred middle-size countries, 10,000 small countries, and countless scattered grains of millet. The Gotenjiku-zu (Map of Five Tenjiku) of Hōryūji copied in 1364 is a map of the world based on this Buddhist cosmology. The diagram itself is, of course, not accurate in the modern scientific sense, but is a map that depicts “real” places that appear in Buddhist texts, biographies of Shakyamuni, travel records of Faxian and Xuanzang. Depicted in the egg-shaped continent are kingdoms of five Tenjiku at the center, a number of kingdoms in Central Asia, and Shintan, or the Great T’ang. Located amidst the ocean in the Northeast is Japan (labeled Shikoku and Kyūkoku), as one of the millet countries that lie beyond the boundaries of the continent. The map is just one example that gives a picture of Japan’s geographic location in the Buddhist context.

From such a view of the world, the Japanese (whose minds functioned within the above Buddhist paradigm), by the ninth century, developed their own interpretation of the cosmology, referred to as the sangoku shisō 三国思想. According to the sangoku shisō, the world was divided into three major countries—India, in which Sakyamuni Buddha was born, China, to which Buddhism was transmitted, and Japan, where Buddhism continued


4. Gotenjiku-zu is reproduced in Kokuhô Hôryûjiten (a catalogue for an exhibition held at the Tokyo National Museum, Nara National Museum, etc. in 1994), p.149
to thrive. This *sangoku shisō* embodied two extreme views of Japan as Self and China and India as Other: (1) India and China are two great central civilizations of the world, whereas Japan is a small, peripheral country. In other words, Japan recognized itself as being marginal. (2) At the same time, however, it was also commonly believed that Buddhism had declined in both India and China, whereas it was still thriving in Japan. Buddhism gradually progressed to the east, that is, until it reached its final destiny, Japan (*Bukkyō tōzen* 仏教東漸). In terms of the prosperity of Buddhist teachings, therefore, Japan was the most successful. Furthermore, we must note that by limiting the central countries to three, many countries that were excluded from this cosmology, the most significant being Korea (it is totally invisible in the *Gotenjiku-zu*, for example).

### III Tales from *Konjaku monogatarishū*

The *Konjaku monogatarishū* is divided into three sections, Tenjiku (India), Shintan (China), and Honchô (Japan), each subdivided into Buddhist tales and secular tales, a division clearly based on the above *sangoku shisō*. Tales about Korea and other Foreign Lands are also included, though they do not constitute an independent section. In the following pages, I wish to examine how Self and Other are portrayed in some of the stories contained in the *Konjaku monogatarishū*, and how they reveal Japanese attitudes toward Foreign Others.

**INDIA**

Let us begin with the core county, India, referred to as Tenjiku. In fact, stories dealing with India are mostly based on tales that were borrowed from already existing sutras and Chinese writings. Many discuss the founder, Sakyamuni’s life and his miracles. Others have also been taken from Xuanzang’s “Record of the Western Regions” (*Da Tang Xiyi-jì* 大唐西域記). Yet since there were very few actual contacts with people from Tenjiku (which also included those from Southeast Asia), and no Japanese ever saw Tenjiku, reflected in these stories is the Japanese notion of India that remained an imaginary and legendary world. However, some of the stories that are told in this section are believed to have helped shape Japan’s perceptions of the “other world” beyond the Buddhist boundaries. One such example is the story of Sōkara who landed on what would later become Sri Lanka, which was then inhabited by man-eating de-

monesses (5-1). Sōkara was an Indian merchant who, along with a group of merchants, landed on the island of rasetsu 罗刹, the man-eating demons. Initially, the men were fooled by these demons, who appeared as beautiful women, until one day, the men found skulls and flesh of other men who had been eaten by them previously. Having realized the true identity of these women, Sōkara and the merchants tried to escape from the island, and managed to do so with the help of Bodhisattva Kannon. After a successful return to India, Sōkara led a military expedition to the island, conquered the demons, and became the king of the island.6

It is perhaps worth noting that this land said to have been conquered by Sōkara is depicted in one of the earliest surviving maps of Japan, known as the “Gyōki-style” map (Gyōki-shiki Nihonzu 行基式日本図).7 The oldest copy of the Western half of this map, dated early fourteenth century, is presently in the Kanazawa Bunko, Japan, according to this map, is illustrated in the shape of a single vajra (dokko 钵鍬), its border marked by a narrow strip that looks like a serpent/dragon’s body, and is surrounded by bodies of foreign lands such as T’ang, Koryo, and Ryûkyû. Interestingly enough, one of these foreign lands is identified as the “Land of Rasetsu” (Rasetsu-koku 罗刹国), and described as a land inhabited by women, where no visitor ever returns alive. This must refer to the above-mentioned island of Sōkara, or Sri Lanka. Although the Japanese has never seen this island, they were aware of its “existence” as the island in the southern seas, and therefore, placed it as the land that marked the southern border of the map. This is just one example of how literary works such as the Da Tang Xiyi-ji, read in its original form as well as in Japanese form as in the Konjaku monogatarishû, had influenced the Japanese view of the world beyond their actual reach.

CHINA

Even though Japanese diplomatic missions officially ended in the 9th century, the stories in the Shintan section reveal the more direct nature of contact between China and Japan, in contrast to the legendary and mythic world described in the Tenjiku section. Especially notable are the Buddhist priests who went to China to study Buddhism. In Konjaku monogatarishû, we find a number of stories about the experiences of Japanese monks in China.

One such example is Dōshō 道照 (629-700), founder of the Hossō sect in Japan. He went to China in 653 as a member of an embassy, and became a student of the famed monk Xuanzang 玄奘, not returning to Japan

6. NKBT 22, pp. 338-343. This story, originally contained in the Da Tang Xiyi-ji, also appears in the Uji shai monogatari (9) in NKBT 27, pp. 210-6.
7. For a detailed analysis of the Gyōki-style map, see Kuroda, pp. 3-78.
An interesting episode appears in chapter eleven of the *Konjaku monogatarishû* (11-4). The story takes place as Dôshô arrives at Xuanzang’s door.

Xuanzang immediately invited him in, went out to greet him, and began to talk to him as though they were old acquaintances. Dôshô stayed and studied under Xuanzang for one year, and did extremely well. One day, other students of Xuanzang, being envious of Dôshô, said to their master, “there are a number of students in this country, all of whom are with great virtue. However, the great master never respects us, but would personally welcome the Japanese priest. This, we cannot understand. Even though the Japanese priest may be good, he is a man of the small country (小国). How can he compare to the people of this country?” To this, Xuanzang responded, You should all go to the Japanese priest’s chamber in the evening, and secretly look into his room. Only after then, you may speak ill or highly of him.” A couple of his students did as told. They looked into Dôshô’s room one evening and found him reading the sutras. When they looked more carefully, they could see a bright light coming out of his mouth. When the students reported to the master, the master said, “You certainly are fools. You did not understand why I would show respect to him. You have no wisdom.” The students finally realized that Dôshô was a deity incarnate and so was Xuanzang, who could tell that he was special.

One thing to notice in the above passage is the use of the expression “small country” used by the Chinese disciples to refer to Japan. The expression suggests that the Japanese acknowledged the smallness of their country, and were aware of the civilized (and arrogant) Chinese who looked down upon them. Yet the twist in this tale is that, nevertheless, the Japanese priest is the more talented and venerable, while the disciples are mere fools who could not perceive that.

Such a storyline, indeed, is not new or unique to this tale. The episode resembles Kûkai’s own account of his first encounter with his master, Huiguo. As soon as Huiguo saw Kûkai, he smiled and told him that he knew that Kûkai would come, and that he had been waiting for him as the person to whom he could transmit the teachings. Both episodes suggest that the true line of Buddhism has been transmitted to Japan, supporting the earlier-mentioned notion of the eastward transmission of Buddhism. In the case of Kûkai, he claimed that his master, Huiguo, had studied under an Indian priest, hence establishing a direct lineage from India. Dôshô’s master, Xuanzang, too, is famous for his travels to India, and Dôshô had inherited directly the teachings of Buddhism from India via China.

Another renowned priest who studied in China is Jakushô 寂照 (?-1034). His dates suggest that he lived not far from the time *Konjaku monogatarishû*.  

Tarishû was written. Jakushô studied Tendai and esoteric Buddhism under Genshin and Ningai. Then he went to China in 1003 and entered the capital, Kaifeng, the following year. There, he saw the Emperor, responded to his questions regarding Japan, and received the purple robe and the title Enzû Daishi. He lived in Wumen Temple in Suzhou and died in Gangzhou without ever returning to Japan.

There are two episodes about Jakushô in the Konjaku monogatarishû that are of interest to the present topic. The first is about Jakushô finding out that his old friend, Seihan, has been reborn as a prince in China. He finds this out when he is invited to the palace of the Chinese Emperor. The prince, four or five years of age, comes up to Jakushô and whispers to him “in his own language” that he is a reincarnation of Seihan, and has been reborn in China because there were many people there that need his merits. The story emphasizes the eminence of a Japanese priest whom even the Chinese people revered. Also noteworthy is a clear notion of “our” language versus the “other” language. As we will see later, intelligible language was a key element of advanced civilization.

Moving on to the second story (19-2):

While in China, the Emperor summoned Jakushô along with the holy men of China and suggested that each person fly a bowl to receive offerings. The Emperor’s true intention was to test Jakushô who had come from Japan (日本の寛昭). One by one, the Chinese priests flew their bowls and finally, it was Jakushô’s turn. However, Jakushô had never learned this particular rite. He had heard of those who could practice it in ancient Japan, yet because of the Final Age, people have forgotten it. He then prays, “Three treasures of my country (本国), please help me. If I cannot fly the bowl, it would bring a terrible shame on my country. (本国の為に極めて恥も).” The bowl in front of Jakushô then suddenly began to turn like a top and flew in the air, faster than any other bowl, and returned to Jakushô with the offerings. The Emperor, ministers and the hundred officials were all deeply impressed and venerated Jakushô.

Expressions like “shame on my country” reflect pride and vanity as a representative of one’s own country. Moreover, it is interesting that Jakushô prays to the “three treasures,” specifically defined “Hongoku no” (of my country), suggesting that there is a clear distinction between the protective power of Buddhism in respective countries. If this story were retold in the Kamakura period, Jakushô most certainly would have prayed to the kami of Japan instead of the Buddhist “three treasures.” This, as I will discuss in my concluding remarks, is the very limit of Buddhist-oriented sangoku shisô—it cannot produce a uniquely Japanese identity.

The story of the flying bowl reminds us of Shigisan engi emaki 信貴山縁起絵巻, but the story itself is more similar to Kibi Daizin nittô emaki 吉備大臣入唐絵巻 (12th-13th century scroll; the story also appears in Godan-shô 江談抄), which is about Kibi no Makibi 吉備真備, a scholar-official
who was sent to China in 717. According to the scroll, he is confined to a tower immediately upon arrival by the Chinese ministers who fear his talents. Three times, the Emperor and his ministers test him, but with the help of an oni, who is actually the spirit of Abe no Nakamaro, who had earlier died in the tower, he is able to pass the tests and impress the Chinese emperor and his ministers. Both the Kibi Daijin and Jakushō stories reveal the extremely complex nature of Japanese identity vis-à-vis China: an awareness of being small and inferior in knowledge and skills, yet at the same time, the belief that its spiritual power exceeds that of the Chinese, and therefore allows them to overcome the handicap. Similar patterns can be found in later shinkoku shisō 神国思想 (especially in the belief in the Divine Wind that repelled the invading Mongols), and in the concept of wakon kansai 和魂漢才 (Japanese spirit, Chinese knowledge), later modified to wakon yōsai 和魂洋才.

KOREA

The Japanese attitude toward Korea was quite different from that toward China. Although Korea was the country that had actually introduced Buddhism to Japan, none of the tales reflect the kind of reverence held towards China. Instead, many tales in Konjaku monogatarishû reveal the more secular aspects of the Korea-Japan relationship. Notable is a number of episodes that refer to the historic battle against Silla in the 660’s, when Japan sent troops to aid Paekche, which was, in the end, destroyed by the joint forces of Silla and T’ang. There are several tales that recount Japanese priests and soldiers who had been sent to aid Paekche, became captives of T’ang, or escaped the battle, and safely returned to Japan by praying to Kannon and other bodhisattvas.

Others also describe the situation in Koguryo during its battles against Silla and T’ang, also in the seventh century. One such example is about the priest Gyōzen 行善 who was sent to Koguryo to “study and spread” Buddhism (16-1). However, Koguryo was conquered by T’ang during his stay. As Gyōzen was trying to escape from the chaotic capital, he came across a big river. There were no boats, and the bridges had all been destroyed. All he could do was pray to Kannon. Then, all of a sudden, an old man (who in fact is a manifestation of Kannon) appeared with a boat and told him to cross the river on the boat. Thinking that there is no merit in staying in Koguryo, he decided to go to T’ang. There, he continued studying Buddhism, and made a statue of Kannon. The Emperor of T’ang, hearing about this miracle of Kannon, summoned Gyōzen and venerated him. Gyōzen finally returned to Japan in 718.

These stories recount Japan’s alliance with the Korean kingdoms and its
experiences in the battles. Korea is presented as a country that relied on Japanese aid as its kingdoms were being destroyed in one battle or another. Another story, which takes place in the mid-ninth century, represents a more tense situation between Japan and Korea (14-45):

During the reign of Emperor Montoku 文徳天皇 (850-858), Silla denied His Majesty’s orders. The ministers held a meeting and said, “That country agreed to serve our dynasty at the time of Emperor .... It is not good that they deny the orders. We shall immediately send a punitive expedition to Silla.” Fujiwara no Toshihito was thus chosen to lead the troops.

Silla had no clue of what was happening. However, there were a number of strange phenomena in the country, which were interpreted as an omen of a battle against a foreign country. The King and ministers of the country held a meeting and decided to ask for the help of the Three Treasures. They thus invited the Chinese priest Fachuan, student of Huiguo, the master of esoteric rituals, to perform the rituals for conquest.

During this time, Chishô Daishi 智証大師 of Miidera happened to be in Sung, studying Shingon under Fachuan. He, too, went to Silla with his master, and without knowing that the ritual for conquest was against his own country, he performed the ritual. After seven days, blood flowed on the ritual platform. Knowing that the ritual had succeeded, the priests returned to Sung.

Meanwhile, as Toshihito was preparing to leave the country, he fell ill. Then, he suddenly rose and pulled his sword out in the air, danced about with his sword, and died. The Court thus gave up the plan to send troops to Silla. It was only after Chishô returned to Japan that people knew that it was because of his ritual that the general had died.

Similar stories are found in Uchigikishû 打開集 and Kojidan 古事談, although in both cases, the incident takes place during the reign of Emperor Uda 宇多天皇 (867-931), and not Montoku. According to these stories, the conquest of Silla could be prevented only because Chishô, the Japanese priest, unknowingly performed the ritual to subdue the great general. This plot itself is quite ironic. Yet what is more compelling is the depiction of tension between Silla and Japan.

Although there is no historical record that an expedition against Silla was planned during the reigns of Montoku or Uda, according to Sandai jitsuroku 三代実録, and the recently published Taigai kankeishi sôgô nenpyô 対外関係史総合年表, there was a time during the reign of Montoku’s son, Seiwa 清和 (850-880), when the Court seriously feared the invasion of Silla, strengthened its defense, and prayed to repel the Silla sea forces (kai-zoku 海賊).

Noteworthy, too, is the minister’s statement that Silla had earlier agreed

to serve Japan, and that Japan was sending a punitive expedition for not obeying the Emperor’s orders. There is, of course, no historical record that Silla was subjugated by Japan. However, according to the well-known tale of Empress Jingû and her conquest of the three kingdoms of Korea, which first appears in the *Nihon shoki* 日本書紀 and *Kojiki* 古事記, the Korean kingdoms did pledge in the third century to become tributaries to Japan. Later medieval text, *Hachiman gudokun* 八幡愚童訓, even claims that the Korean kings promised to become dogs. This legend has been retold over and over again to justify Japanese invasion of, or even ascendancy over Korea.

In sum, there is much greater sense of rivalry and disdain toward Korea than toward China or India. This certainly is a reflection of immediate interaction and competition for power in the region, and is the very attitude that was carried on to the modern imperialist era.

**BARBARIC OTHERS**

Regardless of it’s domineering attitude, Japan still represented Korea as a country that is as equally civilized as Japan. However, there are many other lands that are described as “barbaric” in the *Konjaku monogatarishû*. In one story, merchants from Kyushu stop over on an unknown island, and later are told that the island is called Torashima (Cheju Island, off the Korean Peninsula in East China Sea), and that the inhabitants there are cannibals (31-12). Ryûkyû, too, is described in as an island of cannibals (11-13). The inhabitants of these barbaric islands were also often deformed or uncultivated. An extraordinarily tall man lived on an island where the people of Sado stopped (31-16); the men were prohibited from landing, and were sent back to the sea with some provisions. People who saw the naked, headless corpse of a giant that was washed in from the sea onto the bay of Hitachi rumored that it must be the body of a female *Asura* (31-17). Abe no Yoshitoki who found himself in northern Kokoku saw people who were chattering away nonsensical words (31-11). Hence the Japanese believed that amidst the distant seas existed barbaric islands inhabited by non-humans or uncivilized people.

Such a tradition of dehumanizing the foreign Other existed in pre-Buddhist Japan, as represented in the notion of *hare* and *kegare* (purity and pollution) prevalent during the Heian period. Demons often appeared in areas deserted by people, such as old, uninhabited huts in the mountain, or at certain symbolic spots such as bridges, rivers, and mountains, which were believed to be the boundary (*kyôkai* 境界) between this world and the other world. Once in a while, they would appear in the capital, within the limits of the boundary and bring pollution and disease to the capital. In order to avoid such impurities from polluting the imperial realm, it was important that the court hold annual purification ceremonies where the Emperor could symbolically drive away all impurities (i.e. evil spirits) from
his realm. Beyond the boundaries of his realm, therefore, existed the Other World (ikai 延界), and it was within this Other World that demons were contained.

However, the notion of demonic other is also an element found in Buddhist cosmology, as noted earlier in the legend of Sokara in the Tenjiku section. The story reveals two aspects of the Buddhist view of the world. First, although China and India (and Korea, to a certain extent) are foreign countries, since they are part of the Buddhist world, they are not completely alien. The Chinese and Indian people are therefore depicted as humans, sharing the common culture and level of civilization with the Japanese. However, there are those who do not belong to this sphere, and those Others often portrayed as barbaric demons. Second, the story of Sokara carries a strong Buddhist tradition that depicts non-Buddhists as demons. In Buddhist tradition, Hindu gods and other anti- or non-Buddhist elements were frequently represented as demons, and there are countless tales of these demons’ defeat by bodhisattvas and priests, as well as their conversion to Buddhism. The story of Sokara, too, is about the conquest of demons with the support of the bodhisattva Kannon, and thereby illustrates the expansion of the Buddhist world.

The hare/kegare view of the world and the Buddhist view were two very different perceptions of Japan’s Self and Other. One was exclusive, stressing the need to drive out the impure Other, leaving Japan with a sense of racial purity and superiority. The world was basically divided into two—Self and Other—and there was a very limited notion of Foreign. The Buddhist view, represented by sangoku shisō, on the other hand, contained in its view a larger world and the enthusiasm to conquer the Other and by so doing, expand the Buddhist world. In both views, Others who did not belong were symbolically represented as demonic; however, when we compare the two, the Buddhist cosmology contains a much more concrete and interactive experience of the Foreign. In that sense, the presence of the demonic Foreign is naturally stronger in the Buddhist tradition.

BUKKYÔ TÔZEN, THE EASTWARD PROGRESSION OF BUDDHISM

It is within this Buddhist cosmology that Japan, by the twelfth century, begins to show signs of national pride. This can be seen in one of the key concepts that underlies the structure of Konjaku monogatarishû, “Bukkyô tôzen” (仏教東漸) or the eastward progression of Buddhism. This concept defined the historical development of Buddhism within the spatial framework of sangoku shisō. In other words, Buddhism was progressing in an

11. This consciousness of purity and pollution in relation to the Court and the world outside of the boundaries has been discussed in Itô Kiyoshi, Nihon chûsei no ôken to ken’i (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1993), pp. 17-68, and Murai Shosuke, Ajia no naka no chûsei Nihon, pp. 108-142.
eastward direction, beginning with India, where Sakyamuni Buddha was born, moving on to China, where it developed, and finally, was brought to Japan, where it continues to flourish. What is important here is that this concept not only describes the transmission of Buddhism, but also contains the notion that Buddhism had deteriorated in both India and China as its center gradually shifted eastwards, until it finally reached Japan. Two stories in chapter 20 are particularly representative of this attitude:

The first is a story about a tengu from India. As he was flying from India to China, he heard a stream of water in the sea chanting a Buddhist phrase on impermanence. Curious to know why the water is chanting the holy words, the tengu becomes determined to find out its origins and stop it. He reaches China, but the water continues to chant, so he passes China, crosses over the sea, and through Tsukushi (Kyushu), reaches the mouth of Yodo River in Japan. From there, passing through Uji River, he reaches Lake Biwa, as the chanting grows louder and louder. Finally, he gets to a river that flows from Yokawa of Mt. Hiei, over which stands the Four Diva Kings and a number of other deities protecting the water. The tengu asks one of the lesser deities why the water is chanting the holy words, the deity replies that this river is located below the latrine used by priests of Mt. Hiei. That is why even the water chants the holy words. “If even the water from the latrine chants the holy words, how venerable must the priests of this mountain be!” The tengu immediately repented his evil thought of stopping the water, and was reborn as the priest Myôgu in his next life.

Tengu are demonic creatures that appear in different forms (usually half-bird and half-human figure, or in the form of a kite) in medieval Japanese literature and painting. In Konjaku monogatarishû, they are presented as symbols of ma, or the Buddhist concept of evil, which defies Buddhism. This story, which is the first of the twelve stories in chapter twenty featuring tengu, recounts the arrival of ma, the antithesis of Buddhism, along with the introduction of Buddhism. Ma, as represented by tengu, naturally follows the same path that Buddhism took—that is, starting from India, moving on to China, then to Japan—causing its decline in respective countries. When it reaches Japan, however, it is conquered by Buddhism, as represented by Mt. Hiei, the headquarters of Tendai Buddhism in Japan.

The second story in chapter twenty is about a tengu from China named Chira Yôju who comes to Japan. He speaks to the Japanese tengu, “there are many priests in China of great evil deeds (i.e. good deed; “evil” from the tengu’s point of view), but there is none that I could not seize. I therefore came to this country to challenge the priests here.” The Japanese tengu are elated, and take the Chinese tengu to Mt. Hiei. The Chinese

tengu, disguised as an old priest, awaits by the stone stupa on Mt. Hiei to challenge the priests; however, he is completely defeated by the Tendai priests Yokyō, Jinzen, and Ryōgen. The Japanese tengu, seeing this, says, “We brought you here because we believed that you, being a tengu from the big country, should be able to easily win the people of this small country, but poor fellow, you have broken your hip bone,” so saying, he takes him to the hot springs, then sends him home.

The above story may be interpreted as a reflection of a more critical and even superior attitude of the Japanese of the twelfth century towards China, to which they had earlier held great respect. This is the period when Japan gradually began developing a sense of national identity, and even superiority over the other two countries. Such sentiments arise from the realization of the collapse of the subsequent dynasties in China, and from the fact that Buddhism had declined both in India and in China, whereas it was still flourishing in Japan. Hence, the Chinese tengu could defeat the priests in his own country, but not in Japan.13

IV Conclusion

In sum, the world as illustrated in the Konjaku monogatari shū is divided into several levels: (1) First, at the core are the three countries, India, China and Japan, with Japan being identified as a small country on the periphery (zokusan hendo or hendo no shōkoku). (2) Korea, though the country that introduced Buddhism to Japan, is not included among the central kingdoms. It was excluded from the center so that Japan could take the secondary place after China. At the same time, however, it is not completely removed from the Buddhist world, and is often portrayed as a country that shared the common culture and level of civilization of the other three countries. (3) Then, on the outskirts of the Buddhist world are the uncivilized, non-Buddhist lands, believed to be inhabited by demons. (4) Finally, although I did not have the time to discuss it today, there are the Other Worlds in this Buddhist cosmology, which include the non-human world of Hells, the Dragon Palace, and the Heavens.

How, then, did the Japanese construct their positive and negative identities within the above worldview? Although physical, territorial boundaries were yet to be fixed, there was a clear sense of boundaries between existing states—terms such as hongoku and Nihon suggest that distinctions

13. This story about the Chinese tengu is an interesting piece of work in examining the early forms of Japanese nationalism. The same story appears in a narrative scroll form as Zegaibō ekotoba in the early fourteenth century, just decades away from the attempted Mongol invasions, and in the mid-sixteenth century as a nō theatrical drama, “Zegai.” Zegaibō ekotoba is reproduced in vol. 27 of Shinshū enuki-mononenshū (Kadokawa shoten, 1978), and “Zegai” is in Yōkyoku taikan, vol. 3 (Meiji shoin, 1931), pp. 1595-1608.
were made between one’s own country and the others, and between civilized and barbaric lands. Furthermore, the distinctions were not only territorial, but cultural as well. Japan, as much as other countries, is described as having its own language, history, and protective (Buddhist) powers. The tales also reveal awareness of other countries with their own culture and knowledge (or in the case of the barbaric, with no culture and knowledge) that viewed Japan as their inferior, peer, or rival. These identities were strengthened especially when one represented one’s own country or faced trials in a foreign land, or was reminded of memories of war.

However, these sentiments were arranged within the framework of sangoku shisô, or the Japanized Buddhist cosmology of the Konjaku monogatari shû. On the one hand, imported Buddhist cosmology with India at its center imposed on Japan the fact that Japan was a small and peripheral country. This, indeed, was not difficult to admit, since the Japanese already knew of and had contacts with much more advanced civilizations like China, and in Konjaku, Japan is frequently referred to as the shôkoku (small country). At the same time, Japan reframed its own global position by inventing its own version of the cosmology, sangoku shisô, which defined itself to be one of the three major Buddhist countries, while Korea and other numerous Buddhist countries were dismissed. Furthermore, the theory stressed that the history of Buddhism proceeded eastward, where Japan was its final destination. Such views of Self allowed the Japanese to maintain their pride as a major Buddhist civilization.

I must also point to the limits of sangoku shisô as nationalist ideology. After all, this worldview is confined within a Buddhist universe. There is, therefore, no discussion of a distinctly Japanese character or religion. The competition, after all, is contained within the realm of Buddhist cosmology, and therefore, shows no sign of Japan’s unique cultural or religious identity. Instead, much emphasis is placed on its superiority within the paradigm of civilization (i.e. Buddhism) established by the countries that were once overbearing. In other words, the triumph depends on how much Japan could identify itself with China and India, and prevail in the mastery of their culture. In this sense, as much as the Japanese identified themselves with Japan, they, in many cases, presented themselves as members of the larger, Buddhist community.

Although replaced by ideologies such as shinkoku shisô, or by bankoku shisô in the sixteenth century, as Ronald Toby argues, in many ways, sangoku shisô remained prevalent into the modern period. The foundations of Japan’s nationalist sentiment have been constructed upon the notion of its being a peripheral land, and upon the fact that nevertheless, it could overcome its peripherality and rise above the greater nations. In the modern period, India and China were replaced by the great Western nations. This transition is clearly marked in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s An Outline of the Theory of Civilization, which Fukuzawa begins by discussing the once great
civilizations of India and China that had by then declined in contrast to the successful civilizations of the West. Fukuzawa also begins his “Datsuron” by stating that with the development of worldwide transportation, the ways of Western civilization have gradually moved eastward (東に漸し), and all places, grasses and trees, have bent before this wind. He also speaks of bunmei tōzen (文明東漸). In other words, Buddhism or Indian/Chinese ways have now been replaced by Western ways.\(^{14}\)

The notion of the “smallness” of Japan also remains fundamental to modern nationalism. Heroes of folk literature of later periods were often young boys, small in size, who could defeat giant ogres that possessed great power. Such a plot in itself may not be uniquely Japanese. However, in modern nationalist discourse, these small heroes were the ones that represented Japan. The tale of Momotarō, which became extremely popular during World War II, is one example. In wartime propaganda films, the peach boy Momotarō represented sacred Japan, while the vicious demons, much larger in size, symbolized the American and British enemies.\(^{15}\) The heroes in Japanese tradition have found their virtues in their “smallness,” yet defeating the “grandeur” through their righteous, spiritual power. Despite the rise of the unique Shinkoku shisō nationalism, the core elements that constituted earlier sangoku shisō were never eliminated, and continued to influence the Japanese view of the world in two respects—that Japan was small and peripheral, yet at the same time, was the destination of civilizations that progressed in an eastward direction.

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14. See, for example, Chapter I Part 2, “Seiyō no bunmei o mokuteki to suru koto” in Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no gairyaku (Iwanami bunko, 1962) [English translation by David A. Dilworth and Cameron Hurst (Sophia University, 1973)] pp. 25-56.
Chapter 2

Foreign Affairs and Frontiers in Early Modern Japan: A Historiographical Essay

Brett L. Walker

I Introduction

When the Edo shogunate implemented maritime prohibitions (kaikin) in the 1630s, it marked the beginning of a historical era wherein the shoguns strictly regulated Japan’s contact with the outside world. In pre-Meiji Japanese history, it represented one of the few moments when such hegemons, whether in Kyoto, Kamakura or, in this case, Edo, were powerful enough to usurp the prerogatives of coastal domains in Kyushu or such port cities as Sakai, and channel foreign contact through the center. The Tokugawa shoguns prohibited local state and nonstate interests from formulating independent foreign agendas, sponsoring religious exchange, and conducting overseas trade without authorization. As the new historiography argues, it was a powerful assertion of the realmwide legitimacy of the new regime in Edo, as well as an obvious birthplace of an early “national” consciousness among many Japanese and a critical element in the formation of what historians call Japan’s early modern period, or kinsei. In many respects, the pioneering scholarship of Ronald Toby paved the way for this new historiography on early modern Japan’s foreign affairs and frontiers, and so this essay serves as testimony to his signal contribution to Japanese studies.

Simply, this essay attempts to create an updated narrative of early modern Japan’s foreign relations and frontier experiences, one that incorporates previously neglected topics and highlights the new directions explored by this vibrant subfield of Japanese studies. This narrative suggests that the

selective exclusion of certain foreigners from Japanese soil should be viewed as a proactive engagement of the outside world, one which required a fairly sophisticated understanding of the religions and cultures of trading partners and the implications of exchange with them. That is to say, the Edo shogunate actively sought to authorize or prohibit certain domains from conducting trade unilaterally, to debrief repatriated individuals, to craft diplomatic ceremonies so that they bolstered Tokugawa authority, to defend borderlands from invasions and uprisings, and to rigidly scrutinize the implications of the importation of new technologies and ideologies from around the globe. The Edo shogunate’s stance toward the outside world, as this narrative portrays it, was a loosely knit fabric of political and cultural assumptions about foreign affairs and prejudices about the outside world, not to mention real fears of events unfolding in Asia, fears motivated by the Jurchen-Tartar unification wars, the Manchu conquest of Ming China, Ainu insurrection, and European expansion. In short, Edo shoguns wove together the threads of military violence, ideological containment, political legitimacy, identity formation, cultural arrogance, individual paranoia, and the economics of foreign trade when crafting their approach to dealing with the outside world.

In the first section, entitled “Kultur Politik,” I draw on the scholarship of Jurgis Elisonas, Herman Ooms, and others to paint a portrait of Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea and China. Even though a gruesome failure, Hideyoshi’s invasion needs to be viewed within the context of the process of state consolidation and border formation in the beginning decades of the early modern period. Second, in “Diplomacy,” I explore the pioneering work of Ronald Toby, as well as Gregory Smits and others, to illustrate how the Tokugawa regime used diplomacy to legitimize its authority both at home and abroad. Third, in “Diplomatic Sham,” I look briefly at the critique of Toby’s work articulated by Jurgis Elisonas in The Cambridge History of Japan, and then, in an attempt to mediate this dispute, I project both Toby’s and Elisonas’ main arguments against the backdrop of observations made by Engelbert Kaempfer in the seventeenth century. In the fourth section, “Others,” I survey new research on the birth of an early modern identity for Japanese, one which positioned foreign peoples as “others” in the creation of ethnic boundaries, political borders, and notions of a Japanese “self.” In this context, as Toby, David Howell, and Tessa Morris-Suzuki argue, foreign “others” served to bolster a sense of a Japanese “self” in an otherwise fragmented political and social environment where most Nihonjin (a term that people of the early modern period seldom used outside discussions of things foreign) delineated identities along patrilineal, domainal, regional, or status lines. Under the Edo shogunate, it was in the realm of foreign contact that the dominant ethnic group of the present-day Japanese Archipelago, the people we view as “Japanese,” best understood themselves to be just that, Nihonjin.
The fifth section, entitled “People,” looks at multiethnic interaction within the Japanese Archipelago’s most ambiguous spaces. As Smits demonstrates, Ryukyu Islanders possessed more agency in their own cultural assimilation than previously thought. In a fascinating twist, even following the invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Satsuma and Edo officials preserved Ryukyuan foreignness, or place as “other,” in order to keep trade with China alive, while at the same time Ryukyuan ideologues, such as Sai On, emulated Japan, a country they believed to be exemplary in the Confucian world. To the north, the intensification of trade between Ainu and Matsumae domain led to the emergence of such charismatic chiefs as Shakushain, who, in 1669, waged a bloody war against Japanese after forging a pan-Ainu alliance to expel Japanese from the southern tip of the Oshima Peninsula. And, at Deshima, the small islet near Nagasaki, the experiences of Engelbert Kaempfer support the notion that Japan, because of the shogunate’s fear of Christianity, had closed its doors, particularly at the level of interpersonal interaction, during the early modern period. I argue that these three figures caution against using foreigners as simply “others” either in a cultural anthropological sense or to generalize about Japan’s relationship with all foreigners. That is to say, just as Shakushain fought against what he viewed as an expanding Japan to the north, Kaempfer was confronted by an inward looking and, not to put too fine a point on it, paranoid society, one which basically staged diplomatic conduct in the name of domestic politics.

The sixth section, called “Place,” investigates the interdependency of Japan’s domestic economy, overseas commerce, and the ecology. As Toby, Howell, and Robert Innes argue, Tokugawa foreign relations had an important impact on the domestic economy by fueling market growth, and hence sparking technological innovations in mining, fishery development, and other industries. In the case of Ezo, Japanese markets and Matsumae trade policy led to regional depletions of deer numbers in Ezo and undermined the ability of Ainu to subsist independently. The economic intrusion into Ezo also witnessed the introduction of deadly contagions—as European advancement did in “virgin soil” populations around the world in the form of what Alfred Crosby calls “ecological imperialism”2—exposing the implications of Japan’s move into new epidemiological terrain.

As this introduction suggests, a fair amount has been written on Japanese early modern foreign relations and frontiers in recent years, and so not all of it can be discussed in this essay. I focus mainly on historical writings that I see as pushing the boundaries of this subfield, writings that have reshaped the ways we look at the early modern period in particular.

and Japan in general.

II Kultur Politik

Mary Elizabeth Berry argues in her political biography *Hideyoshi* that in the closing years of the sixteenth century, the second great unifier crafted what she refers to as a “federal” state from the remnants of the late medieval polity. Through a variety of political and personal devises, Hideyoshi linked powerful warring states lords (*sengoku daimyô*), rulers who only decades before had viewed their domains as semi-independent states (*kokka*), to the center in Kyoto, and thereby extended his authority over the traditional provinces of the realm. By the 1590s, Hideyoshi extended this vision of unification even further, and orchestrated the failed invasion of Korea and Ming China. To contextualize this invasion, we must start by looking briefly at the late medieval period. This fact might seem obvious to those who study pre-modern Japan. But all too often, the early modern period serves as a kind of preface to discussions of Japan’s modern period—an epochal “straw man” positioned to show just how fast Japan modernized and industrialized in the late nineteenth century—when the birth of the Edo shogunate also represented the termination of the chaotic medieval period and the emergence of a more perfected form of feudalism. The invasion of Korea (as cruel and ill-fated as it was) was an offshoot of these political developments.

At the outset, there was no “Christian century” in Japan at this time. With only about 130,000 converts in 1579, the height of missionary activity and only eight years before the first expulsion edicts issued by Hideyoshi, what C. R. Boxer saw as the “Christian century” was in fact the terminal decades of the Era of the Warring States and the primordial beginnings of early modernity in Japan. What Boxer exposed was that the late medieval period witnessed intense spiritual exploration by many Japanese, no doubt a response to endemic warfare and the “culture of lawlessness” that gripped the late medieval years. After the Ônin War (1467-77), the Ashikaga shogunate had basically lost any semblance of control over the warring states lords of Kyushu, the greatest patrons of the new faith, and motivated for reasons of devotion, exotic magic, weapons technology, domestic ambitions, and access to foreign markets, some gladly accommo-


dated the early missionaries of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. By 1587, however, Hideyoshi had become alarmed. Not because of too many converts, but rather because the hegemon learned that Christian lords reportedly oversaw forced conversions of retainers and commoners, that they had garrisoned the city of Nagasaki, that they participated in the slave trade, and (apparently offending Hideyoshi’s Buddhist sentiments) that they allowed the slaughter of horses and oxen for food. With the San Felipe Incident of 1596, moreover, Hideyoshi’s resolve hardened considerably, and he undoubtedly viewed Christianity as a threat to the realm. “I have received information that in your kingdoms the promulgation of the law [i.e., Christianity] is a trick and deceit by which you overcome other kingdoms,” he wrote in a letter to the Philippines in reply to the embassy led by Navarrete Fajardo in 1597. Christian missionaries, in Hideyoshi’s mind, represented the first wave of European imperialism. The expulsion of these missionaries, therefore, needs be viewed as a first step in centering control over foreign affairs in Kyoto and the stepping up of an ideological campaign designed to articulate Hideyoshi’s legitimacy to rule “all under heaven,” or the East Asian notion of tenka.

Hideyoshi, taking a page out of the missionary’s own handbook, began to fantasize about his own vision of religion as a means to articulate a world hierarchy that legitimized overseas conquest. Herman Ooms, elaborating on the role of religion and thought, illustrates that Hideyoshi, in letters to the Portuguese Viceroy of Indies in Gao (1591) and the governor-general of the Philippines, explained that Buddhism in India and Confucianism in China both spoke of the same deities: the kami of Japan’s Shinto. Therefore, it stood to reason that Hideyoshi’s Japan had religious justification to physically, not just metaphysically, extend its power over the entire known civilized world. It was, as Ooms concludes, Hideyoshi’s version of kultur politik. The invasion of Korea, in other words, implemented a broader spiritual unity that already existed in Hideyoshi’s imagination, albeit with Japan—shinkoku, or the Land of the Gods—as the sacred center. Hideyoshi’s reorganization of foreign relations, then, was not necessarily, as Elisonas submits, “a matured antecedent to the Tokugawa construction, Sakoku,” but rather a form of sixteenth-century Japanese expansionism, interwoven with a program of domestic pacification and legitimation, and rooted in nativist traditions of Japan as a divine land.

Armed with this newly fashioned world order, Hideyoshi launched his infamous attack on the Korean Peninsula. The invasion, skillfully narrated by Elisonas, resulted in Japanese defeat. Elisonas’ moving account of Japan’s “sanguinary excesses” during the invasion, the utterly horrific atrocities inflicted against Koreans of all stripes, ranks among the most disturbing scholarship on Japan. On the one hand, the lurid 1597 threats by Japanese warlords to mass murder Korean officials and farmers illustrates that Japanese armies made few, if any, distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. The Japanese collection of pickled noses, on the other hand, when such domainal contingents as Kikkawa Hiroie’s and Nabeshima Katsushige’s boasted the collection of some 23,794 noses in about two months, remains inexplicable even by modern standards. The Chōsen nichinichiki (Korean days), the work of a Buddhist priest named Keinen, tells of Korean slaves being led by Japanese slave traders. In a section translated by Elisonas, Keinen wrote, “Among the many kinds of merchants who have come over from Japan are traders in human beings, who follow in the train of the troops and buy up men and women, young and old alike. Having tied these people together with ropes about the neck, they drive them along before them; those who can no longer walk are made to run with prods or blows of the stick from behind. The sight of the fiends and man-devouring demons who torment sinners in hell must be like this, I thought.”

Simultaneous to orchestrating these hellish policies in Korea, Hideyoshi also extended Japan’s northern border to include the Kakizaki family (the Matsumae family after 1599) of southern Ezo (present-day Hokkaido). In 1593, when Kakizaki Yoshihiro met with Hideyoshi at Nagoya in Hizen Province, the staging area for the invasion of Korea, they discussed the possibility of a northern route through Orankai (north of the Korean Peninsula near Manchuria, home of the Tartar and Jurchen) onto the continent. Maps in Hideyoshi’s possession, and earlier maps attributed to Matteo Ricci, illustrated Ezo (that is, the island of Hokkaido) as part of North Asia. It was widely rumored, moreover, that the Jurchen and Tartar carried on trade with the Ainu (at this time called Ezojin). Katô Kiyomasa, after attacking Hamgông-do, crossed into Orankai where he captured Gotô Jirô, a Japanese native from Fukuyama (at this time only a fort, but later the castletown of the Matsumae family). He had been living in the region for twenty years, spoke both Korean and Japanese, and told Kiyomasa that Fukuyama, in southern Ezo, was “close to Orankai [and hence Korea].”

Chronicles describe Hideyoshi, after his meeting with Yoshihiro, as “ex-
tremely excited.” Obviously, the reasons for his excitement were twofold. First, Hideyoshi sought to use Ezo as a possible northern route for his invasion of the continent. Second, he sought to position the Kakizaki family as a bulwark against Jurchen and Tartar unification wars that were, according to descriptions offered by missionary Luis Frois, underway in Orankai, and that he and others believed might spill over into Ezo and possibly Japan. It was foreign policy based on realm security, much like his expulsion of European missionaries was motivated (at least in part) by fears of imperialism. To bolster Kakizaki authority, Hideyoshi granted the Kakizaki the exclusive rights to levy shipping duties in Ezo (funayaku): Kakizaki ports henceforth became the hubs of the region’s economic activity. Implicit within this arrangement was the fact that Kakizaki lords became obliged to recognize Hideyoshi’s authority to grant such shipping duties, duties subsequently recognized by Japan’s sometimes cantankerous political community. When Yoshihiro returned to Ezo after the 1593 meeting, chronicles trumpet that he gathered Ainu “from east and west” and read to them, in translation, Hideyoshi’s vermilion-seal order granting the Kakizaki the right to levy shipping duties. If Ainu failed to observe these orders, the chronicle continues, a force of 100,000 warriors would be sent by the hegemon to crush them. With this, “Hideyoshi had extended his control beyond the confines of the traditional provinces of the realm, which suggests that not all his overseas ambitions ended in utter disaster.”

Recent writings, in other words, view Hideyoshi’s policy toward the continent less as simply a bungled invasion of Korea that ended in the later Tokugawa withdrawal from the international arena than as part of a broader process of state consolidation, the conversion of military power to political legitimacy, border demarcation, realmwide security, and the continuing formation of a Japan-centered epistemology in the form of shin-koku. In short, Hideyoshi’s foreign policy set the stage for a proactive engagement of the Eurasian continent designed to strengthen domestic authority and, unless you view events from the singular perspective of Jesuit and Franciscan friars on ships departing Nagasaki, moved to protect Japan, a country he understood to be the sacred core of a more far-flung agenda of kultur politik.

**DIPLOMACY**

The Tokugawa stance toward foreign affairs was initially shaped by Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, and so, Ronald Toby, in his pioneering *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, begins with a discussion of how the Edo shogunate attempted to patch up relations with Korea and China.

Following the death of Hideyoshi, writes Toby, “the most urgent diplomatic business at hand was what in modern terms would be called the normalization of relations with East Asia.” In concrete terms, this meant a withdrawal of troops from the peninsula; offering paddy lands to Tsushima to raise its status so that it could, under the protocol of the day, enter commercial relations with Pusan; and playing host to a 1607 Korean embassy to “normalize” relations to the benefit of both countries, when a forged letter from King Sônjo was given to shogun Hidetada. The 1607 embassy, argues Toby, “functioned to the advantage of both [Japan and Korea] as legitimating propaganda for the bakufu, and as a channel of political and strategic intelligence on continental affairs, as the political foundation for trade, and as one element in an emerging diplomatic manifestation of Japan’s ideal vision of the structure of international order.”

Supported by this new political foundation, foreign trade flourished among those domains that the shogun authorized to trade. By the late seventeenth century, the profits from the private trade between Pusan and Tsushima domain, for example, exceeded 10,000 kan in silver, an amount, Toby notes, comparable to the nengu (annual tax) revenues of all but the largest early modern domains. This diplomatic “normalization”—if such a term can be comfortably applied to conquest—also extended southward between the Ryukyu Islands and Satsuma domain. In 1609, Shimazu Iehisa, after receiving authorization from Edo, invaded Ryukyu with a force of 3,000 troops. Essentially, Satsuma then incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom: it ruled over the islands, conducted cadastral surveys, and eventually claimed Ryukyu’s kokudaka (assessed yield) as its own.

Gregory Smits, in Visions of Ryukyu, writes that Satsuma also proceeded to reinvent Ryukyu history in the form of a pledge, signed by King Shô Nei, that acknowledged Satsuma’s historical role in governing the islands. Smits concludes, “Satsuma’s military power had transformed Ryukyu’s past.” From this point forward, despite the creative resistance of such Ryukyu figures as Tei Dô, Satsuma oversaw the kingdom’s relations with China. Among the Fifteen Injunctions given to the king of Ryukyu, one forbade “any merchant ship to sail from Ryukyu to a foreign country” without Satsuma’s approval. Smits points out, however, that a conflict quickly broke out between shogunal and domanial officials over the ad-

15. Ibid., 39-40.
administration of Ryukyu, a conflict that the Shimazu family ultimately lost. In 1613, Satsuma had sought to assimilate the islands: one domanial order read that “[t]he various customs and practices of Ryukyu are not to differ from those of Japan.” However, three years later, Shimazu Iehisa reversed Satsuma policy, arguing, as Smits paraphrases, that “for Ryukyu to follow Satsuma in every way would be detrimental to Ryukyu’s continued existence as a country.” In time, Satsuma prohibited Ryukyu Islanders from wearing Japanese hairstyles and clothing. The reason that Ryukyu needed “continued existence as a country,” even after its conquest, was because the island kingdom was more useful as a foreign country in the Tokugawa diplomatic order and more lucrative as a trading partner with China than it was as a newly assimilated province.

Toby also explains that in this competition between Satsuma and the shogunate over what to do with the conquered Ryukyu Islands, Edo won. In fact, between 1610 and 1850, Ryukyu kings, adorned in their intentionally preserved native and, more importantly, foreign garb, made twenty-one trips to Edo to visit the shogun. Shogunal officials, moreover, manipulated these visits in order to make them serve as a powerful legitimizing tool for Tokugawa authority. This fact, Toby submits, “should serve to lay to rest some of the misconceptions that exist about the direction of early Tokugawa foreign policy: the bakufu actively sought contact with Korea and the rest of Japan’s international environment, pulling back only when it perceived real danger.” In brief, immediately following the military victory at Sekigahara, the shogunate took an active interest in manipulating audiences in Edo, disputing sino-centric calendars and era names, and crafting its own tally trade with China. In relations with China, the shogunate invented new diplomatic titles such as Nihonkoku taikun, Great Prince of Japan, rather than simply “king,” which smacked of the sino-centric order, because it correctly understood these aspects of political and diplomatic life to be an important part of extending its hegemony over the realm and bolstering its prestige abroad.

In this way, while foreign envoys visited Edo, ceremony was carefully constructed to create a Japan-centered world. As Toby explains, “the bakufu sought a set of protocols and norms for the conduct of foreign relations which would be acceptable to a sufficient number of foreign states to sustain the levels of trade and cultural contact deemed essential, and which might constitute a symbolic mirror of the structure of an ideal ‘world order’ of Japanese fantasy.” Specific diplomatic language, the manipulation of spatial hierarchy, the strict use of a Japanese-based schedule of ambas-

sadorial visits, employing popular art as propaganda in the form of the *Edo zu byôbu* [1637], ritualizing gift giving, and pushing notions of Japan as the “central kingdom” and foreigners as “barbarians”—or the *ka’i chitsujo*—all served to legitimize Tokugawa authority and set a standard for realm-wide diplomatic practice.

In Matsumae domain’s “barbarian audiences” with Ainu, for example, officials employed these realmwide diplomatic practices. Kakizaki Orindo’s *Matsumae jônai nenjû gyôji* (The annual events of Matsumae Castle), which includes a section on the protocol used in Ainu visits to Fukuyama Castle—visits called *uimamu*, a term, as David Howell observes, that was a reinvention of a native Ainu form of greeting—illustrates that these Ainu visits were meticulously constructed to assert the military power and political authority of the Matsumae family, and hence Japanese rule, on the northern border. When Ainu participated in attendance at the castle, Kaki-zaki noted that the ceremony was held in the audience chamber, a room carefully adorned with the symbols of Matsumae authority, including armor and hanging curtains with the household crest. Spatial hierarchy dramatized Japanese power, moreover: the domain lord occupied a raised section of the chamber while Ainu sat in the outer chamber. A designated official mediated all edicts, while a translator made sure Ainu understood them. Even the gifts carried political nuances. Ainu offered *kenjôbutsu*, or gifts presented upward, while the lord presented *kudasaremono*, or gifts bestowed downward. The *goyôban*, or master of ceremonies, then escorted Ainu elders to inspect the military hardware of the domain. This protocol shared several similarities with the seventeenth-century visits to Edo by Korean and Ryukyuan embassies.

Only four decades after Sekigahara the shogunate found itself confronted by a major foreign-policy issue on the Eurasian continent. With the Manchu conquest of China, Edo realized what Toby calls (and all Japan specialists should recognize as) a manifest truth: “Japan is in Asia, and cannot isolate herself from it.” To varying degrees, the shogunate, or domains under its authority, assisted continental allies in their fight against Manchu takeover. In 1627, anticipating a Manchu push, shogun Iemitsu ordered that gunpowder and swords, and possibly some firearms, be sent to Korea. Later, in 1645, Ming loyalist Cui Zhi, through the Nagasaki magistracy (*bugyô*) requested shogunal assistance in fighting the Qing. “[D]ozens of embassies,” Toby explains, followed, all looking for Tokugawa aid. However, the absence of a Ming state, the poor prospects of Ming pretenders, and other factors all pointed to a cautious stance by the shogunate. Finally,

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with the defeat of Zheng Zhilong, any hope of driving the Manchus out of China died, and shogun Iemitsu chose to stay out of the conflict. Still, by favoring anti-Qing merchants and serving as a haven for Ming loyalists, Japan had taken sides in a continental matter.

**DIPLOMATIC SHAM**

Jurgis Elisonas, in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, leveled the first critique of Toby’s thesis, arguing that Korea and the Ryukyu Kingdom, the two countries with which Japan conducted so called “diplomatic relations”—that is, *tsûshin*, as opposed to *tsûshô*, or “commercial relations”—were either reluctant participants in Japan’s staged diplomatic sham or not really foreign countries at all.

Turning the East Asian perspective against Toby and others, moreover, Elisonas points out that the model for the Tokugawa policy of *kaikin*, “maritime prohibitions,” was Ming China, a country that, Elisonas insists, “constructed the model of an isolationist policy.” “The means and motives of what the Chinese of the Ming period called *hai-chin* (*J:* *kaikin*), or maritime prohibitions,” writes Elisonas, “were analogons to those of the Tokugawa period’s *sakoku* directives.”\(^{25}\) Hence, the very spirit and historical precedent of the notion of *kaikin* (strictly speaking, of course, there were no “*sakoku* directives”) issued from the very East Asian context that Toby and others emphasize as being so important.

Elisonas continues by pointing out that Korea, “the only foreign country with which the Tokugawa regime maintained diplomatic relations,” sent only twelve official embassies to Japan during the entire Tokugawa period, and that the first and most famous of these, the 1636 mission to visit shogun Iemitsu and the deified Ieyasu at the Nikkô mausoleum, was in fact a “diplomatic mission” rather than a “return embassy,” thus hardly constituting a tributary visit as understood by the rules of the East Asian diplomatic order. As for the Ryukyu Kingdom, between 1634 and 1806, the Ryukyu king dispatched some fifteen embassies to visit Tokugawa shoguns. Elisonas insists, however, that Ryukyu “could scarcely be called a foreign country insofar as Japan was concerned. Ryukyu was not an independent or even an autonomous state: it had been conquered in 1609 by the Shimazu and was no more than a dependency of the daimyo of Kagoshima, whom the bakufu enfeoffed with Ryukyu just as it did with Satsuma and Ōsumi.”\(^{26}\)

Elisonas is correct about Ryukyu. Nonetheless, remarks made by the German doctor Engelbert Kaempfer, whose seventeenth-century history of Japan has recently been translated Beatrice Bodart-Bailey under the title

26. Ibid., 299-300.
Kaempfer’s Japan, illustrate the complexity of the relationship between the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan, as well as some noteworthy comments about Chôsen (Korea) not mentioned by Elisonas but that support his critique. “Some centuries ago,” Kaempfer wrote, the Ryukyu Islands “submitted to the king of Satsuma as a result of military force, and he keeps them subservient with bugyô, or commissioners and magistrates, strong military commanders, and guards.” Kaempfer continued, “Even though they are not considered foreigners, but to some extent as Japanese subjects, they are, nevertheless, treated as foreigners and outsiders when it comes to trade.” In the case of Chôsen, Kaempfer remarked in his section on “Japanese Possessions Overseas” that, after Hideyoshi’s invasion, “Ieyasu had the Koreans appear at court every three years with a delegation as proof of their submission. After that, they slowly came again under the sway of the Tartars and pushed the Japanese occupation to the furthest corner of their last province, which indeed is still subservient to the present Japanese ruler.” Kaempfer explained that the Tokugawa shogun “is happy to own no more than the Korean frontier as safety for his own country and has it guarded by the lord of Tsushima, who maintains a military guard of sixty people under the command of a bugyô. The Koreans are ordered to appear at court only at a time of shogunal succession to take an oath of loyalty to the new ruler.”

Herein lies the crux of the debate between Toby and Elisonas. If we follow Kaempfer’s line that Ryukyu Islanders “are not considered foreigners,” then we can accept the rather sharp critique of Toby leveled by Elisonas: “Japan had a government that barely pursued foreign relations at all.” That the “sham played with Ryukyu enforced participation and the facsimile of a formal relationship in which Korea acquiesced sufficed to create for the bakufu its own international order, in which Japan ranked first, even if it had to be prima in vacuo.” Regarding Chôsen, although Elisonas never questioned its authenticity as a foreign country in trade and diplomatic exchange, some Japanese historians, such as Yamamoto Hirofumi, float the notion that southern Korea was part of the administrative frontiers of the early modern Japanese state or, as Kaempfer mentioned, that the shogun oversaw part of the Korean frontier “as safety for his own country.” Hence historians raise questions regarding even Chôsen’s authenticity as a real diplomatic partner.

If we return to Kaempfer’s earlier remarks, however, we learn that Ryukyuans were “treated as foreigners and outsiders when it comes to trade,” which was, if we understand Kaempfer’s use of the word “trade” to
mean both economic and diplomatic exchange, precisely Toby’s point. That is to say, the Tokugawa shoguns partly manufactured such foreigners to fit within its version of diplomatic exchange to bolster its political power at home and abroad, even if such diplomatic exchange was largely the product of the Japanese imagination.

OTHERS

By retelling a fascinating story from Ezo, David Howell demonstrates that Matsumae policy toward the Ainu shared similarities to the shogunal and, later, the Satsuma strategy of what might be called mandated difference toward the Ryukyu Islands. That is, Ainu were, like the Ryukyuans, "treated as foreigners" by Matsumae domain, even when the status of their actual foreignness, at least in the area called Wajinchi (Japanese land) was less clear. Howell points to an Ainu named Iwanosuke, of Kennichi village in Wajinchi, the Japanese occupied section of southern Hokkaido, who was thoroughly assimilated to the everyday customs of Japanese life: he had a Japanese name, lived in a Japanese village, and wore his hair in a Japanese fashion. During New Year’s ceremonies, however, Iwanosuke underwent what Howell calls a “curious metamorphosis.” “As a representative of the Ainu people,” writes Howell, Iwanosuke went to Fukuyama Castle to participate in an audience with the Matsumae lord. Iwanosuke’s metamorphosis was cast by contemporary Japanese observers as a “remnant of old Ezo customs.” However, as Howell argues, the opposite was true: “Iwanosuke assumed what had become for him a false identity for reasons that had little to do with old Ainu customs and everything to do with the institutions of the Matsumae domain.”

This invention of tradition and fabrication of foreignness, Howell points out, served several purposes. Most pertinently, it demarcated "ethnic boundaries” which in turn served to establish “political boundaries.” At the same time, it cast the Japanese domination of the Ainu “in history and the ‘timeless’ traditions of Ainu culture.” Howell observes of the Tokugawa shogunate that it “was the first regime in Japanese history to draw clear physical borders for itself.” Qualifying this assertion, however, he continues that “rather than establish a dichotomy between Japan and the rest of the world, it surrounded itself with peripheral areas that were neither fully part of the polity nor completely independent of it.” Howell submits that this “spurred the formation of a Japanese identity even before the emer-
gence of a modern nation-state in the mid-nineteenth century.”

Similarly, Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out that even the assimilation policies aimed at the many “societies on the periphery” of the early modern polity “involved a sharpening of the official definition of what it meant to be Japanese.” Scrutinizing the place of the “frontier” in mapping out what was spatially “Japan,” Morris-Suzuki asks important questions regarding “the whole way in which we deal with space in history.” “The eye of the historian,” she writes, “tends to look for change over time rather than diversity across space.” Through investigating Japan’s relationship with its neighbors, Morris-Suzuki argues for a sensitivity to “spatial diversity” as well as “temporal change.”

Following an analysis of the 1713 *Wakan sansai zue* (An Illustrated Japanese-Chinese encyclopedia), Morris-Suzuki conjectures that the “feeling conveyed by this work is of a world made up of concentric circles of increasing strangeness, stretching almost infinitely outwards from a familiar centre.” She points out how this model was born from the *ka’i chitsujo*—or the model of the “civilized center” and “barbarian periphery”—although it remains not entirely clear whether Japan or China served as the hub in this first work (it being modeled after earlier Chinese encyclopedias). Bruce Batten, though more concerned with comparative models of frontier and boundary creation, emphasizes a similar frontier theme, albeit on a more state-centered level, in his Japanese-language history of premodern Japanese boundaries and frontiers. Rather than identify “concentric circles of increasing strangeness” which stretched out from a “familiar centre,” as Morris-Suzuki did, Batten draws on Robert Gilpin’s state-centered model of “loss-of-strength gradient,” wherein premodern frontiers are defined by their distance from the political core and by their political strangeness.

Morris-Suzuki argues that in the late Tokugawa period, other popular encyclopedias drew on the increasingly important nativism of Motoori Norinaga, “in which Japanese identity was defined in terms of spontaneous virtue and creativity, as opposed to the rigidity and sterility attributed to Chinese learning,” and the civilized hub was clearly identified by an “urbanized samurai encountering a group of Geisha in a city street.” “Moral rectitude” emerged as one of the defining characteristic of being Japa-

Like Howell, Morris-Suzuki writes that the “cornerstone” of the *ka'i chitsujo* was “the logic of difference,” even if it was sometimes trumped up. She explains that the “relationships with the Ainu and the Ryukyu kingdom were important precisely because they represented the subordination of foreign people to Japanese dominion. Everything about the relationship, therefore, had to be structured in such a way as to magnify the exotic character of the peripheral societies.” The embassies dispatched to Edo from the Ryukyu Kingdom, for Morris-Suzuki, were an “extravagant and elaborately staged dramatization of the logic of *ka'i*,” or mandated difference. Later, with late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century contact with European nations, Japan was forced to grapple with a modified notion of the frontier. Morris-Suzuki explains that Japan needed to adjust to the idea of a frontier as a “line marking the boundary between one nation and another, instead of the idea of a series of frontiers marking gradually increasing degrees of difference.” (Pointing to a later transformation of frontiers to national boundaries, Batten picks up this theme as well, arguing that actual boundaries failed to emerge in the north until around 1855 with the Shimoda Treaty between Japan and Russia.) But for Morris-Suzuki, evidence of boundary creation earlier than 1855 includes the formulation of an assimilationist discourse in Japan, a discourse that forced Edo officials and intellectuals to sharpen their definition of what was, and what was not, the Japanese realm. The geographer Honda Toshiaki, for example, following the intrusion of Russian trappers into the North Pacific, believed that Ainu should be made more Japanese. “[W]e must establish a mutual frontier between Japan and other countries and create a fortress to withstand foreign enemies,” he wrote on one occasion. Thus, even the slow absorption of “peripheral societies” into the early modern polity (and hence the clean delineation of borders between Japan and other nations) further helped clarify what it meant to be Japanese. For Morris-Suzuki and Batten, one of the hallmarks of modernity in Japan was the transformation of once “concentric circles of increasing strangeness” or “loss-of-strength gradient” emanating from the political center to political borders and the ultimate assimilation of foreign peoples who found themselves living within these newly drawn lines.

35. Ibid., 51.
In 1857, in a different kind of example of this spatial and ethnic demarcation of the boundaries of the early modern polity, the Edo shogunate sponsored medical treatment and Jennerian smallpox vaccinations for all Japanese and Ainu in Ezo. With this policy, shogunal officials, working through the Hakodate bugyô, placed medical treatment and smallpox vaccinations in the same context as the other forms of assimilation discussed by Howell and Morris-Suzuki. State-sponsored medicine in Ezo “sought to transform the place of the Ainu, even at the level of the individual Ainu body, in relation to the early modern Japanese polity.” Like the Foucauldian relationship between public medicine and state power that emerged in modern Europe, medicine in Ezo was employed by the shogunate to protect what it viewed as “a newly acquired appendage of the body politic—or something to be integrated into the national whole—as well as demarcate, at the level of the individual body, the borders of the Japanese state in the north.”

Beginning in 1799, with the Tokugawa attainder of lands and administrative powers once under Matsumae control, officials in Ezo mandated that Ainu infected with disease report to administrative posts throughout Ezo. In other words, in the same context as ordering Ainu to change their hairstyles, conform to Japanese customary norms, use the Japanese language, or to abandon the practice of polygamy, Ainu were forced, via shogunal policy, to recognize Japanese-based notions of health and medical culture. The ultimate manifestation of this was the 1857 vaccination project. Physicians on Tokugawa payroll set out to vaccinate people increasingly thought to be wards of the early modern state, even if they were ethnic Ainu, and conscious decisions were made at the outset about who and where to vaccinate. In short, in the arena of public medicine, the Edo shogunate consciously mapped out the ethnic, spatial, and administrative boundaries of the early modern body politic before the rise of the modern nation-state.

The emergence of an early modern Japanese identity, and the delineation of modern state boundaries, was not confined to the political arena, but extended into the popular consciousness as well. As Toby illustrates in several articles on the topic, images of “foreign others,” ones usually built on strongly held, and sometimes state-sponsored, stereotypes—or “codes of Other”—of Koreans and other outsiders, galvanized the imagination of

urban commoners in Japan. He writes that along the routes of Korean embassies, “rich and poor; courtier, daimyo, and commoner, competed—and paid dearly—for the best vantage point from which to watch the passage of an embassy.” To preserve and profit from these embassies, “artists and printmakers recorded virtually every stage of a Korean embassy’s progress through Japan, from first landfall in Tsushima, to passage by ship through the Inland Sea and riverboat up the Yodo River, and overland through Kyoto, and along the highways to Edo, and occasionally beyond.” Toby’s highly original analysis of these visual sources illustrates that the tropes of alterity (or “codes of Other”) employed by Japanese served to affirm what it meant to be Japanese. “Through reenactment and representation,” writes Toby, “the alien embassy became permanent and omnipresent, an enduring element in contemporary culture. It was an instrumentality for the construction of ‘Korea’, and implicitly of all ‘others’, in Japanese culture, and by extension it was a means for creating ‘Japan’.

The symbolic meaning of Korean embassies also altered the nature of the Tokugawa status system. When townspeople undertook their own Tôjin gyôretsu, or foreigners parades, and crafted Chôsen yama, or Korean floats, common people asserted an “identity radically different from that sanctioned by official social ideology,” and by masquerading as foreigners, they “licensed themselves temporarily to step outside the tightly controlled behavioral requirements of role and status demanded of them by the norms of their society.” In other words, participants stepped from the realm of the Japanese self, and its implicit rigid status categories, to the realm of stereotyped-ethnic alterity, appropriating the “codes of Other” which remained alien enough to serve as a commonly perceived liminal space for escaping the officially endorsed social norms of the day. Common people, Toby concludes, masquerading as foreigners, brought the political center, that lavish capital where embassies visited, to themselves, thus “asserting their own, communal parity with the shogun.”

Ultimately, as Toby explains, confronting foreigners actually forced early modern Japanese “to reorder not only their cosmology, but their imaginings and imaging of the range of human variation that they encountered in the wake of Columbus.” The greater the number of outside people Japanese witnessed in the early modern period, the less meaningful became the blanket terms they used to describe this outside world, such as Sangoku, or the Three Realms. Prior to what Toby describes as the

43. Ibid., 445, 452, 454.
“Xavierian moment,” the tripartite framework Japanese employed to describe the outside world was the Three Realms of Wagachô (“Our Land,” or Japan), Shintan or Kara (usually “China,” but also other continental peoples such as Koreans), and Tenjiku (rendered as “India,” but more of a theologic term that meant “Land of the Buddha”). Toby writes that for early-sixteenth-century Japanese, “the real world consisted largely of two possible identities: people of ‘Our Land’, and people from China—comprising ‘the Continent’, with which there was a long history of contact and commerce.”45 (Perhaps for this reason, when Kaempfer traveled to Edo, he was called Tôjin, or Chinese, by onlookers.46) After the 1550s, however, in the wake of the “Xavierian moment,” Japanese were, argues Toby, “inundated with a bewildering array of new-found Others,” people who “came in hitherto inconceivable variety of colors, shapes, hirsutenesses, and habiliments.” These were the people not of Sangoku, but rather of the more broadly cast Bankoku, or “Myriad Realms.”47

The notion of Bankoku required a new way of construing the world, one riddled with unfamiliar geographies and taxonomies, demanding that Japanese artists, who rendered these new cartographies visually, move beyond distinguishing between Japanese and others, now distinguishing Japanese from among a vast variety of human kinds—jinrui. In his analysis of such works as the 1645 Shôhô bankoku jinbutsu zu (Shôhô illustration of the peoples of the myriad realms), Toby describes a “groping toward an ‘anthropology’ of sorts,” or what he later refers to as the “anthropology of representation.” Moreover, Toby cautions against dismissing this type of early modern “anthropology of representation” as overly imagined by pointing out that “European ‘knowledge’ of the foreign was not consistently empirical, either...” The principal medium for representing foreigners became the visual image and, as Toby argues, “each image was a specimen, much like museum dioramas or specimen villages at a World’s Fair.”48 This explosion of anthropos in the Japanese world view engendered new knowledge of “other” and “self,” and visual sources, unlike texts, provide a rare glimpse into this world of the early modern imagining and imaging of the outside world.

**PEOPLE**

Focus on the formation of an early modern identity, one which required casting foreigners as “others,” has had its dangerous interpretive pitfalls. Fine tuning this notion of an early modern Japanese identity has meant

45. Ibid.
47. Toby, “Imagining and Imaging ‘Anthropos’ in Early Modern Japan,” 19.
48. Ibid., 36.
casting foreign peoples, both real and imagined, as reflexive or reflective “others,” with little or no historical agency. More often than not, such foreigners and the places where they lived have served the purposes of either Japan or those who write its history, which is, of course, a biased vantage point from which to view any country’s foreign relations and frontier experiences. New research reveals that relations with foreigners not only transformed the Japanese idea of self, but that these foreigners themselves—the “others” with whom the Japanese interacted—also witnessed political and cultural changes as a result of their contact with early modern Japan. Aside from important observations related to missionaries, or brief discussions of seventeenth-century Korean politics, this point has only been made by Elisonas, Smits, and Bodart-Bailey, but nonetheless it should be considered central to our discussion. Really, this lesson is simple yet critical: vantage point, or the temporal, spatial, and human perspective from which history is construed, shapes our rendering of the past.

When Boxer and Elisonas argued that Japan was isolated under the Tokugawa regime—the “sakoku directives”—their vantage point and temporal site stemmed from European experiences in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Of course, for these Europeans, Japan was a “closed country,” and so not surprisingly, historians most reliant on this European perspective most passionately pushed the sakoku thesis. Reinier Hesselink, who actually bridges the Japanese and European perspectives, has most recently made this point in Prisoners from Nambu. In July 1643, when Japanese authorities from the northeastern domain of Morioka ( overseen by the Nanbu family) cleverly lured ashore and then incarcerated ten crew members of the Breskens, a yacht out of Batavia that Dutch officials had dispatched along with the fluyt Castricom, these Dutch sailors correctly came to the conclusion that Japan was a country run by paranoid and at times even sadistic rulers. What else could they possibly have concluded as they watched the Christian hunter Inoue Masashige and others subject Catholic missionaries to horrific tortures such as the anatsurushi (the legendary “pit torture”). By contrast, it stands to reason that historians illustrating the pervasiveness of East Asian contact in the early modern period should depend on an Asia-centered perspective. These historians argue that some foreign groups understood Japan to be an altogether too-open country. In other words, if certain Europeans understood Japan to be closed, then Ryukyu Islanders, Koreans, and Ainu had a different opinion. Japan was not only open, but slowly expanding and at times highly intrusive.

In his introduction to Visions of Ryukyu, Smits stakes out a decidedly Ryukyuan vantage point. He writes that his study “seeks to center Ryukyu
as a historical agent, examining Ryukyu history mainly from the vantage point of Shuri (capital of the Ryukyu Kingdom), not Edo or Beijing.” Smits accomplishes this largely through the person of Sai On, a Ryukyuan ideologue and statesman who believed that the small island kingdom must strive to reach a “moral parity” with Japan and China. Smits explains that Sai On understood that “Ryukyu’s long-term survival and prosperity... depended in large part on its adoption and adaptation of the Confucian way.”50 Thus, in an ironic twist, the idea of the dominant Japanese forcing the acculturation and assimilation of neighboring people is cast in a fresh (and slightly uncomfortable) light: some of these neighbors also advocated a policy of assimilation—of assimilating themselves—through the adoption of certain aspects of Japanese life in order to assure their country’s survival.

To begin with, Sai advocated a Confucian agenda for Ryukyuan officials that would have brought a grin even to the face of his stoic hero, Kaibara Ekken. He believed officials should thoroughly familiarize themselves with the Classics; nurture a Confucian-based notion of sincerity of will; employ geomancy in the construction of sacred and political sites; adopt Confucian notions of family relations; replace certain “native” Ryukyuan rites with Japanese ones; and recast the king as a Confucian sage.51 In one polemic, Sai inferred that the Satsuma conquest of the Ryukyu Islands had in fact benefited his kingdom. Ryukyu, under Satsuma rule, now practiced what he identified as “fundamental principles of the Way of Government.” Smits illustrates that Sai expressed his indebtedness to Satsuma in largely Confucian terms, believing that even the rice tax extracted by the powerful Kyushu domain, which no doubt pained the Ryukyuan countryside, had led to better agriculture among farmers, in turn leading to a “rectification” of Ryukyuan customs.

Moreover, Sai oversaw important policy initiatives that in today’s world might be viewed as traitorous to his country. In the mid-eighteenth century, for example, Sai oversaw widespread forestry reform and the Genbun survey. Smits points out that the Genbun survey, based on Japanese cadastral practice, “established the basic economic framework for early modern Ryukyu,” and resulted in a revision of the original cadastral numbers and a tightening of the central government’s control over rice-producing districts. However, as it did in Japan, the survey went further than just the realm of agronomics. As Smits argues, in Ryukyu it provided the government with a means to regulate everyday life in the districts, which extended into the realm of “moral behavior” and ceremonial practice. With increased central control, Sai was able to oversee a crackdown on “native” Ryukyuan festival life, assert a ban on shamanism, and reinvent the original meanings of

50. Smits, Visions of Ryukyu, 3, 8.
51. Ibid., 75, 76, 97, 101, 103.
such rites as worshiping the hearth deity. Of course, these measures met with mixed results; but the point is that some of the deculturation and assimilation of the Ryukyu Kingdom was generated internally.52 Oddly, while Tokugawa officials pushed to preserve Ryukyu foreignness, Sai On and others advocated that country’s move in the opposite direction.

In the far north, Shakushain’s seventeenth-century struggle against Matsumae domain serves as another example of the historical agency of foreigners. A survey of the twenty some years leading up to Shakushain’s War demonstrates that the roots of this conflict lay planted in the soil of cultural and ecological change brought about by trade with Japan. By the late sixteenth century, Ainu notions of political power, social prestige, and ritual practice had become tied to trade with Japan. That is, like the example of Sai On’s reform policies, Ainu generated political and cultural change internally. Everything from the clothing that adorned powerful chiefs, to the lacquerware cups and saké used in ceremonies, Ainu acquired in trade. To obtain these items, Ainu brought dried fish, animal skins, and certain pharmaceuticals to trading posts. Consequently, as certain chiefs maneuvered to extend their hegemony through acquiring more emblems of prestige, they positioned themselves to extend their control over the land that produced the animals whose skins purchased these goods. Early on, this led to border conflicts between Ainu chiefdoms, including the construction of Ainu fortifications called casi. In the case of Shakushain’s War, the two main chiefdoms involved were the Hae, under Onibishi (and his territory known as Haekuru), and the Shibuchari (or Menashikuru), under Shakushain.53

In the 1660s, Shakushain defeated Onibishi, but not before forcing Matsumae domain to take sides in the conflict. Just prior to the outbreak of full-scale war, Hae Ainu sought assistance from Japanese miners and Matsumae domain, and Shakushain, viewing these events from his fortified position in eastern Ezo, believed himself to be boxed in by hostile neighbors. So he lashed out, killing just under 300 Japanese in two well-planned assaults. Matsumae domain dispatched troops to Kunnui, in eastern Ezo, to stem a potential Shakushain-led march on Fukuyama Castle, and at Kunnui a stalemate ensued. Ultimately, the shogunate, in an unqualified example of how it viewed its role on the borders of the realm, dispatched a retainer, Matsumae Yasuhiro, to take over local command of military activities in Kunnui and see to the “subjugation of the barbarians.” Indeed, “Campaigns to ‘subdue the barbarians’ were urgent prerogatives of the shogunate; after all, it was the imperial duty of the Barbarian Subduing Generalissimo (seiitai shōgun; the formal imperial title of the shogun) to defend the realm.”54

52. Ibid., 109-16.
However, Shakushain’s War also forged strong ethnic identities among the participants, leading some Japanese historians to call the conflict a “greater ethnic war.” Once underway, Shakushain’s War served to strengthen ethnic identities in Ezo. Although competition for resources sparked the conflagration, the two sides of the conflict, with some important exceptions, were drawn along ethnic lines. Matsumae commanders, such as Kakizaki Hiroshige, went so far as to threatened to “destroy all the Ainu.” Shakushain, by contrast, boasted that his forces should “slash their way to the Matsumae” stronghold. In short, Shakushain’s War took on a disturbing us-against-them mentality, prompting the shogunate to assert its duty to defend the realm by conscripting support among northeastern domains under the already arcane gunyaku (military conscription) system.

The important point is that trade with Japan, and the incorporation of Japanese-manufactured items into Ainu politics and culture, was a powerful ingredient in this war and the formation of pan-Ainu alliances. Moreover, at the same time that Japanese probably viewed themselves as “Japanese” while facing tenacious Ainu fighters, Ainu probably formed broader conceptions of their Ainu-ness while facing Japanese warriors as well. Before and after this point in 1669, Ainu society remained fragmented among patrilinear political alignments called petiwor, or river-based villages and chiefdoms. However, as Shakushain watched his hunting and fishing grounds transform into akinaiba chigyô, or trade fiefs, under Matsumae’s economic expansion, it forced him to think more bilaterally about ethnic relations on the island. Importantly, for these Ainu, Japan must have been a country all too actively engaged with the outside world, or from Shakushain’s vantage point, actively conquering his homeland.

Situated on the southern and northern edges of Tokugawa hegemony, Sai On and Shakushain faced the ensuing complications of an expanding early modern Japanese polity at different periods of time. Sai On, on the one hand, resisted the Edo shogunate’s attempts to mandate Ryukyuan difference on an intellectual and political level, pushing the small kingdom in the direction of Japanese-style Confucian reform. On the other hand, Shakushain resisted Japanese economic designs on the cold, harsh battlefields of eastern Ezo by attempting to create an united Ainu front to expel the Japanese from his homeland. For these two non-Japanese societies situated on the fringes of the Japanese realm, Japanese expansion resulted in nothing less than their ultimate conquest and acculturation, and so, consequently, any characterization of early modern Japan as a “closed country” would have come as some surprise to them.

Such a characterization would not have surprised other foreigners, however, proving once more that vantage point is critical to understanding early modern Japanese attitudes about the outside world. As mentioned,
Engelbert Kaempfer was stationed on Deshima Islet near Nagasaki, (like Ryukyu and Ezo, Nagasaki was also an ambiguous space, with Chinese temples and the Chinese factory, not to mention the Dutch presence at Deshima). He viewed seventeenth-century Japan not as an expanding country but as a closed and highly paranoid one. Given a chance, he speculated, the Japanese people would have lavished “the best possible treatment on us [Dutch visitors],” but owing to the strict prohibitions against Christianity, the Edo shogunate kept Europeans under a watchful eye.\(^{55}\)

Even a superficial reading of Kaempfer’s writings related to his stay in Japan (between September 1690 and October 1692) exposes the extreme steps taken by the Edo shogunate to immunize Japan from any potential Christian infection. It is hard to overestimate the shogunate’s fears of the monotheistic religion. Like antibodies scurrying around an alien, and quite threatening, virus, trying to protect the larger body from infection, attendants and translators followed Kaempfer throughout his stay in Japan, making sure that he did not infect people, and hence the Tokugawa body politic, with the toxins of Christianity. Those Japanese who dealt with the “imprisoned visitors,” as Kaempfer called the Dutch, were “bound by an oath and sign with their blood not to talk or entrust to us information about the situation of their country....” In others words, as Kaempfer concluded—in many ways setting the tenor in Japan and the West for nearly three centuries of historiography related to early modern Japan’s foreign affairs and frontiers—Japan was a “secluded world apart from the rest of the world.”\(^{56}\)

Offering much needed details on the nature of the Nagasaki trade, Kaempfer wrote that when European ships first entered the waters off Japan, their arrival was announced by guards called *tomiban*. They manned watch towers to warn of European invasion (an invasion thought immanent, incidently, after the expulsion of the missionaries). In the case of such an invasion, signal fires would be lit in succession until the fires, and hence the news of the European attack, had reached Edo. Later, as European ships entered Nagasaki harbor, they were assisted (or accosted, depending on your perspective) by guard boats called *funaban*. Kaempfer described the city of Nagasaki as having an international flare, a product of late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century trade. Three Chinese temples (the Nankin, Chokusū, and Hokushū temples) graced the port city and upwards of 10,000 Chinese merchants had once visited Nagasaki every year in well over 200 ships. Some Chinese, according to Kaempfer, had even set up permanent residences in the city. After 1688, however, following shogunal suspicions that the Qing state had accommodated the Jesuits (the Tokugawa family’s “sworn and banished enemy”), and that Christian

\(^{55}\) Kaempfer’s Japan, 285.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 27, 56.
books “printed in China were hidden among the other Chinese volumes that annually arrived in the country,” the Chinese trade was restricted and Chinese merchants themselves, much like Dutch merchants at Deshima, were forced to reside at the Chinese factory. Although the Chinese were allowed to intermix with the Japanese population for a longer period of time, in the case of the European presence, “No Japanese who treats the Dutch with sincerity is considered an honest citizen,” observed Kaempfer.57

Kaempfer described Deshima as a “jail” or a “fortified compound,” one where Europeans were “sealed off and guarded like thieves.” Japanese who worked with the Dutch were inoculated from foreign influence through a “Letter of Acceptance,” wherein a guarantor promised that the new employee would not “listen to any talk about the banned Christian sect” and not “have any secret discussions with the Dutch.” Even when traveling to Edo for a shogunal audience, Japanese attendants watched over Kaempfer’s every move, “even when stepping aside to follow the call of nature.” At the inns where they stayed along the Tôkaidô Circuit, “the Dutch must rely on the small walled garden during the day and, if it pleases them, the bath at night.” While traveling, “young gentlemen” followed Kaempfer and his entourage shouting, “tôjin bai bai!” (or “Chinaman, haven’t you got something to peddle!”), illustrating a curious clumping of all foreigners under one category of “other” in the Japanese mind, hardly a quality that one expects from a country really open to outside contact. Once at Edo Castle, much like infected people in need of quarantine, “Our rooms were isolated from all other human beings,” wrote Kaempfer. Following the audience, Kaempfer returned to Nagasaki in time to witness the execution of Japanese who had smuggled with the Dutch (a common occurrence). For the crime of illegal trade with the Dutch, “with neither a word nor ceremony,” an executioner “cut off the heads of their charges as soon as we arrived and turned our eyes upon the scene.” Although the Japan trade was lucrative for the Dutch, their treatment at the hands of paranoid Tokugawa attendants and translators was the conduct of people who had, in Kaempfer’s opinion, “closed their mouths, hearts, and souls” to their foreign guests.58

PLACES

Where early modern Japan did actively engage the outside world, it often reshaped such places through prolonged ecological and cultural exchange. John Hall, for example, has illustrated the importance of the copper trade in commercial relations between Japan and China.59 Robert Innes,

57. Ibid., 186-88, 153-54, 224-25, 199.
in his unpublished dissertation on the economic value of such trade, argues that the continental trade led to technological advances in mining in some Japanese communities. Trade spurred an expansion of mining in Japan to meet the foreign demand. The main reason for this expansion was that the major Japanese export specie in the early Tokugawa years (as Hall pointed out) was precious metals: gold, silver, and copper. Facilitating the expansion of the mining industry, and the exploitation of these valuable resources, were technological innovations in excavation techniques, drainage, surveying, and smelting. In short, Innes concludes that foreign trade speeded the pace of innovation by increasing the demand first for silver and later for gold and copper.60 Toby echoes this point, explaining that the influence of foreign trade on the early modern domestic economy was several fold: it fostered a general advancement of the market economy, sparked regional industries such as sugar and silk, facilitated an expansion of national transportation networks, and led to market competition which improved the quality and increased the quantity of goods.61

Economic and technological advancement also transformed Japanese commercial activity beyond the traditional provinces. In Capitalism From Within, Howell illustrates how the intensification of cash-crop farming in the Kinai led to increased demand for herring-mulch fertilizer. This demand, in turn, sparked a massive expansion of merchant-run fisheries in Ezo, transforming the production habits of local Japanese and Ainu. It was not long until Japanese were searching out fresh supplies of herring on southern Sakhalin, hoping to fill the large merchant vessels, or kitamaebune, which followed the Japan Sea coast to ports such as Tsuruga or Obama.62 Along with engendering dependency in Ainu communities by forcing them to labor in fisheries, however, the herring industry depleted fishery yield throughout Hokkaido and beyond. At one point, explains Howell, herring shoals which migrated from the Sea of Okhotsk to the west coast of Hokkaido to spawn had been so dense that “a pole could almost stand unsupported.” At these sites, gams of whales and flocks of seagulls gathered to feed off the concentration of fish. However, with advances in fishing technology, such as the invention of the pound-trap, not only were small family fisheries unable to compete with the proto-

capitalist firms which owned this equipment, but the environment witnessed a drastic decline in fishery yield by the Meiji period.63

This type of environmental degradation and ecological change occurred throughout Ezo (and other places in Asia) with the expansion of Japanese markets and trade networks. In the early seventeenth century, large quantities of deer skins were imported into Japan from Asia, an early trade largely ignored by Western scholarship. Once in Japan, these skins were used to make armor and other specialty crafts such as brushes for calligraphy or tabi, a kind of sock worn with traditional Japanese footwear. Deer-skin items became so popular that Japanese merchants traveled to Southeast Asia in search of more skins to import. Dutch records from 1624 lament that European traders could not get their hands on any decent deer skins because Japanese had bought them all up. That year alone, 160,000 skins were imported. It reached the point where Spanish observers (no doubt motivated by their own greed) worried that deer herds were disappearing from Southeast Asia.64 John Shepherd, in his history of early Taiwan, points out that the deer skin trade with Japan also became an important part of that island’s economy under early Dutch and Chinese rule.65 Thus Japanese had an appetite for animal skins, and as certain Asian markets were increasingly closed off, or as deer became scarce, Ezo began to supply deer skins in their place.

Ainu trapped and hunted deer throughout Ezo, exchanging the skins with Japanese at trading posts. Matsumae Norihiro, in an eighteenth-century memorandum to Edo officials, remarked that trade in deer skins had depleted herds in Ezo. (These herds, it should be mentioned, along with healthy salmon runs, were closely tied to Ainu subsistence systems.) Norihiro was not the only observer to note the depletion of deer herds, however. Five years earlier, Matsumiya Kanzan had briefly remarked of deer pelts that “in recent years none are traded.” Likewise, in 1717, a shogunal inspector wrote that “in past years deer pelts were mainly taken in the Saru River and Yûbetsu areas, but in recent years few pelts are taken at all.” These are important observations because healthy deer herds were central to Ainu survival.66

In 1792, Kushihara Seihô, a local observer in Ezo, offered hints as to how deer had come under so much pressure. He wrote that in the fall deer from the mountains of the southern section of the Ishikari region crossed the Ishikari River and migrated southeast to Shikotsu. Illustrating ecological trends in fauna distribution, he observed that in western Ezo the snow

63. Howell, Capitalism From Within, 50, 117.
became very deep in the winter, and deer found it difficult to forage for food. During this migration, when deer crossed the Ishikari River, Ainu concealed themselves and their boats behind reed blinds and waited for deer to cross the river so that they could overtake them in boats and kill them. “In recent years an increasing number of deer have been taken, and none are left. Those deer that did remain have swum across the straits to Morioka domain,” wrote Kushihara. Now, “there are very few if any deer in eastern Ezo.”

Finally, maritime prohibitions, and Japan’s geographic isolation from the Eurasian continent, shaped the disease ecology of the archipelago, and hence the rhythms of life and death in early modern Japan. In her research on disease and mortality crisis in the early modern period, Ann Bowman Jannetta argues that with the establishment of the Edo shogunate few new diseases actually entered Japan. Pointing to evidence such as the absence of bubonic plague and epidemic typhus, Jannetta argues that “Japan’s geography and her isolation from the major world trade routes provided a cordon sanitaire that prevented major diseases from penetrating Japan until the mid-nineteenth century.”

That is not to say, however, that certain diseases did not spread outward from Japan. Similar to the scenario outlined by William McNeill in *Plagues and Peoples*, Japanese contributed to the dissemination of deadly contagions in Ezo as their commercial and political interests advanced into Ainu communities. In Ezo, Japanese traders brought diseases such as smallpox and syphilis, incorporating the northern island into the disease ecology of early modern Japan and sparking demographic havoc in Ainu communities. Ecologically speaking, viewed from the perspective of the epidemiologic range of Japan’s disease ecology, Ezo was incorporated into the Japanese Archipelago in the early modern period via forms of “ecological imperialism.”

67. Ibid.
III CONCLUSION

I should offer at least a brief explanation as to why this historiographical essay concludes prior to the rise of the “unequal treaty” regime negotiated between the Edo shogunate and the early Meiji state with the Western powers. Quite simply, in my opinion, such forms of international interaction and diplomatic order no longer resemble early modern forms and so are beyond the scope of this narrative. As W. G. Beasley and, more recently, Michael Auslin point out, after 1855, Japan was forced to navigate within a new logic of foreign relations and international order that was not premised on the notion that Japan (or even China for that matter) stood at the center of a real or imagined global community, but rather one that exposed that it sat precariously on the edge of modern civilization. As Auslin cautions, this is not to say that between 1858 and 1872 the Japanese were completely unable to assert some political and diplomatic agency when negotiating with the Western powers. For example, Japanese diplomats did succeed in shifting the location of some key treaty ports (along with other minor diplomatic successes) during this early phase.72 However, the mere advent of such ports, not to mention the “unequal treaties” that made them legally binding and the “extraterritoriality” that made them sting, meant that Japan, whether it liked it or not, had joined the dog-eat-dog international climate of the late nineteenth century.

As for the early modern period, three points stand out after surveying new literature on its foreign affairs and frontier experiences. The first comes in the form of (not altogether unbiased) praise: with the exception of John Whitney Hall’s Government and Local Power in Japan, 500-1700 and Thomas C. Smith’s The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, possibly no single monograph on the early modern period has spawned the kind of explosion of historical writing as has Ronald Toby’s State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. To different degrees, the writings of Howell, Morris-Suzuki and others expand on Toby’s point that the notion of sakoku was highly Eurocentric and that historians need to focus on the Edo shogunate’s relations with Asia. With the thesis that Japan isolated itself from all foreign contact wiped clean from the deck (although, as the case of Kaempfer shows, certain important issues clearly have yet to be swept away), Japan specialists have started to navigate entirely new waters. For this reason, some of the most interesting work in early modern Japanese studies relates to the subfield of foreign affairs and frontiers. At the same time, however, so much still could be done: multiethnic communities in Nagasaki, Japanese-trading stations in Korea, foreign trade and environ-

mental degradation in Japan, early-seventeenth-century Japanese trading communities in Southeast Asia and their environmental impact, and many other topics cry out for investigation by talented scholars.

Second, an interpretative gulf exists among scholars of early modern Japan. Those who study domestic-centered topics, ranging from literary studies to domainal politics and economics, often sound like they are talking about a different country than those writing on foreign affairs and frontiers. Increasingly, historians such as Philip Brown, Luke Roberts, and Mark Ravina paint a picture of an early modern polity where local domains remained the most pervasive manifestation of the political and economic country. However, in the realm of foreign affairs, few would dispute the idea that the Edo shogunate maintained tight control over contact with the outside world, a concrete manifestation of a state in the process of centering power. These two ideas are not mutually exclusive, but Japan specialists have yet to integrate them into one convincing narrative of Japan’s early modern experience. To date, in the collective scholarship of Japan specialists, two political countries coincide and sometimes collide in one temporal and spatial frame. One aim of future research should be to reconcile some of these differences.

Third, the new writings on early modern foreign affairs and frontiers have failed to convince historians of the modern period of the complexity of Japan’s pre-Meiji relations with the outside world. Many modernists still slavishly use the “closed country” (sakoku) and “open country” (kaikoku) dichotomy to explain Japan’s plunge into the modern age. It is still common to talk of the “opening of the country” with Matthew C. Perry, and how in the 1850s Japan was forced to confront for the first time the practice of international diplomacy. This is, of course, highly misleading, but it does make the task of writing about the Meiji years easier. With sakoku, we can be told that only in the Meiji period did Japan master diplomacy, conduct foreign trade, conquer foreign lands, and develop collective philosophies similar to what might be described as a “national” identity. The next step, it seems to me, is to have a broader penetration of the complexity of early modern foreign affairs and frontiers into the other subfields of Japanese studies. This would require the onerous process of rethinking topics such as modern Japanese expansionism, but it would surely enrich our understanding of Japan’s past and present.
Chapter 3

Both a Banker and a Poet Be: Village Elite Networks in Late-Tokugawa Japan

Brian Platt

I Introduction

While the bulk of Ronald Toby’s research on Tokugawa Japan focuses on issues of diplomacy and ethnic identity, his article “Both a Borrower and a Lender Be” makes an original contribution to the study of proto-industrialization in the Japanese countryside. Tracing the lending patterns of one family of hereditary headmen over the last several decades of the Tokugawa period, he demonstrates that they came to borrow money from elite families in other villages to provide additional capital for their own lending activities. In doing so, they graduated from mere “moneylender” to “banker,” thus enhancing the potential for capital accumulation and making possible new forms of entrepreneurial activity.1

This development represents one aspect of a larger phenomenon that occurred during the last half of the Tokugawa period: the formation of regional networks among village elites. This process began in the eighteenth century when village notables, seeking to reaffirm their local status on a foundation of literary credentials, established intra-regional ties through aesthetic pursuits. Indeed, the family of bankers in Toby’s article invested a good deal of time and money in their self-image as literati, building up cultural capital as well as financial capital. In the last few decades of the Tokugawa period, these same networks of village elites that provided capital for rural bankers also allowed for the spread of ideological movements aimed at restoring order to rural communities and shoring up the local authority of village leaders. The circulation of commodities, poetry, capital, and ideas along these networks fostered a common identity among village elites.

elites, while also creating a kind of public sphere that enabled them to contribute their voices and energies to the Restoration movement and the formation of the Meiji state.

II Status, Aesthetic Pursuits, and Elite Networks in Eighteenth-Century Society

The first half of the Tokugawa period saw an important transformation in the structure of rural society. During the course of the eighteenth century, the power of village magnates (dogo)––who typically held expansive landholdings, supported large numbers of dependents, and enjoyed a monopoly on local political position––began to decline relative to the general village population. A growing parity in landholding and burgeoning demands for political participation from below led to a narrowing of the economic and political distance between magnates and other landholders in rural society. This decline in the power of multi-village magnates did not result in a leveling of status distinctions within village society, but it did involve changes in the roles and activities of village elites and the criteria for social distinction within the village. One aspect of this change was the linking together of village elites into networks of communication and interaction.

These networks were forged in part by the political and economic activities of village elites. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, local political administration increasingly required village officials to interact and cooperate with one another—to attend meetings with other village officials in the same village league (kumiai), to circulate overlord decrees, to arrange for the shipment of tax rice to Edo, and so on. In addition, the first half of the Tokugawa period also saw the expansion of commercial activity in rural society. This expansion was gradual and uneven, and did not mark a sudden and fundamental change in the livelihood of most rural families; nonetheless, commercial activity tied villages together into what Wigen calls “functional regions,” usually centered on regional castle towns. Commercialization, therefore, provided another context for interaction and communication, particularly among village elites who were positioned to take advantage of commercial opportunities.

But while political and economic practices helped to foster regional interaction among village elites, cultural practices—namely, aesthetic and in-


tellectual pursuits—were perhaps most instrumental to the formation of elite networks. These pursuits flourished in Japan’s major urban centers during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Then, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, these cultural pursuits spread quickly to regional urban centers and, from there, into the hinterlands. This diffusion of cultural pursuits occurred largely through the movements and activities of village elites. In turn, these individuals and their movements and activities provided both the infrastructure and generating force behind the formation of the networks of information that are the focus of this essay.

Let me explore the dynamics of the formation of these networks by focusing on the aesthetic and literary pursuits of village elites in Shinano province. Like many provinces in central Japan, Shinano was politically fragmented, composed of fifteen different domains and dozens of Bakufu territories scattered throughout the province and administered by intendants in regional urban centers. Several major transportation arteries passed through Shinano, giving it ready access to the urban cultures of both Edo and Kyoto and linking it northwards towards the Tōhoku region and southwards towards Nagoya and the Nobi plain. Its location and geo-political conditions were thus ideal for the transmission of culture and information. For the first hundred and fifty years of the Tokugawa period, however, village elites did not actively seek out contacts outside of their own immediate vicinity for the purpose of pursuing aesthetic and literary knowledge. Even the passing of Matsuo Bashō through Shinano in 1688 elicited little interest from local elites.

By the mid-eighteenth century, however, a few native Shinano residents had begun making a name for themselves in Edo or Kyoto poetry circles. One such individual was Oshima Ryoṭa (1718-1787), who was born into a wealthy commoner family in the Ina district but left the family business as a young man to live in Edo and study with some of Matsuo Bashō’s pupils. Ryoṭa eventually achieved fame and status as one of Edo’s top poets. Upon reaching this pinnacle, however, he returned to Shinano and opened up a haikai school in the castle town of Matsushiro, organizing the publication of over two hundred poetry volumes and teaching over three thousand pupils, who ranged from merchants and rural elites from nearby vil-

lasses to the daimyo of Matsushiro domain, Sanada Yukihiro. Similarly, Kaya Shirao (1737-91) was the second son of a samurai in Ueda domain who achieved nationwide fame as a haikai master in Edo. Shirao opened up his own school in Edo during the spring and autumn, but in summer and winter he returned to Shinano and taught thousands of aspiring poets (mostly commoners) from throughout the province—many of whom would eventually become haikai teachers themselves, and who raised money to publish ten volumes of Shirao’s poems after his death. Through the movements of provincial elites like Ryōta and Shirao, cultural forms were carried from the national urban centers to regional urban centers.

These regional urban centers, however, did not serve merely as provincial outposts of Edo and Kyoto culture. After nationally known masters like Ryōta and Shirao returned from Edo to the provinces, they—and the castle towns in which they usually set up shop—became hubs in the generation of regional cultures. And if Ryōta and Shirao acted as the “hubs” of such regional cultures, then the “spokes” were formed by individuals like Kobayashi Issa (1763-1827), a native Shinano poet from a later generation of local haikai masters. Issa came from a humbler background than most other Edo-trained Shinano poets. His family lived in Kashiwabara, a small post town in northern Shinano, near the primary roadway connecting Shinano to northeastern Japan. His father held only about six koku of land, which would classify him as a small landholder—enough for agricultural self-sufficiency but definitely not enough to be considered among the economic elite of the village. The family once had significant holdings, but generations of partitioning among multiple offspring had dissipated their holdings considerably. At age 15, Issa went to Edo for a term of domestic service (hōkō); this was not, it seems, the “grand tour” type of domestic service mentioned above, but a one-year term involving unskilled manual labor. While there, however, he found time to study poetry briefly with some friends he met in Edo, and when he returned to Edo ten years later, he formally entered the tutelage of a poetry master in the Katsushika school of haikai. He gradually climbed his way up the Edo poetry circles and traveled extensively throughout Western Japan teaching and writing.

9. This is not to suggest that Edo was the “original source” for all Edo-period culture, and that provincial areas like Shinano were simply cultural blank slates, waiting for “Edo culture” to reach the peripheries. Constantine Vaporis has effectively criticized this notion in a recent article, in which he argues that “Edo culture” itself was in part the product of the interaction of influences brought from the provinces to Edo. See Vaporis, “To Edo and Back: Alternate Attendance and Japanese Culture in the Early Modern Period,” in Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 23, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 25-67.
poetry.

Issa eventually returned to Shinano, but unlike earlier haikai masters like Ryōta and Shirao, he did not establish a permanent school in a regional urban center. Rather, he became an itinerant poetry teacher with a clientele scattered in villages throughout northern Shinano. According to Issa’s diary, during the last fifteen years of his life, he spent nearly two-thirds of his days away from his home in Kashiwabara, staying in the homes of village elites who had entered his tutelage. The individuals to whom he taught poetry (at least, those whose names can be located on local tax and population registers) were the upper crust of village society: headmen, sake brewers, large landlords, and so on.11 Around this time, many of these wealthy villagers began building an extra room in their homes specifically for the purpose of housing wandering literati such as Issa.12 These wealthy villagers were not merely students, but patrons, with whose support haikai culture reached further into village society through regionally prominent poets like Issa.

We can witness a similar dynamic in the spread of other aesthetic pursuits as well. Terajima Sōhan (1794-1884), for example, was a regional ikebana (flower arranging) master from a wealthy farm family in northeast Shinano who had studied in Edo with the nationally renowned ikebana master, Shōfū Enshū. Like the poet Issa, upon returning to his hometown, Sōhan spent decades traveling around the province, teaching both ikebana and Noh to village elites in exchange for temporary room and board. According to Sōhan’s records, he taught over one thousand students in Shinano during this period.13 In a similar fashion, the popularization of waka poetry in Shinano can also be traced to the movements and teaching activities of commoner elites. Momozawa Mutaku (1737-1810), for example, was the son of a village headman in the Ina district who, according to the records of one of his pupils, developed a passion for waka as a youth, and traveled to Kyoto at the age of thirty to study with master Chōgetsu.14 Upon returning to his home in 1801, Momozawa founded a waka society. Hundreds of samurai, castle-town merchants, and village elites from throughout southern and western Shinano flocked to his home to study with this prestigious figure in regional poetry circles.

The transmission of new ideologies in eighteenth-century Shinano followed a similar pattern. Particularly important was Shingaku, a religious movement that flourished in the merchant communities of Kyoto and Edo.

11. Ibid., pp. 113-116.
13. Sōhan’s records are in NKKS, vol. 8, #1.
14. This quote is found in the diary of one of Mutaku’s students, a headman and aspiring haiku poet in the Northern Ina district of Shinano. Ibid., #128.
and was carried into the provinces by disciples during the last few decades of the eighteenth century. While Shingaku originated in the major urban centers and diffused outward into the provinces, the agency behind this diffusion lay not only in the center, but also in the periphery—namely, in the activities of commoner elites in villages and provincial towns. The spread of Shingaku in Shinano is usually attributed to the efforts of two Shinano natives, Nakamura Shūsuke (1732-1816) and Uematsu Jiken (1749-1810). Both were born in villages alongside major highways in Shinano, and spent much of their time in Japan’s major urban centers: Shūsuke spent part of each year in Kyoto as a silk thread merchant, while Jiken went to Edo as an apprentice and eventually opened up his own bookstore there.\(^{15}\) Both became disciples of Shingaku in their forties after a time of study at Shingaku meetinghouses (kōsha) in Kyoto and Edo, and both returned to Shinano to establish meetinghouses in their home villages.\(^{16}\) More important to the spread of Shingaku than these meetinghouses, however, were Shūsuke and Jiken’s traveling lectures. Shūsuke traveled throughout most of Shinano, teaching nearly five thousand students from 350 different villages.\(^{17}\) The geographic scope of Jiken’s preaching was even larger, including the provinces of Kai, Kōzuke, Bishū, and much of central Japan.

But the dynamics of the spread of Shingaku in Shinano were not limited simply to the movements of two exceptional individuals who traveled to the center and returned to transmit new forms of knowledge throughout the periphery. Once they returned to Shinano, it was only through the patronage and connections of village elites that Shingaku became a prefecture-wide phenomenon. Shūsuke’s case is illustrative here. During the first several years after returning to Shinano, he concentrated his teaching activity in castle towns (particularly Matsushiro, Suzaka, and Ueda) and in nearby post towns on major highways.\(^{18}\) During this time, many of his pupils were from villages near these towns, and were similar in background to those village elites who traveled to castle towns to study at private schools or with regionally renowned poetry masters. After studying Shingaku with Shūsuke and returning to their home villages, these elites served as a kind

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\(^{15}\) Biographical information on Shūsuke and Jiken can be found in Nagano-ken kyōikushi, vol. 1, pp. 170-71. As a youth, Shūsuke had studied poetry in Ueda with Kaya Shirao, the aforementioned haikai master who achieved notoriety as a prominent Edo poet while also spending part of each year in Shinano tutoring aspiring local poets.

\(^{16}\) For a discussion about the organization and activities of Shingaku meetinghouses, see Janine Sawada, Confucian Values and Popular Zen (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 46-48.

\(^{17}\) Shūsuke’s records of his students is found in Nagano-ken kyōikushi, vol. 7, #307.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
of human infrastructure for Shūsuke’s evangelistic activities, housing and feeding him as he traveled throughout the province.

What was occurring at this time was not merely what Nishiyama has dubbed the “diffusion” of Edo and Kyoto culture to the peripheries, but the formation of new, regional communities of cultural production. Castle towns served as the nodal points for these communities. This was where the poetry of regionally renowned masters was compiled and published, usually through the initiative and funding of their former students. This was also where village elites from throughout the region gathered to study and socialize with other aspiring literati. Upon returning to their respective villages, they sometimes took on their own pupils; in other cases, they formed local poetry associations with other like-minded elites from nearby villages. These regional communities had their own “who’s who” catalogues of local literary figures, as well as their own hierarchies of masters; famous poets like Ryōta and Shirao rested at the top of such hierarchies, while part-time connoisseurs in the countryside occupied the bottom. These communities sometimes had their own local histories, written by regional poets or artists who sought to legitimize their local field of cultural action and make a name for themselves within it.

Before exploring the implications of these networks for the subsequent history of late-Tokugawa and Meiji Japan, it is worth considering why, in the mid- to late-Tokugawa period, village elites began to invest so much time and money into aesthetic and literary pursuits. The answer to this question lies, in part, in the changes in the role and position of village elites over the course of the first half of the Tokugawa period. During this time, the dominant position of early-Tokugawa rural magnates grew more precarious. This involved, as noted above, the erosion of the economic basis for their local authority. Many headmen and elder (toshiyori) families were faced with difficult financial circumstances: in addition to the financial attrition caused by the tendency to divide family landholdings fairly equally among at least two male offspring, the burdens of public office also caused a significant drain on the time and resources of elite families.

As a result, some hereditary headmen in Shinano actually quit and renounced their families’ position and the privileges and responsibilities it entailed. The house rules of one elite family in Ueda domain actually forbade family members from seeking public office, arguing that it took time away from the family businesses, often resulted in troublesome lawsuits,

and incurred the jealousy of other villagers.22 Meanwhile, many landholders—especially those whose holdings had increased significantly over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or who had profited from commercial opportunities—began to challenge the monopoly over political office held by long-standing elite families. One strategy of up-and-coming families was to petition for the creation of additional elder (toshiyori) positions, thereby opening up political office to previously ineligible families, some of whom were of small landholder (kobyakushō) status.23 A directive issued by Matsumoto domain in 1800 noted this development: “In recent years,” the author lamented, “we see [officials] from among men of small landholder status. In fact, there are some villages where all the officials are small landholders.”24 The decree stipulated that henceforth only one official in each village could be of small landholder status, with the other two coming from traditional elite families; in so ruling, the domain attempted to constrain the political power of those families of small landholder status, but also sanctioned their inclusion among the political leadership of the village. Up-and-coming families also challenged the status trappings of older elite families. Many families of small landholder status—and even some non-titled peasants (kakae, kadoya, mizunomi)—became quite wealthy, and sometimes used their newfound wealth to purchase the status of titled peasant (onbyakushō).25 Others violated village laws by wearing certain types of clothing and materials that had customarily been restricted to titled families; more than a few village disputes (murakata sōdō) in Shinano started over such seemingly trivial matters.

For those long-standing elite families who sought to preserve their local position at this time—as well as for those up-and-coming families who aspired to elite status—such matters were far from trivial. As Bourdieu has argued, it is precisely when the economic or political foundations of status have been shaken that such symbolic sources of status become more valuable.26 Such a claim is based on the notion that symbolic capital is fully convertible with economic or political capital, and can therefore function to bolster status even when its material foundation has eroded. Ooms has used this concept in his study of intra-village conflict, viewing titles (like onbyakushō), clothing materials, and types of housing as forms of symbolic capital that functioned to maintain or create status differences.27 This

concept is also useful in understanding the involvement of village elites in aesthetic and literary pursuits. Facing various challenges to their economic and political dominance in village society, village elites invested in such pursuits as a means of creating a new foundation for their local status. As Iwahashi points out, this increased involvement of village elites in aesthetic and literary pursuits was accompanied by the emergence of *yuisho*, in which elite families traced the history of their leadership role in the community in an effort to legitimate their monopoly of local political office. These *yuisho*, Iwahashi argues, were usually written in response to specific challenges to the authority of elite families, and thus reflected another strategy by which elites sought to shore up their authority by shifting it to new foundations. See Iwahashi Kiyomi, “Kinsei kōki ni okeru rekishi ishiki no keisei katei,” *Kantō kinseiishi kenkyū*, no. 34 (September 1993), pp. 8-34).

28. As Iwahashi points out, this increased involvement of village elites in aesthetic and literary pursuits was accompanied by the emergence of *yuisho*, in which elite families traced the history of their leadership role in the community in an effort to legitimate their monopoly of local political office. These *yuisho*, Iwahashi argues, were usually written in response to specific challenges to the authority of elite families, and thus reflected another strategy by which elites sought to shore up their authority by shifting it to new foundations. See Iwahashi Kiyomi, “Kinsei kōki ni okeru rekishi ishiki no keisei katei,” *Kantō kinseiishi kenkyū*, no. 34 (September 1993), pp. 8-34).


31. Furuichi’s “who’s who” guide is discussed in Tasaki, p. 286.
graphic space (the distance between Mikawa and Yamagata) and an equally significant social space (between commoners and samurai). The connections were made through personal contact, but the extent of a given individual’s social network was not confined to those whom he encountered personally: in this case, the link was between a friend of a friend. All of Imai’s contacts, in other words, could potentially become Furuichi’s contacts, and vice versa. As a result, the cumulative scope of these elite networks was far greater than that which could be achieved by the movements of a single individual. And while these took shape through the involvement of village elites in aesthetic and literary pursuits, they made possible the transmission of other sorts of knowledge and information. As a result, their historical import would soon reach far beyond the realm of aesthetic practice.

III Information Networks and the Roots of the Nation-State

A number of important developments from the last several decades of the Tokugawa period can be traced to the formation of these elite networks. As Toby’s research on rural banking has shown, these networks allowed village elites to use borrowed capital in their moneylending practices, thus stimulating an exponential increase in the supply of credit in rural society and, ultimately, providing the capital for Japan’s industrialization. These networks also allowed for the spread of various kinds of information in late Tokugawa society, fueling both a public activism among local elites and a process of cultural integration that linked together distant regions by strands of shared knowledge. Both of these developments would have far-reaching implications for the Tokugawa political order and the formation of the modern nation-state after the Meiji Restoration.

Networks of village elites took shape in the context of cultural pursuits, as aspiring literati passed on the latest literary trends from Kyoto, formed poetry associations, gained introductions to prominent haikai masters, and so on. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these same networks also enabled village elites to share information about socio-economic conditions. They were particularly concerned with a number of problems that plagued rural society in the late Tokugawa period and threatened the status and position of village elites. Natural disasters—for example, the eruption of Mount Asama in 1783 and the string of poor weather in the 1830s—exacerbated famine conditions and brought tremendous suffering and instability to rural society. Village depopulation, the result of starvation, increased migration, and poverty-induced dekasegi, eroded the village tax base and destabilized the local labor supply for wealthy households who depended upon hired help. Commentators also took note of the sharp increase in internal village disputes (murakata sōdō), in which ordinary villagers directly challenged village elites’ monopoly of social and
political privileges.

In and of themselves, conditions such as famine and unrest were not unprecedented. However, because village elites were now linked by networks of information, they were increasingly aware that such conditions were not confined to their own communities. As a result, phenomena that might have otherwise been viewed as localized or temporary were seen as pervasive and chronic, and were interpreted as signs of a profoundly disordered world. This disorder manifested itself in the social, political, and economic realms but was, in the view of many village elites, moral and cosmological at its root. There even emerged a common language to describe this crisis. For example, one striking metaphor that appears in the writings of a number of village elites is that of a “world on thin ice”—a metaphor that comes from *The Book of Odes*, an ancient Confucian text that village elites would likely have encountered in their training as literati.

In the late eighteenth century, village elites began to seek out ideological movements aimed at fixing this perceived crisis. These ideologies, too, spread among village elites via the same networks that had originally been formed in the context of aesthetic pursuits.32 Such ideological movements were remarkably diverse in their intellectual provenance, ranging from Kokugaku to Shingaku and Confucianism. What they shared, however, was the goal of restoring social and moral order to the village community at a time of distress and anxiety. These ideologies also informed the efforts of village elites to adopt new measures and create new local institutions for the purpose of rejuvenating rural communities in the midst of this perceived crisis. Thousands of elites, for example, opened schools in their communities beginning in the 1830s, and encouraged the attendance of local children; schooling, they believed, would enable them to both inculcate morality among local people and transmit useful skills, thus fostering economic improvement and moral regeneration within their communities.33 Other elites, believing that the neglect of agriculture was at the root of both famine and moral decline, initiated land reclamation campaigns and other public works projects in an attempt to effect economic and spiritual

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renewal. Others, distressed by the prevalence of infanticide and child abandonment in late-Tokugawa society, devised new arrangements for orphanage care. In the final years of the Tokugawa period, many village elites organized farmer militia in order to defend local communities against the threat of foreign invasion and domestic insurrection. A few elites even established quasi-public libraries, distributing free copies of exhortatory tracts and making outreach visits to the local poor.

These initiatives were not completely novel: most had historical precedents in the repertoire of reformist measures available to political leaders and were informed by Confucian notions of benevolent governance. What is significant, however, is that thousands of village elites were prompted at this particular moment to adopt these measures in response to what they perceived to be a crisis in late-Tokugawa society. Their efforts were, in many respects, consistent with what Harootunian has described as a secessionary movement in late-Tokugawa Japan: with the Tokugawa regime unable to save the realm from a condition of crisis, village elites took proactive measures to resolve this crisis within a proscribed local space. In the process, elites began to reconceptualize their own role within this local space, viewing it increasingly as a public office—or, more precisely, as a vehicle for the expression of public activism. In this capacity, they sought to intervene in a variety of social practices (education, land reclamation, orphanage care, and so on) and make them matters of public concern. Elite

37. Tasaki Tetsuro, “Zaison chishikijin,” pp. 302-309. Tasaki gives the example of a library established by Hadano Takao, a Hirata disciple. Hadano originally created this library in an effort to compile Nativist texts and distribute them among his fellow Hirata disciples, but gradually expanded its scope and function during the 1850s and 60s. Hadano even put up signs to direct travelers to the library, where they could borrow volumes for a month-long loan period or peruse volumes in the library’s reading room.
networks had helped to make this development possible: not only did they facilitate the transmission of new ideologies and new strategies for local regeneration, but the horizontal, extra-village linkages among elites also allowed elites to visualize themselves outside the context of their community, which in turn enabled them to think in an abstract way about their own position in the overall structure and rationale of the Tokugawa order and thus conceptualize the public dimension of their role in local society. This development was deeply significant for the formation of the modern Japanese state, because it facilitated the Meiji government’s effort to bring the public initiatives of late-Tokugawa elites under its own purview, and provided the rationale by which it mobilized the support of local elites behind this effort.

The importance of elite networks in Tokugawa society took on a new dimension in the mid-nineteenth century, when the threat of Western imperialism transformed them into a vehicle for the transmission of political information and a forum for discussion of current events. As Miyachi has shown in his study of *fu¯setsu tome* (private journals containing news reports on contemporary events), Commodore Perry’s arrival in 1853 provoked furious efforts by commoner elites throughout the country to collect and transmit information about Japan’s dealings with the West and about the Japanese leaders who were responsible for such dealings. He also demonstrates that this information was collected and transmitted via the same networks that had taken shape in the context of aesthetic and intellectual pursuits. Miyachi argues that these networks allowed for the emergence of public opinion as a political force in Tokugawa society, and thus constituted a central component of an emergent public sphere. As he points out, this public sphere diverged from the Habermasian model in one key respect: because of Bakufu censorship, political information could not be fully commodified and sold on the market (in the form of newspapers, for example). It was precisely due to this constraint, however, that the networks of information-gathering subjects were so crucial.

Through these networks, village elites not only could know about contemporary political and diplomatic issues, but could engage in a discussion of those issues and thus contribute to the formation of public opinion on the momentous events and policy decisions taking place during the Bakumatsu era. This development was inimical to the Tokugawa regime in two important respects. First, the organization of territory into autonomous han...
and the division of people into distinct status orders, both of which were fundamental to the rationale of the Tokugawa order, were undermined by the formation of elite networks that transcended those divisions. In addition, the political operation of the Tokugawa regime assumed a monopoly over the flow of discussion and information. The unprecedented broadening of public discussion in the late Tokugawa period destroyed that monopoly, bringing the conduct and decisions of the Tokugawa government into full public view precisely at the time when it was being thrust into the realm of modern international politics and diplomacy. Since the government was accustomed to acting autonomously in its political decisions, it was paralyzed when forced to operate in an environment of public discussion. The anti-bakufu forces, by contrast, capitalized on such an environment—for example, when activists in Chōshū published and distributed hundreds of thousands of pamphlets in an effort to articulate its cause to the Japanese people. Defining the limits of that popular involvement would become one of the central political projects of the Meiji period.

The formation of this public sphere was part of a larger, longer process of cultural integration in Tokugawa society. The main engines behind this process were urbanization, the commercialization of print culture, and, as I’ve explored in this essay, the formation of networks among local elites. Increasingly, people in Tokugawa society read the same texts, bought the same woodblock prints, visited the same tourist sites, imagined themselves in the same geographic space. As Berry points out, this integration resulted not in cultural unity or sameness, but rather in the formation of “integrative principles that can connect necessarily different units in society—the ideas or mental habits that permit fragmented units to situate themselves in a whole.” Following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese society was able to coalesce around such integrative principles inherited from the Tokugawa period, permitting the relatively rapid formation of a modern nation-state.

43. One integrative principle that would prove central to this process was ethnicity. Ronald Toby has turned to precisely this issue in his recent research, using visual sources to demonstrate how Tokugawa culture imagined self and other in ethnic terms. It did so using a code of signifiers (such as hairstyles, clothing and diet) that provided a vocabulary and a conceptual framework for articulating Japanese ethnic identity. See Toby, “The Narcissism of Petty Differences,” book manuscript. Toby’s earlier research on rural banking complements this recent work, in that it uncovers the networks through which these concepts of ethnicity and identity were disseminated among the Japanese population.
Chapter 4

福井藩芝原上水における利用違反の処罰
—近世都市における家臣団の位置づけ—

The Violation of Waterworks Regulations
in the Edo Era
—The Character of Vassal Groups in FUKUI HAN—

藤村 聡（Satoshi Fujimura）

I 初めに

I 本稿の課題

近世城下町の居住者集団は、おおまかには武家一町一寺院の三者に区分される。このうち研究の遅れが指摘されてきた武家集団も近年は多様な観点から考察が進められ、豊富な情報が蓄積された。しかし、そこでは専ら江戸の大名屋敷（藩邸）が対象であり、諸藩の城下町で家臣団が都市居住者として、どのように位置づけられ、いかなる性格を持っていたのかという問題は充分には解明されていない1。

筆者は先に福井藩の上水管理の実態を分析した。本稿では福井藩の家臣団を題材に、上水利用における違反行為の処罰を通じて都市居住者としての武家集団（家臣団）の性格とその変容を検討する2。上水は橋や街道と同じく、空間

1 武家屋敷に関する研究には、武家屋敷の所有形態については宮崎善美「江戸の武家屋敷地」（高橋康夫・吉田伸之編『日本都市史入門』第1巻 東京大学出版会 1989年）、宗教的活動は吉田正美「江戸都市民の大名屋敷内鎮守への参詣行動」（『地方史研究』第284号 2000年）、都市公共施設の関連では岩嵜孝治「江戸武家方番の制度の変動」（『史学雑誌』第102巻 3号 1993年）、総括的な研究としては宮崎善美・吉田伸之編『武家屋敷』（山川出版社 1994年）や藤川昌樹「近世の武家屋敷と都市史研究」（都市史研究会編『年報都市史研究』城下町の類型』山川出版社 1994年）など。

藤村 聡

的、あるいは身分的な差異を越えて城下全域を覆う重要な都市公共施設であり、上水利用に伴う事柄は家臣団だけでなく町にも共通し、同一の制御下に両者の対比が可能である。本稿は家臣団を対象にしつつ、必要に応じて町人と比較し、都市居住者としての家臣団の性格を考察したい。

2 福井藩家臣団と芝原上水の概要

福井藩の石高（朱印高）の変遷は、初代藩主の結城秀康が越前一国68万石を領有したものの、貞享3（1686）年には6代藩主の嗣昌が改易されて同藩の石高は25万石に減知された。その後、享保年間に30万石に復帰し、近世後期には32万石で推移して維新を迎えた。また藩主秀康の血統は宝暦8（1758）年に16歳で没した11代藩主重昌で絶え、以降は将軍家一族から迎えた養子が藩主に居いている。

近世を通じた城下福井の人口推移の全貌は明らかでなく、断片的な数値を提示すると、町人は慶長年間に25,231人、享保2（1717）年21,622人、天明5（1785）年21,589人、弘化4（1847）年に19,789人であった。武家人口は貞享の半知により土卒2,861家となったものの、嘉永5（1852）年には士卒3,673家に増加している。従って近世前期以降の城下人口は町人比が平準、武家は漸増傾向であり、全体的には横 تخ度であったと推測される。

福井藩は弘化4（1847）年に領内人口を調査して「御国人別帳」を作成しており、城下人口の内訳が詳細に判明する。同史料から幕末期の城下人口を抽出し、また参考までに家臣団については嘉永5年の絵帳から家数を加えて表1を作成した（家船家臣のなかには在郷居住者がいるので、その分は除外している）。

「御国人別帳」の記載様式は例えば、

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>大御番組</th>
<th>上 男</th>
<th>八百八人</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>上 女</td>
<td>八百六人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>下 男</td>
<td>八拾五人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>下 女</td>
<td>百五拾三人</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⋆千八百拾五式人</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

のように、家格別の集団ごとに集計されている。文中の「上」は当主（表の家数）と家業、「下」はその奉公人を示している。

福井藩の家臣団は、大きくは史料で「御侍」と呼ばれる士分家臣と、足軽などの卒家家臣に分ける。最上級の士分家臣は国老という尊称を持つ本多内蔵助で、同家は武生に2万石を領有し、また江戸では幕府から屋敷を拝領するなど必ずしも福井藩の家臣団体制に包摂されない特殊な存在であった。ついて
福井藩芝原上水における利用違反の処罰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>身分・家格</th>
<th>家数</th>
<th>家数 〔男/女〕</th>
<th>稲倉人 〔男/女〕</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>上級士分家臣</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>445 〔211/234〕</td>
<td>2,807 〔1,489/1,318〕</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>内 本多内蔵助</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 〔2/3〕</td>
<td>1,333 〔691/642〕</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>その他の門閥</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>440 〔209/231〕</td>
<td>1,474 〔798/676〕</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中級士分家臣：番士</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>2,924 〔1,487/1,437〕</td>
<td>518 〔201/317〕</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>下級士分家臣：新番以下</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>570 〔276/294〕</td>
<td>127 〔49/78〕</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>土分家臣</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>3,939 〔1,974/1,965〕</td>
<td>3,432 〔1,739/1,713〕</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

人口合計 32,683人 〔男16,649人/女16,034人〕

[「御国人別帳」[松平文庫] 福井県立図書館]

高知席（16家）－高家（2家）－寄合席（38家）－定番外席（14家）と続き、この71家が門閥とも呼ばれる上級士分家臣である。中級の士分家臣は家臣団の中核である番士（601家）であり、下級士分家臣は新番（81家）や医師等（49家）で、士分家臣の合計は本多内蔵助を含めて802家である。与力や足軽などの卒業家臣は細かくは御目見得の資格を持つ者でない者に分かれ、その総数は1,898家であった。

町人と寺社は「御国人別帳」では

足羽郡福井：町中・寺社・門前・宿屋・地名子・地方男女当歳以上

一、男九千九百七十人
二、女九千八百五十人

一、寺社百四十七人
内、社人四人

一、尼三十一人

メ式方式百五十人

内、三千百五十人

地方

と総数のみが記載されている。このほか城下の「御印地神明」に僧4名と社人2人のほか、男3人と女5人の計14人が居住していた。これらの記載から城下町人は19,789人、寺社は男450人と女30人の合計480人であったことが判明する。史料では「地方」の人口も含まれているが、ここでの「地方」は城下周囲
表２ 城下人口比率

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>家族</th>
<th>家分家臣</th>
<th>3,939 (12.1)</th>
<th>奉公人</th>
<th>3,452 (10.6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>卒族家臣</td>
<td>4,984 (15.2)</td>
<td>9 (0.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>町人</td>
<td>19,789 (60.5)</td>
<td>－</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>寺社</td>
<td>480 (1.5)</td>
<td>－</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総計</td>
<td>32,683人</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

（）は総計にいう％である。

で、実質的な城下城を意味している。また町人の記載では家族と奉公人は区分されておらず、これは両者の間に身分の差異がなかったためと判断される。

以上の数値を、表1に整理した。表1によれば、士分家臣の家族数の合計は3,939人で、その奉公人は3,452人である。ただし本多内蔵助の奉公人には、明らかに家に仕える武士身分の陪臣を含み、同じく家禄が大きい高知（最大4500石）などの上級家臣の奉公人も、若干の陪臣が存在すると思われる。ただし奉公人の大部分は屋敷内の雑労働に携わる雇用者で、その身分は町農民であったことは間違いない。奉公人数は家禄の多寡に比例し、本多内蔵助は1家で1,333人の奉公人を持ち、町人11家では奉公人は2,807人（1家平均40人）である。しかし中下級の士分家臣では1家平均1人以下に激減し、卒族家臣では1,808家に対して奉公人は30人しかいない。

また家族規模を見ると、上級士分家臣は1家平均6.3人である一方、中級士分家臣は1家4.9人、下級士分家臣は4.4人、卒族家臣は2.6人となっており、家禄の大きさと家族規模には比例関係が見受けられる。奉公人と寺社を除けば、それぞれの集団内の男女比には、それほどの相違は感じられない。

表2では、表1から身分別城下人口比率を算出した。幕末期城下の人口比率は総計32,683人うち、家臣数（士卒合計、当主と家族）は8,923人で城下人口の27.3%、武家奉公人（士卒合計、一部に武士身分を含む）は3,491人で10.7%、そして町人が19,789人で60.5%、寺社480人で1.5%という構成であった。

これに約3万3千人が居住した福井城下で、飲用水や生活用水を供給したのが芝原上水である。芝原上水の開設時期はさくらでなく、近世初頭に国老本多家が開設したともいわれる。芝原上水は九頭竜川の松原大堰から、途中の村々に農業用水を分水しつつ約10キロメートルを流れ、上流域では上水路に油絵りの水車が建てられたほか、川幅が広いので灌漑用の運搬水路としても使用された。そして城下人口の志名口で上水路は大きく2つの経路に分岐したのち、城下では毛細血管的に複数の上水路に分流して、城郭内はもちろん、各家臣の武家屋敷や町々を流れて飲用水や生活用水として利用された。

芝原上水は、江戸の上水道のような地中に埋設された暗渠ではなく、水面が
福井藩芝原上水における利用違失の処罰

露出した開渠である。取水口の松岡大堰から城下まで上水路の幅は3間であるが、城下では各所で分岐することに上水路の幅は狭められて末端では幅2尺になり、これは流速や流量を保つための工夫であったという。城下の上水路は武家屋敷地では街路の一方の縁に、町地では街路の中央に設置され、武家屋敷地と町地では異なる景観を生んでいる。

多くの武家屋敷は「泉水」という屋敷前の上水路から水を引き込んで廻内を循環させる装置を持ち、泉水には再び水を上水路に戻す「元返し」と屋敷裏の悪水を排出する「悪水落」という2種類があった。元返しと悪水落では泉水口寸法に大小の違いを定めて取水量を調整している。

町地には「河戸」や「食水溜」と呼ばれる設備があり、前者は上水を汲むために上水路に降りる石段、後者は水を汲み上げやすくする目的で水底に埋められた桶である。

芝原上水の管理は、上水奉行とその配下の長柄組足軽２名が担当したが、管理態勢の充実のために明和5（1768）年に数名在職していた目付から上水行政を専管する「上水掛目付」を1名選び、同じに目付組（史料では「組之者」と表記される）の足軽２名を付けて上水方の足軽を４名とした。上水掛目付は上水奉行を指揮し、文化10年に一旦廃止されたものの、上水利用に紊乱が生じたとして翌11年には再設置された。

上水の管理制度は徐々に整備が進められ、特に明和5年と文化11年には諸法令が出されるなど大きな変革が認められる。その際の変更は従来の政策の否定や根本的な方針転換ではなく、おおむね既に定着していた慣習の明文化や法令の遵守勧告を中心であり、前例を踏襲し、その方向に則った強化策というべき性格の強い。

本稿が分析素材にした『上水掛御用留拔書』（以下『御用留』と略記）は、嘉永元年に上水掛目付に就任した浅井政昭（八百里）が伝来の上水関係の諸文書を整理した編纂史料であり、延宝3（1675）年から嘉永2（1849）年までの記事を収録する（嘉永2年以後も、必要なことを若干の記事が補足されている）。浅井政昭は藩主慶永（春嶽）の側近で右筆兼近習を歴任し、藩政改革を志した有能な藩官僚であったが、嘉永2年に37歳で急逝した。現在でも同人が編纂した藩政文書は『御用留』以外にも多く残っている。

『御用留』の内部は「上水掛旧例考」と「上水掛近例考」に大別され、さらに「旧例考」は延宝3年～明和4（1767）年、明和5年～文化10（1813）年の2つの時期に区分される。明和4年までの記述はきわめて簡素で1年分は数行か、まったく記述がない年もあり、浅井政昭は特に目を惹いた事項のみ収録している。しかし明和5年以後は年ごとにページが割り付けられ、記事の内容と

3 『松平文庫』福井県立図書館蔵。本史料は冒頭と末尾の部分が『日本都市生活史料集成』（四、城下町編II 学習研究社 1976年）に翻刻されている。
種類は急速に豊富になる。
文化年間には一時的に上水行政は混乱し、「旧例考」でも文化8年の部分は空白で、文化9年と同10年の記事も数行にすぎない。しかし上水掛目付が再設置された文化11年から史料名は「近例考」に変わり、史料が編集された嘉永年間に向かって記述は再び詳細になる。こうした『御用留』の構成と記事の精細さは、上水掛目付を基軸にした上水の管理制度の変化に照応したものと理解できる。
『御用留』の内容は、上水の管理役職の人事異動、取綱の法令、処罰、補修普通、水量分配の争議、城下一斉の清掃日などの社会的行事といった種々の事項を収録する。

II 違反者の処罰

1 取綱の概要

芝原上水の最大の目的は、城下居住者に円滑かつ充分に上水を供給することであり、そのため藩は上水の汚損や不適な取水を禁止する利用規定を設け、それに違反する行為を処罰した。『御用留』の冒頭に収録された延宝3（1675）年の通は「伊良部相談宛、弥上水へと茶を物見問敷旨、下々江柵の口支付候」とあり、ほかの年でも上水への汚物投棄や上水で手足などを洗うことを禁止した触が頻出する。上水方に所属する数名の足軽は、毎日2回ほど城下を巡回し、違反者を摘発した。

明和5（1768）年7月には「上水之儀、御定法も有之候処、不參候儀も有之」として、上水奉行を始めとする上水方を専任で監督する上水掛目付1名が置かれた。また武家屋敷の泉水口寸法を厳格に規定し、屋敷前の上水路に堀石を埋めて取水量を増加させることを禁止した。同8月には上水方役人は各武家屋敷を廻って水口寸法を取り調べ、違反した屋敷主に罰正を命じている。

それ以外に同年の改革では上水路幅の規定、通料銀の標準額設定、流死人の取扱い、上水路の流いや制札場の指定など、上水行政全般にわたって、上水の利用規制を強化している。

しかし現実は違反行為は跡を絶たず、『御用留』はそうした違反行為に対する多くの処罰記事を収録する。その一例を挙げる。

一、同廿八日  御徒  丹羽与左衛門
通料銀壹両
右之者上水を築候を掛り之者見咎、相沢武兵衛へ申達、右之通申付候段相違候、
表3 身分別処罰数

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>期 間</th>
<th>町人</th>
<th>百姓</th>
<th>卒族家臣</th>
<th>武家奉公人</th>
<th>士分家臣</th>
<th>他</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>明和5(1768)年〜明和6(1769)年</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>明和7(1770)年〜安永3(1774)年</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安永4(1775)年〜安永8(1779)年</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安永9(1780)年〜天明4(1784)年</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>天明5(1785)年〜寛政元(1799)年</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>寛政2(1799)年〜寛政6(1794)年</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>寛政7(1795)年〜寛政11(1799)年</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>寛政12(1800)年〜文化元(1804)年</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>文化2(1805)年〜文化6(1809)年</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>文化7(1810)年〜文化10(1813)年</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>上記期間の合計:73件</td>
<td>36(49)</td>
<td>19(26)</td>
<td>10(14)</td>
<td>2(3)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>6(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>上記期間の合計:138件</td>
<td>57(41)</td>
<td>34(25)</td>
<td>25(18)</td>
<td>9(6)</td>
<td>8(6)</td>
<td>5(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 本表の処罰件数は加算である。処罰1件で複数の町人が処罰されるケースがあるので、件数と処罰人数は必ずしも一致しない。
* ( ) は各期間内の合計数における%である。

これは文化14年4月28日の記事で、上水を汚濁した御徒（卒族家臣）の丹羽左衛門に銭1両の通料銀を命じたという内容である。

処罰記載の大部分はこうした簡略な記述であり、また史料を編纂した浅井政昭（八百川）は、あくまで件数は「度々之事故、一々不記之」と記載を省略する。しかし折に触れて「八百里家スルニ」と自身の論評を加えて前後の事情を明らかにするほか、処罰規定の変更や重要な処罰事例は遺漏なく収録しており、細かく数的変化の動向はもちろ、処罰方針の長期的傾向は充分に観察できる。

まずは被処罰者を、身分別に提示しておこう。明和5（1768）年から嘉永元（1848）年まで、被処罰者を身分別に区分したものが表3である。各期間は、できるだけ5年で区切り、文化11年を画期としたので便宜的に年数を調査した箇所がある。前述のように文化年間は「御用留」自体の記載が乏しく、文化4年から同10年まで処罰記事はない。記事のあり方が常態に復するの上水行政が改革されて、『御用留』も「旧例考」から「近例考」に代わる文化11年からである。

この表から明和5年から文化10年までの時期を観察すると、処罰件数の合計73件で町人が36件、百姓19件、卒族家臣10件、武家奉公人2件である。他6件は三上町官正院と西山照寺などで、特に官正院の町は数度に亘って上水を汚
して発覚されている。浅井政昭はすべての処刑事例を『御用留』に収録したわけではないので、処刑事例数は厳密とは言えない。しかしこれ数と処刑の傾向を把握することはできる。その観点から表を見れば、文化11年以前の時期では、処刑の大部分は町人と百姓であり、戸籍家臣の処刑も多い。戸籍家臣は一応は武士身分ではありませんが、町人や百姓と同じく処刑対象に含まれていたことが判明する。

それとは異なり、士分家臣の処刑事例は、この時期には観察できない。また武家奉公人の処刑例は安永3年（1774年）6月6日に上水に水をまいた江口次郎兵衛屋敷内に処刑された（島料銀3枚）と、同月13日に上水に塵芥を掠り込んだ岡田藤兵衛屋敷内に処刑された（島料銀3枚）の2件にすぎず、武家奉公人の処刑も稀で、実質的に処刑されない存在になっている。屋敷主の江口次郎兵衛は事前に鈴鹿によれば、役者御奉行で家禄250石の上級士分家臣であり、岡田藤兵衛は給紙では確認できないものの、その氏名の記載様式や、表1で明らかのように武家奉公人は僅かな例外を除いては士分家臣の屋敷に雇用された奉公人であったから、同人也是士分家臣の武家屋敷に雇用された奉公人と推測される。

即ち文化11年以前の時期では士分家臣本人（及びその家族）はもちろん、その屋敷に雇用された奉公人も処刑から除外され、士分家臣の屋敷が上水の利用規定に違反して処罰されることはなかったことが特徴であった。

2 違反行為の内容

違反行為は、城下では専ら上水の汚濁であった。『御用留』に収録された違反行為の規定は、前出の延宝3年（1675年）の汚物投棄の禁令が初出であり、その後の記述では上水路での洗濯、水浴、野菜洗い、魚洗い、土木や製竹の浚け込み等々が摘発されている。ただし同地方は冬季には生鮮食品が不足する豪雪地域であり、城下では食糧確保のために初冬に上水路を使用した「大根洗」が許された。

一、十一月五日、御城下上水筋大根洗相済候ノ付、例年之通清浄申付為致掃除候段、掛り之者中聞候、

これは天保10年（1839年）の記事である。通常は上水路における野菜の洗浄は厳禁であったものの、冬を迎える直前に上水路で大根洗浄（浄物用と推測される）を洗うことを許可し、その終了後に各町に上水路の掃除を命じている。「大根洗」の記事は各年の11月頃に散見されて、初冬の城下を彩る年中行事であった。

城下の違反行為の実態は、高札からも読み取れる。幕末期には29本の高札が城下の所々に立てられ、上水路での浴み、汚水の流し、塵芥の投棄、木材運搬を禁止しており、ともすれば、そうした行為が上水路で行なわれたことを示し
福井藩芝原上水における利用違反の処罰

ている。藩が設置した高札以外に、寛政8年4月に油町尾崎長左衛門は「夜分等二箇所に沿って、所詮二つもり等持ち仮名」と自分の屋敷周辺で夜間に廃棄を投棄する
者があり、注意喚起のために附書札の設置を願って「自分建札」の許可を得た。
種々の議論を見ているかぎり、違反行為の内容には近世を通じて時期的に変化が認め
られない。

村方では盗水（規定以上の取水）や無届けの振替請、上水路士手の植付けや
伐採、筏流しなどである。芝原上水は城下城外では農業用水として機能し、城
下周辺の53村（約4万石）に用水を供給した。そのため湯水時には農業用水と
城下への上水の分配をめぐる対立が発生し、大きな騒擾につながることもあっ
た。文化14（1817）年夏に城下の湯水を解消するため、藩は上水源流の彦右衛
門川を崩壊したところ、農業用水が不足したとして周辺農村の数百人が彦右衛
門川を再び埋め直すという騒擾が発生した。このときには村々を扇動した下森田
村湯番番右衛門が村に三里四方を追放され、また騒擾に加わった28村が詫言を
提出している。

こうした城下周辺農村が引き起こす騒擾に対しては、藩は農業用水を犠牲に
しても、城下の飲料水を確保する方針を堅持している。城下への上水と農業用
水が不足した弘化3（1846）年5月、城下周辺53村は用水奉行に堀川（崩壊）
を願い出て、家老は用水奉行管轄で堀川を許可した。しかし、それに対して上
水奉行は口上書で次のように反論している。

元上水口堀川の儀、古来上水湯水之節ハ上水方夫々御通申上候而堀川
被仰付候得共、其節村々江人足等申付堀立候儀ニ御座候、此度方之願ニ依
而堀川被仰付候節ハ、愈以上水掛り用水之方重ニ相成、第一御城掛り御城下
食水等ハ次之様ニ相成候而ハ不相濟候、

即ち従来は堀川は上水奉行の管轄であり、それを用水方が担当したのででは
城下への上水よりも農業用水のほうが優先されることになると危険に、史料では続
いて、今回の堀川は一旦用水方に許可したもの、上水方へも下命し、用水方
と上水方の双方が担当するように変更を求めた。このときの家老の裁断は不明
であるものの、弘化3年12月に作成されて上水奉行の職務範囲や上水管理の諸
事項を定めた「上水奉行職務之覚」には、城下飲料水と農業用水の位置づけが
明文化されている。

一、四月頃九月頃迄上水分水仕候而、用水二仕候方五十三ケ村寺御座
候、此高四万石余二御座候ニ付、割合以用水へ分水仕候、且又上水湯水仕、
御城下食水指支之節ハ、右用水口歩留仕、共上ニも食水指支ニ相成候得ハ皆
留ニ仕候而、御城下之食水指支不仕様取扱申候、右口留之節ハ御目付組御長
柄之者、毎日為相毎候、
芝原上水は春から秋まで石高4万石の53村に農業用水として分水された。しかしこ城下が済水した際にはそれぞれの用水を減水し（時間制や取水の遮板を用いて用水量を調整した）、城下の済水が深刻になった場合には完全に農業用水を差し止めると規定している。芝原上水は城下への飲料水供給が最も優先の使命であり、農業用水は副次的な位置に留め置かれた。

本来は村方の用水は藩の用水奉行が管理するはずにもかかわらず、城下城外に居住して農業用水として利用する百姓に対しても、上水方が処罰の権限を持ち、そのため表3で見られるように多数の百姓が上水方の手で処罰されたと考えられる。

3 処罰の諸手段

違反行為にはその重軽に応じて、様々な処罰が課せられた。最も厳しい処罰は元禄10（1697）年9月、多賀谷権大夫が召使う小坊主が発覚された事例である。史料の原文を掲げる。

多賀谷権大夫召仕之小坊主、去頃門前之川ニ網を構申し、依之、右之小坊主ハ未幼少之者事をニ候問其事ニ候、網賊者不届ニ付、権大夫へ被下置候、権大夫遠慮之儀ハ御免被候候旨、但追而右網賊者家来、権大夫於下屋敷成敗、

多賀谷権大夫は寄合席に所属する家禄1300石の上級家臣である。このとき上水路を網漁をした小坊主は幼少ということで処罰はされず、また権大夫も遠慮などの処分を受けなかったが、小坊主に網を貸した家来は権大夫の下屋敷で成敗された。上水関連で死罪になった唯一の事例であるが、その執行は藩によるものではなく、多賀谷権大夫の私的な手討ちと解釈される。

城下道放を、寛政4（1782）年3月に激しい冷え上水方役人に暴言した町人1名の事例がある。ほかには利用施設の没収があり、例えば魚町寄合の大河戸があった一条町（町地）で「度々上水を網漁体見受候共、組合者相候得ハ逃去、行衛相知レ不申、其上河戸ニ捨物等有之」と上水方役人が上水を汚す者を捕らえようとしたところ、違反者は逃走して摘発できなかった。同所を管理するはずの一条町では、その河戸は元来は魚町のうえで責任を負えないと上水方役人に回答したため、藩は天保元（1830）年5月に該当の大河戸の閉鎖を命じている（同年9月に魚町が訛書を提出して、再使用が許された）。

しかし、このような処罰は稀であり、一般的な違反行為は「押込」「過料銀」「一札」「叱り」が科せられた。これらの多くは単独で、場合によっては「押込のうえ過料銀」「過料銀と一札」などと組み合わせて執行された。

このよう押込は、特に懲罰的な違反に適用された処罰手段である。時期は下がるが、押込の典型的記事を挙げよう。
福井藩芝原上水における利用違反の処罰

一、同廿三日
押込五百

鰤刺町　桶屋懸九郎

右之者上水を惚候を十郎兵衛見遣候処、再三相詰候得共、此者懸ヒ每度之儀
二面、先年も過料銀被仰付候者ヲ付、何之上右之通申付之。

これは弘化3（1846）年10月23日の記載である。上水を汚損した鰤刺町桶屋
懸九郎を上水奉行権山十郎兵衛が摘発し、同人は再犯であるので過料銀では
く押込に科している。再三の違反や違反の度合かい深刻な者、あるいは摘発時
に上水方役人に過言を申した者などは押込を命じられた。後出の表7で明らか
なように文化10年以前の押込40件の被処罰者の内訳は町人22件、百姓9件、卒
族家臣7件などで、土分家臣や武家奉公人を押込にした事例はない。

近世前期以来、過料銀の徴収が最も一般的な処罰手段であった。延宝3
（1675）年、家老は上水に汚物を投棄した者には過料銀を科すように上水方々
命じ、また享保2（1717）年8月に評定留を監査した藩主は、次のごとく上水
奉行を訓戒した。

上水奉行織田藤左衛門、最前御番役被仰付候御ハ、過料銀択取改換入念候様
ニ相見得候処、此者過料銀取候沙汰も無之、上水不沙汰ニ成候様ニ御聞被
成候間、仲ノ間中申談、藤左衛門ニ油断不仕様可申聞旨御意ニ付、右ノ趣仲ケ
間申談、藤左衛門へ申聞候。

即ち上水奉行織田藤左衛門は、就任当初は入念に過料銀を徴収したものの、
近頃は過料銀の取扱いが少なく、一層の精労を督励している。通常の違反行為
は過料銀で処理され、明和5（1768）年の上水行政の改革に際して、過料銀額
の基準が定められた。

一、上水相権候者過料之儀、都而銀三欠ヲ取退、

八百里案ヵルニ、当子年ヲ以テ後年は右之趣ノ相見候、尤其科ニ依リ
五欠拾欠ニ上過料申付候儀後々ハ有之、乍去何様之職方と中事多分
認無之ヲ付、一々ハ不記之、

この違で過料銀を銀3欠トすることが定められたもの。実際の処罰記事を
検討すると、浅井政昭（八百里）が添書で述べるように寛政年間から銀5欠、
銀7欠、銀10欠という銀額が頻出する。過料銀3欠はあくまで標準額であり、
例えば文政9（1826）年10月3日、三上町吉田懸八は「妻儀毎度上水を梢候
得共、過料銀も難消出者ニ付町役人呼ぶ、叱ニ而内後」と経済的に困窮した者
であることを考慮し、過料銀を免じて叱りで済ませている。過料銀は違反内容
の軽重を基本にしつつ被処罰者の内情を勘酌し、柔軟に対応して決められたと
考えられる。

III 幕末期の変化

Ⅰ 文化11年の改革

文化11（1814）年、藩は上水行政の改革を布達した。同年5月29日の記事によれば、

一、同廿九日、此度上水御圧味改便被出候所付、明和五年改而立岩平右
衛門へ被出候所留書之内、御触面文段少々引査し、尤御定法書等相協、御家
中井町奉行へ可相達故と被触案文を以、御家老中へ相伺候処、共通差出候様
大谷丹下方差囲有之ニ付、六月四日之通差出之、

ここで明らかのように文化11年の改革は、基本的に明和5（1768）年の改革
を踏襲したものであった。6月4日には家中と町方に触書が出され、その冒頭に
「上水川筋之儀、御定法等有之候処、近来儀成趣相関候所付、此度改而御圧
味被出候」と述べる。即ち上水の定法が近来は等閑にされており、弛緩した
現状の引挙めが目的であった。具体的な内容は、前年に一旦廃止した上水掛目
付の再設置、利用規則の遵守徹底、各武家屋敷の泉水改め、生け葺改め、川cré
圧味、過料銀や押込規定の改定、上水路の浚い、善請担当役職の権限の調整な
どである。

詳細な実情は不明であるものの、前述のように文化年間に着えると『御用留』
の記述は急激に減り、また上水掛目付が廃止されるなど上水行政全般に混乱が
生じており、それが文化11年の改革を必要にしたと思われる。

文化年間に、上水行政が著しく混乱した理由は明らかでない。しかし藩内部
の実態を記した史料によれば、同時期の家臣団体制が著しく紊乱していた情
況が窺われる。

「米賃安・請色高」の物価転変や借知（給禄の削減）によって近世中後期に
諸藩の家臣団が経済的困窮に陥っていたことは多くの論考に指摘するが、福井
藩では宝暦11（1761）年に給禄を50％削減する半知が始まり（同13年まで）、
安永元（1772）年以降は連年に亘って半知と八分減（給禄8％削減）が交互に
実施された。慢性的な借知に家臣団の不満はついつい、文化2（1805）年には藩
政を揺るがす前代未聞の大事件が発生している。

文化2年11月、家臣団の中核で中下級の士分家臣で構成される番組一統（主
に大番組と新番組が該当し、士分家臣約800家のうち680家程度が所属）は、
連年の借知で貧窮が耐え難いので格別の手当を支給するか、御役銀等の上納を
免除することを藩に願い出た。寛政年間には7ヶ年という、それまでにない長
期の半知を強引にしたので、直前の明和3年にも2ヶ年の半知が施行されたばかりで、家臣団が厳しい囲攻にあったことは疑う余地はない。

しかし藩は番組一択の要求を却下したため、番組一択は「当幕領既不、来春年礼相動不申、門外礼式之訪不致」と答せし義礼をポイコットしたのみならず、頻繁に大雪を出荷して公然と反抗的態度を示した。事態の深刻さに驚いた藩政当職は江戸在府の藩主に急報し、藩主は説諭書を御手当を約束して慰撫に努め、ようやく騒動は沈静化された。翌年6月には大番組と新番組の首謀者19名が処刑されたものの、切腹や追放などの厳科に処せられた者もおらず、最も重くて家禄削減にすぎない。この騒動のせいか、以後20年間の借债は八分滅に抑えられ、文政7年まで半知は施行されなかった。

おそらく、この紛擾は家臣団の不満が表面化したごく一部にすぎず、藩財政の窮乏化と共に、当時の家臣団体制は激しく動揺していたと考えられる。文化末年に実施された上水行政の刷新は、そうした藩体制の建直しの一環であった可能性が大きい。

2 処罰範囲の拡大

文化11年の上水在法の改革は基本的に明和5年に達せられた対法を踏襲し、その遵守を企図したものであったが、『御用留』の諸記述からは、改革の道をで明示された以外の運用状況や、あるいはそこから逸脱した様々な変化が観察できる。本節では、そうした幕末期（便宜的に本稿では、化政3年以降を幕末期と表現した範囲がある）の上水行政を検討する。

最大の変化は、処罰範囲の拡大である。藩は明らかに処罰範囲を拡大する方針をとり、それまで処罰されなかった士分家臣やその武家奉公人も処罰を受けようになった。

前述したように、家臣団のなかでも御徒や下代といった士族家臣は、町人と同様の処罰対象であった。

その一方で、化政期以前に処罰を受けた士分家臣は皆無である（寛政3年に行政事務の拡増のために御用行験田差役が処罰された例があるものの、これは本稿が扱う上水利用における違反行為ではない）。士分家臣の処罰記述がまったく記載されていないことは、史料編纂者の浅井政昭の恣意的な操作によるものとは考えがたく、実際に処罰された士分家臣が存在しなかったことに基
因し、その背景には士分家臣を卒業家臣や町人とは異なる存在と見なして、同列には挙げないという封建的身分秩序意識があったと判断される。しかし、そうした士分家臣も表3で見るように文化11年から嘉永元年までには、8件の士分家臣（家族を含む）の処罰記事が収録されている。また武家奉公人は安永3年

注4 「続日誌記」
表4 士分家臣の処罰者

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>処罰年月</th>
<th>氏 名</th>
<th>家 禄</th>
<th>所 属</th>
<th>処罰内容</th>
<th>処罰理由</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>文政5年5月</td>
<td>柳下勘七</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>大番組</td>
<td>甲関宿</td>
<td>弊が水浴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 3</td>
<td>伊木作大夫</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>書院番</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>天保元・12</td>
<td>松村市内</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>大番組</td>
<td>過料銀1両</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 6</td>
<td>小野庄助</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>新番組</td>
<td>過料銀2両</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13, 9</td>
<td>野村要助</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>大番組</td>
<td>過料銀10両</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14, 6</td>
<td>三好久左衛門</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>無役留守番組</td>
<td>過料銀1両</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>大野勝次郎</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>大番組</td>
<td>過料銀5両</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>久化3, 8</td>
<td>鈴木作大夫</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>大番組</td>
<td>過料銀5両</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*家禄の「xy」は、「切米x石、y人扶持」を表す。大野勝次郎の家禄は不明。
*各家の家禄及び所属・役職は「御用留」のはか、天保年間や嘉永年間の絵巻によります。
*文政5年5月の松原伝五右衛門と柳下勘七は一件である。

の2件の処罰記録以外には記載がなく、実質的に処罰対象から忌避されていたが、文化11年以降は9件の記録がある。
このように士分家臣と武家奉公人が処罰されるようになったことが、幕末期の最大の特色である。
まずは士分家臣の処罰を検討しよう。

処罰された8件9人の士分家臣を表4にまとめた。士分家臣の初めの処罰記録は文政5年5月、酒井外記下屋敷前の上水路で水浴した柳下勘七と松原伝五右衛門両人の子息を上水方役人が摘発したという事例である。

一、同様日

伝五右衛門権 松原伝次郎
勘七俳 柳下兵吉

右丙父酒井外記下屋敷上水二川、水をあび居候処、掛り者者見咎、名元承
候ニ付、相越武兵衛へ相違候処、先此度ハ内分ニ面指候も可なら中間候由、
道而伝五右衛門挙挙ニ罷越候由、

文中の相越武兵衛は当時の上水奉行で、上水掛目付に内務に処すように上申
した。このときは内関宿として違反者両人は実質的な処罰は受けなかったものの
、本件は士分家臣（正しくはその家族）が摘発された初めての事例である。

続いて文政8年3月には、鈴木作大夫が過料銀1両を命じられ、天保8年6月
の小野庄助の処罰記録には「末次征右衛門見咎反省（中略）、上水奉行直見
咎候而之取扱、庄右衛門帯中ノ初御用留ヲ相見得候」という添書があり、
士分家の摘発には上水奉行来末次征右衛門が自ら乗り出し、士分家臣の処罰に
藩は強い意思で臨んでいたことを示している。

被処罰者の内訳は、家臣団の中核である大番組が6人、書院番・無役留守番
組・新番組が1人ずつで、その家禄は最高でも25石4人扶持の切米で被処
表5 武家奉公人の被処罰者

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年月</th>
<th>被処罰者</th>
<th>屋敷主家禄</th>
<th>屋敷主家格</th>
<th>処罰内容</th>
<th>処罰理由</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>安永3年6月</td>
<td>江口次郎兵衛北風家</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>役番外</td>
<td>過料銀3両</td>
<td>糸懸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>岡田藤兵衛積家</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>過料銀3両</td>
<td>糸懸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>文政5.6</td>
<td>金千之助家来弥吉</td>
<td>20,3</td>
<td>留守番</td>
<td>過料銀3両</td>
<td>糸懸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>天保5.6</td>
<td>平安貞親家来</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>外科</td>
<td>拝師2両</td>
<td>備置</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>赤尾久郎家來</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>御徒</td>
<td>過料銀10両</td>
<td>備置</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>中山忠兵衛家来</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>末之番外</td>
<td>過料銀2両</td>
<td>備置</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>小栗家来喜八</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>大番</td>
<td>拝師7日</td>
<td>糸懸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>弘化2.5</td>
<td>稲荷町行門高</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>高専</td>
<td>吐り</td>
<td>糸懸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>嘉永5.6</td>
<td>数賀山尾右衛門家来</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>市倉</td>
<td>過料銀3両</td>
<td>糸懸</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 屋敷主家禄の「x,y」は、「切米x石、y人扶侍」を表す。その他は単位の知通高である。
- 屋敷主の家禄及び家格は「御用留」のほか、天保年間や嘉永年間の給帳による。
- 天保9年7月の中山家来と関家来は同一件である。

従者は中下級の士分家臣であった。家族が違反行為の当事者であっても、処罰が申し渡されるのは屋敷主の士分家臣であり、また処罰手段は専ら過料銀で、押込等の罰則は料せられていない。

士分家臣と共に、文化11年から処罰対象には武家奉公人が含まれるようになった（正確には安永3年6月に武家奉公人の処罰が2件あるが、これは例外的事例と思われる）。安永3年から嘉永元年までに処罰された11件12人の武家奉公人のうち5件である。この表で見るように、「家来」「屋敷」「中閤」「下女」などの奉公人が、主に上手の飼いを理由に押込・過料銀・吐りに処せられた。彼らを雇用する屋敷主は右衛門（辛子家家）1件と不明1件を除いて士分家臣であり、それも大番組や新番組の中級家臣だけでなく、家禄百石以上の屋敷主も多く、家老に次ぐ家格である高知階の上級家臣も含まれる。

また後期の表で観察できるように、嘉永2（1849）年と1年に従来された過料銀29件には士分家臣の奉公人が4件あり、そこには寄合に所属する家禄400石の波々伯郎家来や同350石の西尾久作の奉公人が含まれ、上級の士分家臣の奉公人も日常的に処罰を受けたことが判明する。

武家奉公人の処罰が、直ちに屋敷主の処罰を意味するわけではない。自分の屋敷の奉公人が飼いされても、その屋敷主の上級士分家臣には何の制裁もなく、形式上であっても処罰を申し渡されて過料銀を負担し、あるいは押込されるのは違反行為の当事者の奉公人であった。もっとも多数の奉公人を抱える上級士分家の屋敷で、屋敷主本人やその家族が団案等を処理して上水路を汚濁する機会があったときは考えがたく、上水汚濁が理由の違反行為で上級の士分家臣
が処罰される局面は、現実的には皆無であった。
しかし、それまで処罰されなかった上級士分家臣の屋敷における違反行為も
摘発されるようになったことの意義は大きい。藩は違反行為の実行者のみを処
罰し、屋敷主の上級士分家臣は処罰しないことで、巧みにすべての武家屋敷を
処罰の枠内に置き、身分の高下の差異なく武家屋敷の違反行為を処罰対象に囲
い込んだといえる。

3 処罰手段の改定

文化11（1814）年の改革では、処罰規定が変更された。まずは処罰に際して
の手続きの簡略化が指摘できる。同年6月4日の速では、

一、過料の儀、前々之儀令吟味候査、過料銀申候申し押込等申候得共、同
役談之上、此度&制札之表之過料銀取之、押込ハ不申候候事、尤任儀ニ寄、
各候節過言等ニ而中候査、或ハ老者ニ而每度上水儀候訪之節ハ押込等ノニ
可申付事、備其節之模様次第之事、

八百里案スルニ、足迄ハ押込ハ勿論、過料等ニ而も毎分御家老中ヘ相伺
得差図候上申候趣ニ候得共、此度&以来一通り各候儀、御家老中ヘ相
伺候儀相止、

従来は過料銀に加えて押込を命じる場合もあったが、これらは押込は極力
抑制するという方針がとられている。明らかに藩は体刑から経済的制裁への移
行を指向しているものの、ただしこの事情によっては押込に処すると附言する。実際
に後出の表7で判明するように押込は抜粋していない。また、これによっても松
井政昭の添書に注目したい。即ち、これまで過料銀や押込を科すときは家老
への伺いが必要であったものの、後に家老への伺いは無用とされた。そして
弘化3（1846）年10月には上水方内部で「同役談議之上、以次之通致内定置
候事」と処罰手続きを再度改定し、そこではさらに規定は詳細になり、かつ手
続きは簡略になった。

一、御使持人以上御家中家来共押込相伺候節ハ、同役談議之上及差図、追而
御家老中江可致御物語事、

一、町人百姓押込相伺候節ハ、同役談議之上及差図、御家老中ヘハ不及御物
語事、

一、過料銀相伺候時ハ、都而即刻可致差図事。

御使持人（卒族家臣）や武家奉公人を押込に処ずときは家老に事後報告する
ものの町人や百姓の押込は報告せず、また過料銀は上水方内部で判断し直ちに
表6 嘉永2（1849）年の過料銀徴収

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>月</th>
<th>日</th>
<th>[身分]被処罰者</th>
<th>[屋敷主]</th>
<th>銀額</th>
<th>罪</th>
<th>状</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1, 27</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>下谷町庄屋 青木清一郎母</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>芸子洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 22</td>
<td>奉</td>
<td>藤田奥右衛門屋之さん</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>木枝投棄</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5, 11</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>田原町 銀治屋次郎右衛門家内</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>度々検し</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5, 12</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>万町 古木屋文大</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>砂揚げ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, 1</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>小野寺町 小野寺穂家</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>洗濯</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, 7</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>小野寺町 大文字屋伝六</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>米洗など</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, 31</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>小野寺町 大文字右衛門</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>輪流洗</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 1</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 わたや十助</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>小柄洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 4</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 金ものや善八</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>重箱洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 8</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 多菜麻や壁右衛門</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>梅洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 15</td>
<td>奉</td>
<td>笹田冊内家来</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>草代り込み</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9, 15</td>
<td>奉</td>
<td>西尾久右衛門家来</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>場絵込み</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9, 20</td>
<td>奉</td>
<td>安井舘大夫図女</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>大根洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9, 30</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>清瀬寺町橋木や留原借家</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>大根洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, 1</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 大野や壁右衛門母</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>窓透かす</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, 12</td>
<td>奉</td>
<td>駒町香町武倉大府</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>紙箱洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, 13</td>
<td>奉</td>
<td>岩沼市左衛門家来春助</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>大根洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, 14</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 八百屋長喜家</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>袋洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, 15</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>松本西中町</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>大根葉入れ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12, 12</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 松屋右衛門</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>洗い</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12, 13</td>
<td>町</td>
<td>駒町 川北屋家</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>雪入れ、不埒</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

・[ ]のうち町は町人、[奉]は武家奉公人、[卒]は卒業家臣である。

処分を決定した。このように上水方の裁量は拡大され、同時に処罰手続きは簡略化される方向にあった。

続いて、各処罰手段の執行状況を検討しよう。主要な処罰手段である過料銀は、文化11年に次のように再制定された。

一、過料銀之事、左之通相定之、町方至而軽き者へ、銀三両ず。前々之通取之、
御家中家来共、右同状、
御足軽之儀へ、銀廿両 四両三分也 取之、

ここで被処罰者は、町人（「町方至而軽き者」）、武家奉公人（「御家中家来」）、卒業家臣（「御足軽」）に区分されており、前二者は銀3両で同額、その単位
は一般的に使用される『銀仮』であった。しかし家族家臣には『銀仮』という特殊な単位が用いられ、その換算銀額は銀1両＝銀4分3文で、町人や武家奉公人よりも高めに設定されている。同月7日には、妻が上水を減した塩平大夫維正井の部下に銀1両を命じられ、「銀仮」という単位が現実に適用されたことが確認できる。こうした措置は、前述のように文化初年の家臣団の動揺が背景にあり、上水行政においても身分差を強調することで家族家臣の統制強化を計ったのではないかと推測されるものの、史料的資料のために実はさだかでない。

しかし文化11年に導入された「銀仮」という身分差を強調する適用は、間もなく放棄された模様である。

一、十二月十二日 長谷部小右衛門組 石田勝蔵
上水懸仮ニ付、過料銀三文
八百里倉屋文化十一弐年之定ニハ、組之者過料ハ銀二両と申定之ノ、
此節ニ而ハ定法も崩壊哉如何、

これは文政3（1820）年12月、長谷部小右衛門組石田勝蔵が上水懸仮して過料銀三文を命じられた記事であり、そこで浅井政昭は「文化十一弐年之定ニハ、組之者過料ハ銀二両と申定之ノ、此節ニ而ハ定法も崩壊哉」と添書する。この後も過料単位の過料銀は観察できるものの、文化11年から嘉永元（1848）年まで過料銀91件のうち、銀両単位は町人9件、百姓3件、士卒家臣9件、寺1件で各身分が混在している。通銀でなく銀仮単位で家臣から過料銀を徴収した事例も多く、過料銀額の単位に身分的区別を設ける試みは、導入後にはほとんどなく挫折したことが判断する。

また文化11（1814）年の規定では、被処罰者は町人・武家奉公人・卒族家臣の三者で、そこに士分家臣は入っていない。しかし士分家臣の処罰を整理した前出の表4で明らかのように、天保5年には6名の士分家臣が過料銀を科せられている。

前述のように『御用留』はすべての処罰や過料銀徴収を記録しているわけではないが、嘉永2（1849）年是正月27日から12月13日まで1年間の過料銀徴収を記録しており、それを表6にまとめた。同年の過料銀徴収は29件、その内訳は士分家臣の奉公人が5件、卒族家臣が2件（ほかにその後の奉公人と推測される者が2件）、残りは町人である。武家奉公人の屋敷主は波々伯部熊蔵（家禄400石）や西尾久作（家禄350石）など上級の士分家臣も含まれている。銀額単位に『銀仮』は使用されておらず、すべて「銀仮」である。ただし銀1両と同額の銀4分3文（あるいは倍額の銀8分6文）が9件あるものの、それは町人5件、士分家臣の奉公人1件、卒族家臣とその奉公人と推測される者が2件で適用に身分の違いはない。また当初は家臣団の過料銀は町人と比較して、やや高
く設定されたが、嘉永２年の過料銀徴収では身分と銀額に関連性は見られず、あくまで訴科の軽重が銀額の決定要因であったと思われる。
こうした処罰における身分的差異の縮小は、「一札」でも観察できる。過料銀と押込に関しては、家老への報告の有無は別として、卒族家臣と町人百姓は同じく処罰されるべき存在であり、過料銀は文化11年の規定で両者の区別が強調されたものの、すぐに形骸化した。押込は表7である。押込の身分別の処罰者数を表7で観察すると、文化11年以前も以後でも卒族家臣は町人や百姓と同様に押込に出され、三者に差異は見られない。
しかし一札では事情は異なる。次の史料は天保8（1837）年9月、違法な普請をした卒族家臣に過料銀20仮と一札の提出を命じた記事である。

一、同十三日 生駒五左衛門下代 東山千左衛門
一札取置、過料銀二拾町
右之者、去る六月十五日地蔵町地蔵堂裏に先年地蔵高御贈水とか中水口極有之為、近年嘗切に相成来候処、何方へも不相違手促に深く、泉水へ掛申所存ニ面致引水候を相啓候処、度々相詰候ニ付従吾等を以、右之通上水奉行へ一札取、過料ニ面相催候旨、
八百里楽スルニ御扶持人　一札取候儀為事ニ候故、相記置之、

近来断水していた水口関を勝手に桶立て利用した東山千左衛門という卒族家臣が摘発され、過料銀20仮の徴収に加えて一札を上水奉行に提出させたという内容である。ここには特に添書に注目したい。浅井政昭は「御扶持人　一札取候儀為事ニ候故」と述べ、同時期以前には卒族家臣（「御扶持人」）の一札提出はなかったことが読み取れる。天保中期に藩の取扱いが変化したことが想定され、従って便宜上、一札については天保中期を画期として検討しよう。
一札に関しては、表8で見るように「御用留」では天明元年から嘉永元年まで28件の記載があり、天保5年までの15件は町人3件、百姓11件で、いくら百姓が多く感じられる。諸記事から判断すれば、過料銀や押込を命じるには及ばない比較的軽微な違反者に一札を科せられ、多くは内務で許された。被処罰
表B 身分別の一札処分

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>期 間</th>
<th>町人</th>
<th>百姓</th>
<th>卒族家臣</th>
<th>武家奉公人</th>
<th>士分家臣</th>
<th>他</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>明和5 (1768)年～安永8 (1779)年</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安永9 (1780)年～寛政元(1789)年</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>2(2)</td>
<td>2(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>寛政2 (1790)年～寛政11 (1799)年</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>寛政12 (1800)年～文化10 (1813)年</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>文化11 (1814)年～文政7 (1824)年</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>文政8 (1825)年～天保5 (1834)年</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>天保6 (1835)年～嘉永元 (1848)年</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
<td>例</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

・( )は処罰対象が町人、あるいは村の件数である。

者に注目すると、特に百姓の処罰において、一札の提出者は個々の百姓ではなく村（あるいはその代表者である村役人）であり、天保6年以前の百姓11件では8件が新保村、間島村、組合33村住民など、個人は3件にすぎない。町や同村の傾向が見受けられる。専ら一札は個人よりも、町や村といった団体の責任を問う処罰手段であったと理解できる。

多くの記載では一札自体の文面は不明であるが、文政元 (1818) 年5月20日に松本地方志紀口町庄屋（福井藩では町役人も「庄屋」と呼称された）清助に「水汲河戸之儀二付不届之儀有之、相告候処、日々相詰候ニ付上水奉行宅へ召呼、一札取置」という記載では、その時に提出されただ一札も収録している。

差上申一札之事

一、私町内新住式人之著者共、河戸ニツ御願申上候処、願之念被仰付難有仕合奉候候、然処御太切之御上水ニ御座候得ハ、石ニ而厳重ニ仕候親被仰聞候得共、両人困窮者ニ御座候得ハ石ニ而ハ難仕候故、武少し不呑ツ仕度旨仰願申上、又々御免之様、私心得違仕致差図河戸ニツ為致懌り之処可申上様も無御座、不調法至極恐候入候、依之口書差上申候処、仍如件、文化十五年五月

松本地方志紀口町

庄屋 清助 印

要するに、当初は同町の新居2軒に河戸2つを願い出たものの、石では建設が困難なので2軒で河戸1つに減らして再度許可を得たが、町役人の手違いで河戸を2つ設置したという内容である。このように一札の大部分では、違反の当事者ではなく、監督者としての町（村）役人の責任が問われており、その点も違反行為の当事者の処罰した過料銀や押込と異なっている。

しかし天保6年以後の時期では、百姓4件のうち2件は村に一札を命じているものの、町人5件はすべて違反行為の当事者の個人が対象で、町（あるいは町役人）が一札を提出した事例はなく、明確に町においては団体から個人へという変化が認められる。
そして一礼における最大の変化は、前述のように卒族家臣が処罰範囲に含まれたことである。天保6年以降の期間で、合計13件の内訳は町人5件、百姓4件、卒族家臣4件で三者が混在し、卒族家臣は町人や百姓と同じく一礼提出を命じられる存在となった。処罰における身分差の縮小の一例と評価されるが、ただし土分家臣やその奉公人から一礼を提出させた事例はなく、その理由は観察期間の短かさのせいか、土分家臣には未だ身分的な差異が認められていたからなのか、史料的制約のために、その理由の確定は現時点では困難である。

Ⅳ まとめ

本稿では福井藩の家臣団を視座に据えて、上水利用における違反処罰を通じ、その都市居住者としてのあり方や位置づけの変化を検討した。

近世初頭以来、化政期以前には、土分家臣はいかなる処罰も受けない存在であった。これは同じ都市居住者でありながら、土分家臣は町人や卒族家臣とは異なるという封建的身分秩序を意識した藩の措置であったと理解される。しかし化政期からは処罰範囲が拡大して土分家臣も処罰に含められるなど、都市社会の秩序構成に変化が認められる。家臣本人の処罰は中下級の者に限定されて上級家臣本人を処罰した事例はないととも、上級家臣の武家屋敷では違反行為の実行者としての奉公人が処罰され、実質的にすべての武家屋敷における違反行為が処罰対象に包摂された。

近世前期から町人と同様の処罰対象であった卒族家臣は、文化11年の改定で、過料銀単位には町人や武家奉公人と異なる「銀碼」という身分別区分が導入されたが、その規定は崩れ、また一礼においても卒族家臣は町人や百姓と同様に提出を命じられるようになった。

こうした変化を端的に表現すれば、それは封建的な身分的差異の縮小傾向であり、平準な関係の居住者で構成される近代的都市社会への移行過程であった。

「自己意識」や「主体化」の生成は、その存在内外の両側面から発達する複数の経路が想定されるが、本稿では外部から存在形態が規定される事例を観察した。ここで見た家臣団の位置づけの変化は、近代的都市社会の創出過程の一つと考えているが、それは基本的に藩という国家による改変であり、家臣団自身にとっては外部から強いられた結果であったことは否めない。ただし本稿では家臣団内部の意識には立ち入らず、また家臣団の上水利用も処罰以外の様々な視点から分析する必要がある。そうした考察を今後の課題としたい。
Chapter 5
江戸後期における流通貨幣
— 近江商人・中井源左衛門家の事例 —

On Stratified Currency of Late Tokugawa Japan:
A Case Study of Nakai Genzaemon, an Affluent Merchant

加藤 慶一郎（Keiichiro Kato）

I はじめに
江戸中期において、大坂を中心として手形の制度が確立し、その流通をなす酒呑童の経営が伸張した。江戸後期になると、経済発展の原動力は地方へと伝わり、それとともに地方金融市場が発達した。地方において資金流通網が広がりをみせながら、遊芸資金を社会的に動員するための貯蓄－投資連結機構も胎動をはじめた1。時には、地主の「原基的銀行家」化現象などもあらわれることもあった2。通貨の面でも、地方における変化が際だった。すなわち、もともと東西で基軸通貨を異にする状態のもとで、地方の諸藩において多数ののぼる紙幣発行することもあった。さらに、藩だけでなく、豪農商さえも紙幣を発行した3。これらの紙幣は、幕府貨幣とは違い、一定地域内でのみ通用する貨

1 新保博『近代日本経済史』（創作品、1995年）46頁において、「市場経済の枠組のつもりで近代経済発展しない工業化を展開していくためには、少なくともa生産要素の自由な移動、b私的有産権の確立、c貯蓄－投資連結機構の形成、という三つの条件が不可欠である」とのべられている。江戸後期において、「cが自生的にうまれつつあった」ということになる。
2 この点については、ロナルド・トビ氏が、以下の論考によって先駆をつけていえる。
3 ロナルド・トビ『プロト工業化期金融の一試論—天保期における銀行的経営形態の生動—』『人文学報』第78号、1996年。また、貯蓄－投資連結機構、すなわち金融仲介機関の広範な展開について論じたものに、加藤慶一郎『近世後期経済発展の構造—米穀・金融市場の展開—』清文堂、2001年、第4～6章がある。
幣であった。

このような多様な通貨構造が解消され「一国一通貨」の体制が構築されたのは、さほど遠い昔のことではない。通貨の統合は、そう簡単ではないからである。貨幣制度の場合、ある人が利用しているからといって、他の人の利用がさまたげられることはない。つまり、通常の私的財とは異なり、同時消費が可能なのである。さらに、貨幣制度の利用者から、その費用を徴収することは難しい。つまり、ただ乗りをふせぐための費用が膨大であるという意味で、排除不可能性をもっているといえる。このように、貨幣制度は公共財の性質を強くもっているため、その統一には想像以上に長い時間を要するのである。くわえて、時における値段不足による取引渋滞や、発行者が享受する鋳造益の誘引が多様な通貨発行を誘発し、統合への道程を長くさせた。明治期以降の日本においても、幣制の完全な統一には絶えず曲折があった。

1906（明治39）年、不況下の金融難に対応して蔓延しつつあった私札を取り締まるため、紙幣類似証券取締法が公布されなければならなかった3。この事実が、明治末にいたっても地域内通貨の発行・流通が根絶されていなかったことを物語っている。しかも、大正期にいたってもなお地域内通貨が発行された形跡がみとめられる4。こうした点をふまえると、近世後期の地域内通貨にかんする考察は、近世経済史研究にとどまらず、近代の経済史研究をも補益しようというものといえよう。

この地域内通貨の経済的意味は、簡単につぎのように考えられる5。まず、短所としては、市場機能の働きを阻害することができると、すなわち、地域内通貨が基準貨幣としてもいられると、各商品価格の価格表示が地域ごとに異なってしまう。その結果、市場間の価格について、その見通しが悪くなる。市場機能が適切に作動して「一物一座」へむかうさいに、価格は最も重要な情報として機能する。価格情報の質が低下するならば、その代償は大きいといわざるをえない。さらに、通貨間で成立する交換相場が変動するため、いわゆる為替差損の危険がともなる。通貨同士を交換するためには、両替費用も必要となる。

3 加藤慶一郎『近世後期における地域通貨—後期私札を中心に—』（『近世史サマーフォーラム2002の記録 全体テーマ 貨幣からみた近世社会』近世史サマーフォーラム2002実行委員会、2002年）。
4 公共財にかんする議論については、建元正弘『公共経済学』（熊谷尚夫・塚原三平編集委員代表『経済学大事典 第2版』1）東洋経済新報社、1980年）を参照した。
5 京都府下の一部地域においては、明治初期から私札の流通が継続していた。この点について、松好貞夫『明治維新後における両替商金融』（財団法人金融研究会、1937年）第8章を参照。阿部謙二『日本通貨経済史の研究』（紀伊国屋書店、1972年）245頁にも、明治30年代に個人が発行した私札が紹介されている。
6 小根義雄『紙幣類似証券取締法公布後の紙幣類似証券 附 伊予地方紙幣類似証券一覧表』（収集第26巻第4号、2001年）は、富山商工業連合会や宇和島運輸株式会社が大正期に発行した紙幣類似証券を紹介している。
7 加藤「近世後期における地域通貨」23—25頁を参照。
なる。いずれにせよ、「一物一価」実現の障壁となる要素である。他方、地域内流通は、長所となる側面ももちあわせている。すなわち、貨幣発行は金融政策の手段になりうるものであるから、地域の実情にうょうした金融政策の実施が可能となる。景気の動向や作物の作況などに対応し、地域独自の政策運営ができることになる。したがって、地域内流通は地域経済の安定・発展に寄与しうる可能性をもつのである。また、長所と短所の両面を兼ねそなえた要素もある。地域内流通は用途範囲がかぎられているため、それだけ地域需要の開い込みが期待できる。有効需要を地域の外に流出させず、地域内にとめる効果をもっているのである。だが、このことは長−短であり、競争劣位にある地域の生産者や商人を温存するという弊害もある。その縁由せは、地場の商品や用役を置き換えなかった地元の購入者である。長期的には、地域全体の生産力を閉くこともありうる。こうした長所と短所の両方を勘案すると、共通の通貨をもった方が都合がよいのは、商品のやりとりが頻繁で、なおかつ経済構造がよく似た地域同士である。なぜならば、こうした条件の下では、為替相場の危険と両替の費用が特にかさむこと、類似した経済構造には類似した金融政策がふさわしいからである。逆に、両地域が比較的確実であったり、特色ある経済構造をそれぞれがもっているならば、別個の地域内流通がのぞましいということになる。

江戸後期の地域経済の動向と、各種の地域内通貨、すなわち私札・藩札・金銀の幕府貨幣からなる重層的な流通構造とは無関係ではあり得ない。藩札についてはこれまで多く取りあげられてきたが、民間の決済手段としてよりも、財政政策の手段としての機能が注目されてきた。近年では基本に立ちかえり、『東の金voie、西の銀voie』といった図式的理解にかわる、重層的な通貨構造が実証的に明らかにされつつある。

以下では、関連する主要な先行研究をあげておくことにしよう。『西の銀voie』という理解に修正をせまる早い段階の論考に、田谷博吉氏による大坂市場を対象としたものなどに、新保博氏による摂津国西部の農村を対象としたものがある。両氏は、大坂および西摂農村において、価格表示は銀貨単位である

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8. こうした地域内通貨の経済的意味を前提としたとき、相対的に低水準にあった東日本が金voie経済圈を形成したことは、その地域経済の保護・蓄積の点で一定の意義があったといえよう。もちろん、こうした経済的帰結や政策意図とは密接させて考えることはできない。
9. 新保博・斎藤修『概説19世紀へ』(新保博・斎藤修編『日本経済史 2 近代成長の軌跡』岩波書店、1989年)、西川俊作・天野雅敏『諸藩の産業と経済政策』(同前)なども参照。
10. 田谷博吉「幕末初期西の流通貨幣 — 湖池と三河家文書の紹介を兼ねて —」『歴史研究』第14号、1972年。
11. 新保博『徳川後期西摂農村における貨幣流通 — 摂津国八部郡花畑村の史料を中心にして —』(兵庫県の歴史)第11号、1974年。他に河内農村を対象とした竹内繁治『近世小作料の構造』(御茶の水書房、1988年)補章2をあげることができる。

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にもかかわらず、じっさいの受取貨幣は「金貨」であったことを指摘した12。また、浦長瀬隆氏は、土地売渡し証文における基準貨幣を基たる指導として、金貨の経済面と銀貨の経済面への分野が17世紀初頭に生じたことを、その境界が近江一越中国にあることなどを明らかにした13。さらに、九州を基たる対象地域とする藤本隆三氏が、九州に「銅貨・経済面」を検出したあとをうけ14、岩橋恵氏は、精力的な史料研究をうけ、銅貨・経済面の日本国内と東北地方へ拡張している15。そのさいに、銅貨の一定量を単位で表示する、いわゆる「銅貨図」の検出が特徴となった。これは、銀貨の相対的な急激への対応措置として自然発生的に生まれたもので、銅貨流通が基盤になければ生まれえない取引慣習であった。この銅貨図の普及を指標として、西南地域に広範に銅貨が展開していた事実と、その論理についての説明である。また、安国良一氏も、銅貨図がみられる江戸時代中葉の地域を対象に、貨幣の多様性から派生する諸問題を広範にあつかい、在地における貨幣同様の存在など興味深い論点を提示されている16。同様の貨幣をめぐる地域社会的視点をもつ古賀隆士氏は、倉敷地域における銅貨流通に検討をくわえて、交換相場の決定権が村にあったことなどを明らかにしている17。さらに、江戸後期の東日本において私札が発展的に発行された実を明らかにしつつ、その経済的意義について論じる報告もなされている18。このように、近年、各地の事例が着実に蓄積されつつあるが、江戸期貨幣流通の重層的構造については、より一層の研究蓄積が必要であろう。特に、上述の先行研究の動向をふまえたとき、流通貨幣その

12 本論文では、貨幣種類をその素材如何にかかわらず単位を基準にして、まずは以下のように大きく区分してよぶことにする。すなわち、「金貨」とは、両・歩・朱の単位をもつ新銀貨等をさすものである。「銀貨」とは、の単位をもつ新銀貨と銀札の総称であり、「銅貨」は文の単位にしたがう銅貨と銅札のことである。それ以下については、注解の分野にて区分していく。
13 浦長瀬隆『近世貨幣流通史—取引手段の変化と要因—』（勁草書房、2001年）第8～10頁。
14 藤本隆三『近世西南地域における銅貨勘定』（九州大学osen論叢）第17巻第1号、1972年）や同『近世における銅貨流通の一部考察—福岡藩の「銅銭」成立を求めて—』（経済学研究）40巻4号。（1984年）など。
15 同氏による多数の論考のなかで、同『近世貨幣流通史』（経済学研究）40巻4号。（1984年）など。
16 同氏による多数の論考のなかで、同『近世貨幣流通史』（経済学研究）40巻4号。（1984年）など。
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ものの定量的な分析が比較的少ない傾向が看取できる。
ただし、じっさいに授受された貨幣（流通貨幣）の把握はさほど容易ではない。取引帳簿や証文などをみると、ある貨幣で金額がしるされている。一見すると、これが流通貨幣をしめしているかのようにある。しかしながら、それらはあくまで基準貨幣なのであって、流通貨幣そのものを意味している訳ではない。基準貨幣と流通貨幣の乖離は、取引上の慣行や貨幣価値の変動、あるいは集計作業上の理由から十分おこりうる。長期的にみれば、基準貨幣は貨幣流通の構造変動と無関係ではあらゆる、とはいいえ、必ずそこにある対応関係が成立するとはかぎらない。

本論文では、流通貨幣を検討するにさいして、中井源左衛門家という商家経営を素地とする。周知のように、同家は広域にわたり支店を展開した近江商人であるが、ここではその支店網の中枢をなした本家（本店）にそってしめることにしたい。中井家という商人を取りあげることで、貨幣流通の結節点をなした豪商経営における流通貨幣の一端をとらえることが期待できる。さらに、前出の先行研究をみてわかるように、西日本の東端に位置する近江国はこれまでに余りふれられてこなかった点も指摘しておきたい。また、基準貨幣ではなく、流通貨幣を対象とするという本論文の方法は、貨幣流通の実態そのものに接近できるという特徴をもつ。もちろん、ここで観察するのは一商人の使用貨幣であるため、それは商品の種類・取引の規模・取引相手の所在地などから多様な影響をうけているであろう。他方で、商品流通を通じた大規模な商人の貨幣的基礎をしめることができるという利点ももっている。以下ではこうした点に留意しつつ、検討をすすめることにしたい。

II 中井源左衛門家概要

本節では、中井源左衛門家に関する基本事項について、あらかじめ確認しておくことにしよう。

はじめに、中井家の事業について、簡単にみておくことにする9。当家の商業活動は、初代源左衛門光武により1734（享保19）年にはじめられた。日野合戦の関東地方への行商が、その出発点であった。そのごと、1745（延享2）年における下野への出店を皮切りに、仙台・京都・大阪のほか各地に店舗が展開した。その数は、支店・枝店をあわせ通算で44にたどる。表1は、各支店の事業内容を整理したものである。同表は、1745～1867年を23年あるいは25年ごと

9 この部分にかかっては、おもに松尾『中井家の研究』（雄山閣、1965年）第1章と第3章に Boiseしているが、後出の枝郡・枝郡数については、『平成12年度～14年度科学研究費補助金研究B(2)21340080研究成果報告書 近世近代商家文書に関する総合的研究』（研究代表者：宇佐美美穂、2003年3月31日）「中山家出店表」（岡井たまき氏作成）による。
表1 中井家支店数と取扱品目

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>日本</th>
<th>日本生産</th>
<th>稲米</th>
<th>海底</th>
<th>酒</th>
<th>飲料</th>
<th>合計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793-1817</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818-42</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843-67</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注）1、江戸時代「近江商人中井家の研究」(雄山閣、1964年、1962年復刻)「付録1」によって作成。
2、貿易は、前期より取扱支店数が増加することを示す。

に区分して作成している。これをみると、とくに18世紀初頭から19世紀初頭にかけて、支店数の急増と取扱商品・関係事業の拡大がみとめられる。初代の光武の昭和から2代目の昭和にかけての時期である。こうした状況と並行して、ひとつの商品を複数の支店で扱う傾向が明確にみられる。これは、商品経営が厳密さを増したことを示すと同時に、事業展開が限界にたどりつつあったことを示唆するものであろう。多岐にわたる貿易取引に対応して、取引仕法としていわゆる「商物替しの商法」がとられた。すなわち、上方地方と東北地方の支局をますんで、各地方の商品が大規模に取引された。上方地方の日本生産・生産・酒類などと、東北地方の生産・貿易・紅花などが支店間で相互に流通した。商業取引以外では、金融業をはじめ、絹油業や酒造業などの製造業にもたずさわっていた点は、表1に示されたものであり、商品取引とはならんが金融業も重要であり、貿易業を丟なっていた。表1にあるように、その展開は1783-1817年において活発化した。これは、既存の京都店などにくわえて、羽倉国大学・豊後国竹・大坂などを設置した結果である。初代光武から3代目の昭和にかけて事業規模は大きく伸張し、本家資産は天保初頭に10万両をこえるにいたった。資本の充実とともに、諸藩との関係が深まった。その結果、大名の利益もおこなかった。なかでも、本家が立地した下呂藩（石高2万5000石）と、仙台藩の在地した仙台藩との関係が深かった。両藩とは、御用商人としてその経済・財政運営に深くかかわることになった。しかしながら、
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1834（天保5）年に家督を相続した4代目の光基の代になり、家運に隠りがみえはじめたようである。資産規模の伸びは頭打ちとなっている。1860（万延1）年、仙台店営業をめぐる紛争から、光基は押込め隠居を余儀なくされた。この前後から事業の縮小がされ、出店の閉鎖があついった。

つぎに日野の本家の役割について、瞥見しておこう。その基本的機能は全国各地の店舗の統括であった。本家の主要帳簿である大福帳には、各支店の勘定がたてられており、「産物損失」にともなう支店間の決済に関与していたとみられる。それにくわえて、金融事業も併行しておこなっていたと。

たとえば1853（嘉永6）年正月起筆の店卸帳をみると、同5年において約580両の収益をあげており、これは本家全収益約6,700両の8.7%を示している。仙台支店の60.0%や大坂店の21.9%にはおおよばないが、京都店（3.6%）・仙台支店（2.9%）・天童店（2.8%）をうわまわる業績をあげている。従業員数でみても、本家は相応の比重大きめている。1855（安政2）年現在において、家事使用者をのぞいた全68名中、本家所属が5人でその比率は7.4%であったと。中井家本家とは、全体の統括部門である同時に、自律的な財務部門としても機能していたのである。

さいごに、本家の立地状況についてみておくことしよう。本家が所在していたのは、湖東地域にある蒲生郡日野の大関町であった。日野は、東海道と中山道をむすぶ御代参街道上にあり、交通の便に恵まれていた。水口藩の城下町は、そこから10キロほどの位置に存在した。ここに東海道の宿駅がおそらくのは、1601（慶長6）年のことであった。1843（天保14）年現在の戸数と人

口は、それぞれ102戸・2,032人にそぼった。この数字は、近隣各宿中で最高であったと。しかし、町勢は停滞気味で、周辺に特産物もなく商品流通がきかなかかった形影はあまりみられないと。所領支配の特質としては、非領国的であったことがあげられる。すなわち、周辺には、水口藩のほか、彦根・仁正寺・大森の諸藩、あるいは旗本領や他国大名領などが散在していたと。

21 本家主要帳簿である「大福帳」をみると、縫縫の仕入をおこなっている。たとえば、天保11（1840）年には、約1,000両にのぼる縫縫を仕入れており、この取引によって約10%の利益を生みだしている。さらに、週間の日数の売り上げがあった。
22 中川泰「中井家史 第13巻」（熊本、滋賀大学経済学部附属史料館蔵）108－111頁。
23 水口町志編纂委員会編「水口町志 上巻」（同委員会、1959年）190－191頁。近隣各宿の戸数と人口は、「水口町志 上巻」230頁に示されておりのとおりである。亀山（557・1,549）、高森（632・1,942）、坂ノ下（153・564）、土山（351・1,506）、石部（458・1,606）、草津（586・2,351）。
24 『水口町志 上巻』251頁。
25 藤田貞一郎『近江商人生成の諸条件』（安岡重明・藤田貞一郎・石川健次郎編著『近江商人の経営遺産 — その再評価 —』同文館、1992年）23頁。
III 中井源左衛門家における流通貨幣

III-1 「金銭出入帳」について

前述のとおり、中井源左衛門家の本家における流通貨幣を観察する。そのさ
いの依拠史料は、現金の出納を管理した「金銭出入帳」である。当該史料は、
1808（文化5）年から1898（明治31）年まで、ほぼ連年にわたり残されている。
その分析に先立ち、ここでは記載形式を確認しておくことにしよう。以下にか
かげたのは、1810（文化7）年度分の冒頭部分である。

「二月七日改メ
一金三拾五両弐分四文朱印
銀十六文六分
壱八百十四文

二月七日
出 百廿四文 （写） 大寄合人用
入 金弐文 （合） 祖母様かし

二月九日
入 百三十六文（合） 右つり払
出 百七十四文

入メ 金六十四両也
九貫四百六十八文

出メ 金三十六両壹分四文
五メ九百七十三文

差引而メ

26 じっさいには、表題に異同がある。1828（文政11）年以前は「金銭出入帳」、1830（文
政13）年以降は「金銭出入帳」となっている（1829年は欠帳）。ここでは、便宜上、「金
銭出入帳」で統一した。
27 この年の金銭出入帳の記帳は、やや変則的であった。まず、この帳簿には、文化7
年と同8年の2年分がまとめられている。そして、7年については、2月から記
帳されており、1月分は前年の文化6年分末尾に記録されている。また、当年分の表紙
には「末尾同年分明治七甲戌年改録記」とあり、のちに書きあらためられたことがわか
る。
江戸後期における流通貨幣 — 近江商人・中井源左衛門家の事例 — 103

金廿八両弐分文……
三両四百九十四文

一金壱両両文 無足仕分、色々相手仕方を異音出不申、
武百拾拾文

二月廿日改
一金壱両弐文
銀十三両六分
銭三両四百拾文

（後略）…」

まず、①に書きあげられているのは、2月7日現在における貨幣残高である。ここでは、金が2両あまりと圧倒的に多かったことがわかる。つきの②では、じっさいの出金と人金が記録されている。各取引について、日付・入出金の区別・金額・摘要を書くことができる。店の交際費や親族への貸金、あるいは家賃収入など、多岐にわたる貨幣の出入りがみられる。そして、一定期間が経過した時点で、ひとまず録めきり集計作業にはいる。このときは、13日後の2月20日であった。それが③と④である。ここで注意が必要なのは、③の入金額合計は①の総合金額をふくむ点である。つまり、総合金は前期から「入金」とみなし、外部よりの入金と合算しているのである。よって、最新の貨幣残高は、総合金額と入金額の合計である③から、出金額である④をさそ引くことで算出できる。これが⑤である。当然、次期への総合金は⑤と同じはずであり、それが⑦である。計算結果と、じっさいの貨幣残高が一致すれば、計算結果が正しいことが確認できる。ただし、ここでは2点の不充分な点があった。ひとつは、銀貨の書き込みである。本来なら、これも③に計上されなければならなかったが、実際にはおちいてしまっている。⑦には①と同額の銀13両6分が計上されているので、この期間においては銀貨取引が行なわれたことが表わしたと推測される。もうひとつは、⑥の不足金の発生である。本来ならば金2両2歩2朱と銭3,494文がなければならないところが、1両不足の金27両2歩2朱と252文不足の銭3,242文しか見あたらなかった。このような形式と手順で、「金銭出入帳」では「現金の物質管理」がおこなわれ26、そのさいには貨幣へつに入金と出金が記録されていた。したがって、その記録にとどまることにより、中井家を経営する貨幣の流れを把握することができることになる。次節では、貨幣流通の実態を観察することにしよう。

26 小倉栄一郎『江州中井家結合の法』（ミネルヴァ書房、1962年）91頁。ただし、同書で検討されているのは、伊勢国一志郡香良洲の酒造店のそれである。
III-2 本家における流通貨幣

本節では、「金銭出目帳」にもとづきながら、中井家本家の授受貨幣の内容について明らかにしていくことにしよう。

まずは、全体的な推移を観察することにしたい。図1は、年初における貨幣残高を、銀紙に換算したのち、種類別に表示したものである。先に検討した「金銭出目帳」の記載例にあたるように、前年から繰りこまれた貨幣が年頭部分に記載される。その時期的変化を観察することで、流通貨幣の変遷に近接できるであろう。同図を一瞥すると、金貨が群をなしていることが明瞭である29。そして、それにつくのが銭貨であり、銭貨はほとんど使用されていないことがわかる。こうした序列はほとんど揺らぐことなく推移するが、時期によっては若干の変動がみられる。1820年代においては、金貨が突出して増加するかたちで、ほかの貨幣の残高は僅少なため、両者の格差は拡大傾向にあった。そのご、こうした金貨の増大は沈静化し、その動きにやや遅れて銭貨の残高が増えている。この銭の増大は幕末までつづき、この間、金貨の何れか率近接するまでにいたっている。年によっては、銭貨の残高が上まる場合も確認できる。銭貨についても、微弱ながら、その残高には変化が生じていた。銭貨の増加とはほぼ同じくして、1840年代後半において若干の増大が見てとれる。しかしながら、こうした銀貨の推移は、三貨の序列を根底からおびやかすようなものではなく、常に最下位のままであった。

図1 中井家本家のにおける貨幣有高（年初）

29. この金貨単位貨幣については、計数金銀貨と金札との区別も重要である。金銀貨幣と紙幣の別にかんしては、銀貨単位貨幣と銭貨単位貨幣とあわせて、のちにふれることにしたい。
以上、中井家本家の貨幣残高について、年頭の数字のみであるが、長期にわたり観察をおこなった。その結果によると、同家においてはすでに銀貨はほとんど所持しており、主人流通貨幣は金貨であったことがうかがえた。ただし、残高のあいだの相対的ではあるが、時期的変化が観察された。つぎに、これらの点について、検討をくわえることになる。

図2は、そのために用意したものである。この図には、先にみた年頭貨幣残高について、その構成比を表示している。ここには、先に挙げた数値がより鮮明にあらわれている。金貨の比率の低落は、1830年代後半を境として一気にあらわれている。金貨はそれまではほぼ100％近い割合を占めていたのであろうが、その比率を下げるというに乱高下をみせるようになる。一方、銀貨と銭貨は、1830年代後半から比率上昇の兆しが見えはじめ、1840年代にはいるとその傾向はより明確となる。二度にわたって、銭貨が金貨を上まわっていることが確認できる。特に1860（万延1）年には、その比率は約70％にたった。こうした両者の構成比に生じた変化は、金貨の減少と、それにつづく両貨幣の増大による結果であることは先に検討したとおりである。ただし、銀貨については、そうした動きは長つく問い合わせ、1850年代にはいりふたび元の水準へと回帰した。

こうした金貨が一貫して圧倒的比率を維持したという事実は、先の観察結果とあわせ、どのように考えればよいのであろうか。本家が商取引にもちいたのは金貨であったと推察され、その回転率が高いために金による支払額もふえたとみられる。「はじめに」の部分でのべたように、18世紀末から19世紀初頭、とくに文化期に対地で支店が展開したことが作用したのではないだろうか。すなわち、中井家は東京の各支店をむすんで取引をこなしていたから、本家が支店網をより有機的に組合せると成功すれば、本家を通じる資金の流通効率は高まるはずである。逆に、資金が遊休化して有効につかわれず、本家に

図2　中井家本家における貨幣残高構成比（年頭）
加藤 慶一郎

表2 中井源左衛門家本家の支払い貨幣（単位：仮、％）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度\貨幣</th>
<th>金額（仮）</th>
<th>構成比（％）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>金貨</td>
<td>銀貨</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810（文化 7）</td>
<td>61,116</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830（文政13）</td>
<td>1,008,046</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850（嘉永 3）</td>
<td>3,346,903</td>
<td>2,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870（明治 3）</td>
<td>10,002,003</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注）1. 各年分「金銭出入帳」によって作成。
2. 換算相場は、鶴岡実枝子編『大津諸相場帳』・宮本又次編『近世大阪の物価と利子』によった。
3. 1仮未満は切捨て。
4. 嘉永3年3月27日の7088,75仮（中井屋岩之助綿代差引売貨）はのぞいている。この点については注釈を参照。

滞留することが多くなると、その流通量にたいして残高が膨大せざるをえない。図1においてみられた1820年代における金貨の急増は、こうした事情を背景にっていたのではないか。表2をみると、金貨による支払は1810年から顕著な増大傾向をもっていており、商勢の充実することがある。同時期における残高は、1820年代の調整期間をはさんで安定している。資金の有効利用を実現する仕組みが構築され機能していたと推察されるのである。

つまり、一時点における貨幣残高ではなく、1年間の支出における使用貨幣量を観察することにより、表2はそのために作成したもので、ここでは「金銭出入帳」の残存状況を勘案しつつ、19世紀初頭以降の4つの時点で20年おきにえらび作業をおこなった。すなわち、1810（文化7）年にはじまらず、1830（文政13）年、1850（嘉永3）年、1870年（明治3）年の4年間である。同表によると、金貨じめの割合が非常に高かったことは一目瞭然である。銀貨と銭貨は、ともに僅かであるが金額・比率が変化しており、その動きは連動している。

以上、いくつかの側面から中井源左衛門家本家の使用貨幣について考察した。ここでは、主に金貨が使用されており、銀貨は薄かったことが明らかとなった。しかしながら、表2にみられるように、銭貨とともに使用頻度がやや上昇しているのも事実である。本来なら、銀貨は金貨に並びつつはずの主要通貨

30 平時においては支払額と受取額はほぼ均衡するはずであるから、支払のみによって使用貨幣を把握しても大過ないと考える。
31 なお、1850年3月27日において、銀貨残高の出納が中井屋之助（大阪店）との銭取引に関連しておこわれている。しかし、こうした事例はほかに見当らないこと、と同日に他店へ譲り替えられていることを重視して、検討対象からはいだ。しかし、こうした帳簿銭取引が大阪店との関係で生じていることは、大阪の流通貨幣を考えるうえでは重要である。
である。そこで、わずかにみられた銀貨の使用について、その内容とはいかなるものであったのか次節で検討をくわえることしよう。

III－３ 本家における銀貨単位貨幣の使用実態

はじめに、銀貨が使用されるさいの、他の貨幣との組合せを整理した表3をみよう。この表には、銀貨のみ使用された場合のほか、金貨、銭貨、金貨・銭貨と併用された時の金額と件数、およびその比率を表示した。このうち、金貨単独、あるいは金貨・銭貨と併用された銀貨とは、端数処理に付されたとみて良い。その性格からして、銀貨が基軸通貨であるか否かにかかわらず、こうした事例は見いだされるであろう。したがって、焦点は銀貨のみの使用事例である。支払にかんしては、金額には上下があるが、銀貨のみが金額で半分程度

表3－1 中井家本家の銀貨単位貨幣使用形態（支払）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度/種類</th>
<th>銀のみ</th>
<th>銀・金</th>
<th>銀・銭</th>
<th>銀・金・銭</th>
<th>合計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1810年</td>
<td>92.57(24)</td>
<td>31.40(4)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>36.30(2)</td>
<td>160.27(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文化7)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830年</td>
<td>22.20(9)</td>
<td>31.40(4)</td>
<td>2.10(2)</td>
<td>31.40(4)</td>
<td>57.51(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文政13)</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850年</td>
<td>1,426.11(87)</td>
<td>450.12(41)</td>
<td>76.16(16)</td>
<td>200.00(9)</td>
<td>2,152.89(153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(嘉永3)</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870年</td>
<td>7.30(1)</td>
<td>12.90(6)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20.46(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(明治3)</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注）1. 各年分「金銭出入帳」によって作成。
2. 嘉永3年3月27日の70887.75文（中井屋及び助綿代差引居屋）はそず。2
3. 上段の単位は文であり、括弧内の数字は件数をしめし、下段の数字は構成比（％）である。

表3－2 中井家本家の銀貨使用形態（受取）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度/種類</th>
<th>銀のみ</th>
<th>銀・金</th>
<th>銀・銭</th>
<th>銀・金・銭</th>
<th>合計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1810年</td>
<td>214.77(4)</td>
<td>7.50(1)</td>
<td>4.50(1)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>226.77(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文化7)</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830年</td>
<td>72.90(3)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6.30(2)</td>
<td>79.21(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文政13)</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850年</td>
<td>1,317.22(36)</td>
<td>801.48(35)</td>
<td>19.95(6)</td>
<td>35.40(2)</td>
<td>2,174.07(79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(嘉永3)</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870年</td>
<td>10.15(3)</td>
<td>10.31(4)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20.46(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(明治3)</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注）1. 各年分「金銭出入帳」によって作成。
2. 嘉永3年3月27日の70887.75文（中井屋及び助綿代差引居屋）はそず。2
3. 上段の単位は文であり、括弧内の数字は件数をしめし、下段の数字は構成比（％）である。
をしめる。1件あたりの金額をもとめると、1810（文化7）年が3,966、1830（文政13）年が2,500、1850（嘉永3）年が16,400、1870（明治3）年が7,875となっていた。したがって、嘉永3年をのぞくと、基本的には銀貨は小口の支払にはほど限界としていたことになる。受取についても同様に数値をもってみると、銀貨の全使用が多いうことがわかる。1件あたり金額は、それぞれ53,756円、24,300円、30,600円、3,400円とわずかに高額である。

先にみた図2にあったように、嘉永期の銀貨増大は一時的であった。そこで、まずは文化7年をとりあげ、平時の銀貨の使用状況について確認しておくことにしよう。表4は、同年の銀貨の使用事例について、その日付・入出金のペース・使用内容をしぼしたものである。上段には支払い、下段には受取について掲げている。後に検討する1850（嘉永3）年とは異なり、「礼」の記載がないため、すべて秤量銀貨であったとみられる。支払で目だったのは、1月1日の

表4 中井源左衛門家本家の銀貨単位貨幣の使用目的（1810（文化7）年

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>月日</th>
<th>金額</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-5,80</td>
<td>大聖寺祝儀</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-3,50</td>
<td>正崇寺香帳</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-2,00</td>
<td>奥仙寺法事券付香典</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-2,00</td>
<td>泰三郎欽同関（奥仙寺法事券付香典）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-1,50</td>
<td>奉太郎欽関（奥仙寺香事券付香典）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-7,90</td>
<td>銀兩かへ（金2朱）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>-5,50</td>
<td>後藤元通左時から払</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>-6,00</td>
<td>法雲寺正林寺布施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>-4,30</td>
<td>長德寺へ布施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>-5,80</td>
<td>彦根町書院礼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>-5,00</td>
<td>大の団頭書施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>-1,60</td>
<td>牧野氏書状</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>-3,65</td>
<td>小谷若村卿兵衛香帳</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>-4,52</td>
<td>両かへ（500文）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>-4,30</td>
<td>竹部九命寺書</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>-1,60</td>
<td>両かへ（170文）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>-3,05</td>
<td>（大聖寺祝儀和尚入院祝儀）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>-3,05</td>
<td>奥太郎欽関</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>-4,30</td>
<td>宜智和尚円通寺へ入院祝儀</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>-2,00</td>
<td>西ノ本誓寺へ布施破分</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>-1,00</td>
<td>奥太郎から時同園金（助講）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>-7,80</td>
<td>大東へ渡し同関（法事布施）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>-2,10</td>
<td>清水寺へ香帳</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.29</td>
<td>-4,30</td>
<td>周造殿へ茶礼</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注）1.「金銭出人帳」（文化7年）によって作成。
2.正の符号は入金を、負の符号は出金をしめす。
3.単位は銀貨である。
江戸後期における流通貨幣 — 近江商人・中井源左衛門家の事例 — 109

大聖寺祝儀のほか、香典・布施・栄礼といった各種の儀礼上の目的である32。両替（「両へあり」）取引も何度かおこなわれており、4月に2件、7月～9月には1件ずつあった。注目されるのが、3月29日の200両のやや高額の入金である。受取先は中井屋岩助、すなわち中井家の大阪店である。同店は、買屋業や銅器・古物などの仕入取次を担当していた。小玉銀は旅行のさいにも必要であったため33、わずかずる大阪から取引したのかもしれない34。なお、この年、源

32 「水口日野緑談一件帳」（天保3年）は、4代目となる光基が、婿養子として中井家へむかえるのを防ぐために作成されたと推測される帳簿である。これによると、祝儀として白銀1両と銅錠1片のほか、金100円と金2朱がはかれており、銀貨、あるいは銀材としての銀への期待が読みとれる。

類似の現象は他に数か所でみられる。ここでは、西宮（現兵庫県西宮市）の古市による貨幣流通にかんする同館談を引用しておこう。なお、両替は「慶応末年は余は年齢15歳で有る」とのことを、安政・慶応期ごろの当地の状況をのべていると考えられる。

「以前には丁銀や豆板や一分の金などに有ったやうで有るが一向目にて触れなかった、小玉は御城にて有つて銅錠等に用た（中略）銀は・・・銀札許りで・・・銀の代用で銅錠にて発行した・・・小玉は計量器にて使用すると、自分等の年少時には偶々計量器などに用いた事を記憶している」（吉田尚秀編・発行「老の思い出 一名西宮譚本」私家版、1926年、160－162頁）。

33 以下は、『旅行須知』という旅行指南書で、道中での貨幣使用についても言及している。著者は岡山藩士と推定される。執筆年は不明であるが、写本が作成されたのは1855（安政2）年である。ここでは読みやすくするため、適宜、句読点と丸数字を付している。

「（前略）

一、小行を道中にて切りする事無くから。狭央のものありてあき百歩に両替する事

間に有り。歩歩道中にて入用程へ、両替して出へし。但、伏見にて一行銭五両給に

申付切らてもよし。（①）

一、銭を両替せば、宿にて銭をよめて両替し、銭の数を家来に改させ受取へし。道中

にて両替すからか。数を改む際もなく、数不詳から也。（②）

馬兵常分多くやまきも。（③）

一、銀子二三両或るべし。銭多く用意すへし。道中にて、はとや共に銭を出事有物

也。其館、島々共奥へて、下品にて悪し。銀子を銭換二遺してよし。（④）

（後略）（近藤観「旅行須知」三井高陽監修『日本交通史料集成第三編』国際交通文化

協会、1939年、28頁）

①～③によると、道中において、小行ではなく一分行を携行し、それを必要に応じて宿

に於て銭を有するに両替するのが良いとされている。一気何故に両替すると、銭その

ものが荷物となってしましまうからである。④では、小玉銀貨の儀礼的使用については言及

されており、旅行屋への返札は銭ではなく小玉銀貨が推奨されている。中井家にも同様

の傾向がみられる点については、このあたりにふれる。

34 年末詳であるが、1805（文化3）年から1808（慶応4）年まで設置された大阪店の

「月販」には、つぎのような記載がみられる。

「一、小玉五百両

右は御祝文之品也」

小玉銀貨幣としてよりも、商品としての認識がまき散らしていた状況がうかがえる。
左衛門光雄は、出店の経営監査のため店舗を訪れ、そのさいに、奉公人の待遇を下付することもあり、その用意であった可能性もある。いずれにせよ、この時期においても大坂では相対的に払下げ銀賃が豊富であったことがうかがえる。

表5-1 中井家本家の銀貨使用目的（出金）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1810年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文政7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文政3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(嘉永3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(明治3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注: 1. 2年目の「金銭出賃」によって作成。
2. 嘉永3年3月27日に7,088,756文（「中井屋撮之助錦代差引在貸し」）の造り。これは、上段の単位は文であり、括弧内の数字は件数を示し、下段の数字は構成比（%）である。

表5-2 中井家本家の銀貨使用目的（入金）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1810年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文政7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(文政3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830年</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(嘉永3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870年</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注: 1. 2年目の「金銭出賃」によって作成。
2. 嘉永3年3月27日に7,088,756文（「中井屋撮之助錦代差引在貸し」）の造り。これは、上段の単位は文であり、括弧内の数字は件数を示し、下段の数字は構成比（%）である。

35 江頭「中井家の研究」816-818頁。
36 大坂支店では仏化期においても、出店をもって、出向いた当主をたいてし小玉銀が貸しつけたり、現金化することが起こっている（「差引調帳」仏化2年および同5年）。
してまずみよう。1810年と1830年においては、寄付がもっとも金額が多い。両年においてそれについてのが、貸借であった。しかしながら、1830年は銀貨の使用は不振であり、4項目すべての使用金額が減少している。そのご1850年になるとは、なるまで増加して、全項目に増加がみられる。つまり、商品・用役代金の増大が顕著であり、両替と貸借もそれについた。こうした全体的な増勢のため、寄付もある程度は増加しているにもかかわらず、その比率は大幅に減少することとなった。1870年になると、その使用はほとんどなかった。一方、受取はどうであったろうか。1810・1830年については、小玉銀行では両替にともなう受取でしかされており、それ以外の使用を見なかった。それ以前は銀貨が無くとこと足りていたわけであるから、中井家が積極的に銀貨をもまとめないかだ。1850年になると、先と同様の変化が生じている。すなわち、大量の銀貨が両替をつうして入金してきたのである。それに連動するかのように、商品・用役代金としての入金も増えている。この年についていえば、両替を通じて受けとった銀貨を、商品・用役代金あるいは両替などの目的で出金していたことになる。つまり、銀貨のみの循環は、規模あるのが形成されていたのである。当時、中井家では伊勢の香良洲店をもっており、そこでは比較的銀札が流通していた。しかし、本家独自の取引をつうして銀貨の流通がみられるため、同店からの流入ではなかったということになる。それ以前の1810・1830年においては、主に端数処理によって受けとった銀札を、支払時に使用するという形になっていたのとは対照的である。

右の検討により、1850年における銀貨の使用事例が際だった。この事実は、その流通量が増大していたことを示唆するものである。さらに、この年独自の現象として、秤量銀貨とともに「銀札」の使用がみられた。銀貨については、「銀札」使用があった点では共通している。それぞれの流通量増大は、紙幣流通に起因するものであった可能性がある。そこで、同年について、銀札の部分をわけて作成したのが表6である。出金・入金それぞれについて、各項目の上段が銀札の使用金額で、下段が全体の使用金額である。まず合計額をみると、入金出金とともに、銀札が全体の約68％を占めている。したがって、この時期における銀貨の使用量増大は、銀札によるところが大きかったとみて間違いない。若者されてはならないのは、秤量銀貨使用量も増大している事実である。恐らく、銀札流通に牽引され、それまで退蔵気味であった秤量銀貨のふたび市場に出るようになると考えられる。こうした点からしても、通貨が自然に統合されることはきわめて困難であったといえよう。つぎに各項目をみると、出金では商品と両替において銀札使用率が高い。寄付と貸借においては、

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37 同支店の「金銭出入帳」の嘉永2・3年分をみると、全支払額（銀約47貫分）のうち、約4%（約2貫分）が銀札であったと見込まれる。
表6 中井家本家の銀札使用状況（1850〈嘉永3〉年）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>商品・商用銭</th>
<th>貸借</th>
<th>寄付</th>
<th>両替</th>
<th>その他・不明</th>
<th>合計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>出</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>銀札</td>
<td>504.40</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>330.00</td>
<td>106.00</td>
<td>966.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>比率(%)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>金</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>全体</td>
<td>633.49</td>
<td>224.35</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>351.49</td>
<td>149.08</td>
<td>1,426.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       |             |      |      |      |             |      |
| 入    |             |      |      |      |             |      |
| 銀札   |             |      |      | 5.00 | 888.67      | 903.07|
| (構成比)|             |      |      | (1)  | (14)        | (20) |
| 金    |             |      |      |      |             |      |
| 全体   | 139.30      | -    | 5.00 | 1,083.37| 87.55       | 1,317.22|

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

注) 1. 各年分「金銭出納帳」によって作成。
2. 嘉永3年3月27日の7088.75銭（「中井屋岩之助銭代差引尾貸し」）はのぞいた。
3. 単位は銭、括弧内は件数をしめす。

反対にその率が低くなっている。これらの場合は、銀札よりも秤量銀貨がより適当であったがさえる。支出目的によって、貨幣の使い分けがなされていたのであろう。香典などの儀礼的な貨幣授受にかんし、紙幣よりも金属貨幣が選好された点は先にみたところである。また、貸借についても、先に検討した表4にしめされた内容からすると、近親者のために香典を立てかえた場合や、身内のものへの少額を貸しつけた場合がかなりふくまれていたと推察される。こうした時、金額が小ならば何でもよいというのでなく、貨幣素材にも一定の配慮がなされたが再確認できる。他方、入金をみると、商品・用役代金に秤量銀貨の比較的高額な1件があるため、銀札使用率が低くなっている。これはその内容をみると、京都の分家である中井正治右衛門からの銭代と駄貨である。この事実から、京都では依然として秤量銀貨の使用頻度が高かったことがうかがえる。そのほかでは、両替が大半であり、銀札の比率も80％余と高くない。

おわりに

以上、文化期以降を対象時期として、中井源左衛門家の本家における流通貨幣に検討をくわえた。6その結果を簡単にまとめておくことにしよう。

中井源左衛門家の「金銭出納帳」は、1865（元治2）年が利用できる。これによると、同年の支払貨幣の内訳は、総額銀約4,000貫目を見つけ、金単位貨幣が91.2％、銀単位貨幣が8.3％、銭単位貨幣が0.5％となっている。この中における異常な銀安傾向を勘案すると、この銀単位貨幣の比率は過小であるかもしれない。
江戸後期における流通貨幣 — 近江商人・中井家左衛門家の事例 — 113

①大半の流通貨幣は計数金銀貨であった。
②主として、秤量銀貨は儀礼的な目的につかわれた。
③「銀貨」と「銅貨」の使用は、紙幣の使用とともに重とに回復した。
④にかんしては、明治期にはいって「金銭出入帳」に「金札」があられるため、それ以前は計数金銀貨であったと判断した。②と考えあわせて、中井家の本家における取引は、計数金銀貨によって成立していたことになる。秤量銀貨の経済的機能は、著しく低下していたのである。この事実は、江戸後期の豪商のなかには、計数金銀貨のみでこと足りた経営があったことを示唆している。
⑤的には、天保期の改銀によって「秤量銀貨の役務」が決定的となったとされる。しかし、中井家においては、文政の改銀以前の1810（文化7）年において、すでに計数金銀貨が決済手段となっていたのである。

もちろん、在地経済とのつながりが深ければ深いほど、銀貨あるいは銅貨の使用頻度は高まるであろう。この点を裏づけるのが、③の事実である。中井家が所在した湖東地方は、先述のとおり非領国的地方である。したがって、種々の藩札が越境して流通することは十分ありえた。じっさい、同家による札の使用増大と、近隣における札の発行とは時期的に重なっている。すなわち、1847（弘化4）年において、下大森村（現八日市市）に陣屋をもつ旗本・最上氏（石高5,000石）が、銀札（2分・1分・5文）と銅札（5文・300文・100文・5文）を発行している⑧。その名称が「茶切手」、引替所が「江州大森茶会所」となっており、茶の専売制と関連して発行されたのである。この旗本札はよく流通していたようである。他地域へ流出した分については、月に一度ずつ八日市町へ出張して引きかえたというを。最上氏は、1860（安政1）年以降も4度にわずか鉄札あるいは銅札を発行したことが確認できる。中井家とは所領を異にするが、日野と大森とは8キロほどしか隔てていなかったため、在地における諸取引を通じて同家の手にもわたったのであろう。また、東林村（現安土町）に陣屋をもつの根来氏（石高3,400石）は、1849（嘉永2）年に銀1分の額面をもつ豆手形を発行している。さらに、水口藩自身も1856（安政3）年に

30 山本有造『両から円へ』幕末・明治前期貨幣問題研究（ミネルヴァ書房、1994年）306頁。
31 中井家が所在した蒲生郡をふくむ近江国南東部について、土地売買を証文を検討した浦長村『近江本邦貨幣流通史』28頁によると、17世紀末においては銀が基準貨幣であった。この点に、貨幣の流通構造の重層性、あるいは基準貨幣と流通貨幣の乖離があらわれている。
32 日本銀行調査局編・土屋義雄／山口和雄監修『図録 日本の貨幣6』（東洋経済新報社、1975年）26頁。
33 北陸県浦生郡所編『近江蒲生郡志』卷五（同前、1922年）79頁。
34 北陸県蒲生郡所編『近江蒲生郡志』卷五（同前、1922年）377頁、日本銀行調査局『日本の貨幣6』84頁。
銭札（500文・100文・50文）を発行している。藩札はやはり在地経済における通貨であった。中井家の本家は、その経営を計数銀札により成り立たせていたため、藩札の流通との接点はほとんど無かった。地域内通貨とのかかわりは、その在地経済との関係により格差があったといえよう。重層的な貨幣構造と直接むきあわせなければならない商人もいれば、間接的な接触にとどまるものもいたことになる。

【付記】
本論文は、日本銀行金融研究所貨幣史研究会西日本部分会における報告をもとにしたもので、彼にとり、会員各位よりご教示を頂きました。また、徳島県立貞光高等学校・野口昭四郎氏からは、近代の私札にかんする有益な情報をご提供いただいた。史料採訪にさいしては、滋賀大学経済学部附属史料館の関係者の方々よりご高配を頂きました。謝辞ながら、充てして感謝の意を表したい。なお、本論文は2002年度流通科学大学商学部特別研究助成による研究成果の一部である。

41 日本銀行調査局『日本の貨幣』27頁。
Maps are seen in the mind long before they are drawn on paper. Denis Wood reminds us, “[T]he maps we make in our minds embody experience exactly as paper maps do, accumulated as we have made our way through the world in the activity of our living.” (Wood 1992: 14) And there are many more maps in the mind than can ever be inscribed on paper, for maps are the products of purpose, “choos[ing] among competing interests; that is, they embody those interests in the map.” (Wood 1992: 57; emphasis in original) What is shown, and what hidden, in any map is an index of the interests behind its makers.

Maps show certain things—say, irrigation channels, rice paddies, or common land—while ignoring or obscuring others. A map of the distribution of landholding in a village will not show the distribution of occupations, office-holding, or religious affiliation; a map of arable and fallow land may be of little use as a guide to the best route from one field to another. And the social map of a village, as found in the mind of its headman or others of the village elite, may differ markedly from that in the mind of a tenant farmer, an outcaste, or a Buddhist priest.

The “maps” I write of in the present paper, following Wood, existed principally in the minds and practices of villagers—in this case, the small farming village of Nishijō, situated on the banks of the Nagara River, in the polder lowlands of what is today Gifu Prefecture. They can be found on paper as well, but not as what we might commonly recognize as maps. For they are not simply “graphic representation[s] of the milieu” (Robinson and Petchenik 1976: 16), according to a schematic code, of the geographical features of the village, indicating their spatial distribution—though this is a fair working definition of a “map.”

First, if maps are “simply... a representation of things in space; representation and space are the key elements” (Ibid., 1976: 15), they may exist in
the mind, and be recovered from ordinary written, that is, verbal records of the acts and behavior of ordinary people. And second, following Wood (1992), and especially the late J. B. Harley (1988, 1989a, 1989b), we also have come to recognize that those “things in space” that Robinson and Petchenik (1976) took to be immanent, given features of the landscape, the objects maps represent, are not so innocent; the makers behind the maps may deploy “graphic representations” as much to constitute as to represent. Maps, that is, are suffused with what Baxandall (1985) has called “patterns of intention,” the purposes of both their immediate architects, and the patrons who employ them. The villagers of Nishijō in the late Tokugawa period have left palimpsests of their mind maps, that is, embedded in their written records and cultural practices, from which it is possible to elicit a variety of mappings of Nishijō and its environs. These mind maps call into question the nature, perhaps even the very existence, of Nishijō as a village, and reveal it to be a series of arguments about its identity, and its geographic and social extent. It is precisely these invisible maps that I propose to bring out in the discussion that follows.

BACKGROUND

Some years ago, I began a project inspired by the pioneering work of the economic historian Hayami Akira, on the demographic history of Edo-period Nishijō. Much of Professor Hayami’s path breaking work in Edo-period historical demography had been based on data from Nishijō’s population records, which were compiled annually from the seventeenth century until 1872, and which survive intact in a continuous series for the last ninety-seven years of that span of time. Professor Hayami has elucidated such questions as marriage and fertility patterns, labor migration, etc. in Tokugawa Japan, using the Nishijō data as his laboratory, to the great advancement of our understanding of demographic and social processes in early modern Japan.¹

In the Edo period, Nishijō was a tenryō village, that is, a village in the

¹. Much of this work is summarized in Hayami Akira 1997, Chapter 4. Nishijō has been the focus of several important studies that take off from Hayami’s extensive corpus of work. Of particular relevance to this paper is Narimatsu Saeko, Shōya nikki ni mieru Edo no sesō to kurashi (Mineruva Shobō, 2000).
direct domains of the Tokugawa bakufu in Edo. It was one of dozens of such villages scattered around the heartland of Japan that were not part of extensive tracts of shogunal land, but simply one or two isolated villages, not concentrated enough for the shogunate to place its own administrative agent there. Like many other such villages, Nishijō was “deposited” with the nearest daimyo (daimyō azukari), in this case with the Toda of Ōgaki domain in 1748, as a sort of fiduciary agent for the bakufu. (Harafuji 1988) The village was within a day’s round trip by ferry and foot from the daimyo’s castle town of Ōgaki, which sat astride the Minoji, a branch highway connecting the Nakasendō and the Tōkaidō, the two main routes between Kyoto and Edo. The successive headmen’s diaries are replete with references to their many trips to “the honorable fiduciary office” (oazukari oyakusho), the Ōgaki office that collected taxes and oversaw the tenryō villages deposited with Ōgaki. (Narimatsu 2000)

For the purposes of his demographic analysis, Prof. Hayami implicitly takes “Nishijō” as a unitary site, with a coherent population and internal socioeconomic structure, a “village” comprising the lands inhabited and farmed by the people registered the annual census registers. The registers, most of them entitled Ninbetsu shūmon aratame chō, were compiled each year by the village headman, with the assistance of local Buddhist clergy, both as a census and as a check that all village residents were uninfected with any taint of Christianity. Taking the population of the registers, which are extant for a century from 1773 to 1872, to represent a unitary village yielded a population large enough for significant statistical analysis—analysis that has revolutionized historical scholarship on Edo-period Japanese demography. But it may have masked internal fissures and divisions, the existence of cross-cutting communities both within and beyond the area covered by those records, a multiplicity of overlapping, layered villages, occupying the same territory. Beginning to map these multiple communities—to attempt to tease out some of the villagers’ own mind maps—is the focus of this paper.

FIRST ENCOUNTERS

In preparing for my first extended visit to Nishijō, I had made two quite brief stops there earlier, in 1983 and 1984. The village immediately called up images of Teshigahara Hiroshi’s film version of Abe Kōbō’s Woman in the Dunes: Nishijō is surrounded on two sides (north and east) by tall earthen dikes that tower above the rooftops of the village; maintenance of the dikes has long been a life-or-death matter. For, situated in the northeast corner of the Fukutsuka Polder, Nishijō is nestled on the west bank of the Nagara River, and just south of a dry creek called the “Nakamura River” (it was not dry in the Edo period, but had a ferry), in the heartland of the polder region (wajū chitai) of the Mino lowlands (modern Gifu Prefecture).
Most of the region was reclaimed marsh and sandbar in the Edo period, and is still susceptible to prodigious floods; to control the floods and preserve the land in arable condition, it has been diked for more than four centuries.

Thus, while I had a visual image of the village, and some sense of its physical reality, I was essentially limited in my knowledge about it to what I had learned from Prof. Hayami’s work, my own examination of the documentary and scholarly record, including local histories, and a few hours’ observation of the physical environment. I had yet truly to walk the ground on which the people of Nishijō had lived and worked. When I worked in the village for an extended period in 1985, however, I discovered that the “village” of Nishijō presented me with epistemological problems that confront every historian and anthropologist, but that I had taken too lightly.

One calm but dreary afternoon in the Spring of 1985 I was sitting outside a small local store—if Nishijō were larger, it might be a mini-mart—at a bus stop on the main road that bisects the community, squatting down and sipping a soda beside a middle-aged man doing much the same. He seemed to be waiting for the bus into town (Ōgaki). He was, not surprisingly, puzzled by the presence of a foreigner, for while hundreds of foreigners pass Nishijō (and Ōgaki) each day on the “bullet train” which runs just north of the former and south of the latter, surely none of them notice it; indeed, concealed as it is by a towering flood-prevention dike constructed in the Tokugawa period, the village is invisible from the Shinkansen. And few foreigners ever enter the village.

Equally commonplace, we struck up a conversation, to pass the time, about nothing in particular. He wanted to know where I was from—though he correctly assumed me to be American—but, thankfully, did not remark on my ability to speak Japanese. Even more, he wondered what had brought me to this seemingly unremarkable rice-farming village. I told him I was there doing research, and asked him, in turn, whether he was returning home to Ōgaki, or whether he lived in Nishijō. I was hardly prepared

2. There have of course been fine-grained changes in the surface of Nishijō, especially the so-called “reorganization of farmland” (nichi seiri; kaku seiri) of the postwar era, which has all but obliterated the patchwork of irregular field shapes that characterized most Japanese farmland until “modern” and “rational” systems were parachuted onto the land. Nearly all the fields, both paddy and dry, are now neatly rectangular and of essentially uniform size. Consequently, the irrigation system has also been completely restructured around the new rectangular fields. And, of course, the village is crisscrossed by paved roads lined with utility poles, TV satellite dishes, parked automobiles, and hundreds of other appurtenances of modern, consumer society are everywhere to be seen. But Nishijō’s fundamental layout, deep structures like the location of the dikes, the division between residential plots and farmland, and many of the internal divisions not immediately apparent to the eye, remain.
for his indignation: “Me live in Nishi-jō? No, I live in Jūrenbō,” he said, in a somewhat exercised voice, indicating by its local name the eastern half of the “Nishi-jō” compassed by the Edo-period census registers. For my interlocutor, Jūrenbō was decidedly not “Nishi-jō.”

MULTIPLE MAPPINGS

This brings me to the epistemological issue I shall address here. If the “village” of today is so uneasy of definition, then where was the “Nishi-jō” of the Tokugawa period? Who were the peasants of Nishi-jō? What are the physical, social, and cognitive boundaries of Nishi-jō—indeed, is Nishi-jō a unitary cognitive entity? I raise these issues because they are essential to our enterprise, because their resolutions are anything but self-evident, and because they are issues central to an understanding of how communities defined themselves—that is, an understanding of people and locality, locality and region, governed and governing. To put my conclusion ahead of my exposition, whether Nishi-jō was a “village,” and what its relationship was to other villages, depended substantially on one’s point of view. From some perspectives—say, from the viewpoint of the annual census—early modern Nishi-jō was a unitary community, within the larger “village” of Niremata; and other times, particularly when viewed from higher on the administrative ladder, Nishi-jō disappeared from sight almost entirely. And yet, at the same time, there were multiple villages within “Nishi-jō,” which were themselves obscured by administrative fiction.

The “Nishi-jō” of Professor Hayami’s studies is in essence the unit of reality defined—and, I shall argue, constructed—by a series of census and sectarian-affiliation registers, the Shūmon aratame chō (hereafter “census registers”), an uninterrupted annual series of which covers the years from 1773 to 1872. The peasants listed in these registers were juridical members of the seventy-five to ninety-two households (ie) that comprised the village, the “village” whose marital, reproductive, and migratory behavior has been so well elucidated by Professor Hayami. As Prof. Hayami makes clear, the census registers themselves identify Nishi-jō simultaneously as a “village,” and as part of a larger, more complex village: “The Village of Nishi-jō, within the Village of Niremata” (Niremata-mura no uchi Nishi-jō-mura). Although part of Niremata for certain administrative purposes, as the title of the Shūmon aratame chō makes clear, Nishi-jō reported its population independently; the southern half of Niremata reported its population separately—as “Niremata.” To distinguish the larger, all-inclusive Niremata from the smaller one, I shall call them “greater Niremata” and “lesser Niremata,” respectively.

But when it came to the annual report of village conditions, the meisai-chō (“register of details”), also submitted to the “honorable fiduciary office” (o-azukaridokoro; oyakusho) each year, Nishi-jō almost completely
disappeared: Greater Niremata presented the office with a unified annual report summarizing the tax base and population, Shintō shrines and Buddhist temples, and other details of conditions within its boundaries, without a single mention of “Nishijō”—nor of the “Lesser Niremata”—hidden within. The only hints that there might be more than one community that this document politely conceals—the oyakusho, of course, knew of both Nishijō and Lesser Niremata from census, tax, and other records—were the mention of two separate public notice boards (kōsatsu), and the fact that the meisai-chō were signed by the headmen, elders (toshiyori), and peasants’ representatives (hyakushōdai) from both Nishijō and Lesser Niremata.


Some have suggested that there is an a priori entity, a “natural village” (shizen shūraku) that is somehow immanent in the structure of life and local geography, an expression of the inherent social and cognitive organization of the people of “the village”: “Mura: Natural village. Under the sato or gōri system, the household [ko] was the [basis of] the administrative unit, but the mura was completely unrelated to that, having reference to a coherent territory, persisting as the unit of peasant life” (Nihonshi Yo¬go Jiten Henshū Inkai 1979: 781; emphasis added) This is distinct from the “administrative village” (gyōsei sonraku), which is an administrative fiction imposed arbitrarily by higher (samurai/daimyo/shogunal) political authority. However, for this “natural village” to exist, there must have been a physical and geographical unit that corresponded to a widely-agreed-upon social and cognitive unit—a community—that constituted “the village.” Anyone familiar with the area, that is, ought readily to have been able to point out a dividing line between “village” and “not-village,” and that boundary ought to have been affirmed by any other local person, even from another village, excluded from the cognitive/geographical unit of the “village” agreed upon above.

In Nishijō, however, the case is not so simple, as my chance encounter at the bus stop suggested, and as the complexities of local practices—some of them noted above—reflected in the shūmon aratame chō, meisai-chō, and other local records, confirm. For some purposes, the social and residential unit comprising the population registered in the Nishijō census registers was the “village,” but for other purposes, neither the residents of the census “village,” nor the neighboring village of “lesser” Niremata, regarded Nishijō as a village. At times, Nishijō was part of a larger village—Greater Niremata—and at others, if we are to believe the cognitive implications of the record, and of local collective memory, it was itself an amalgam of the two villages of “lesser” Nishijō and Jūrenbō. If Marc Bloch was correct about feudalism being characterized by landholding patterns such that many people might look at the same field and say, “this is my land,” in some “villages” in Tokugawa Japan the same peasant might look
to different entities for different purposes, and say: “That is my village.” In order to clarify this admittedly confusing description, I will have recourse to a more conventional map.

Map 2: Nishijō and Its Multilayered Communities

The Nishijō of the census registers, that is, was part of a larger administrative village known as Niremata, which comprised both the Nishijō of the census/sect registers, and a separate, contiguous census registration unit called Niremata. It is unclear when the two villages were combined for administrative purposes, or even when, and in what sequence they were founded. One local (Nishijō) oral tradition has it that Nishijō is older, and that Niremata was founded later, after the Battle of Sekigahara (1600). Folks in Niremata, of course, see it differently. But both appear—as separate villages—in Hideyoshi’s 1588 catalog of the Ichihashi fief (Gifu Ken 1972-1973, Shiryō-hen, Kinsei 6: 6; Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan linkai 1981: 781), rendering the question of seniority moot, except for local bragging rights. But my suspicion, on the basis of several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century manuscripts in the Nishijō headman’s collection, in the collection of the Niremata headman, and in other archives, is that the process of amalgamation proceeded piecemeal over the course of the seventeenth century, and that it received added impetus from a peasant protest in the village during the Genroku period (1688-1704).

When Toyotomi Hideyoshi enumerated the villages given in fief to Ichi-
hashi Shimōsa-no-kami in 1588, Niremata (listed as “Nuremata”) and Nishijō were listed as separate villages—indeed, separated in the catalog by another village—with a notation that the taxes on Nishijō were to be paid to a local samurai of the Nishimatsu family, as a form of subfief within the Ichihashi domain. But just eight days after Tokugawa Ieyasu won a decisive victory over Hideyoshi’s heirs in the winter of 1600, in the Battle of Sekigahara, only a few miles northwest of Niremata and Nishijō, Tokugawa Ieyasu issued an order to seven of the villages in the Fukutsuka Polder, proscribing arson, banditry, and illegal (secret) harvesting of crops: Niremata was among them, but Nishijō was not. Perhaps Ieyasu saw Nishijō as a subordinate part of Niremata. (Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan Inkan 1981: 787-788) Local lore has it that Nishimatsu had been a Toyotomi partisan, and was deemed untrustworthy: As punishment, he was linked—and subordinated—to Niremata and its headman. This might account for Nishijō’s invisibility, but it is just as likely that the absence of Nishijō from this order merely indicates that Ieyasu had not yet taken account of it: These were unsettled days, and there were several other villages in the polder that Ieyasu had likewise overlooked. (Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan Inkan 1981: 785-786)

A quarter-century later, a 1624 survey of commons (kayano) in the villages along the New Shimo-ōgure Road listed Niremata and Nishijō as separate villages, each with its own headman. (Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan Inkan 1981: 791-793) But the impression that Nishijō is subordinate to Niremata is reinforced by a land tax (nengu) report only two months earlier: While Niremata and Nishijō’s tax obligations are distinguished, the report is a submission from Nishijō’s headmen to Niremata’s headmen, as if the latter were superior officers. (Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan Inkan 1981: 804-805) And, when Niremata villagers protested a 1641 reassessment that would have nearly doubled Niremata’s tax obligations, it was a Niremata without Nishijō. (Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan Inkan 1981: 807)

The earliest extant census of “the village,” the Ninbetsu-chō of 1676, treats Nishijō and Niremata as two villages paired for reporting purposes. It is entitled Ninbetsu-chō Niremata Nishijō, suggesting that the two clusters of residential and agricultural land and people constitute separate entities that are paired for convenience, and that the two villages are rough peers. This document is itself internally contradictory as to the nature of “the village,” though it seems to confirm the administrative superiority of

3. Despite the bakufu mandate that “investigations of sect affiliation” (shūmon aratame) be conducted in every tenryō village, and the extension of that mandate to all villages after 1665, there is no indication of sect affiliation in the 1676 Ninbetsu-chō, nor are individual members of each household identified by name or relation to the family head. The members of each household are merely recorded in the aggregate: so many males; so many females—and so many horses.
Niremata. The register opens by counting 999 koku of currently productive land as constituting “Niremata-mura, in Anpachi District, Mino Province”; but it closes with the two reporting officers signing the census. One of them, Magoshichi, I can identify as both a descendant of the “Nishimatsu” to whom Toyotomi Hideyoshi allocated Nishijo in fief in the 1580s (Wanouchi-chô shi Hensan Iinkai 1981: 785), and the ancestor of all subsequent Nishijô headmen. Both sign themselves, however, as Niremata-mura shoya —[co-]headmen of Niremata village—seeming to negate the independent existence of Nishijô as a village, or even as a separate community within Niremata.

The practice of Niremata and Nishijô headmen co-signing documents as joint heads of a Niremata that makes no reference to the inner constituency of Nishijô as a village was common throughout the early modern period, though by no means consistent. Three joint “headmen of Niremata Village” signed a 1799 map of the dikes within the Fukutsuka Polder; indeed, eight of the eighteen “villages” mapped were represented by multiple headmen. But the map itself speaks of Nishijô independently of Niremata (Gifu Ken 1972-1973, Kinsei 5, suppl. 4), and another map of riparian works in the early eighteenth century likewise maps “Nishijô Village” separately from Niremata (ibid., suppl. 5).

The 1676 census register gives no indication which households reside in which sub-village, but the muradaka (assessed product) of the “village” listed in the front of the register for the entire “Niremata” is broken down at the end into “Niremata” and “Nishijô” land. The inference might readily be drawn that the administrative “Niremata” is a fiction imposed by higher authority. Neither does the register make any pretense to registration of individuals, or of sectarian affiliation, suggesting that the bakufu’s mandate to do so was as yet only unevenly implemented across the country—much as Hideyoshi’s land surveys took several decades for full implementation. (Brown 1993)

**RITUAL PRACTICE AS MAPPING**

There are practices in the villages even today which suggest that for some ritual purposes the administrative fiction is a reflection of social fact. There are six Buddhist temples in the extended villages of “greater” Niremata (one of which did not exist in the Tokugawa period), and two major Shinto shrines, as well as one small Ise shrine—really a stone lantern dedicated to the grand shrines at Ise—and countless lesser shrines, especially to

4. The Nishijô headman’s family continued to use the Nishimatsu surname unofficially, in family financial records, for example, throughout the early-modern period, and in 1861 recovered both samurai status and the legal privilege of the Nishimatsu surname. See Toby, 1991.
Jizō, guardian of the crossroads and protector of children. Shirahige-san is located in the Jūrenbō section of Nishijō, in the northeast corner of the combined villages, where the Nakamura River reaches to join the Nagara; Shinmei-san is squarely within the bounds of “lesser” Niremata, between the village residential area, and the Nagara River levee. O-Ise-san, a stone lantern dedicated to the shrines at Ise, stands above the village, atop the Nakamura River dike just north of Jūrenbō.

All residents of Nishijō are *ujiko* (children) of Shirahige-san, and all residents of “lesser Niremata” are *ujiko* of Shinmei-san—people “living within the precincts of a particular shrine, who are thus under the protection of its principal deity.” (Nelson 1996: 266–267) In the Edo period the two shrines celebrated their festivals on the same days, precluding anyone’s participation in both festivals—a significant indicator of membership in the shrine community. And the “children” they protect, therefore, would seem to form mutually-exclusive communities.

At the level of shrine organization, this may be true; yet local practice at New Year suggests that in other ways the boundary between these two “communities” were blurry: The route for New Year’s Day shrine pilgrimages (*hatsu-mōde*) for all residents of “greater” Niremata, according to local informants, starts with Shirahige-san, proceeding thence to “Ise-san,” the stone lantern (*jōyatō*) dedicated to Ise, sitting atop the Nakamura River dike at the northern edge of Nishijō. Thereafter, the pilgrimage routes diverge: Those living in the Nishijō sections (“lesser” Nishijō and Jūrenbō) then proceed directly to family deities (the ancestors), while those from “lesser Niremata” return to a pilgrimage to Shinmei-san before their obeisances to family deities. (verbal communication) It is of course possible that the “lesser Niremata” practice of *hatsu-mōde* to O-Ise-san arose as part of the State’s reorganization and regularization of Shintō practice in the years between the Meiji Restoration and the Pacific War, for including an “Ise pilgrimage” in the *hatsu-mōde* would constitute starting the year with obeisance to the originary ancestor of the imperial clan, Amaterasu, who is enshrined at Ise.

These overlapping New Year practices suggest that, in fact, there are several “villages” that overlap: “Nishijō” existed as a unit of census and sectarian record-keeping, but was not congruent with any social unit as defined by either Buddhist affiliation or Shinto affiliation. All residents of the Nishijō of the census registers acknowledged the protection of Shirahige-san, but that was also true of residents of Niremata. One could say that the religious group that was congruent with the Nishijō reflected in the census registers was all those who were *ujiko* of Shirahige but did not pray at

5. *The mura meisai-chō* for 1838 records festivals at both shrines on the sixteenth day of the sixth lunar month and the fifteenth day of the eight month. (Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan linkai 1981): 868.
For all residents of “lesser Niremata” were ujiko of (or at least made New Year visits to) both shrines, and no Nishijō residents went to Shinmei for New Year prayers. (verbal communication) The Ise Shrine in the Nishijō section of Niremata, may be recognition of the fact that 10,103 koku (one koku equals approx. 4.96 bu.) of Niremata land was set aside as the Ise shrine’s fisc ([Niremata mura sashidashi meisai kakiage chō [1838], in Wanouchi-chō shi Hensan Inkai 1981], 867-869).

DECONSTRUCTING “NISHIJO¯”

For all that, “Nishijō” is less self-contained in its Buddhist aspect than “lesser” Niremata: While all residents of “lesser” Niremata were parishioners of one of the local Buddhist temples (there were three in Niremata, all of the Jōdo Shinshū—True Pure Land—sect), this was not true of Nishijō residents. Although there were also two temples in “greater” Nishijō, Sai-fukuji and Shinjōji, only 85% (figures are for 1793) of the households were parishioners of those two temples (and in about equal proportions: Sai-fukuji=44%; Shinjōji=41%), the remaining 15% were: a) not Jōdo Shinshū believers, and b) therefore parishioners of temples outside Nishijō. Of these, 12% were affiliated with one of two different Zen temples of the Myōshinji branch of the Rinzai sect; one of these is over 5 km. from Nishijō. The remaining few (3%) were Pure Land sectarians, and affiliated with a Pure Land temple 2.1 km. away. Note, however, that there is no overlap in Buddhist temple affiliation between the “lesser Niremata” population—all of whom were True Pure Land adherents—and the “greater” Nishijō population. The True Pure Land believers in the combined village supported five Buddhist temples, all of the same sect.

One wonders why, of course. I recall the borscht belt joke about an ocean liner on a tropical cruise, coming across a tiny, uncharted island on which they see a small town. The captain, of course, puts over in a small boat to see what it is all about, and comes upon an aged Jewish castaway. The man is happy to be rescued, but of course he is eager to show the rescue party the town he has built in his years on the island, and they are quite as curious as he is eager. He shows them around the town, pointing out the grocery, the hardware store, the town hall, and the shul (synagogue). After he has shown them all around the town, the captain notices another building on a rise outside the town, and asks the castaway what it is. “It’s a shul”, he replies. The captain is nonplussed: “But you said this was the shul! What do you need two shuls for?” he asks. “Why, it’s simple,” the castaway replied, “This shul I go to, but that one, I wouldn’t!”

And indeed, it seems that the parishes of which I speak were—and remain today—real, significant social groups within Nishijō, perhaps defining two separate communities. I have begun to refer to “greater” and “lesser” Nishijō because the Nishijō defined by the census registers in fact...
comprises two smaller social and geographic entities, masked by the census registers, but defined in part by membership in a Buddhist temple parish.

In the Tokugawa period record, there are tantalizing references to a “Jūrenbō,” which is sometimes referred to as a kumi (group), sometimes as a mura, and today as a buraku (hamlet). People resident there today refer to themselves either as “Nishijō” people or as “Jūrenbō” people, as if they were mutually exclusive categories. On the map, Nishijō and Jūrenbō appear as contiguous members of the northern sweep of “greater” Niremata—that is, “Lesser Nishijō” in my shorthand. Neither one today has any juridical or administrative significance. But, according to the priest of Shinjō-ji, all his parishioners are Jūrenbō residents, while all Saifukuji parishioners are residents of lesser Nishijō.6

Taking this information as suggestive, I have analyzed the membership in gonin-gumi (mutual-responsibility groups) as found in the Shūmon aratame-cho (they are listed for each year from 1801 to 1869), and have found that they are mutually exclusive: there is no overlap in membership; no gonin-gumi comprises both Saifukuji and Shinjō-ji parishioners. Furthermore, while the census registers never refer to Jūrenbō, other records do indicate when people reside in Jūrenbō (about which more in a moment), and in all cases, the families or individuals so designated are Shinjō-ji parishioners, confirming the geographical separation of affiliation. So where is “the village?”

The Shūmon aratame-cho of “Nishijō” and those of Niremata disagree, implicitly, on what constitutes “the village.” Both sets of registers are explicit when designating either the origin or the destination of persons moving in or out of the population registered, whether the “move” is for employment, study, adoption, or marriage. In the Nishijō registers, traffic between Nishijō and “lesser” Niremata is treated the same as that between Nishijō and any other village: the distinction is between “this village” (tōson, denoting Nishijō), on the one hand, and anyplace else (e.g., Niremata-mura); that is, Niremata is treated as an “elsewhere,” rather than a part of “this village” (tōson) “This village” comprises only “greater” Nishijō (itself composed of “lesser” Nishijō and Jūrenbō). In the registers for lesser Niremata, by contrast, traffic between “greater Nishijō” (a population not recorded in the Niremata registers) and “Niremata” is treated as traffic to and from parts of “this village.”

Viewed from the standpoint of the Niremata Shūmon aratame-cho, therefore, Nishijō is part of “this village,” and has no separate existence, even though the entire Nishijō population is excluded from the same census registration. The headmen of Niremata and Nishijō do not agree on

6. While Shinjō-ji still has a resident priest, Saifukuji’s priest lives outside Nishijō; I was unable to interview him.
what constitutes “this village” for census purposes. For the headman of Nishijō, his is a separate village whenever he can assert that viewpoint; for the headman of Niremata, all of “greater Niremata” is under his purview—even if he does not register its entire population. It remains to be determined whether these two contrasting viewpoints reflect a sense of identity shared broadly by the various subsets of “Greater Niremata” residents (in “Lesser Niremata,” “Lesser Nishijō,” and Jūrenbō) or are limited to the two headmen—who had a necessarily tense relationship of competing claims to authority.

Another articulation of independent status in the early-modern village was the presence or absence of a public notice-board (kōsatsu), where shogunal edicts were posted, including proscriptions on Christianity, and other legal proclamations. As Kurushima Hiroshi (1993) has noted, rural communities were not free to establish a kōsatsu at their own initiative, but required higher authority to do so; the presence of a kōsatsu was a cherished public signifier of a community’s very existence as a corporate entity. Here, though Nishijō was melded into Greater Niremata for certain administrative purposes, as we have seen, the mura meisai-chō lists two locations for kōsatsu in Greater Niremata—strongly suggesting that there was one in Lesser Niremata and one in Nishijō. (Wanouchi-cho shi Hensan Inkai 1981: 868)

For still other purposes, however, the headman of Nishijō cut the distinctions even finer. As mentioned above, some records distinguish between “Nishijō” residence and “Jūrenbō” residence. In particular, the headman of Nishijō was, like most headmen in the area, a moneylender, and one whose activities grew in scope over time. In his banking ledgers, he categorizes his loans geographically, according to the borrower’s place of residence; and there, Jūrenbō residents are included within “this village,” but “lesser” Niremata borrowers are listed under people from “elsewhere” (yoso no bu). Jūrenbō borrowers are, however, distinguished from others within “this village,” by being starred as “Jūrenbō.” (Toby 1991)

NAMING PRACTICES AND COMMUNITY

Since peasants in Tokugawa Japan were not allowed (with rare exceptions) to have legally-recognized surnames, households were generally referred to by their household head’s personal name, a practice still common today in villages where many households share the same surname. Personal names rarely heard in Tokyo are heard every day in Nishijō, Jūrenbō, and Niremata today. One important indicator of village boundaries ought to be personal names, especially the personal names of household heads, since duplication in household-head names would create confusion within the community.

And indeed, throughout the 97 years for which the Nishijō Shūmon ara-
tame chō are extant, I can find not a single case of the simultaneous use of a single name by two household heads within either Nishijō or Jūrenbō. The same name may be used by different households at different times, but not at the same time. Further, this “law of avoidance” is not applicable to wives—who brought their names with them from their natal households (as adoptive husbands did not)—or to anyone else in the household or community: Only household heads had to be distinct within the village community.

As among Nishijō, Jūrenbō and Niremata, however, this law of avoidance did not apply: there could readily be an Asashichi in both “lesser” Niremata (TKM, Niremata-mura SAC, HN-40) and in Jūrenbō (NGM, SAC, HN-60A) at the same time (1801-1802). But similarly, there could be a Chūhachi simultaneously in both “lesser” Nishijō (HN-4) and Jūrenbō (HN-64) at the same time (1773-1781), or an Iemon in both Nishijō and Jūrenbō (HN-45 [sfj] and HN-59 [sjj]) overlapping from 1798-1809, strongly suggesting once more that these were two distinct—indeed sometimes hostile—communities, unhappily tied together by administrative fiat.

SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

One could continue, attempting to define the “village” in terms of water-rights communities (Nishijō participated in two different kinds of water-rights communities, one which controlled surface water (irrigation rights), and one which controlled the exploitation of subsurface water (well-digging rights), cooperative work-groups (“lesser” Nishijō and Jūrenbō were mutually-exclusive taue-kumi until the end of World War II [v.c.]), wakamono-kumi (on which no information survives in the written record), landholding and tenancy patterns (the land records do not seem to sustain this sort of investigation, since location of fields is not indicated), and even residence (not everyone registered in the shumon aratame-chō resided in the houses of “greater” Nishijō).

However, what I would like to suggest here is that “the village” is not an objective, palpable cognitive unit, whose boundaries everyone can readily agree upon. Indeed, the selfsame person who regarded Jūrenbō as part of “this village” for census registration purposes regarded it as “elsewhere” for money lending purposes. “The village” was a fluid, shifting unit, comprising different elements—cognitively mapped quite differently—at different times, depending on the purpose served at the moment. Similarly, we as historians or ethnographers need to be sensitive to this multiplicity of “villages” in the cognitive geography of localities in Tokugawa Japan.

Herman Ooms suggests that “maps are representations of the land and its occupants” (Ooms 1996: 287), and to a degree he is, of course, quite correct. But “the village” here proves far too labile an entity to be susceptible of a single mapping. Even for Ooms, “the village” is complicated by
the presence of outcaste branch villages, which appear not to have been present in the area immediately around Nishijō. Rather, interlocking patterns of practice created multiple, overlapping and intertwined social units that “mapped” differently. The taxable Nishijō was coterminous with the census Nishijō; yet within that “greater Nishijō” were two mutually exclusive, and often mutually hostile, communities, separate Buddhist parishes, though of precisely the same Jōdo Shinshū sect of Buddhism.

Both communities contained within them households who were members of neither Buddhist parish—who affiliated as danke of Pure Land, Rinzai, or Sōtō Zen temples elsewhere in the polder. Yet all came together as ujiko of the local shrine deity, Shirahige, and all made New Year’s visits to the lantern atop the northern dyke that embodied the Ise Shrine within the village. And even residents of Niremata, who were parishioners of yet other Buddhist temples in their own residential area, made New Year’s visits to both Shirahige and O-Ise-san.

In sum, the residents of early modern Nishijō, Jūrenbō, and Niremata, coexisted and competed in a variety of cross-cutting communities or “villages,” each defined by a different set of social, economic, political, or religious practices. Though few of these overlapping communities was ever inscribed in an actual, literal “map,” residents were intensely conscious of the boundaries of each of these communities, and of who was included in—or excluded from—each.

Records kept by successive local headmen—“Gonbei” after “Gonbei,” in the latter half of the Edo period—show how comfortable villagers were in simultaneously recognizing mutually contradictory notions of the “village.” On the one hand, Gonbei could construct a “Nishijō” in the census register that readily subsumed Jūrenbō into a seamless and unitary “Nishijō”—that was what the authorities demanded of him—yet on the other, show in his banking ledgers that he did not consider residents of Jūrenbō to be members of “this village,” by which he meant what I’ve chosen to call “Lesser Nishijō.” At the same time, successive headmen of Lesser Niremata felt no compunctions about claiming all of Nishijō as part of “this village,” which for them was all of Greater Niremata.

The complexity of cross-cutting practices mapped in daily behavior and annual ceremonial cycle the multiple maps of community in early modern Nishijō.
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Chapter 7

The “Cantonese” Whirlwind Brought by the Black Ships

陶徳民（De-min Tao）
横浜で書かれた羅森の日記によれば、日
本人はこれまでの200年間、外国人との交流を断ち切ってきた。そのた
め、長崎での交易が許されている少数の中国人やオランダ人を除いては外
国人を見たことがなかったのである。私も珍しそうに見られているのを感じ
じた。日本人は漢字や漢文を非常に尊重しているため、私は行く先々で、
自分の片手に漢字を書いてくれと頼まれた。横浜滞在中の1ヶ月の間に、
私は少なくとも500本の扇子に漢文を書いた。実際のところ、このような
依頼は困難したし、書くにも時間がかかったが、彼らの熱心な頼みを断
るのはむずかしかった。
とある。そして、下田での様子については次のように述べられている。
下田の周辺7里四方には、羊、山羊、豚は1匹も見当たらなかった。しか

図3 羅森が松前勘解由に送った扇面、　図4 羅森君子図『惠比すのうわ
松前町郷土資料館所蔵　　さ』より、国立国会図書館所蔵

1 「ベリー提督の第2回日本訪問ーある中国人が記した日記ー」、株式会社オフィス宮
崎訳『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II（栄光教育文化研究所、1997年）所収、400頁。これ
は、羅森の日記に対するウィリアムズの英訳文から日本語に訳されたものである。
羅森自身が中国語で録った「日本日記」の原本における関係記載は次のようにいま
ている。（横浜にて）「予或到公館，每々多人請予語話，一月之間，從其所請，不下五百余柄。」
王曉秋訳点『羅森等早期日本遊記五種』（湖南人民出版社、1993年）、34頁。ここにいう
「公館」は、幕府がベリーとの会談のために横浜で設けた「応接所」のことである。
なお、周田涉『満清紀事』とその筆者―済国に伝えられた「大平天国」について
（『西学東漸と中国事情』所収、岩波書店、1979年）、大石圭一『ベリー提督の通訳・羅
森の子孫を香港に訪ねて』（『ニューフレーバー』第17巻4号、1983年4月）、王曉秋『近
代中日文化交流的先駆者羅森』（同『近代中日關係史研究』所収、中国社会科学出版社、
1997年）を参照されたい。
し牛はよく見られ、荷物の運搬に使われていた。牛はまた田畑を耕すのに
も使われていた。女たちは中国と同様に機を織っていた。鍛冶屋や大工も
われわれの国と同じように働いていた。しかし、女たちは刺繍をしている
姿は見られなかった。また男も女も好んで扇子を持ち歩くようである。こ
とに滞在している間、私は親まれて少なくとも1,000本の扇子に漢文を書
いた。奉行やアメリカ人との交渉を担当するいろいろな役人、誰もか私に
同じことを頼むのである。2

自分の題辞した扇子の数に関する羅森の記述が決して自己顕示するための誇
張ではないことを、後述に引用するベリーの首席通訳官 S.W. ウィリアム
ズ（1812–1884、中国名は衛三畏）の私信でも分る。要するに、羅森は開国
当時の日本人の間でかなりの人気者になっていたことは確かである。

図5 茄市にある松陰（左）と金子重輔（右）の銅像

羅森の俳名は、当時海外脱出を図っている吉田松陰と同伴の金子重輔の耳に
も入った。密航失敗後に書かれた松陰の『回顧録』によれば、

4月4日（旧暦3月7日）大規模平治時神奈川に留まる故、足を訪ぶ。平
治乱舟に乗じ曳舟に至り、詩を賦し、羅森に贈りたる事を聞きし故、奇策
はなきか不思議なれる、かくて酒席に登り酒を置き、舟を招き悠に
酔々喜びぬ、言を以て之を勧す3。

2 同上、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II、404頁。これに対応する羅森の中国語日記に
おける関係部分は、（下田にて）「子を子に、一月間、所写共扇不下千余枚」となっ
ている。『羅森等早期日本遊記五種』、30頁。
3 『吉田松陰全集』第九巻（大和書房、1974年）、363－364頁。
とある。すなわち横浜にいた松陰は、この日にすでに大槻平治（磐渕）を通じて羅森のことを知っていたわけである。したがって、4月25日（旧暦3月28日）午前2時ごろ下田でベリーの旗艦ポーハタン号に乗り込んだのち、ウィリアムズに「広東人羅森」と書いた一枚の紙を見せて、羅森との面会を求めた。羅森に会うと、英語による筆談でお互いの意思疎通がよりスムーズにできるだろうと想定していたのであろう。

II 「羅嶋風」の正体
では、この羅嶋はいったいどのような人物であろうか。広東人である彼はなぜ、黒船に乗って来日したのだろうか。

いわゆる「黒船来航」すなわちベリー提督の率いるアメリカ艦隊の日本来訪は2003年で150周年になった。そして、日本の開国を象徴する「日米和親条約」の締結も2004年で150周年になる。しかし、当時の日米交渉は日本語と英語ではなく、漢文とオランダ語という二つの媒介言語をもって行われていたということを知っている人は意外に少ないようである。

実際、先にふれたベリーの首席通訳官ウィリアムズも漢文の通訳に当っていた。ベリー来航までの20年間マカオ・香港などに滞在し、教会の印刷所を経営する傍らE.C. ブリッジマンの英字誌『中国叢書』の編集者だったという。

図6 ウィリアムズ肖像
（高川文平著『金海難観』より、早稲田大学図書館所蔵）
黒船のもたらした「広東人」風

報の編集を手伝っていた彼は、洋語についてかなりの自信をもっていた。日本人漂流民を送還する1837年の「モリソン号事件」にかかったので、日本語にも多少通じていた。ちなみによく、ベリー来航後、1856年の約20年間は清国駐在米国公使館の書記官兼通訳として活躍し、晩年はエール大学の初代中国言語文学教授をとつめた。『中国総論』（The Middle Kingdom）、『漢英翻訳』（A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language）などの名著と辞書を残している。

しかし、ウィリアムズの漢文能力は主に読解や会話の方にあらためて、漢文による作文はできず、外交文書を飾る流麗な書道も勿論上手ではなかった。したがって、外交文書や会談記録の作成は無理であった。そして、ウィリアムズはなかなかの勉強家で、航海途中でも中国人を助手とする語学研鑽や漢書英訳の計画を立てていた。このような二つの理由から中国人雇用の必要性が生まれたが、しかし、1853年一団目の来航時に広東で雇った中国人助手は阿片吸引者で病弱であったため、琉球滞在中の6月11日に亡くなってしまった。この意外な出来事が対日交渉に支障を来たすのではないかと憂慮したベリーは、日記に次のように書いている。

けさ一時、ウィリアムズ氏が通訳として雇っていた老シナ人が息を引きとった。五五歳だということ。彼は教育のある人で、外国人、とりわけウィリアムズ氏にシナ語を教えるために雇われていた。その生涯の長い間、彼は阿片吸収常習者であって、全身は非常に弱化し、その結果やせ細っていったため、本職にやってきた時には、誰もが彼は長生きできまいと予言した。こうしてわれわれはシナ語の通訳をもたね状態におかれた。というのは、ウィリアムズ氏は英語の意味を北京官話にして伝えることができ、またこうして口述することもできるが、北京官話で書くことはできないからである。

半月ご、上海で新たに雇用した中国人助言が琉球に到着したが、しかし、彼の教養はあまり高くなかった。それに、彼の上海弁とウィリアムズの広東弁との違いも互いの意思疎通の障壁となっていた。辛いに、二人が協力してアメリカ大統領の国書などを漢文に訳すことができたので、7月14日、久里浜でそれらを日本側に渡すことには影響が出なかったようである。

一方、羅森は広東省南海県の郷紳出身のもので、詩文に長じ書道も上手かつた。アヘン戦争（1840-42）中、イギリス軍に抵抗する民兵を組織して戦ったが、戦争終結後、自分の功績を政府に評価されなかったことに憤慨し、香港・マカオに出かけていった。そこで英米人に中国語を教える傍ら、実業を営んでいたが、ベリーの三回目の来航時にウィリアムズに雇われ、日本に連れられてきた。

6 金井調訳「ベリー日本遠征日記」（雄松堂出版，1985年），132頁。
7 羅香林「香港開埠初期文教工作者羅向調事略述」，『包遵彭先生紀念論文集』（国立歴史博物館ほか編，1971年），290-295頁。
陶 緯民

この香港・マカオ移住や日本来訪の理由について、羅森は平山謙次郎（名は
仏厚、号は省齢、1815-1890）という日本の役人に宛てた書簡のなかで、次の
ように打ち明けている。

凡才の私ではありますが、何年も世界の出来事に関わってまいりました。
イギリスとの戦いにおいても、勇敢な者たちを率いて、全力を尽くして故
国のため戦ってまいりました。しかし、私腹を肥やすことだけに熱心な
政府の役人は、私の貢献や努力を一顧だにしませんでした。このため私の
心は外国に旅することに向けられ、この蒸気船に乗ってここまでやってき
たのです。

日本にやってきた羅森は、扇面題辞で莫大な人気を博したと同時に、対日交
渉の文書作成や筆談記録などでも大活躍し、アメリカ側だけでなく日本側にも
高く評価されていた。

たとえばウィリアムズは、箱館からマカオにいる妻へ送った私信のなかで次
のように羅森を称えている。

首都からは使節もオランダ語の通訳を到着しないので、通訳の仕事が全部
私にふりかかってきまして。まるで二十枚の舌を終日、はねハンマーのよ
うに動かし続けるほどの仕事があるといっても過言ではありません。（中
略）ところが、今や事柄が深刻になりましたので、私は羅にかたり手伝わ
せ、もう一つの言葉（中国語）の助けを借りて、あまり誤りをでかさな
いようにしています。彼は、われわれの計画のすべてに強い関心を示し、
住民ともうまくやっております。たしかに、彼らは彼ほど学のある中国人
に会ったことがなかったし、彼が扇子に優美な詩を一つ行書で書いてやる
と、彼らはいっそう喜んで中国語の学識を彼に披露するのです。日本へ
来てから五百本以上もの扇子に書いてやったのではないかと思いますが、
これを頼まれるほど、彼を喜ばせることはないのです。

一方、羅森は日本人からは次のような賛美の漢詩も受けた的。

横浜相遇豊無因
和議皆安仰頓君
遠方駱舌今朝会
幸親同文對語人

8 同注（1）、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II、399頁。しかし、書簡のこの部分は英
訳された日記に載っているものの、公刊された羅森の中国語版『日本日記』には載って
いない。その理由は次のように考えられる。すなわち中国語版『日本日記』は広東の清
政府の役人も入手可能で、しかも読んで分かるのである。時々広東の故郷に帰省する必
要のある羅森はその反政府言論のもたらすかもしれないトラブルを避けるために、書簡
のこの部分を中国版から削除したのであろう。
9 ウィリアムズ著・潮富雄雄訳『ベリー日本遠征隨行記』（雄松堂出版、1970年）、446頁。
10 同注（1）、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II、462頁。
私たちはここで出会ったことはまったくの偶然でしょうか。
条約と平和が得られたのはあなたのおかげです。
遠くから見知らぬ人々がやってきて、言葉も分からない私たちは、あなたの筆と舌がなければどうなっていたことでしょう。

III 誤解と理解の諸相

このように、日米交渉にかかわる羅森の仕事はおおむね双方の好評を得ていた。しかし、当時の一部の雑誌に現れているように、羅森に対する誤解がなかったわけではない。

たとえば、幕府に接するの首班である林大学頭の了解を得て横浜受接所で写生を行っていた倉代藩の医師兼画師・高川文彦が、羅森との会話を次のように記している。

席末に広東の羅森、字は向の者あり、頼る書画を（善くす）。文、書を以て試問して曰く、何故此船に在るや。曰く、朱氏の乱を避ける。願求に、彼成は罪科有り、潜亡して身を此船に寄る敵。之に之を訪る。遂に他を言う。聞くことに、前年夏、国書を寄ふ時、漢文を作る者、彼の手に出ると言ふ。

これによってみれば、羅森は知らない者には自分の来歴を容易に披露しない態度を取っていたようである。したがって、高川の質問に対して、太平天国の事（実情とは違いこれを朱氏の乱と呼んだのは、清王朝に反旗を掲げた太平天国の乱の目的が、朱氏を皇族とした明朝の復活にあるといえば、一般日本人でも分かると思われたからだろう）を避けるために日本にやって来たのだとまますして答えた。縁返し尋ねても本当のことを聞き出せなかった高川は、結局、羅森は犯した罪を逃れるためにアメリカの軍艦に乗り込んだのだろうと推測したわけである。

そして、前年ベリーから渡されたアメリカ大統領の国書の漢文版の作成者は謝氏であったにもかかわらず、ここでは羅森と誤認されていってしまったのである。

そして、箱館の名主小鷹又次郎の目には映っている羅森の姿は次のようなものである。

此図広東人羅森卜中（ス）モノラリ。姿柔和ニ見セテ内心左ニアラザルヨ

11 高川文彦『横浜記事』、倉田雪湖編『米国使節彼理提督来朝図絵』（吉田郡一郎発行、1931年）所収。
シ。此モノ外（ノ）広東人ト違ヒ、筆法可也。依テ扇面モ諸方ニ書タルヨシ也。又気量モ相応ナルベシ。何ユイニ亜墨利加舟ヘ乗タルモノや、近頃彼等ガ国ニ於（テ）モ一戦（阿片戦争）有之候ヨシ。定テヘリリ（ベリー）ガ威勢ヲ恐（レ）、随心ト見得タリ。餓死テモ何トカノ水ヲ喰ハザルノ語ヲシラザルユイカ。又深き課ト有テノ所為カ。是ヲ課トモノ明白ニイワズ。此モノハ買売ル品ハ字引、墨之類、外品トモアメリカ人トチガイ、貧乏ナルカ金銭不足。買物至面直（価）切ヲ買モノ高不足、此モノ同ジ漢土ニテモ頭高クヨリ。

図8 羅森肖像、『亜墨利加一条写』より、市立函館博物館所蔵
図9 羅森（[[スタットラー『黒船絵巻』より]）

要するために、正義感の高い小 LISはアヘン戦争の敗北から教訓を汲まず、強いアメリカに荷担する羅森を「無節操」のものと見ていたのであった。また、羅森の文才を買っているものの、その買い物時の貰引と借り引き上手には好感を持っていなかった。

このほか、たとえば羅森を通訳という職業（「銭舌之門。」）に陥った士人と見ている日本人もいた12。

種種の誤解を受けながらも、羅森は終始前向きの姿勢を変えなかった。

12 市立函館図書館所蔵『亜墨利加一条写』。本文での引用は、田中彰編『開国』（日本近代思想大系1、岩波書店）のそれによる（175頁）。分かりやすくするために、文中に適宜、括弧のなかに説明や語尾などを補足する仮名を入れた。
13 同注（1）、『羅森等早期日本游記五種』、42頁。
図10 4分の1大のノリス社製機関車（炭水車及び客車つき）
種畑翁が筆。【東京大学史料編纂所蔵模本】

たとえば、和親条約締結後に行われたアメリカ側の近代的贈物の展示や実演について、彼は次のような興奮した口ぶりで紹介している。

翌日、合衆国政府から日本の皇帝への贈物が披露された。模型の機関車と客車、救命ボート、電信機、鉄板写真機、さまざまな農機具などである。町はずれに模型機関車用のレールを円形に敷き、そこで機関車と客車をかならずの速度で走らせたところ、見物人は非常に驚いた。電信機は、鋼線を使ってある場所からほかの場所に瞬時に情報を伝える装置である。鉄板写真機は、太陽光線の反射を金属板に投影して写真を撮るものである。筆者も写真を必要なく、写真を薄れることなく長持ちする。救命ボートは、空気ボックスがついており、沈まないようにっている。この発明品により、船の難破の際に乗組員の命を救うことができる。農機具は、合衆国の農業のために考案された便利な機具ばかりであった。日本の皇帝はこれらの品々を受け取り、返礼として漆器、陶磁器、絹などを贈った。

そして、羅森のもっとも感動的事例はやはり、先にも触れた山崎次郎との親しい交流であろう。開国当時は目下付であった平山は学問はすぐれているものの、思想はやや保守的であった（幕末は外国縄奉行に昇進し、明治維新以後は儒教・心学などをもとり入れた「神道大成教」を創立した。）羅森の『南京紀事』と『治安策』という著を読んだ平山は、孔孟の「王道主義」にも

図11 平山謙次郎の書跡。『ウィリアムズ家文書』所収。エール大学スターリング記念図書館古文書部所蔵。

注14 同注（11）、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II. 401頁。
とづいてこのような西洋批判を行っている。
相互交流という原則は、世界のどこでも共通です。大切なのは礼儀、親切、誠意、正義です。これを守るならば尊い調和が広がり、天地の心がありますところなく現われるのです。これとは逆に、利益だけを求めて商売を行なえば、争いや訴訟が起こり、喜びではなく呪いとなります。（中略）人間の社会はあたかも虎や狼の群れのようにあり、世界中のいたるところで強者が弱者を破滅させ、大が小を飲み込むことになるでしょう（中略）。
あなたはいま、合衆国の船に乗って海を旅していらっしゃいます。私が述べたような人物に会いになったことがおありでしょうか。もしまだお会いになっていないならば、あなたの行く先々で、その国と統治者にこの原則を説いてくださるようお願いいたします。そうすれば、孔子と孟子の願いが、何世紀も経過してやっと世界全体を明るく照らすようになるでしょう。15
平山のこの書簡を受け取った羅森は次のような返事を出した。
すばらしいお手紙をいただき、大変感動いたしました。私たちは水面を流れる葉のように出会い、あなたのご教示は私に光をあけしてくださいました。世界中のすべての人間は天地の子供であり、天理、礼儀、誠意、正義の原理にしたがって互いを尊重すべきだというあなたの言葉はすばらしく、その通りだと思います。また、宇宙の恵大なる心をわれわれの賢人の教えにある平等の慈悲を十分に表わしていると思います。お手紙の一言一語に感謝しております。お言葉を常に心に刻みつけて忘れぬようにいたします。16
このような謙虚に平山の意見を傾聴した羅森は、一方、平山に対する婉曲な説得も試みたのであつ。「現代は古代とは非常に異なる時代です、それを知りながら心ある者が見て見ぬふりをすることができるでしょうか？」「このような羅森の冷徹な現実主義的姿勢は、おそらく理想主義者の平山に一定のショックを与えただろう。」
以上の対話も収録した羅森の『日本日記』は、一中国人による日本関国事情の証言として貴重なもので、早くも1854年の11月から『遐邇賞珍』という香港英華

図12 松浦章ほか編著『遐邇賞珍の研究』（関西大学出版部）より

15 同注（1）、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II. 308－309頁。
16 同注（1）、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II. 309頁。
17 同注（1）、『ベリー艦隊日本遠征記』Vol. II. 309頁。
書院の漢文月刊に三回にわたって連載され、松陰を含む幕末の日本人有志を目の前に写した。そして、ウィリアムズによって英語化された同日記は1854年9月に「香港記録報」という英字商業週刊誌の増刊（Overland Register and Price Current）に掲載され、その価値はベルに認められ、2年後に出版のアメリカ議会の公式文書『ペリー艦隊日本遠征記』第二巻の付録に収録されるようになった。また、1913年に『大日本古文書：幕末外国関係文書』が編纂された際、同日記も付録の一つとして「米国使節随行清国人羅森日本日記」というタイトルで収録され、その価値を再度確認されたわけではない。
Chapter 8

Terrorism and Treaty Port Relations: Western Images of the Samurai during Bakumatsu and Early Meiji Japan

Michael R. Auslin

I Introduction

On the morning of August 25, 1859, two Russian sailors buying ships’ stores were murdered by a vagrant samurai in the streets of the new treaty port of Yokohama. Their blood soaked into the dust of a port opened not yet two months. Yokohama, the offspring of the previous year’s U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce, was the symbol of a new era in Japan’s international history. A mere fishing village a year earlier, it immediately supplanted Nagasaki as Japan’s window on the world, despite being designed for the more prosaic activity of trade. It was there, above all, that Japanese and Westerners came into sustained contact for the first time. The murder of the Russians gave notice that more than just goods would be exchanged between Japan and its treaty partners.¹

For both the Tokugawa bakufu and the Western treaty powers, their new relations were simply economic. Neither side expected or desired to have any other type of exchange and certainly no cultural encounter. Indeed the bakufu hoped to use the treaty ports as a new type of physical boundary between Japanese and foreigners, while the Western nations were in Japan to exchange goods and nothing more.

In reality, though, both Japanese and Westerners transgressed the boundaries carefully imposed by the diplomats. These personal interactions led to the formation on both sides of various images of the Other that was

¹. The 1858 Commercial Treaty opened Yokohama (Kanagawa), Nagasaki, Hakodate, Niigata, and Shimoda to trade immediately, and set staggered dates for opening Edo, Osaka, and Hyogo. Shimoda closed six months after Yokohama opened. The 1858 commercial treaties were signed with America, Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and France.
now encountered on a daily basis. As a result, in the 1860s political relations and cultural images collided as often as did the Japanese and Westerners in the narrow streets of Yokohama. For Westerners, the samurai became in many ways the focus of observation, due in no small part to the frequency of their attacks on the foreigners.

This chapter will explore the Western, primarily British, images of the samurai created during this period. I will tentatively suggest some effects that the politics of the time had on these images. I am particularly interested in tracing the process through which shared images are impacted by political events. Such images are as malleable and susceptible to the vagaries of international encounter as the policies they inform. It is clear that at certain moments of intense contact, these images are radically transformed by politics. At times, the images reenter the political environment and influence subsequent relations.

A note on the use of the word “political” in this paper: it can be argued to what extent the terrorism of samurai attacks was political. If politics is the rational, verbalized working out of competing claims to authority or disparate communal goals, then the nonverbal physicality of the terror attacks was the antithesis of the political process envisioned in the negotiated treaty structure. Yet, terrorism, as William Beasley notes, had an explicit political goal, the expulsion of Westerners from Japan. Thus, it and any other interactions between Japanese and Westerners in this period were political if they took place on a public stage with the aim of affecting the higher-order relations that were uncontestedly political, even if imperialist in genesis.

2. Recent scholarship on international history has greatly expanded from its previous focus almost solely on diplomatic and political issues. The role of Western culture in driving imperialism, the cultural interactions between the West and the rest of the world, race and gender concerns, and regional variations in the clash of civilizations have all been explored in recent years. See, for example, the roundtable on Laura Ann Stoler, “Empires and Intimacies: Lessons from (Post) Colonial Studies,” in Journal of American History 88:3 (December 2001): 829-98; Robert J. McMahon, “Cultures of Empire,” in JAH 88:3 (December 2001): 888-92; Emily Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: the politics and culture of dollar diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Gilbert Joseph, ed., Close Encounters of Empire: writing the cultural history of U.S.-Latin American relations (Durham, N.C.; London: Duke University Press, 1998); Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); and Matthew Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: the United States encounters foreign peoples at home and abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).

II First Impressions

As the treaty port of Yokohama began to fill up in 1859, most Westerners arriving in Japan had little knowledge of the country, its history, customs, or social organization. Information on Japan, especially accurate information, had always lagged far behind that on China. Ignorance of the roles, functions, and life of the military caste was merely a part of the generally low level of Western knowledge. Although the first Western mention of the country was Marco Polo’s brief nod to “Cipangu” in the late 13th century, the traders and diplomats taking up residence in Yokohama most likely would have received their knowledge of Japan from a number of sources. Those sources proffered a melange of images, some positive, some negative, most paternalistic.

Dutch merchants, of course, had been living in the southern port city of Nagasaki for over two centuries, isolated on the man-made, fan-shaped island in Nagasaki Bay called Dejima, which was connected to land by a single, guarded bridge. Once every four years a small delegation, led by the head of the “factory,” or trading post, was allowed to travel to Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa bakufu, to present gifts to the shogun and pay obeisance. This was the only chance during those centuries for most Japanese even to glimpse the “hairy barbarians.”

For Westerners, perhaps their primary source of information on Japan was a nearly two hundred-year-old account by Englebert Kaempfer, a physician attached to Dejima from 1690 to 1692. Kaempfer’s massive three-volume survey, for all its detailed information, shed little light on the samurai. In his account of Nagasaki, he offered his most extensive survey of local government, but only noted that the high-ranking Nagasaki magistrates, directly appointed by the “ziogoon” (shogun), received a “knightly title” of “cami” (kami), along with a grant of land. Their assistants, he further recorded, were drawn from young men of high aristocratic birth who fulfilled both military and government functions. Yet of the intricacies of the status system, and the role the samurai played in governing the lower


A century and a half after Kaempfer, there appeared a more accurate description of the samurai and status system in Japan, a slim volume entitled *Manners and Customs of the Japanese*. It was printed in New York in 1841 and was drawn largely from the translated notes of Phillip Franz von Siebold, a German physician to the Dutch, who lived on Dejima from 1823 to 1829. Siebold had played a small role in Japanese history, having been arrested and deported from the country on account of possessing a map of the islands, a grave offense under the maritime restriction laws of the Tokugawa. His Japanese co-conspirators, part of a group of scholars interested in Western knowledge, were jailed or sent into internal exile.

*Manners and Customs* notes, however, that the section detailing the status system was provided by a Dutch resident at Dejima named Meylan, and not from Siebold’s papers. This description of social organization relates that Japan is divided into “nearly hereditary classes. It is held to be the duty of every individual to remain through life in the same class in which he was born...to sink below it is utterly disgraceful.”7 The eight classes described by Meylan divided the military caste into three rankings, the top being the daimyô (lords), labeled as “princes,” the next class comprising the “noblemen” (“kie-nien,” kenin, lit. “housemen”) who held their lands in fief through military service to their lords, and the fourth class made up of the “samlai”, the “vassals of the nobility.”

The influence of *Manners and Customs* on Commodore Matthew Perry’s official account of his mission to Japan is evident. The entire background section relating social and governmental conditions, written by Francis L. Hawks, drew almost directly, sometimes word for word, from Siebold’s miscellany.8 Unlike Siebold, however, Hawks paid considerable attention to the practice of ritual suicide (seppuku) reserved for the samurai caste, and it is in Perry’s report that the custom was first popularized. Hawks wrote that “A very singular system of self-punishment, even unto death, prevails among all the officials of Japan. When one has offended, or even when in his department there has been any violation of law, although be-

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7. *Manners and Customs*, pp. 154-55. In this scheme, the third class was composed of priests. See Hall (1977) for an accurate description of the status system.
8. See, especially, Matthew Calbraith Perry, *Narrative of the expedition of an American squadron to the China Seas and Japan, performed in the years 1852, 1853, and 1854: under the command of Commodore M.C. Perry, United States Navy, by order of the government of the United States. Compiled from the original notes and journals of Commodore Perry and his officers, at his request, and under his supervision by Francis L. Hawks* (Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, Printer, 1856), pp. 16-17.
yond his power of prevention, so sure is he of the punishment of death that he anticipates it by ripping up his own body, disembowelling himself, rather than to be delivered over to the executioner. In fact, he is encouraged to do so...it is a point of honor thus to kill themselves on any failure in their department.”

Indeed, concludes Hawks, “the severity of the Japanese laws is excessive. The code is probably the bloodiest in the world. Death is the prescribed punishment for most offenses.” An image of the samurai both noble and violent thus painted the official American record of first contact with Japan.

Popular periodicals in Europe and the United States, however, proffered another image of the Japanese, less fearsome than comical. In its review of Perry’s account of his mission, Harper’s portrayed the samurai as a child’s force and certainly no threat to American power. Recounting the Commodore’s landing at Uraga, when he was accompanied by gunboats with cannon at the ready, the reviewer dismissed the shogunal troops who guarded the beach “glittering in their gay robes of bright red and blue, while their lacquered caps, and tall spears, shone brightly in the sun’s light.” The Japanese official in charge of negotiating with Perry was likewise a strange mix of Alice-in-Wonderland and frustrating antagonist, who, through “provoking and tedious negotiation...with his cunning vivacity seemed, in his gay bedizenment, very like an uncommonly brilliant knave of trumps.”

To the conflicting images from Perry and Harper’s were added other accounts, such as an 1855 book by Bayard Taylor, who accompanied Perry, entitled *A Visit to India, China, and Japan*. Just as Western diplomats and merchants set sail for Yokohama, however, a third major account appeared, Laurence Oliphant’s *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan*. Oliphant’s (1829-1888) two-volume work was the British counterpart to the Perry-Hawks offering, recording the British diplomatic mission to sign the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin with China (ending the Arrow War) and to conclude the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1859. Oliphant’s account broke new journalistic and anthropological ground, seeded as it was with his arch comments and keen observations. It broke decisively with the dry, matter-of-fact annals offered by previous authors, and provided the model for future first-hand memoirs and the review of them in Western periodicals. Oliphant, nonetheless, often repeated accounts of Japanese society that had appeared previously. He followed the status out-

9. Perry, pp. 20-21. Contrast this with Siebold’s laconic statement that “a man of the higher orders publicly accused, and conscious of his guilt, will prevent his trial by at once committing suicide.” (*Manners and Customs*, p. 160)


line given in *Manners and Customs*, but also played down the hereditary nature of the samurai caste, giving instead an impression of a fluid bureaucracy at the lower levels.\(^{13}\)

Oliphant’s readers, however, found such formal categorizing buried amongst idiosyncratic anecdotes, which gave life to the samurai for Western readers. Commenting on the habit of wearing two swords under their outer half-coat, for example, Oliphant cast the Japanese officials as having “the appearance, at a distance, of being some new species of biped adorned with two tails.”\(^\text{14}\) He also disagreed with the emphasis on seppuku in the Perry-Hawks account, noting that what the Japanese called the “happy dispatch” was a “notorious method of suicide,” and confessing, “whether this...is really common at the present day, I could not ascertain.” Nonetheless, Oliphant dramatically concluded, “it is resorted to as a means of preserving from disgrace a whole family...it is a certificate which whitewashes all the survivors.”\(^\text{15}\) Oliphant, it would seem, readily bought into the prevalent image of strict samurai justice, painting them as modern-day Spartans, while at the same time exploiting to the full their exotic nature to Western eyes. Oliphant’s memoir offers a melange of seemingly uncontested observations, serving only to give weight to stereotypes that had already appeared.

As the preceding examples suggest, it is questionable to what extent any kind of firm image of samurai existed by the time Yokohama was opened for trade. Gaudy, brave, devious, pitiless—all these adjectives could be employed with equal seriousness by sophisticated writers and readers. Of the actual workings of the status system, the relations among shogun, daimyô, and samurai, even the best read Westerner was almost entirely ignorant. Only slightly more knowledge did he have of samurai tradition, customs, or dress. And yet certain of the images relayed above, particularly that of ritual suicide, clearly embedded themselves in the consciousness of those who paid Japan more than just a passing thought.

Despite this misty portrait, or indeed perhaps because of it, nearly all who came into contact with Japan sang its praises in comparison with other “barbarian” lands, especially China. As part of a larger East Asian “orientalist” discourse, Japan and China were arrayed on the scales, and China was found wanting. The glowing vision of the islands was best encapsulated by the Atlantic Monthly, which praised the “extraordinary habits and character of the people” of Japan, and concluded that, “on close examination, the imagined attractions of China disappear, those of Japan become only more definite and substantial. The old interest in China is trans-
ferred to its worthier neighbor." On the other hand, the ruling samurai were portrayed as a less-than-fearsome military force of hereditary soldiers, some of whom were devious negotiators, and all of whom possessed an inhuman tradition of self-immolation for even the smallest of offenses. With this bare, shifting, and often misleading template, the West was finally to encounter the samurai in the flesh, sometimes far too closely.

III Terrorism Erupts, 1859-61

The foreign policy of the Tokugawa bakufu was predicated on defending the pillars of its traditional diplomatic culture, which comprised ideological, intellectual, and physical components. The bakufu saw the trade treaties forced on Japan by the Western nations as an unavoidable expansion of Japan’s international relations, but strove to maintain the conceit that Japan was at the center of an international realm ordered by the shogun. The strategy it adopted relied heavily on preserving the physical boundaries between Japan and the West.

Faced with the necessity of opening up to Western-style trade relations, the bakufu signed commercial treaties with the Americans, British, French, Dutch and Russians during the summer and autumn of 1858. Nonetheless, Edo made sure that trade would be conducted at a limited number of official ports, which it conceived of as sterile spaces within which the bacillus that was the West could be contained. The bakufu’s primary strategy was to control the physical presence of the foreigner in Japan through attempts to isolate the treaty ports and to postpone the opening of others. The main port under the trade treaties was Yokohama, located about eighteen miles southwest of Edo. It was, in reality, only at Yokohama and in its immediate environs that Japanese and Westerners mixed to any great degree. Thus, it is not surprising that conflict between the two groups took place in the Edo region, and that no attacks or murders were recorded at the other ports until 1868.

In Edo, the shogun’s administrative center, fully half the inhabitants, nearly a half a million persons, were samurai, which represented far more than their actual percentage among the population of Tokugawa Japan. Anti-foreign feeling was particularly strong among middle-level and lower samurai and even stronger among those from han traditionally antagonistic

19. Samurai comprised five to seven percent of the total population.
to the Tokugawa, such as the far-western fiefs of Choshu and Satsuma. The rise of “men of spirit” (shishi) and the sonnō jōi (revere the emperor and expel the barbarian) movement is one of the best-documented features of the time. The Westerners in Japan were fully aware of their tenuous position, and everyday they were surrounded by thousands of sword-bearing men, ranging from decorated officers to fiercely anti-foreign ruffians.

It did not take long for hostilities to erupt, although on balance, the loss of life must be considered relatively small. On the last day of July 1859, the month that Yokohama opened, Townsend Harris’ secretary, Henry Heusken, was attacked by a mob in Edo, although he was not wounded. Three weeks later, the two Russian sailors were cut down in the streets of Yokohama. Their murder made the establishment of a foreign cemetery a necessity, and the bakufu appropriated land from a Buddhist temple at the foot of the Bluff in Yokohama, where it remains today. In late February 1860, two Dutch sailors met a similar fate. By the following month, terror had struck at the shogun’s highest ministers, for in late March, tairō Ii Naosuke was murdered just outside Edo Castle.

With these initial murders, a menacing image of the samurai began to overtake the foreign residents of Japan. Ironically, given the tenor of later reporting, it was certain elements of the Western press that for the moment resisted provocative labeling. Commenting upon the murders of the Russians and Dutch, the London Times declared that “it is not denied that our sailors, and those of other nations, behaved themselves too commonly with rudeness to the natives, offended their susceptibilities, and outraged their feelings. This conduct naturally generated a retaliative spirit, until, in the end...foreigners were occasionally the objects of murderous attacks.” But such judicious commentary was not to last long, especially given the increasing number of the attacks and the inflammatory accounts by Westerners actually present in Japan.

To the foreign residents in Japan, the attacks were acts of terror, pure and simple. They saw themselves as blameless merchants carrying on legitimate business that the commercial treaties protected. Many, of course, formed perfectly normal relationships with non-samurai Japanese who were merchants or domestic help. However, that their presence had loosed political passions rocking the country could not be adequate explanation for

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21. The cemetery is still the major burial ground for foreigners in Japan. In its old section, ordinarily closed to the public, one can see the graves of the Russian and Dutch sailors, Charles L. Richardson, and Major Baldwin and Lieutenant Bird (see below).
22. The Times, April 9, 1860.
the peril they perceived. Their fears and frustrations were shared equally by Western diplomats, and both groups poured those concerns into their accounts of the attacks. The accounts created a new, terrifying image of the samurai.

Among the leading contributors to this new image was the British Minister to Japan, Rutherford Alcock (1809-97), who was known in particular for the descriptions in his 1863 best-selling memoir, *Capital of the Tycoon*. Yet even before he published that book, Alcock’s diplomatic dispatches, printed in the *Parliamentary Papers* series, helped engender the initial changes. His reports were picked up, amplified, and disseminated by Britain’s elite press. For example, a mere two years after Yokohama opened, the highly influential *Edinburgh Review* used Alcock’s descriptions of the first murders and of the samurai, writing that the “two-sworded men” were “swaggering, blustering bullies, cowardly enough to strike an enemy in the back, or cut down an unarmed and inoffensive man.” These ruffians were, the *Review* concluded, “the terror of all the unarmed population and street dogs.”

The accounts steadily darkened with the new year of 1861. On January 15, Henry Heusken, secretary to the American Legation and perhaps the Westerner best informed about Japan, was murdered late at night in Edo while returning from the Prussian Legation. All the Western legations were located in Edo, a day’s ride from Yokohama, and Heusken’s murder inflamed the diplomats’ feelings of insecurity. He was the highest-ranking foreigner to be cut down, and his murder occasioned a minor political crisis. Headed by Alcock, the British, French, Dutch, and Russian officials abandoned Edo and took up residence in Yokohama, where they sought safety behind the gates of the foreign community. Townsend Harris, the American Minister to Japan since 1856 and Heusken’s superior, refused to decamp from Edo, however, believing that the bakufu was sincere in its desire, and capable in its ability, to protect the foreigners. Although Harris was mollified by an indemnity paid to Heusken’s mother, the perpetrators of the crime escaped, as had the murderers of the Russians and Dutch. This sense of impotence aggrieved the Western diplomats and further unnerved their countrymen living in the scarcely protected foreign settlement.

It took a full-scale assault on the British Legation that spring to solidify the image of the savage killer among Westerners. On July 5, the Legation, a Buddhist temple known as Tôzenji, was attacked by a band of ronin from the anti-Western domain of Mito, who were intent on driving foreigners out of Japan. At least 14 attackers swarmed the compound. During fierce fighting at the front gate the rônin killed two bakufu guards and

wounded ten. British soldiers fired their rifles as the Mito samurai attempted to hack through the defenders with their long swords. In the residence, attackers poured into the narrow hallways aiming for Rutherford Alcock’s quarters. The Britons beat back the attackers in the darkness with rifles and whips. Two English officials, including Laurence Oliphant, who had recently returned to Japan, were seriously wounded, Oliphant being severely cut on his wrist and neck.

Alcock himself narrowly escaped assassination. As he reported immediately to Lord John Russell, British Foreign Secretary, “the Legation looked as if it had been sacked after a serious conflict. Screens and mats were all spotted with blood, the former thrown down, broken, and torn; furniture and bedding all hacked, books even cut through by the sabres...”24 Nearly a century and a half later, Tôzenji’s entrance pillars still bear sword cuts and bullet holes from British rifles, offering mute testimony to the fury of the battle.25

Contemporary treaty port newspapers avidly recounted the terror of the attack and painted a picture of the machine-like precision of the samurai: “[T]hose who appreciated the reality of the attack must have felt the cold hand of death—and such a death—upon them! Japanese assassins, reckless of their own lives, seldom leave their work unfinished, and here they were with clamour and yell within a few paces of their destined prey.”26 The papers, however, did not have to work too hard to convince foreigners in Japan of the tenuous nature of their position. Those back in Europe and America similarly were provided with greater detail, yet equally high-strung images. For example, the *London Illustrated News* of October 21, 1861 graphically portrayed scenes of the attack and its aftermath on its front and second pages. All the papers shared a growing contempt for the samurai. When reporting on the grisly fate of the assassins, a number of whom were killed on the spot, the *Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser* asserted that “Among themselves, the Japanese think very little of death and wounds; affrays are so common.”27 The killer was not merely savage, but inhumane, incapable, according to the accounts of shocked Westerners, of loving life and limb.

British Minister Alcock sealed the image with his dramatic description of the attack published two years later in his memoirs. The beguiling na-

25. Tôzenji is still located a mile away from Shinagawa station in Tokyo. On the wooden entrance pillars to the main hall, one can easily see both sword cuts and pellet holes from the vicious battle fought there. For a nominal fee, visitors can go into the private back garden and view the building where Alcock and the other diplomats were attacked.
27. *Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser*, ibid.
ture of Japan competed with the ever-present specter of danger in Alcock’s pages. He reflected on the violence of the samurai as he surveyed the remains of the two rônin killed during the attack: “One man had his skull shorn clean through from the back, and half the head sliced off to the spine; while his limbs only hung together by shreds.”28 The swords of the Japanese guards inflicted these wounds, and the message is not lost on the reader that it could just as easily have been Englishmen lying like butchered meat. Indeed, despite the heroics of the Japanese guard, the Western accounts focused on the vicious nature of the attackers and their lack of humanity, not only for their victims, but themselves as well. Alcock in part was undoubtedly reacting to his years in China, where Europeans held the upper hand in any clashes, being able to utilize larger military forces and gunboats. Nothing had prepared him for the type of personal dangers presented by samurai committed to attacking Westerners.

Supported by the growing unease in Europe, Westerners in Japan now demanded the ultimate penalty for any attack. Only in this way, they believed, could they defeat the terrorists. Samurai who dared wave a sword at a foreigner must be made to pay the heaviest price possible. Alcock reflected this mindset in his memoirs, when he wrote that Westerners had, perhaps unfortunately, accustomed themselves to “isolated acts of butchery or assassination in the streets. But this last deed [i.e., the Tôzenji attack] was a conclusive demonstration of the existence of a hostile party, which would stop at nothing...”29 Therefore, although no Englishmen were killed in the Tôzenji assault, Alcock demanded death for all the attackers, and was satisfied to learn by March 1862, as he was drafting his memoirs, that all the ronin had been accounted for, the majority being killed or committing suicide.30

Despite the apparent vengeance extracted by the bakufu, though, Alcock was profoundly shaken by his brush with death and he shared with his readers how nerve-racking it was “never to sleep without feeling that your next waking hour may be your last, with the vengeful steel at your throat, and the wild slogan of murderers in your ears...”31 The American Minister Robert Pruyn shared this feeling, writing to the U.S. State Department that “all the officers of the Western powers in Japan are sentinels in the outposts of civilization.”32

30. Minutes of meeting between Alcock and Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs on March 12, 1862 in Parliamentary Papers: Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Japan, March 1861 to February 1863, no. 73.
31. Alcock i, p. 47.
IV “Cruel Butchery”: The Second Tozenji Attack and the Namamugi Incident, 1862

The codification of Western images of the samurai climaxed in 1862, a year that witnessed the most famous killing of a Westerner as well as a second attack on Tôzenji. One year to the date of the first strike on the British Legation another nighttime assault took place, despite the presence of over five hundred bakufu guards assigned to protect the Britons. This time rônin murdered two British soldiers attached to the Legation. The bakufu claimed that a sole assailant committed the attack and that he was wounded and later committed suicide. Lt. Col. Edward St. John Neale, chargé d’affaires and head of the Legation during Rutherford Alcock’s sojourn back to Europe in 1862 through 1864, viewed with extreme skepticism the bakufu’s account of the second Tôzenji assault.

Neale was on the whole sympathetic to the bakufu and understood the difficulties it faced in controlling anti-Western elements. Nonetheless, he too contributed to the image of the samurai as an ever-present threat, a zealot who when consumed by the desire to attack was nigh unstoppable. Neale’s dispatches, soon published in Parliamentary Papers, relived the terror of the samurai slaughter of one of the British sentries. He noted that in this “barbarous attack,” the diplomats trapped inside the Legation buildings could do nothing to help their doomed colleague and could clearly hear a “rapid succession of blows or cuts, at each one of which the unfortunate man cried out in anguish.” Neale was even more graphic in a letter to Vice Admiral Hope of the China Seas Squadron: “Every cut of the sword with which [the sentry] was attacked severed the member it was aimed at. He could offer no defence whatsoever. He met his death from sixteen wounds in less than five minutes, the half of which were each separately mortal.”

The actions of the Japanese government itself, moreover, helped strengthen the Western impression that the life of a samurai was not only of little worth, but that he was to be little respected even after death. In an attempt to limit international fallout from this latest attack, the bakufu assured Neale that there was only one assailant, a samurai named Itô Gunbei, who committed suicide immediately afterwards. Since the bakufu could not punish him while he was alive for his crime, they informed Neale that his body, which was not yet buried, would be burned and his remains thrown into the streets, a major disgrace. Moreover, his family would be punished and exiled from Edo.

33. Tokugawa Japan used a lunar calendar, and both attacks occurred on the 28th day of the 5th month; however, by the Western calendar, the 1861 attack occurred on July 5, while the 1862 attack took place on June 26.
The bakufu’s response was merely an extension of its punishment for the lowest criminals, which normally resulted in their severed heads or crucified bodies being displayed publicly with an admonitory explanation of their crimes tacked up nearby. Samurai terrorists in bakumatsu Japan, however, turned this government technique on its head and likewise displayed the heads of their victims on public bridges and in front of daimyô mansions or bakufu offices. To the Westerners, the harshness of the Tokugawa legal code gave the lie to the idea of Japan’s “civilized” status.

The second Tôzenji attack is also notable because it created another Western image of the samurai. On the one hand was the savage killer; on the other, a cowardly, lazy, untrustworthy partner unable or unwilling to protect foreigners. Ito Gunbei, with or without actual confederates in the attack, had penetrated a supposedly secure screen of over 500 samurai specially commissioned by the bakufu to protect the British Legation. Moreover, after fatally wounding two British soldiers and despite being wounded by a gunshot himself, he somehow managed to escape back through the defensive lines and return to his dwellings, where he committed suicide.

Neale and others both in Japan and Britain realized that they were faced not merely with what they considered murderous renegades, but also with an incompetent or simply disingenuous samurai support system, insultingly offered by the bakufu as the best way to assure Western life and limb. Neale held back nothing in his reports to Russell, blaming the Tokugawa government for the success of the attack and excoriating the “unaccountable disgrace and utter want of vigilance of the Japanese guards.”

Neale’s direct superior, Rutherford Alcock, was at this time putting the finishing touches on his memoirs, and, undoubtedly influenced by the second Tôzenji attack, condemned the entire samurai class as dishonorable, the very opposite of British officialdom’s moral virtue. He recounted that many of the attacks on Westerners took place at night, or from behind, with the assailants swiftly escaping from the scene of the crime. “They do not deem it inconsistent with a reputation for courage,” he wrote, “to attack perfectly inoffensive and unarmed strangers walking alone.”

Alcock was being at least partly disingenuous, for he himself had once called the British merchants resident in Yokohama the “scum of the earth.” Nor were all those wearing the uniforms of their country paragons of virtue, as indeed Japanese artists portrayed drunken Western sailors swagger-

38. Alcock I, p. 236.
ing through the streets of Yokohama. Part of Alcock’s wrath came from the fact that his own Legation seemed to be a permanent target and him the biggest prize. This sense of danger and injustice transformed itself in his memoirs into a charge that the savage samurai attacked innocent Westerners for no other reason than the fact that they were not Japanese.39

Alcock of course knew that the Western presence had ignited a raging political debate between those samurai who favored opening the country and those who sought to keep it closed. He downplayed, however, the idea that the samurai attacks came from the political fissures in Japan caused by the Western presence. The assaults, Alcock averred, were a symptom of the essential cowardice of the samurai. He dismissed the Japanese warrior class, who “when beaten in the field...fall back on fraud and cunning, the traditional arms of the weak; and, it must be added, the only ones much relied upon by the Asiatic.”40 Alcock thus lumped the Japanese warriors together with the entire “Asiatic” race in a clear reaffirmation of the moral superiority and courage of the West as represented by him. In Alcock’s description, the turn around from the early innocuous, if not positive, portrayal of the Japanese in the pages of magazines like Harper’s was nearly complete.

The image of the savage capriciousness of the samurai was reaffirmed in the late summer of 1862, with the most famous attack on Westerners in Japan. On September 14, a party of four Britons, three men and one woman, left Yokohama to ride along the main road in eastern Japan, the Tôkaidô. At a little village called Namamugi, about seven miles northeast of Yokohama, the four crossed the three hundred-man strong procession of Shimazu Hisamitsu, the father of the daimyô of Satsuma and the effective power in the domain. Hisamitsu was returning to the imperial capital of Kyoto after installing a new ruling triumvirate in the bakufu which he hoped would be more amenable to sharing power with the Court and leading domains such as his. What happened next was described by various Western sources.

William Marshall, one of the party, stated in a deposition taken the next day by British officials that the group pulled their horses off to the side of the road when they encountered the samurai. “Our horses were quietly turned around,” he continued, “when I saw a man in the center of the procession throwing the upper part of his clothes off his shoulders, leaving himself naked to the waist, and drawing his sword, which he swung with both hands, he rushed upon [Charles L.] Richardson.”41 After slashing at

39. See, for example, Yokohama kaikô kenbun shi I, illustration of a “drunken foreign ship captain” staggering through Honmachi, supported by two uniformed sailors.
the 28-year old Richardson, the samurai turned to Marshall and William Clarke, cutting both of them, and finally aimed a blow at the woman in the party, a Mrs. Borradaile. Clarke and Borradaile’s accounts accorded with Marshall’s.

Chargé Neale continued the story in his next-day dispatch to Russell, describing this “barbarous murder” in which “Mr. Richardson, nearly cut to pieces, fell from his horse.” To both Russell and the Japanese foreign magistrates, Neale went into detail, describing how, while the other three managed to escape in the confusion, “Mr. Richardson was cruelly butchered, and though on the ground and dying, or dead, by orders of a superior officer...his throat was cut. The cortege, with the cruel chief whom it surrounded, went on its way.”

This first murder of a civilian in Japan shocked both the treaty port community and the Western governments into action. Richardson actually was not a resident in Japan, but was vacationing from Shanghai. No matter, for now that one of their own had fallen victim, the foreign community in Japan wanted instant vengeance. Neale was barely able to restrain the British community from heading off en masse to find and punish the Japanese responsible. Thwarted in forming a posse, the merchants held a community meeting the following day. They sent a separate report to Russell demanding action which, when published in the Times in November, inflamed British public opinion. The attack on Mrs. Borradaile was particularly reviled, and the merchant report contained her statement that, during the attack, though confused and desperate, she rode her horse into the nearby sea, “preferring the risk of drowning to falling into the hands of these bloodthirsty miscreants.” British officials and civilians alike professed utter disgust for those who would carry out a deliberate attack on an unarmed woman.

It is important to note here that major European newspapers did not have correspondents in the Far East, but relied upon occasional reporting, letters from travelers, or, most commonly, the treaty port newspapers. Yet the treaty port papers had intimate ties with the Western merchants, and could hardly be considered unbiased. European readers therefore received unadulterated treaty port images directly in their home papers. For example, the minutes of the merchant meeting referred to above, which contained Mrs. Borradaile’s statement, was sent as a dispatch to Russell and also reprinted nearly verbatim in the same day’s edition of the Yokohama-based Japan Herald. This paper was sent to the major treaty ports in China, such as Shanghai, and from there its account appeared newspapers such as the


43. Enclosure 2 in no. 46, P.P. 1863:74.
Thus it was that a great number of London breakfasts undoubtedly went untouched on the morning of November 28, 1862, when the _Times_ reprinted the exact same account, containing Mrs. Borradaile’s statement as well as the following passage: “[European officers] found the body lying about ten yards off the road in a field at the side of a small cottage...The whole body was one mass of blood; one wound, from which the bowels protruded, extended from the abdomen to the back; another, on the left shoulder, had severed all the bones into the chest; there was a gaping spear wound over the region of the heart; the right wrist was completely divided, and the hand was hanging merely by a strip of flesh; the back of the left hand was nearly cut through, and on moving the head the neck was found to be entirely cut through the left side.”

Europeans in Yokohama photographed both the site of the murder and Richardson’s body, while Charles Wirgman, the most famous sketch artist in Japan portrayed the attack in prints circulated among Western residents.

British diplomats were aware that Edo had little, if any, control over Satsuma, but nonetheless demanded an indemnity from both parties. The fact that Satsuma steadfastly refused to pay its share of the indemnity pushed Foreign Secretary Russell into the August 1863 bombardment of Satsuma’s capital, Kagoshima, by British warships. That one-day battle was inconclusive and led to the deaths of eighteen British sailors, including two high-ranking officers. Yet justice was never fully served according to British lights, for Richardson’s killers never were caught.

Richardson’s murder codified in Britain the popular image of the samurai. Whereas the London _Times_ back in 1860 could blame the ill-mannered Europeans for their misfortunes, not so the _Times_ of three years later. By now, Alcock’s memoirs, numerous diplomatic dispatches, and media accounts had formed an accepted portrait of the savage and untrustworthy samurai who terrorized innocent civilians. A long article entitled “What Are We to Do with Japan?” printed at the end of June 1863 represented the new common wisdom. Comparing Japan to the China of the 1850s, which accepted European superiority only when the Chinese rulers themselves were threatened by military action, the article averred that the “early provocations...had nothing to do with the system of assassination deliber-

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44. “The Murder of Mr. Richardson in Japan,” the _Times_, November 28, 1862.
46. Richardson was buried in the foreigners’ cemetery in Yokohama, where he still rests. His large headstone reads that he was “assassinated on the Tōkaidō.”
ately adopted by the Japanese nobles. The names of Europeans who have been savagely murdered within the last two years would make a long list. [These] can be accounted for by no other supposition than a foregone resolve to murder every European who may fall in the way of a Japanese chief.”

Several months later, a lengthy piece reviewing the Richardson murder expanded on this theme. The *Times* dismissed arguments that the Richardson party somehow brought disaster upon itself, noting that such a claim cannot “hold good of an onslaught made by a retinue of 200 ruffians on three gentlemen and a lady...The fear, or hatred, or jealousy of strangers which is found in every barbarous race lives in the breast of the Japanese Princes...They set upon the object of their abomination to kill them...” Ignoring direct evidence that primarily one, at most several, samurai were involved in the attack, the *Times* charged the entire procession with savage murder and condemned all Japanese as uncivilized.

It was at this moment that the cultural image inserted itself into the international politics of the day. Rutherford Alcock had returned to Japan in 1864 convinced of the duplicitous nature of the samurai and the constant threat they posed to Britain’s position. His fears were combined with a conviction that the bakufu itself was secretly planning on expelling the Westerners from Japan. An ill-conceived bakufu policy of closing Yokohama, broached with the treaty powers in 1864, coupled itself in Alcock’s mind with the previous year’s attack on Western shipping by the anti-Western domain of Chôshû. While Chôshû had acted alone on an Imperial order to expel the barbarians, the bakufu had done all it could to quash the same order after initially accepting it. The bakufu’s senior councillors repeatedly told Western representative that they had no intention of carrying out the expulsion order. Nonetheless, as the price of maintaining domestic stability, Edo decided to attempt a closure of Yokohama. To Alcock, this was the final blow.

In late March 1864, he sent a long, aggressive dispatch to London, claiming that relations were in a “crisis.” He wrote Russell, “the time has gone by irrevocably for concessions contrary to the spirit and intent of existing Treaties.” Two weeks later he again exhorted Russell to action, asserting that “there will be no improvement until measures of a hostile and coercive character are resorted to...[the Japanese] will then learn to respect such rights, as the lesser of two evils, if for no better or higher reason.”

By early May, Alcock was little short of panic: “Something must be done

47. The *Times*, June 29, 1863.
48. The *Times*, November 4, 1863; emphasis added.
to stop this underhand plotting for our final expulsion and the rupture of all friendly relations, or the end will surely come.\textsuperscript{51}

Alcock’s words easily lead one to conclude that he saw enemies on all sides. His disdain for Japan’s samurai government and his fear of the anti-Western samurai was reflected in his public and private writings. The image he helped create informed his viewpoint as he wrestled with what he believed to be an unsolvable problem. Ultimately, he could see no course other than the exercise of military force to beat back a threat that none of his fellow diplomats perceived as strongly. Over the summer months of 1864, Alcock worked tirelessly to convince the other Western diplomats to support an attack on Shimonoseki, the main city in Chōshū. He saw this as a righteous punishment, not just of Chōshū, but of the bakufu itself, and believed that it would serve as a warning to any contemplating violence against Westerners in Japan.

After months of hectoring his allies, Alcock in the end won out and a mainly British flotilla engaged in a three-day bombardment of Shimonoseki in late September, ostensibly to reopen the shipping lanes in the Inland Sea. Despite his conviction, Alcock could not sway his own superiors that his policy was correct, and Foreign Secretary Russell recalled him from Japan at the end of 1864, replacing him with the equally experienced, yet apparently more stable, Harry Parkes.

Alcock had run the cycle round: politics had led him to craft an image that itself affected politics. Such an outcome was not preordained and indeed might not have happened had another man been in his position. Unlike most Westerners in Japan, Alcock was in a position to translate his beliefs into policy, but he clearly did not hold those images in isolation, as press accounts and the writings of other diplomats show. The image of the samurai could have remained that used by Rutherford Alcock to justify his actions, yet soon after the image began radically to be transformed.

V The Transformation Begins: Shimizu Seiji and the Baldwin and Bird Murders, 1864

The first intimations of this shift occurred a few months after the bombardment of Shimonoseki and just before Alcock returned to England. On November 20, 1864, a band of samurai at Kamakura murdered two British officers of the 20th Regiment, Major George Baldwin and Lieutenant Robert Bird. It was while returning from visiting Kamakura’s landmark Great Buddha, located about seventeen miles southwest of Yokohama, that Baldwin and Bird were cut down.

The first reports to reach London, this time from the \textit{Times’} own Shang-
hai correspondent, who still relied on treaty port papers, replayed the now-familiar scenario: “[A]nother murder, more brutal and inexcusable, than any which have preceded it, has been perpetrated at Yokohama...upon this occasion, they have cut to pieces two English officers who were engaged in sketching the caves and temples in one of the most picturesque spots among the Japanese islands...It was a sudden surprise and a murder of malice. It had, in fact, all the characteristics of an ordinary Japanese murder...”

Yet this assault proved different from the murders before it, for the bakufu now searched with alacrity for the assailants and, within one month, had captured and executed two purported attackers. Chastened by Alcock’s show of force against Chôshû, Edo tried to prove that when attacks occurred on its territory, by ordinary samurai, it could act swiftly. British bloodlust, and British pride, was partially salved, for justice had finally taken its course. More importantly, however, this was the first time that British representatives witnessed an execution.

Two weeks after this execution the British tone changed even more. The bakufu had captured the ringleader of the murderers, a rônin named Shimizu Seiji. He was transferred to Yokohama, an act by which the bakufu symbolically recognized the right of the entire foreign community to “punish” him, and was executed in front of not only British representatives, but in the presence of the entire 20th Regiment, the billet of his victims. Shimizu, reviled only slightly before by Europeans in Japan and across the globe, evoked admiration from all present for his calmness in the face of death. British diplomats John MacDonald and Martin Dohmen represented acting minister Simon Winchester, and wrote the first approbatory account of the death of a samurai. Noting Shimizu’s steadfastness and military bearing, the two representatives wrote warmly that “He met his doom in a manner worthy of a better cause, and for which he would no doubt have left this world with full forgiveness from the regiment he so outrageously insulted in murdering two of its beloved officers had he but shown the slightest sign of regret at the sorrow of which he was the cause.”

Despite these feelings, there was still a message to be delivered in Shimizu’s execution, and the bakufu paraded his head through Yokohama and displayed it at the entrance to the foreign settlement, where Felix

52. The Times, January 27, 28, 1865.
Beato photographed it.\(^{55}\)

Nonetheless, despite the cruel post-mortem treatment of Shimizu, MacDonald’s report, publicly printed the following year in *Parliamentary Papers*, marked the first change in the samurai image. Even a half-century after the fact, Ernest Satow, another witness to the execution, retained impulses from this turning point and wrote of Shimizu in his famous memoirs, *A Diplomat in Japan*, that “[I]t was impossible not to hate the assassin, but nevertheless, looking at the matter from a Japanese point of view, I confess that I could not help regretting that a man who was evidently of such heroic mould, should have been misguided enough to believe that his country could be helped by such means.”\(^{56}\)

**IV Enshrining the Image: The West Witnesses “Hara-kiri,” 1868**

This newly emerging image lay fallow for nearly three years, as the Kamakura murders marked the end of the high tide of joi terrorism. Indeed, in the view of William Beasley, post-1864 domestic politics in Japan turned to the construction of a new political order, guided by the slogan of the era: fukoku-kyôhei (enriching the state and strengthening the army).\(^{57}\) By late-1867, the fifteenth shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, had relinquished shogunal authority to the Emperor, and the bakufu struggled to retain any vestige of power. The main phase of the struggle ended on January 3, 1868, when forces of the anti-bakufu domains of Chôshû and Satsuma, united under the imperial standard, took control of the Imperial Palace in Kyoto. In the name of the sixteen-year old Emperor Mutsuhito, they proclaimed the restoration of imperial rule (ôsei fukkô) and abolished the position of shogun.

Two days prior to the restoration, the major commercial city of Osaka and the treaty port of Hyogo opened for trade. Although Hyogo, actually moved about ten miles west to the village of Kobe, did not rival Yokohama in importance, the Western diplomatic representatives valued its location closer to the heart of Japanese domestic politics then roiling in Kyoto. Thus it was that the entire foreign diplomatic community found itself at Kobe on February 4, 1868 to celebrate the near-completion of the foreign settlement. Near the end of the ceremonies, a detachment of samurai from Bizen (Okayama) domain leaving the settlement apparently skirmished with some French sailors present for the festivities. Suddenly, according to the diary of A. B. Mitford, secretary at the British Legation, the samurai “halted at the word of command and opened a murderous fire

55. Beato’s photograph can be found in Ozawa (1996), p. 102.
Despite the intensity of the attack, none of the diplomatic representatives was killed or seriously injured. The assault, however, was the first major attack on foreigners since the Baldwin and Bird murders, and more importantly, it was the first serious international crisis faced by the new Meiji government. The outrage immediately called into the question the ability of the new government not only to conduct smooth diplomatic relations and to honor international law, but also whether it could prevent the very type of terror attacks its leading members supported when opposing the old Tokugawa bakufu. Equally important, however, was the role the Kobe Incident played in enshrining the new image of the noble samurai for Westerners.

The Meiji government lost no time in arresting the leader of the Bizen detachment, a samurai named Taki Zenzaburô. Brandishing language identical to that once used against the Tokugawa, British Minister Sir Harry Parkes led the Western representatives in demanding capital punishment for Taki. Decrying the “murderous attack,” even no Westerner was actually murdered, Parkes wrote to London that relations between the Meiji government and the West could actually improve if there were to be a “satisfactory arrangement” for the Kobe Incident, i.e., the execution of Taki Zenzaburô. Yet Parkes did not let on to the Japanese that Russell had given him strict orders back in 1865 not to use military force in Japan. After three weeks of pressure, the Imperial government agreed to the Western demand and, in an order immediately translated for the foreign community, commanded Taki to commit seppuku.

The execution was scheduled for March 2, 1868. On that morning the Meiji government requested clemency for Taki. The Western ministers met and divided over the request, but ultimately agreed that to back down would lead the Japanese to call into question Western resolve. Such a result could, in their view, not only lead to a resurgence of terrorism, but also gravely impact the effectiveness of Western policy in Japan. That evening, Taki Zenzaburô was brought to Eifukuji temple in Kobe for his

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60. Parkes to Stanley, February 13, 1868. F.O. 46/91, No. 22.
61. Copy of order in *Dai Nihon Ishin Shiryô Kohon* [hereafter, DNISK] ME019-0494, which contains most of the material relating to the Kobe Incident.
62. The Meiji government asked for clemency only from the original treaty powers (minus Russia, which did not have a minister in Japan at the time), even though other foreign representatives, such as Prussia’s von Brandt, were fired upon. The opinions of von Brandt and Italian Minister de la Tour, both in favor of capital punishment, can be found at DNISK ME019-0494.
punishment. For two centuries the famous ceremony of seppuku, often called hara-kiri had influenced all Western accounts of the samurai, and now the foreigners would see it in their own quest for justice. The event was a milestone in Japanese-Western cultural relations, and marked a qualitative change in the Western image of the samurai; indeed it can be said to have started the popular culture cult of the samurai which retains vigor to this day.

The scene of the execution was carefully laid out in the temple’s main hall with seven Japanese and seven foreign witnesses. The government made a careful schematic of the arrangements, noting the exact positions for each observer, the centering of the platform upon which the sentence was to be carried out, and the positions of the executioners. Torches, “shedding over the altar a dim and spectral light, which lost itself in the mysterious darkness beyond”, lighted the temple. To the foreign observers, the entire event became not merely the execution of justice but a new and deeply impressive ritual.

The reports of the Western witnesses became the basis for the new image of the samurai, which took hold first among the small circle of foreign representatives and officials in Japan, and soon to a much wider Western audience. The most important was by Bertram Mitford. He, along with Ernest Satow, witnessed the ritual, and reported back to Parkes. Mitford then published an account of the execution in Cornhill Magazine and a revised version in his famous 1871 book Tales of Old Japan; the book chapter greatly expanded his personal account, filling fully thirty-five pages with an in-depth look at the history and culture of seppuku. Mitford’s account is worth quoting in extenso: 

> [After entering the hall] Taki Zenzaburō advanced slowly toward the Japanese witnesses...bowed before them, then drawing near to the foreigners [he] saluted us in the same way...in each case the salutation was ceremoniously returned. Slowly, and with great dignity, the condemned man mounted on to the raised floor, prostrated himself before the high altar twice, and seated himself on the felt carpet with his back to the high altar, the kaishaku crouching at his left side. One of the three attendant officers then came forward, bearing...the washizaki, the short sword or dirk of the Japanese, nine inches and a half in length, with a point and an edge as sharp as a razor’s. This he handed, prostrating himself, to the condemned man, who received it reverently,

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64. See DNISK ME019-0494 for the schematic and ancillary documents, including the final government order of kappuku, dated 2/9 (3/2).
65. The following account is taken from “The Execution by Hara-kiri,” in Cornhill Magazine November 1869, pp. 549-54. It was reprinted and expanded with more material in Mitford, Tales of Old Japan (London, 1871), pp. 375-409.
66. The kaishaku was his second: a handpicked man who would deliver the coup de grace after Taki had disemboweled himself.
raising it to his head with both hands, and placed it in front of himself.

"After another profound obeisance, Taki Zenzaburô...spoke as follows:—

"I, and I alone, unwarrantably gave the order to fire on the foreigners at Kobe, and again as they tried to escape. For this crime I disembowel myself, and I beg you who are present to do me the honour of witnessing the act."

"Bowing once more, the speaker allowed the upper garments to slip down to his girdle, and remained naked to the waist. Carefully, according to custom, he tucked his sleeves under his knees to prevent himself from falling backwards; for a noble Japanese gentlemen should never die falling forwards. Deliberately, with a steady hand, he took the dirk that lay before him; he looked at it wistfully, almost affectionately; for a moment he seemed to collect his thoughts for the last time, and then stabbing himself deeply below the waist on the left-hand side, he drew the dirk slowly across to the right side, and turning it in the wound, gave a slight cut upwards. During this sickeningly painful operation he never moved a muscle of his face. When he drew out the dirk...the kaishaku...sprang to his feet, poised his sword for a second in the air; there was a flash, a heavy, ugly thud, a crashing fall; with one blow the head had been severed from the body.

"A dead silence followed, broken only by the hideous noise of the blood throbbing out of the inert heap before us, which but a moment before had been a brave and chivalrous man.

"The ceremony...was characterized throughout by that extreme dignity and punctiliousness which are the distinctive marks of the proceedings of the Japanese gentlemen of rank....While profoundly impressed by the terrible scene, it was impossible at the same time not to be filled with admiration of the firm and manly bearing of the sufferer."

Mitford’s famous description was reprinted many times and codified for the West the image of the noble suicide. In Mitford’s retelling Taki became the apotheosis of his peers, his dignified death but an extension of the honor that guided his life and manifested itself in a respect for tradition and etiquette. Terrorism was all but forgotten and the samurai was no longer a savage killer, but rather a breed of modern-day knight, willing, even eager, to lay down his life for his principles.

The new view quickly found its way into the popular press in the West. The London Times of May 7, 1868 described Taki’s suicide and decried the severity of the punishment demanded by the West: “The ends of justice would have been met, and a proper moral effect produced, had the man been disgraced in rank, or reprieved at the last moment.” The question of whether British morality trumped Japanese morality was now laid before Londoners. Equally important, punishment assured that Japanese-Western relations could continue smoothly, the good faith of the imperial govern-
ment now proved in blood; as the New York Times headlined its account: “An Act of Reparation...Resumption of the Entente.”

By the time that Taki so impressed Western observers, the samurai themselves had not long to exist, being considered an impediment to the modernizing tendencies of imperial rule. In 1871, the Meiji government abolished the domain system, replacing the 250-odd semi-autonomous territories with Imperial prefectures. By 1874 the samurai were forbidden to carry swords or wear their distinctive topknot, and in that year, as well, their rice stipends were commuted into long-term government bonds. Inter-marriage between status groups was allowed and the samurai encouraged to take up a trade. With these acts ended the status system, and the vast bulk of samurai disappeared into the stream of history.

Taki Zenzaburô was among the last Japanese to attack Westerners for over two decades. Yet the image of the noble suicide remained in the minds of the Westerners. In 1874, the very year that samurai practically ceased to exist, the London Quarterly Review mythologized the caste, regretting that their “sense of honour [was] cultivated at such a cost of life.” After asserting that the samurai represented the best of Japan, the Review wondered whether Britain was “taking due care that our nobler principles and better life shall go along with [the British customs and habits being introduced into Japan]?”

In merely a decade, the Western image of the samurai dramatically evolved. A melange of visions gave way under the threat of terror to a chilling portrait of a savage killer. With successful punishment of their acts, the image metamorphosed into an almost hagiographic depiction of the noble suicide. Men with distinctly different experiences of Japan and the samurai crafted the image. Some of them, like Rutherford Alcock, let the image dictate their actions. Others, like Mitford, used it to create a lasting bond between the two peoples. For all, though, the image of the samurai became for an intense historical moment a central, if not the primary, lens through which they interpreted Japan.

Chapter 9

19世紀後半のアメリカ写真と『米欧回顧実記』

American Photography in the Latter Half of the 19th Century and “Beiou Kairan Jikki”

山地 秀俊（Hidetoshi Yamaji）

I 開 題

I－1 一般的視角

ミッシェル・フーコーは、彼の分析枠組みの中心概念であるディスクール（言説）について以下のように説明している。言説とは「語ることによって対象を体系的に構成していくプラティックである…言説とは対象について語ることではない。対象を明らかにすることではなく、対象をつくりだし、そうするなかで逆に、それが自らつくりだしたものであることを隠蔽するものである」と1。

1 フーコーの分析枠組みの中心概念は、言説である。言説とは、表現方法や思考方法を意味するが、同じく、誰が、いつ、いかなる資格あるいは権威に基づいて語っているかということが問題となる。言説は、意味と社会関係の表現されたものであり、主体と権力の諸関係を共に構成するものである。言説とは「語ることによって対象を体系的に構成していくプラティックである…言説とは対象について語ることではない。対象を明らかにすることではなく、対象をつくりだし、そうするなかで逆に、それが自らつくりだしたものであることを隠蔽するものである」(Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 1982,).

このように、対象を意味づけ定義する可能性は、予めそうした意味や定義を使用する人々の社会的、制度的状況によって先取りされているのである。したがって意味は、言語から生まれるのではなく、制度的なプラティックや権力の諸関係から生じるのである。

ことばや概念は、それらがどのように言説の中で展開されるかに応じて、その意味や影響力を変化させる。言説は、思考の可能性を抑制するのである。言説は、ことばある特定の方法で配列し組合せするものであり、それ以外の組合せは排除されるか配列しなければならないとすることになる。しかし、言説が、包摂と同時に排除によって、語られると同時に語られないことによって構成される限り、そのような言説は、他の言説、他の意味の可能性や主張、権力、立場とは、対立的な関係におかれることになる。これが、フーコーのいう「非連続性の原理」である（「フーコーの紹介」3－4頁、スティープン・J・ポール編著、福垣誠子・喜多信之・山本雄二監訳、『フーコーと教育』。勁草書房，1999年，第1章）。
この思考を我々の情報公開に対する規定に援用するならば以下のようになる。

すなわち、情報を伝達するメディアが、文字・図像・音声を問わず、そうした情報が公開するということは、公開する内容となっている対象・問題について語り明確にしていくという体を嵌いつつ、対象・問題を体系的に構成していくプラティックと考えられる。情報公開は実は対象について語ることに主眼があるのではないか。対象を明らかにすることもなく、対象をつくりだし、そうするなかで逆に、それが自らつくりだしたものであることを隠蔽することに主眼がある。したがって、19世紀から20世紀にかけて形成された近代的公開制度は、巨大社会組織構造の中で形作られた近・現代の言説の発生源として理解されよう。20世紀の巨大組織とは代表的には国家政府であり株式会社企業である。こうした2大巨大組織体が形成するコミュニケーション関係の中に我々は存在し、その関係から影響・規定されてアイデンティティを持った存在となる。

我々がこれまで研究してきた会計もまた一種の言説の発生源として捉えることができる。会計情報公開は、企業行動のある側面を表象し・測定しているというよりも、対象となる行動を体系的に構築していく行為である。そして測定しかなかったものを隠蔽する働きを持ち、会計情報が構築された事実物は、隠蔽した事実物として対立的となる。情報公開は特定の思考（イデオロギー）の発信であると同時に隠蔽行為と同値でもある。

週って、本稿で分析する19世紀のアメリカにおける西潮運動－具体的に本稿では諸省選活動と鉄道網の西部への拡大動向を指す－の中で撮影された写真は、マニフェスト・デスティニーとしての当該運動を刺激して、新興国家アメリカの国民としてのアイデンティティを高め、結果、現代的・アメリカ的な多くの諸制度（鉄道交通網・国立公園・国有林・市民運動・環境保護）を生み出し、その対極で他民族（インディアン）の文化・アイデンティティを消去していくという言説的機能をもっていた。眺めて上述した会計も写真も、事象を事実として描き出すある定型化した技術構造をもっており、それが社会的権力の言説資源としてうまく機能し、結果、制度化されていったと思るべきである。

以上要するに、広く一般に情報公開制度は、実は、大衆民主主義社会の中に巧妙にかつ密やかに組み込まれ、一般大衆を対象とした、言説的・操作的主体形成のための制度として確立することができよう。

我々はこれまでに、徐々に鮮明化しつつある以上のような問題意識の下に、会計情報公開制度の研究、あるいは1930年代の連邦政府の写真収集活動や20世紀初頭においてハイン（Lewis Hine）が撮影したドキュメンタリー写真の社会的意義について、あるいは同様に19世紀の終わりから20世紀の30年代頃までのアメリカ企業－具体的にはゼネラル・エレクトリック社－の写真による
情報公開活動について部分的であるが過去検討を加えてきた。その過程で、さらにこうした分析の対象を19世紀に遡る必要性を痛感した。その検討対象は、19世紀のアメリカにおける領土（拡大）問題あるいは国家権力の浸透問題に直接・間接に関与している意味から、南北戦争と西部踏查活動それぞれ、世界に先駆けて成立した株式会社としての巨大鉄道会社が発行鉄道網の拡大、経過する。南北戦争あるいは一般に戦争と写真の問題は別稿に譲るとして、本稿では西部踏査活動と鉄道網の拡大過程について、そこで撮影され用いられた写真情報の意義について検討する。

1－2 19世紀後半アメリカ写真情報公開への仮説

前項では情報公開に対する著者の一般的視点とそこから導かれる課題について展開した。ここでは、そうした一般的視点から導かれた、19世紀後半の西部踏査あるいは鉄道会社の残した写真の理解という課題に対するより具体的な仮説について触れることになる。

こうした残された大量の写真が撮影された直接的目的是、行論で明らかになるように、鉄道建設に際して費用の面から最小となるようなルートを、地域を中心に検討するための調査に際して、写真は地図とともに、鉄道会社経営者に具体的地質イメージを提供する手段として機能していたことである。さらに

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2 菅野、『20世紀初頭のアメリカにおける写真情報公開の展開—企業写真情報公開から国家写真情報公開へ』、山地幸俊・中野常男・高須教夫、『写真とイメージ』（神戸大学経済研究発行No.49）、1998年に所収。あるいは、同稿。「FSA（農業安定局）とSEC（証券取引委員会）—アメリカにおける国家による情報収集・公開活動に意義—」、「国民経済雑誌」181巻第6号（平成12年6月）。

3 菅野、『20世紀初頭のアメリカにおける写真情報公開—Lewis W. Hineの写真によせて—』、「国民経済雑誌」177巻第6号（平成10年6月）。

4 デビッド・ナイ著、山地幸俊・山地有男共訳、『写真イメージの世界—ゼネラル・エレクトリック社のコーポレートアイデンティティ』、1997年、九州大学出版会。

5 写真情報と各時代においてその「意味は、写真そのものの写された対象から生まれるのではなく、制度的な批判的と権力の諸関係から生じる」である。舞木が最初に上げた写真情報の公開問題で、20世紀初頭のゼネラル・エレクトリック（GE）社の写真情報公開は、それまで多様な環境に住む人々、資本主義的生産関係の中で、自己と会社との関係・アイデンティティを意識的・主体的に形成させ、生産構造の中に組み込むという機能を伴っていた。また同時期のハインの写真は、批判的写真雑誌による公開を通じて、そうした労働過程に組み込まれようとしている移民・児童等の人間を別の社会価値から捉えようとした。したがって資本主義的生産構造に組み込まれつつある人々をそれ以上の関係に組み込むための努力であった。

6 この二つの問題を提起しめる社会・政治・経済問題の構造は、実は情報公開問題をも提起している。それは南北戦争時期の鉄道会社の州規制問題と1880年代の連邦政府の鉄道会社規制問題である。この間の事情については前著、『情報公開制度としての現代会計』、同文館、1994年、第4章を参照。
そうした写真は人々の思考を規定するようになる。すなわち西漸運動と相俟って、アメリカの人々の心に自然保護特にアメリカ独自の西部荒野の自然保護思想を育むようになった。またこうした心的条件を基礎に、国立公園や国所有のような具体的自然保護制度が制定されるようになる。しかしそれには止まらない。このような写真によるアメリカ人アイデンティティ形成過程は、やがて他民族—具体的・直接的にはインディアン—の文化を否定する力としても作用するようになるとともに、他民族—日本人—のアメリカ理解を規定する一因としても作用するようになる。視覚的言説の完成である。
こうした仮説的理解から、以下、19世紀後半のアメリカ写真情報公開を分析していくこととする。

II アメリカ西漸運動と写真
II－1 鉄道網の西漸問題
II－1－1 鉄道敷設と地図（写真情報公開前史）
アメリカの鉄道敷設と対地地図作成との関連は18世紀にまで遡ることができる。したがって商業目的で蒸気機関車が走り始めるのが1830年代からであることから、蒸気機関車が牽引する汽車が鉄道の上を走り出す前に、荷馬車鉄道の上で馬を牽引する時代から、鉄の道（chemin de fer）としての鉄道建設のための調査活動と地図の作成は行われていたといえる。
北アメリカで最初の鉄道建設は、1764年にニューヨーク州のナイアガラ近く水路運搬用に、イギリス人技術者モントレッサー（John Montressor）によって行われた。象徴的に彼は著名な地図作成者（mapmaker）でもあった。アメリカで最初に商業用「鉄軌道」（tram road）の敷設計画を画したのが地図を作成したのはトムソン（John Thomson）であり、1809年9月にフィラデルフィアで描かれている。トムソンの描いた地図は、当時の著名な政治家であるジェファーソンとも知己があった富裕なフィラデルフィアのタカシオ商人ライバー（Thomas Leiper）の鉄道敷設設計計画を基に、地図に描いたものであった。当該地図は「トマス・ライバー殿がグラムクリークにある彼の石切り場からリッチレイクリークにある彼の船着場までを結ぶべく考えた鉄道...を示す素案」とタイトルがつけられている。トムソンは19世紀後半に長期間ペンシルベニア鉄道の社長を勤めたトムソン（John Edger Thomson）の父親である。
やがて1826年にアメリカではスチブス（John Stevens）によって初めて蒸

7 以下の論説は、アメリカ国会図書館の、以下のインターネット・アドレスの論述を参考にしている。
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/rrhtml/rrhome.html
気機関車が走る試走用の円形軌道が敷設された。続いて1830年代になってポルチモア・オハイオ鉄道の調査、地図作成、建設へと進んでいくこととなる。しかし当該時代の鉄道は実際距離も短く、資金調達者が全く想像することができないような地域への鉄道建設ではない。地図を基に資金調達者が説得するという類の調査および地図作成ではなかった。

以上のようにアメリカでは1830年代に遅く東部で蒸気機関車が導入する商業目的の鉄道が敷設されたが、以後一般にアメリカにおける19世紀の鉄道発展は、いくつかの時代に区分することが可能である。第一の時代は1827年に行われたポルチモア・オハイオ鉄道（Baltimore & Ohio Railroad）の建設が認可されて以来、30年代に入って河川、運河交通の補助手段として、主として東部諸州において短距離の鉄道が建設され始めた時代である。マサチューセッツ州等でもこの時代から鉄道建設が開始されている。第二の時代は、40年代から50年代にかけて経済の一つの中心として鉄道が構築する時期であり、四大幹線（trunkline）鉄道が完成するのにこの時代である。この時代には、インディアンの導入が本格化し始めた。第三の時代は、巨大鉄道会社を中心に鉄道網がアメリカ全国に拡大していく過程を含んでいる。60年代から70年代に相当する。さらに第四の時代は、70年代後半以降であり、ようやく投資銀行家が不況下の鉄道会社の更生を通じて、鉄道産業に介入してくる時代である。それは、やがてくるはずです産業レベルでの独自化傾向の前兆ということができる。実はこうしたアメリカ大陸全体への鉄道網の敷設と並行して、地質調査活動そして地図作成活動、後には写真撮影も本格化するのである。

第一の時代は、文字通り、鉄道が河川、運河交通の補助手段として利用されていた時代であり、東部主要都市の商人や銀行家がこそって自己資金を投資したり、あるいは地方政府の援助によって鉄道を建設することにより、主要運河等と自都市を結びせんとしていた時期である。そうすることによって実質的には、中西部との連結を図ろうとしていたのである。その典型は、ニューヨーク・セントラル鉄道（New York Central Railroad）の前身であるモーホーク・ハドソン鉄道（Mohawk & Hudson Railroad）、あるいはマサチューセッツ州の鉄道を求めることができる。例えば、各都市がどれほど鉄道運輸体系の中で主導的观念を獲得しようとしていたかを示す事例としては、モーホーク・ハドソン鉄道とトロイ（Troy）市の鉄道との間の競争を指摘できる。こうした時代においては、鉄道会社の設立には州政府の認可を必要とした。州政府は鉄道会社に対して直接的援助を行ったのであるが、連邦政府が鉄道会社に直接的援助を行うことは稀であった。代わって間接的援助をしたのであるが、それが陸軍

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8 1860年になって初めて連邦政府は、イリノイ・セントラル鉄道に対して直接的援助として土地の無償提供を行っている。以後当該鉄道会社は、無償提供された土地を資金獲得に利用し、鉄道会社が不動産会社化されるとともに債権者として利益を上げるようになる。
の技師を登用した。鉄道建設用ルートの地質調査と地図作成のための踏査隊の派遣であった。こうした踏査隊派遣を資金的にも人員的にも可能にする法律（General Survey Bill）は、1824年に議会を通過している。そして翌1825年には当該法律に基づいて仮算された予算が、カナワ（Kanawha）河上流とジェイムス河やロアノーク河を、運河あるいは鉄道で繋ぐことの実行可能性を確認するための「研究・調査（Examinations and Surveys）」に用いられた。ハーネイによれば当該調査が連邦政府の援助による初めての調査活動であった9。

第二の時代は、幹線鉄道の完成の時代である。ここにいう幹線とは、専ら東部からアラバマ山脈を越えてエリー湖付近までつまり中西部へ達する鉄道のことをいう。この幹線を最初に完成させたのは、ニューヨーク・セントラル鉄道であった。ニューヨーク・セントラル鉄道自体は、合併によって1853年に成立するのであるが、その前身の諸鉄道がすでに、全体でこの幹線を完成させていたのである。続いて50年代に入ると、ペンシルベニア鉄道（Pennsylvania Railroad）、エリー鉄道（Erie Railroad, (New York & Erie)）、そしてボルチモア・オハイオ鉄道が次いで幹線を完成させている。それによって、以後の鉄道建設も中心的存在となる四大幹線鉄道が完成・成立をみたのである。また、この時代には、イギリスからの資本がアメリカに入流し始め、各幹線の拡大に投資されるようになる。例えば、ペンシルベニア鉄道は、造早くイギリス資本の導入を決定し、路線拡大を容易にしたのである。

この時期になると、現実の基幹路線建設と並行して、太平洋と大西洋を結ぶ大陸横断鉄道の議論が本格化する。特に1846年にイギリスとの条約でオレゴン境界線争いの問題が解決する前後で本格化している。最初に具体的な形で、大陸横断鉄道計画を提出したのは、中国貿易で富をたったニューヨークの商人ホイットニー（Asa Whitney）であった。彼は1845年に議会に対して大陸横断鉄道の建設に関する調査旅行への資金援助を申請したが、別のルートを支持し、西部を越えて東洋貿易を目指していたミズーリ州出身の政治家ベントン10（Thomas H. Benton）の反対に遭い却下された。そこで彼は1849年にベントン案も考慮して、北アメリカの地図に描いた複数の大陸横断鉄道計画を小冊子の形で発表した。これが議会に提出された最も初期の大西横断鉄道計画の一つであった。この時期（1851年から1853年）に、戦争省長官アイビス（Jefferson Davis）は太平洋までの大陸横断鉄道敷設可能ルートを調査するよう命じている。

ホイットニーの計画に続いて、西部の郵便事業の拡張が求められ、メリショ州戦争でカリフォルニアがアメリカに帰属し1848年に金鉱が発見されゴール

10 ベントンの「インドへの道」思考は当時の西部への憧れを強化する一つの思考であった。H.N. スミス著、「ヴァージンランド」、第二章「インドへの道」を参照。
ルドラッシュが始まり、加えてフロンティアが消滅し、東部では鉄道が一層の発展をみていくことが重くなり、そして次節で見る文学・絵画・写真等で作り出された西部ウィルダネスへの憧れも作用して、大陸横断鉄道への関心はより高まっていた。さらにはカルホーン（John Calhoun）、ダグラス（Stephen Douglas）ら有名政治家が、領土の西部拡大計画を念頭に、アメリカ全土を鉄道で繋げる大陸横断鉄道計画を支持した。しかし議会は、当該計画が東部起点（eastern terminus）の計画であること、西部では複数路線計画があることで難色を示した。そこで双方の利害を調整するために、デイビッド長官によって奨励された西部調査は、1853年に陸軍地形調査部隊（Army Topographic Corps）に対して「ミシシッピ川から太平洋までの最も実行可能で経済的な鉄道建設ルートを確定する」ための調査費用が認められる形で具体化されたのである。

当該調査は、1850年代に4ルートで行われる。概ね、緯度に沿って南北4つの地域に区分されたのである。最も北部は北緯47度線から49度線までの区間であった。当該地域はワシントン準州の長官であったスチプンス（Isaac Ingalls Stevens）隊によって考察された。続いて北緯38度線から39度線はガニソン（John Gunnison）大尉（Cpt.）によって、彼の死後は41度線まで拡張してベックウィス（Edward Beckwith）大尉（Lt.）によって続けられた。またウィップル（Amiel Whipple）大尉とクリスマス・イヴ（Joseph Christmas Ives）は35度線に沿って南カリフォルニアまで調査した。最も南の32度線に沿って為された調査は、パーク大尉（Lt. John G. Parke）によって指揮が取られた。当該調査隊にはボープ大尉（Capt. John Pope）が同行し、地図作成に携わった。こうした調査の結果が、上述のように1860年代に戦争省から報告されることになる。

当該報告書によって32度線沿った鉄道建設が最も経済的だと判断され、サザン・パシフィック鉄道が建設された。当該鉄道は、ユダ（Theodore Judah）の努力によってサクラメントの富裕商人の資本導入とリンカーンの政治的援助を得て建設されたセントラル・パシフィック鉄道と合併し、さらには1869年5月10日にユタ州プロモントリーでユニオン・パシフィック鉄道と連結され最初の大陸横断鉄道を完成させることになる。

当時の最も詳細な鉄道地図で我々の視点から問題とすべきは、前述の陸軍の調査隊活動が議会に対して提出した報告書Reports of Explorations and Surveys, to Ascertain the Most Practicable and Economical Route for a Railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean 1853－1856 (Washington, 1855－1859)に、添付された22枚の地図である。以下にその一枚を掲載する。

当該報告書の添付地図には、1824年に前述の一般調査法（General Survey Bill）が国内調査を促進する以前の1800年代に、ジェファーソン大統領によって派遣されたルイス＝クラーク（Lewis and Clark）踏査隊の太平洋までの調査から、1850年代終わりのGeneral Land Officeの調査活動まで計45回の調査活動の結果が記入されていた。当該地図を参考に、鉄道経営者たちは、西部への鉄
道の敷設あるいはさらには大陸横断鉄道を計画し、東部と西部を鉄道で接続することによって、東部住人の西部ウィルダネスへの懸念を経済的に利用しようとした。具体的に例えば、クック（Jay Cooke）は、鉄道の西進計画—具体的には Northern Pacific Extension Project—の推進者であり、イエローストーン国立公園設立のために議会に対するロビング活動を行った推進者ともなった。この動向が、第3節で触れるように、自然保護運動と鉄道会社利害の実利的結合（practical alliance）へと結びつける。

第1図 議会提出地図

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11当該銃砲隊の意義については以下の文献に詳しい。D. ノロウェイ著、池央良郎訳『ルイスとクラーク—北米大陸の横断』、草思社、1977年。さらに南北戦争以前にはパイク（Z. Pike）、ロング（S. H. Long）、フレモント（J. C. Fremont）らが政府派遣の探査家として有名である。
II－1－2 鉄道会社と写真
サザン・パシフィック鉄道、セントラル・パシフィック鉄道そしてユニオン・パシフィック鉄道へと発展的に連結され最初の大陸横断鉄道が完成をみることになるが、その過程を支えたのは、連邦政府の派遣する軍隊による調査活動とその結果報告される地図であったが、やって写真も利用されるようになるとは次節で検討する。ここでは、むしろ鉄道会社の側からも大量に撮影された写真について若干言及しておく。

象徴的写真としては、大陸横断鉄道完成時にユタ州プロモントリーで、西からの所が連結された時の写真であるが、鉄道会社の広告を兼ねた委託記念写真としてよく引用される。当該写真を始め、鉄道会社の広告用に西部への鉄道敷設現場が多く写真に残されている12。

しかし実は、本稿で検討対象としている踏査隊の写真と鉄道会社の写真は、それほど簡単に区別できるものではない。その理由として、いくつかの踏査隊に同行した写真家についても、踏査隊員として写真撮影する以前から単独で西部地域を撮影していたものもいるし、また踏査隊に雇用されると同時に、同一人物が民間の鉄道会社にも相前後して雇用され、多くの西部地域の写真を後世に残しているからである。こうした特殊事情を体験した写真家として特に本稿で注目するのは、鉄道写真家として名声を博したハート（Alfred E. Hart）と、踏査隊と鉄道会社それに個人としても写真家として活躍したカーリンス（Carleton Watkins）である。

カーリンスは踏査隊に同行した写真家として有名である。後述のように、特に著名な西部踏査活動を行う4大踏査隊の一つである、キング（C.King）が率いた踏査隊に、カーリンスは同行している。しかしキングとカーリンスの関係は、年齢的には1829年生まれのカーリンスが1840年生まれのキングよりも年上である。カーリンスは、それ以前の1861年からすでに個人的にヨセミテの写真を撮影し、1862年にはニューヨークやロンドンでも、ヨセミテ公園にマリポサの写真で凱旋を開いた世界的な注目を集めており、1863年にはサンフランシスコでギャラリーを持つまでになっていた。また同じく1862年には連邦政府の踏査隊は別に、写真家としてカリフォルニア州地質調査隊のメンバーとなっている。またヨセミテでのカーリンスの交友関係には、次節で触れられる自然保護運動家ジョン・ミューア（John Muir）も含まれていた。因みに、カーリンスが踏査隊に同行する以前に撮影したヨセミテの写真はまた、ホイットニー博士が作成したカリフォルニア州当局への報告書である『ヨセミテ』(1868年刊)にも

24枚が採用されている。
4大踏査隊の隊長の一人であるキングは、コロンビア大学の地質学者ホイットニー博士の薫陶を受け、弱冠27歳で1867年に、民間人として初めて踏査隊の指揮官としての命を受けたが、もちろん、キングが行った踏査活動すべてにэтому鉱床が同行していたわけではない。1870年に行われたシャスタ山（Mount Shasta）までの踏査に同行している。しかしそこででも精力的な撮影活動を行い、1871年には、サンフランシスコの芸術協会のチャーター・メンバーに選ばれ、新しくヨセミテ・アート・ギャラリーを設立している。

ウトキンスは、また、踏査隊に同行すると同時に、セントラル・パシフィック鉄道あるいはサザン・パシフィック鉄道にも雇用され、工事記録や広告用の写真を撮影している。1869年にはIllustrated San Francisco Newsに掲載するべく、セントラル・パシフィック鉄道会社に関する一連の立体画（ステレオグラフ）の作成を引き受けた。

しかし、この間の事情は複雑である。今日、Web上ででのネット展示でもセントラル・パシフィック鉄道が19世紀に残した写真データベースは、ハート／ウトキンス・コレクション（Hart/Watkins Collection）として展示されている場合がある。ところが、最近の研究で、実は1860年代の当該鉄道会社の写真は、実質的にはハートによって撮影されたことが判明している。すなわち、ハートの写真ネガはウトキンスの新聞社に対する仕事の都合上、セントラル・パシフィック鉄道によって1869年にウトキンスに譲渡され、ウトキンスが当時彼自身の名前で新聞に発表していたのである。そのためにハートは長い間、1869年に死亡したときに、彼自身が撮影した写真もウトキンスの写真として伝えられてきた。しかしその後の研究で、ハートは1908年まで生存在していたことが判明している。そうした事情を鑑みると、ハート／ウトキンス・コレクションの大半はハートによって撮影された写真であるといえよう。

特に本稿で注目するのは、1860年代末にセントラル・パシフィック鉄道に雇

13 Eric Hill, “Carleton E. Watkins,” Stereo World, Vol. 41, No. 1, March April, 1977を参照。当時の大衆に写真を体験してもらう方法は、普通紙に写真を印刷する技術が未だ発明されていなかった以上、写真イメージから銅版画や木版画を起こし、後述するトラベラーズ・マップのようなパンフレットを大量印刷に付すか、あるいは多くの人々が集まるところや、ギャラリーを経営して、そこに喫茶のようなステレオ写真を見る器具を準備して、写真を観賞してもらう、といった方法が採られていた。
14 セントラル・パシフィック鉄道の写真はWeb上のデータベースとして以下のアドレスで見ることができる。本稿での筆者の発見と指摘は、ネガからの作業であれば膨大な時間費やしたであろうが、ネット上で小さな作業となった。
http://www.cprr.org/Museum/index.html
用され撮影した鉄道写真家の写真が、当時の日本にまで影響している可能性があるということである。この点については第5節に譲る。

II - 2 西部踏査隊と写真

やがて、60年代に入ると、実際の鉄道建設は第三の時代に至る。上記の幹線鉄道の各々に、その会社を後世まで特徴付ける経営者が出現し、各会社の鉄道建設は一層パブリック（C. Vanderbilt）エリー鉄道のグールド（J.Gould）らが代表的である。彼らは通行して自己の会社の株式操作により巨額の財産を築くという特徴をもっており、大衆の批判的となる。しかし、この時代の鉄道経営者及びプロモーターは、沿海く程度の差こそあれ、このような特徴をもっていたといえよう。したがってこの時代は「金ぴか時代」（Gilded Age）と呼ばれている。こうした鉄道経営者の行動をみた農民が、不満をもつようになり、グレンジャー運動（Granger Movement）と呼ばれる農民運動を引き起こすことになる過程は、拙著で詳しく分析した。

この時代に上記のように大陸横断鉄道は最初の完成を見ることになるが、領土の詳細な調査という意図から、依然として調査活動は続けられることになるとともに、これまでの踏査隊が軍人の指揮下にあったのに対して、南北戦争以後は、民間人が徐々に登用されることとなる。

アメリカ合衆国は19世紀に入って、当初は軍人を起用して後には民間人を起用しつつ、主としてアメリカ西部の地質・地理・天然資源等の調査活動を何度かにわたって行った。そうした調査（Survey）は、踏査隊を組んで行われた。南北戦争前の踏査隊活動については前節で見たように軍隊を中心とした人選で組織されたが、南北戦争後になると、1867年から1879年にかけて、計4回の踏査隊を連邦政府は組織するが、ヘイデン（F. V. Hayden）、キング（C. King）、パウエル（J. W. Pawell）らの民間人をも起用するようになった。計4回のうち3回は民間人主導の踏査隊が組織された。ヘイデン隊、キング隊、パウエル隊が民間人主導であり、残る一つのウィーラー（G. M. Wheeler）隊だけは軍人指導隊である。そしてこれら4隊にはいずれも地質調査班あるいは地図作成者とは別に写真家が同行しており、彼らは多くの写真特に西部のウィルダネ

16 拙著『情報公開制度としての現代会計』、同文館、1994年、第4章「鉄道会社規制と会計情報公開」を参照。
17 調査行為もそれを行う編集人をともにSurveyと呼んでいる。国にサーベイと称される調査活動に際しては、以後もアメリカでは民間・政府系あるいは規制を問わず何度か編成される。編著、「20世紀初頭のアメリカにおける写真情報公開－Lewis W. Hineの写真によせて－」におけるピッツバーグ・サーベイの論述を参照。
ス（wilderness）を本質とする風景写真を撮影し、東部に送るという作業を行うことになる。キング隊にはオサリヴァンとワトキンスが、ウィーラー隊にはベルとオサリヴァンが、ハイデン隊にはジャクソンが、パウエル隊にはヒラーーとピーガンが写真家として同行した。分けても前述したワトキンスと並んで、オサリヴァンも後世最も有名な踏査隊写真家の一人である。こうした写真の意味について、あるいは踏査隊が組織された意義について、今日では例えば、連邦政府は、19世紀半ば以降においてすでに、アメリカでは遅く、自然保護運動（Conservation Movement）が盛んであったという点を強調するために利用している。

上記4つの踏査隊は後に織めて大踏査隊（Great Surveys）と呼ばれ、キング隊とウィーラー隊は合衆国戦争省の管理下に置かれており、ハイデン隊とパウエル隊は合衆国内務省の管轄下であった。各隊の正式名はキング隊が、the United States Geographical Exploration of the Fortieth Parallel, ハイデン隊が、the United States Geographical Surveys West of the One Hundredth Meridian, パウエル隊が、the United States Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories, パウエル隊はthe United States Geographical and Geological Survey of the Rocky Mountain Regionといった。単発の調査ではなく何度か各踏査隊は地域的に踏み入っており、最終年となる1879年には、調査目的を終了していたキング隊以外の3隊は合同調査隊を組んでいる。各隊の正式名称からおおよその担当地域が分かるが、ハイデン隊はイエローストーンやハリエックス山での活躍、キング隊はシエラ地域の調査あるいはコロラドでのダイヤモンド駆逐、ウィーラー隊は中南部コロラドでの隊員の歯痛による偶然の新ルート発見、パウエル隊はコロラド川の征服によってその名前を知られている。

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18 ウィルダネスとは、人手が介入していない野生原生・原始性を指す抽象的概念である。もちろんその具体的形象が、アメリカ西部の荒々しい原生林や荒野であることは言うまでもない。
20 例えば、アメリカ国会図書館（Library of Congress）が開いている、インターネットのホームページ The Evolution of the Conservation Movement, 1850−1920を参照された。ここでは、上記の踏査隊によって撮影された写真が掲載されており、19世紀中葉からアメリカに存在した環境保護運動としての意義付けのために用いられている。
（http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/phcoll.new.html）
ヘイデン軍
ベニシルベニア大学地理学教授フェルディナンド・ヘイデン博士率いるヘイデン軍は、1871年の夏にイエローラストーンを調査している。当該軍は前述のよう に写真家としてウィリアム・ジャクソンを同行するとともに、当時の人気画 家であったトマス・モランも同行している22。ヘイデン軍が画家及び写真家を 伴ったのは明確な意図があった。それは、写真や絵画によって、東部の人々に とっては観念的であったウィルダネスを視覚化して提示するという機能を意図 していたのである。彼らの意図は事実に結実し、特にモランの絵画「イエロー ラストーンの大渓谷」は連邦議会に1万ドルで買い上げられ、イエローラストーン を国立公園にする機運を高めることになり、ヘイデン博士も議会で証言を繰り 返し「公共のための自然保護」を主張した。1872年にイエローラストーンが世界 ではじめて国立公園として制定された。また写真家ジャクソンはコロラド州の ハーリークイスク山の写真撮影にはじめて成功した。コロラドのメサベルデ地域の アメリカ・インディアンが住む岩窟を世界に紹介したもの欧当該軍であった。

キング隊
1863年にカリフォルニア地質調査局に勤務したキング(Conrad King)は1867年に勇猛27才で民間人としては初めて陸軍省を説得してアメリカ合衆国大陸部 調査隊の指揮官となった。キングは、カリフォルニア地質調査局勤務中に、当 時の地質学の大家であったハーバード大学教授ジョセフ・D・ホイトニー博士の指導下で、後述するミューアーとホイトニーのいわゆる「ヨセミテ氷河 形成説」の真否を確かめるべく、1864年にヨセミテ渓谷を調査し、いくつもの 氷河活動の痕跡を発見している。しかし現にあるホイトニーが、氷河形成説 を採らずに、当該説の主張者であったミューアーを批判するに及んで、キングも またミューアーへの中傷を開始するに至る23。キングには、1867年3月に「バシ フィック鉄道建設用ルート及びその複数の代案を含む、ロッキー山脈からシェ ラ・ネバダ山脈にかけての領域の地質学的・地勢学的探検を指揮する」という 具体の命令が陸軍省から発せられた。調査地域に因んで「北緯40度踏査隊」と 称され、具体的には当該地域の地質学的構造・地理学的条件・天然資源の探索 ・気象状況等を調査した。

特に当該隊に同行した写真家が撮影したヨセミテの写真は、以後当該地域の 風光明媚さをアメリカ全土に知らしめる機能を果たすとともに、多くのアメリ

22 西部の荒野を好んで描いた風景画家。兄弟であるエドワード・モラン、ピーター・ モランや2人の息子パーシー、レオンも画家として有名。「イエローラストーンのグラン ドキャニオン」「コロラドのグランドキャニオン」「ホーリー・クロスの山」の3部作で
知られる。
23 彼はカリフォルニアの最高峰に、師の名前を冠してホイトニー山と命名した。彼 は1867年に正式に踏査隊長に任命される以前から、シェラ地区の調査を行い、写真を撮 影していた。1865年撮影と思われるヨセミテ地域の写真が残っている。
カ人にあることによって、次節で検討するような文化的機能を果たすことになる。

### バウエル隊

バウエルは当時の代表的な民俗学者であり地質学者であった。1867年からロッキー山脈の調査を開始し、69年にはグランドキャニオンを流れるコロラド川を小船で横断することに成功している。北アメリカ・インディアンの言語を比較研究するとともに、1870年には国立ロッキー山脈地理・地質学測量部を創設し、民俗学、地質学双方の分野で業績を挙げた。

### ウィーラー隊

ウィーラーは軍人であり、ウエストポイント士官学校卒業のエリート大尉であった。彼自身あるいは軍隊は、南北戦争後多くの領域でバーディオーグやエール山脈の民間人の若手が活躍するに及んで、軍人の存在意義を顕著にする必要があった。踏査隊に関しても上記3隊はいずれも民間人を隊長としていた。そこで海軍はthe United States Geographical Surveys West of the One Hundredth Meridianを組織して、ウィーラーを隊長に任命した。ウィーラー隊はコロラド一帯を調査探検しているが、写真家オサリヴァンは、ウィーラー隊とともに同行し、風光明媚なコロラドの山岳写真を撮影している。

こうした諸隊の大量の写真を撮影し、東海岸をはじめアメリカ全土に結果的に配布したことになるのであるが、当該写真は、まずは直接的に企図された鉄道施設計画への助成という経済的機能を果たすことになる。例えば、前節で指摘した大陸横断鉄道の建設という観点からは、1860年代にその第1号が完成したが、1880年代には、アシソン・トベカ・サント・フェ鉄道とサザン・パシフィック鉄道が1881年にニューメキシコ州のデミングで連結され、1883年にはノーザン・パシフィック鉄道が北西部で、合併を利用して大陸横断道路を完成させ、複数横断鉄道の時代に入る。当該1880年代は独占的鉄道会社間にぼるアメリカ鉄道建設技術上の最盛期となり、鉄鋼レールへの変換、路線敷、連結器、ブレーキ等の規格化が進んだ。そして独占力を強めた鉄道会社を規制すべく、1887年には始めて連邦政府によって鉄道規制を行う州際商業委員会（Interstate Commerce Commission）が設立される。

しかし、上記のような踏査隊活動による情報提供が進み、大陸横断鉄道は複数完成したが、鉄道路線の通過しきに建設競争は長くは続かなかった。そしてアメリカの鉄道建設時代における第四の時代に入れる。具体的には、70年代の不況を一つの契機として、その不況により倒産した鉄道会社の再建を引き受ける形で、モルガン（J. P. Morgan）を始めとする投資銀行家が台頭・介入して、鉄道会社をいくつかの企業間で再編成することになる。さらに、鉄道産業においてその資金力を蓄えた投資銀行家がやがて世紀の転換期頃に鉄道部門における独占体制の確立に、中心的役割を果たすことになる。
だが、直接的には経済的動機で撮影された写真ではあったが、経済目的以外にも、多くの場所でアメリカ人に見られる機会があったと推測される。それが次第でより詳細にみるように、自然保護や国立公園・国有林の設立運動といった市民運動的な動向を形成する心の要因となっているのである。

彼らあるいは先行の調査隊に同行した写真家が残した写真は、ヨセミテやイエローストーン、グランド・キャニオンそしてナイアガラ瀑布等の風景写真であるために、そして安南のアンセル・アダムス（Ansel Adams）等に代表されるような鮮明なビントの風景写真に類似しているために、自然保護を企図したといった意味付けて行うことはきわめて自然なようにも思われる。またさらにに、当時の動向としてこうした写真は、制度としての国立公園・国有林の設立運動にも大きく影響を与えているといえよう。すなわち、先の自然保護機運の高まりと並行して、州政府や連邦政府の権力が前提となり、微妙に異なった要因が作用する運動として当時、国立公園・国有林の設立運動が起きており、1864年にはヨセミテがカリフォルニア州の公共公園（public park）に、イエローストーンが1872年にアメリカで最初の連邦政府公認の国立公園（national park）として制定され、1891年には国有林指定の基礎となる森林保護法が制定。
されている。

しかし、そうした写真が撮影された当時としてそのような意図の下に撮影されていたのか、あるいはより客観的に検証可能な問題として表現すれば、どのような社会的コンテクストの中で当該写真が利用され一定の機能を果たしていたかとなると甚だ不明瞭になる。例えば、踏査隊の活動報告書として合衆国戦争省（the U. S. War Department）が公刊した1860年代の報告書では、当該踏査隊の公的な目的は、「ミシシッピ川から太平洋までの最も実用可能な経済的な鉄道建設ルートを確定する（to ascertain the most practicable and economical route for a railroad from Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean）」ための調査と明記されていたりするからである。したがって、この場合には、写真は、東部の鉄道会社を投資する資本家に対して、西部に向かって路線を延長敷設するための、あるいは大陸横断鉄道等の建設可能性を判断せしめる資料の一つとして撮影された可能性が高いのである。この場合は、明らかに撮影目的は、あるいは撮影された写真の社会的機能は経済目的が優先されていたことになる。

さらに多くの写真の意義付けとしては、大衆や鉄道の西進問題、自然保護運動そして国立公園・国有林設立運動以外に第四の、あるいはその基底にあるといってよいより基本的な要因を検討する必要がある。それは、トラクテンバーグ（A. Trachtenberg）も指摘するように、アメリカ合衆国という新興国家が、戦争や貿易によって領土を拡大していたが未だ完全には国家権力が及んでいない地域は、踏査隊を派遣して、地質を調べ、地図をつくり、見知らない風光明媚な土地に、先住民族がより先に付着していた名前とは異なった名前を取り、写真を撮り東部に送り写真集等の形で刊行・公開するという行為（これを写真情報公開と呼ぶことにする）の自体の意義こそが、我々が注目しようとする基本的な第四の要因である。参考までにアメリカ国家の拡大時期を以下に掲載し

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25 具体的に連邦議会は、An Act to set apart a certain Tract of Land lying near the Head-waters of the Yellowstone River as a Public Park という法律を1872年に通過させて、ワイオミング州の当該地域をアメリカで最初の、というよりも世界最初の国立公園に制定している。同日に、著述の1892年の1864年に、連邦議会はリンカーン大統領の署名入りでカリフオルニア州に対してヨセミテを公共公園として付与する法案（a bill granting Yosemite Valley to the State of California as a Public Park）を通過させている。当時の注目度という観点からは、イエローストーンよりもヨセミテの方が、大きかかつより早期からであった。

26 Alan Trachtenberg, Reading American Photographs, Images as History, Mathew Brady to Walker Evans, 1989, 邦訳、生井英考・石井常史訳、『アメリカ写真を読む 歴史としてのイメージ』、白水社，1996年、第三章，「風景を名づける」を参照。

ここで第四の要因としての写真の機能は、写真映像を制度として捉えて、そうした映像機能が大量に東海岸の人々に降り注がれていることによって、彼ら東海岸の諸州の住人は、市民運動的に環境保護を唱える集団に無意識的に作り替えられることになるという構造主義的認識に基づて描かれている。またスミス（H. N. スミス）が彼の著書『ヴァージンランド』で用いた方法である「神話と象徴」も、文学的作品がアメリカ西部のウィルダネスに対するイメージ形成に、さらには西部志向の東部人というアイデンティティを形成するのに寄与したことを指摘する。H. N. スミス著，永原誠訳，『ヴァージンランド－象徴と神話の西部－』，研究社叢書，昭和46年。特にアメリカ人を西部に置き立てる心理的要因として「明白なる神意」（Manifest Destiny）が指摘されるが、この心理的要因の社会的形成過程の分析としてスミスの著作は興味深き。
III 自然環境問題 —特にヨセミテを中心に—

III－1 環境保護運動 —ミューアの活動—

本節では、19世紀後半の踏査隊活動が残した写真に関する今日的・支配的解釈である環境保護・保全運動としての意義に基づいて、したがって写真情報公開のそうした側面での意義について見ていくこととする。

アメリカでは1850年以前から、いわゆる東部13州に住む人々は、西部への憧憬があり、その感情に訴えかけるように絵画や線画によって西部の風景を描き出して販売するという商売が成り立っていた。それは映像以外に文学の領域でも存在していた機運であり、いわゆるウィルダネス（wilderness）に対する憧憬を刺激した初期の作家・歴史家として、フランシス・バーマンを挙げることができる。彼は紀行文学（travel literature）作家としても活躍し、ヨーロッパ文化から継承した、多少退廃的な原始と野蛮を崇拝するゆとりがあり、そう

した性向を「原始主義」と称していた。彼もまたアメリカのウィルダネスの素晴らしさを強調することによってアメリカのアイデンティティを高めていったのである。こうした文学上の西部志向は、ホイットマン、ダーナーにも共有されている。

さらに19世紀後半にあった所得の上に余裕の出た一部階層の人々は、ヨーロッパにおける貴族階層の余暇の過ごし方に倣って、自然に囲まれる旅行等に憧れるようになった。そこで西部探査の行った西部地域の調査・報告、特に写真による報告は、東部の人々に西部への憧れを一層かき立てる結果になった。他方、ヨーロッパの完全な模倣ではなく、アメリカ独自の自然を尊重する傾向と相まって、東部から比較的近くに位置するナイアガラ瀑布が初期には注目され始めた。やがては、西部のウィルダネスが注目され始め、ヨセミテやイエローストーンがアメリカ独自の自然を象徴する地域として注目を集めるようになった。

また自然への配慮を思想的に基礎付ける動向との関係では、エマーソン（R. W. Emerson）28、ソロー（H. D. Thoreau）29の存在について言及しなければならない。エマーソンは牧師の家系に生まれ、聖職に就くが、やがて辞してヨーロッパに遊学後、1834年からボストン近郊のコンコードの森に移住し、そこで超越主義（トランセンデントリズム）の思想に到達する。そのコンコードにエマーソンの考え方を共鳴するものとしてソローが住むようになる。彼らはそれぞれの慣習や宗教の存在、あるいは国家の存在を疑問視（否定）し、外見的には隠遁者風の生活を送っていた。個人の絶対的存在・霊的尊厳を最も重要なものとして位置付け、こうした絶対的存在の個人を信頼する「個人信頼」の考え方をエマーソンによって提起されるが、それを実践する場として、都会ではなく自然の中で生きたのであった。しかし彼らは政治に関心がなかったわけではなく、民主主義が隆盛になり数による支配が明確化すると当時の国家や法制度を講演等の場で批判し、まずもって個人の尊厳を説いていた。そのために、都会から遠く離れた大自然の中で生活ではなく、ボストンという大都会の近郊の小さな田舎村コンコードを活動・実践の場としていた。彼らの思想は後で見るミニアの自然思考に影響を与えることになる。

アメリカ西部のウィルダネスを保護する活動は、前節で見た踏査隊等の撮影した写真あるいは絵画に触発されてはいるが、必ずしも踏査隊のメンバーの多

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28 H. N. スミス、『ヴァージンランド』、62頁。
29 アメリカ古典文庫、第17巻『超越主義』研究社に、エマーソンの論考が訳出されている。「歴史的覚書」(Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New England)「自然」(Nature)「アメリカの学者」(The American Scholar)の3作である。
30 またアメリカ古典文庫、第4巻はソローの著作『H. D. ソロー』(研究社)が14編訳出されている。ソローの個人尊厳の主張の政治的適応は、後にトルストイ、ガンジー、キング牧師そして1970年代のヒッピーに影響を与えた。
くが自然環境保護を主張したわけではない。むしろ環境保護の立場からは、上で見たエマーソンやソローの思想に触発された主張・思想を持った人々が活躍することになる。例えば、本節で主として検討するヨセミテの場合には、ランドスケープ・デザイナーとしての先駆的存在であるオルムステッド（F.L. Olmsted）や、自然保護の父と称されるミュア（John Muir）の保護活動が有名である。そこで本節の以下では、ミュアのヨセミテ保護活動と踏査隊の関係について言及しながら、自然保護運動と写真公開の問題を議論する。

ミュアはスコットランド移民の息子で、彼の家族は1848年にカリフォルニアに金鉱が発見されたニュースとともにヨーロッパから大してアメリカに渡ってきた移民集団の一家族であった。子供の頃より自然観が強く、前進のエマーソンやソローの論述を読んで感化されたといった教養人ではなかった。むしろ自然観が強く、アメリカに移住してからも北アメリカ大陸を植物採集で縞横断して視察を広めていった。その過程が一見エマーソンやソローの生活様式に類似していた。そしてミュア自身、自然崇拝という観点から思想的にエマーソンやソローも後年になって共鳴していった。人間は自然の中においてこそ最も崇高であるとする彼らの思想は、ヨセミテに関する写真とともにミュアに実際の自然保護運動へと向かわせる切掛けとなった。

ミュアは1870年当時すでにアメリカで注目される存在になっていた。彼は大自然を崇拝して住み付いたヨセミテ渓谷、エリオによって形成されたとする今日では通説である「ヨセミテ氷河形成説」を唱えて一部地質学の全国的論争の渦中にいた。他方は、ハーバード大学地質学の教授であり、1863年にはヨセミテ渓谷の地質調査隊を指揮し1864年のヨセミテ公共公園（public park）設立に貢献したホイトニー博士が提唱する「地殻変動説」であった。彼らが生きた時代には、論争の最終的決着はつかなかったが、当時の地質学の権威である

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31 19世紀末の自然保護運動の先駆者であるジョン・ミュアについてはあまり日本で知られていない。しかし数冊の伝記と彼自身の著作の邦訳書は出版されている。東良三、『自然保護の父 ジョン・ミュア』、山と渓谷社、加藤則芳、『森の聖者 自然保護の父 ジョン・ミュア』、山と渓谷社、1999年。ジョン・ミュア著、小林勇次訳、『山の博物誌』、立風書房、ジョン・ミュア著、熊谷錬司訳、『1000マイルウォーグ縦断』、立風書房、ジョン・ミュア著、岡島景行訳、『はじめてのシエラの夏』、宝島社、また『1000マイルウォーグ縦断』は、刊行された著作集 John Muir, Nature Writings, The Library of America, 1997, に含まれている。

32 伝記によれば、エマーソンとミュアはヨセミテで出会って、ミュアがエマーソンへの思想的傾倒を打ち明けている。加藤則芳、前掲書、第5章参照。
ホイットニーと論争を展開した隠遁生活者ミューテアは、一躍、アメリカの自然保護運動の中心的存在としてクローズアップされるようになり、以降多くの著作を発表し、また論敵であったホイットニー博士の所属したハーバード大学等複数の大学から、名誉博士号を授与されるまでになる。

彼の活躍は20世紀に初とより顕著なものとなり、以後20世紀を貫徹する自然保護運動の代表的思考を形成することになる。思想形成過程の一つのピークは森林局の初代長官であったピンショ（Gifford Pinchot）との森林保護論争においてであり、一つのピークは後述するシェラー・クラブを形成して市民運動として自然保護を展開する過程である。アメリカは1891年に自然保護の一環として森林保護法を成立させ、森林保護区を設定することになるが、保護区確定とその保護政策をめぐって連邦政府の国家森林委員会（National Forest Committee）の中心的存在であったピンショとミューテアは対立する。ピンショの森林保護思想は、ヨーロッパで形成された持続的収益（sustainable yield）を生み出す森林管理という学術を継承し、木果伐採等経済開発を前提として、その利害保護のために森林を管理維持という新しい思想であった。後に森林経営学と称される所以である。それに対してアドバイザーとして委員会に参加していたミューテアの思想は、人間の個人的尊厳を最も高める場としての自然の保護であることから人間の絶対非介入を理想としていた。両方の思想は以降今日まで森林政策等での二大思想として受け継がれている。

こうした思想の対立は、以後多くのケースで見られるようになるが、すさまじ現れたのは次項で検討するヨセミテ国立公園内のヘッチ・ヘッチー渓谷でのダム建設問題であった。

初期のミューテアのウィルダネスへの憧憬を形成したのは、もちろん彼の気質やベースソーンへの思想的傾倒があったこととは事実であるが、それとともに伝記作家も指摘しているように、当時西部への憧憬を誘う旅行パンフレットの写真であったことも確かである。ミューテア自身が踏査隊の撮影した写真を見たか否かは定かではないが、写真がミューテアのウィルダネスへの傾倒を刺激したこととは事実であろう。またさらにミューテアの生き方や活動は徐々に今日でいう市民運動的な支持をアメリカ全土特に東海岸の人々から得ることになるが、そのような状況を東海岸の諸州で醸成した要因の一つに、紛れもなく踏査隊が撮影して東海岸に送られた写真があったことは否めない。このように、19世紀後半
19世紀後半のアメリカ写真と『米欧回覧実記』

国には、東海岸の諸州に住む人々にとって瀕然としたウィルダネスを保護しようとする市民運動的機運を高めていった要因の一つに、対象を具象化し美化した写真の存在があった。

III - 2 国立公園・国有林設立運動

アメリカの国立公園あるいは国有林は、第2節でみた鉱山開発・牧場化や治水工事、場合によっては鉄道の敷設によって自然が破壊されることに対する抵抗であるという環境保護の側面と、他方では、ウィルダネスを標榜する地域への鉄道敷設によって始めて原生の森すなわちウィルダネスの経済的価値が社会的に認識されるという経済的側面の妥協の上で展開されることという特徴がある。したがって鉄道敷設を伴わず、むしろ鉄道建設を積極的に誘致するという事例も見られる。この点は純粋の環境保護運動とは一線を画している。鉄道建設者には環境保全に気を配っていたわけではないが、ツーリズムを活発化させ、それによって旅客量を増やし、収益をあげようとしていたに他ならない。しかしツーリズムの活性化ということは、それによって開発という経済的動機を犠牲にして環境を保護することの強固な経済的動機を与えることになり、結果的には環境保護運動家（conservationist, preservationist）と当時において利害が一致したのである。その先例は先述したように、1871年頃から始まるフィラデルフィアの銀行家クック（Jay Cooke and Company）のノーザン・パシフィック鉄道建設拡張計画とイエローストーン国立公園化計画である。鉄道関係者は、ワイオミング北
西部の鉄道の敷設と国立公園の開園時期を合わせようとしていた。他方、イエローストーンの開発者であったランフィールド（Nathaniel Pitt Langford）も、イエローストーンの「驚異」に旅行者が「素早く近づける」ようにする直接的手段としてクックの提案を受け入れていたのである。こうした事例は他には例えば、ハリマン経営下のサザン・パシフィック鉄道は、ヨセミテ等カリフォルニアのハイ・シエラ地域の保護キャンペーンを行った。こうした環境保全活動で当該鉄道会社は数十年に渡って大きな利益を得ることになる。前述の踏査隊長キング等の写真によって東部にその存在が知られるようになったヨセミテであったが、以後の開発には鉄道会社の影響が強い、そうした商業活動に加えて、環境保護の立場からは前述したランドスケープ・デザイナーとしての先駆的存在であるオルムステッドや、自然保護の父と称されるミューアの活動があと存する。ミューアの活動によってヨセミテは1890年に国立公園に昇格するが、彼を中心とするシエラ・クラブの以後のさらなる活動によって、ヨセミテ渓谷を含む広範囲の国立公園化は1906年に完結する。アリゾナ州にあたるサンタフェ鉄道が、グランドキャニオンの保護運動を展開した。続いて1908年にはルーズベルト大統領によってグランドキャニオンが国家モニュメントとして宣言され、1919年には運動の結果、最終的にグランドキャニオンは議会によって国立公園に認定された。同様にモンタナ州のグレインサ国立公園設立運動はグレート・ノーザン鉄道のヒル（Louis Hill）によって、当該鉄道会社の「アメリカを最初に見よう（See America First）キャンペーンの一環として熱心に取り組まれ、1919年に国立公園となった。

むしろ自然保護の観点から直面した典型的な問題は、1908年にサンフランシスコ市がヨセミテ公園の中のヘッチ・ヘッチャー渓谷（Hitch Hitchy Valley）を禁止してダムを建設しようとした事例である。経緯は1906年にまで遡る。この年の4月にマグニチュード8.3の大地震がサンフランシスコを襲い火災が3日間続いた。しかしこれを鎮火させる水源が当該市にはなかった。そこでこれまでにも連邦政府に申請され却下され続けていたダム建設が再度議論になった。ダム建設推進者の主張は、当該ペリーは年に一度夏シーズンだけ数百人の「自然愛好家」がその景観を享受するために訪れているだけであるが、ダム建設によって75万人のサンフランシスコ市民が恩恵を享受できる、というものであった。上述したように、こうした経済的主張に対抗するためには、自然保護主義者も

38 Louis Hill は19世紀後半のアメリカ鉄道正として有名なJamesJ. Hill の息子である。
また経済的論理で対抗する必要性があり、ロビング活動にも強い鉄道建設者の実利的連合（practical alliance）を強めていったと考えられる。バイプラインやダムよりもホテルのほうが景観には「まし」だったのである。しかし結果的には自然保護派のミューアらの反対にもかかわらず、そしてミューアと知己のあったルーズベルト大統領が退任し、次のタフト政権下ではダム建設を食い止めたが、建設推進派のウィルソン大統領が就任するに及んで、1913年9月に建設法案が下院を通過し12月に上院を通過した。ダム建設推進派の勝利に終わった。この事件を切掛けに、自然保護運動家の間で、国立公園として護られている景観を保護しつつけることの意義を、多くの一般大衆に対して説得する必要性が痛感され、そのためのバブリシティ活動を行う必要性が改めて認識された。こうした国立公園設立・保護運動に関するバブリシティ活動に写真が多用されたことは想像に難くない。ヨセミテの場合には初期には踏査隊の撮影した写真が、観光開発が進んだ段階では、特に繰り返し使われた風景写真として「ヨセミテ公園のマリポサ、レッドウッド・グローブにあるワヴァナ・トンネル・ツリーを通過する馬車」30が有名である。これによって東部にはない西部のウィルダネスのイメージが東部の旅行客に一層伝えられていった。因みに、1915年にはサンタフェ鉄道とユニオン・パシフィック鉄道は合同で、サンフランシスコに至る直線路を建設した。
コ万博に、50万ドルをかけて国立公園に関する展示を行った。さらに、多くの写真を掲載し自然保護を主張したPR雑誌が、西部鉄道17社の掲出金4万3千ドルを基金として出版され、学者・政治家・商工会議所メンバー、新聞記者等27万5千人の人々に配布された。
また自然保護者は、サンフランシスコ市のような公共部門が新たに部局を設立して国立公園に対して新たな開発・管理行動を取ることの先手を打つべく、連邦国家の単一の機関によって国立公園を管理させるべく運動を展開し、1916年8月に国立公園局（National Park Service）の設立を議会に認めさせた。

III-3 娯楽の提供とその落し穴

さらに注目すべきは、当初、National Park Serviceを設立して国立公園を保全・管理しようとした際には予期していなかったような問題が発生することとなる。本節の最初に新たな課題について言及しておこう。20世紀に入りNational Park Serviceに対して二つの目的で公園を管理する義務を付与した1916年の法律の文言に新たな問題の源泉があった。二つの目的とは、自然を保護するという目的と、娯楽（enjoyment）を提供するという目的である。前者についてはそれまでの規制の流れから理解できるところであるが、後者の目的は観光会社あるいは前述のサンフランシスコ市の水源確保目的等、自然を別の目的により破壊する計画から景観破壊をくい止めるべく、一方で経済的な自然破壊よりも、自然を保護してそこから国民に娯楽を満喫してもらい、それを経済計算で換算し景観を別の経済性から保全するという考えを対等させると、打ちだされたのである。この娯楽を提供するという発想が、実は、National Park Service設立より今日まで、国立公園の社会的意義付けを変遷させることになるのである。以下該当箇所を引用しておこう。

The service thus established should promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations hereinafter specified by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purposes of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

40 因みに当該管理局の初代局長はマザー（Stephen Mather）であり、彼の1929年の死は国立公園への観光客の誘致によって国立公園の経済的存在意義を強調するという初期の保全政策の終わりを意味している。
問題は、例えば現代のヨセミテの状況と対比することによって明確になる。現代のヨセミテは、多くの観光客によって占拠され、毎日のようにロックコンサートが開かれている。おおよそ19世紀にウィルダネスとしてヨセミテが注目され始めた時には、あるいは、上記の法律が制定された時（20世紀初頭）には予期しなかった状況である。こうした当該国立公園の今日的な都会型のアミューズメント・パーク化は、結局は食い止めが出来なかったのであるが、その後、もはや“provide for the enjoyment”という文言であった。自然保護のために拝入した文言が、今日では公園保護の最大の障害あるいは破壊の最大要因になっているのである。このように、20世紀に入るとアメリカ国立公園の維持管理運動は、enjoyment概念が変容するにしても、当初の運動目的が大幅に修正されることを余儀なくされている42。

IV アメリカ現代国家の眼差し －在来文化の消去と取込み－

IV－1 地図作成の意義

地図の作成、特に近代社会における地図の作成には政治的意図あるいは利害調整の意味が込められていることが多い。さらに歴史を遡れば、黒田日出男氏も指摘のように、中世あるいは近世の日本においても、物理的正確性は保たれていないものの、それどころか一見牧歌的に象徴的風景や建造物をあしらった地図（絵図）が作成され、そこに社会的意義である村の境界線あるいは入会権の境界線、あるいは国境が描かれている。それはある意味で契約あるいは権力の均等関係を視覚化（visualization）する、あるいは当該地域を「支配するための基本図」であり、それを持つことによって（当該地域の）把握と支配が可能になるような「地学的にはベースマップ」という意義がある43。こうした解釈がアメリカの各種踏査・調査による鉄道発展用地図について言えるか否かを検討するのか第一の課題である。

さらに地図を持つの上の第二の問題として、未だ踏査隊の所属する国家の権力が完全には及んでいない、したがって当該国家の言語・文化を使って当該地域を掌握できていない地域に、踏査隊が送り込み測量し、地図作成上必要なネーミングを行い、それを地図に書きこみ、印刷し、当該国家の国民に配布することの意味である。

以上の二点を念頭に以下、議論を続ける。踏査隊の地図の典型として掲載し

42 Stanford E. Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855－1985の論説を参照。
43 黒田日出男,『姿としごさの中世史』,「第四部　畝園絵図は語る」, 平凡社, 1986年。引用は22頁。
た1850年代の地図を参照するとき、ある特徴に気付く。もちろん日本の中世における絵図とは異なり近代的な測量技法で作成されてはいるが、踏査された地域の特に山脈の描写が非常に鮮明であるのに対して、すでに既知の領域の山並みは精密な描写を受けていないという点である。踏査対象を描写したのであるから当たり前のことはあるが、こうした地図の意義には、国家権力が十分には及んでいなかった地域の明確化・権力内への取り込みを宣言するという意義

第5図 アイオワ観光鉄道地図
にある。さらにそれらは、未知の土地に英語によるネーミングをし、地図に刷り出すことによって完結する。すでに既知のアイオワの鉄道周辺を描いた地図とは明らかにその趣旨が異なることが分かる。アイオワの鉄道地図は、周辺のすでに既存のアミューズメントを絵画化しながら挿入し列挙して、鉄道の観光利用を促す目的で作成されている。それに対して極西部からの販売あるいは戦争終結でアメリカ合衆国の領土（テリトリー）となったが、その詳細が知られていなかった未だ、未だその本来の意味ではテリトリーではなかった。白人の西進を拒むインディアンあるいは大自然の存在等が、テリトリーとしての宣言を拒んでいるのである。そうした領域の詳細を視覚化して地図に刷り出すこととは、インディアンや大自然の問題（障害）をクリアしづつあることの宣言となっており、近代国家アメリカの眼差しが、西部のウィルダネスにも届いたことを意味するのである。

Ⅳ－２ 写真撮影の意義

先にトラクテラの主張を参照しながら触れたように、アメリカ合衆国という新興国家が、未だ完全には国家権力が及んでいない地域に、踏查隊を派遣して、地質を調べ、地図をつくり、見知らぬ風光明媚な土地に先住民族がより先に付着していた名前とは異なった名前を付け、そして最終的には新たな科学的手段である写真を利用し、撮影された映像を東部に送り雑誌等で刊行・公開するという行為の意義こそが、地図作成と相まって、問題で我々が注目するよう指摘した当該時代の写真情報公開の基本的な第四の要因である。そこで本項では、こうした意義を具体的に解釈しておこう。

鉄道建設という具体的・直接的な経済課題の下に、写真家が、北アメリカ大陸を縦横に写真撮影して回ったのであるが、そうして撮影された映像を、資本主義的生産様式がある程度確立して余剰所得を持ち、西部のウィルダネスに対する憧憬にも燃えた感情を持ち、そしてアメリカ人としてのアイデンティティ追求に目覚めつつあった東部の人々が、「大量消費」することになった。そのことは意識・無意識は別にして、全く異なる意義を持つことになる。写真家自身の、あるいは写真家から映像を入手して出版する編集者の直接的意図は、東部のヨーロッパ移民に分かりやすいような形で、西部の自然を紹介することにあったかもしれない。したがって、撮影された写真に対して分かりやすい英

41熊本学園大学の酒巻政彰教授の主張であるが、こうした地図の意義は会計にもある。会計手続き上、あるが経費が欄卸減損をある金額計上したということは、単にそれだけ欄卸品が物的に減耗していることを示しているのではない。そうした欄卸品の管理責任者が自らの管理責任の度合いをその程度であると公表してもよいとして認めたこと、すなわち組織内での権限関係の均衡結果を示していることになる。地図による権力関係の落ち着きを機能に類似していると思われる。
語彙のキャプション（見出し）をつけて投稿・掲載することになる。このことが多くあるアメリカ大陸の風景について、何度も繰り返し考えることによって、もともとは原住民たるインディアン由来の名が冠せられていた風景に、英語のスペリングが与えられたり、ヨーロッパの名前と意味が再付与され定着化されることになる。被写体である現実の西部の山や河をみたことのない東部住人にとって、それは素晴らしい。ヨーロッパにない、わが祖国「アメリカ」の荒々しい原風景（wilderness）となって、脳裏に焼き付けられることになる。以下に掲載された写真を参照されたい。

当該写真には「3人兄弟」とキャプションが付されている。その荒々しさから姉妹（sisters）ではなく兄弟（brothers）と冠されたと思われるが、当時すでにインディアンの名前が付されていたことは容易に想像がつく。しかしインディアンの痕跡はこの写真からは微塵も見えない。またキャプションにも登場しない。東部アメリカ人はこうしたキャプション付きの写真を数多く無意識に見せられたことになる。こうした写真作業が、インディアンに対する連邦政府対策に影響を及ぼしたり、支持する根拠になっていった。一見綺麗な西部のウ

第6図 Three Brothersの写真（Carleton Watkins 1866年頃）

45 こうしたパターンの後追い命名作業はアメリカに限ったことではない。オーストラリアにも「four sisters」という連山がある。
19世紀後半のアメリカ写真と『米欧回覧実記』

19世紀後半のアメリカにおいてインディアンを排排斥する多くの戦闘が繰り返された時期であることとは周知のことであり、それとともに、インディアンに対して「文化変容の強制」を行った。具体的に利用された手段は、西洋人によってそれまでに使われて来た手段であり、「キリスト教化」と「私有財産制化」であった。多くの牧師・宣教師がインディアン居留区に派遣されている。またインディアン居留地区と鉄道敷設の関係から、強制退廃を迫られた部族は呼応が見られない、しかしこうした手段、特にキリスト教化は、西洋において近代市民社会が確立する以前から植民地政策として用いられていたからこそ戦略でしかなかった。それに対して対して、自然保護運動あるいは国立公園設立運動という市民運動の先駆けの運動は、同じ政府政策課題をより洗練された形で遂行することを可能にしたと考えられる。すなわち、キリスト教化に代わる近代的市民運動理念の高揚、土地の私有化に代わる「国立公園化」「国有林化」による国際化が、現出されることになる。

そこには、ウィルダネスの写真の変遷、異文化（インディアン文化）を排斥すると同時に取り込むうとする思想的努力がなされた跡を追うことができるのである。それは例えば、国立公園設立運動の頃にみたヨセミテ公園の写真や見ることができよう。当初、我々が上で見てきたようなヨセミテ自然を歴史・文化・自然保護写真が用いられ、東部にも送付されていたと思われるが、やがてヨセミテ公園にインディアンのテントと女性インディアン等比較的和順な情景を撮り込んだ写真が用いられるようになる。自然環境保護に加えてインディアンとの共存を想定させる写真である。しかしこれは、アメリカ的なウィルダネスとそれを保護する環境保護運動・国立公園設立運動の中の一環を担われたインディアンではない。かつてアメリカ人の西進に立ち塞がったヨーロッパ・アメリカ文化の外のインディアンではなく、東部アメリカ人のアメリカ・アイデンティティを形成する西部ウィルダネスの構成物と化したインディアンの姿である。このことは、来米文化の消去からさらに進んで取り込み(co-optation)、有和化へと写真作業が進展していることを顕わせる。こうした写真の意味は、当時の写真家が意識して付与した意味とは言えない。しかし、意識の上で主体

46 W.T. ヘーガン著、西村願男・野田研一・島川雅史訳『アメリカ・インディアン史』、北海道大学図書刊行会、1983年、第五章「文化変容の強制」を参照。
的に行う行為の意味と、結果生ずる制度的影響とは、必ずしも対応するものではない\(^{48}\)。

第7図

２枚のインディアンの写真（1）

２枚のインディアンの写真（2）

インディアン問題はそこから離れているほど、問題に対する現実感の欠如からインディアンに対して実は同情的であったとされる49。したがって西部よりも東部の人物がインディアンに対して同情的であった、あるいは温情的政策を支持したとされる。このことは逆説すれば、東部の人物はメディアを通じた情報のみによってその態度が左右されやすいことを意味している。そこに東部での写真の公開が意味を持ってくることになる。

さらに20世紀になると、環境保護運動あるいは国立公園運動に、そうした在来文化の視角は完全に消滅して、アメリカの自然管理に対する二つの視角が対立する現代的環境問題へと変質してしまう。

本節では、19世紀後半にアメリカで組織された西部探査団が残した写真の意義について考察を加えてきた。重層にも重なった動機から写真が利用されてきた経緯について指摘してきた。第2節では19世紀のアメリカ経済の拡張歴である鉄道建設の西を問題で、それを国家がサポートするにあたり、あるいは鉄道会社自身が開発を誇示する目的から北アメリカ大陸の風景写真の撮影が、行われてきた。また第3節では、こうした鉄道の西を問題と拮抗して、自然が開発によって荒廃させるという危機意識から、そして経済的盈余の発生によってヨーロッパの余暇意識も手伝って、自然環境に対する意識が高まったことを指摘し、それが東部の大衆をして、自然特にウィルダネスの写真を大量消費する写真の消費大衆へと変質させたのであった。

またさらに重層にも重なった目的で利用された写真はあるが、ある共通の要因すなわちアメリカという比較的新しい国家権力の発現過程の中で写真が利用されている状況が認められた。この点は時間に関わって、筆者の今一つの研究領域であるアメリカ会計情報公開史の中での近代国家の権力発現過程と漂を一にしている。すなわち19世紀後半は一方では私的資本の集中形態である株式会社制度が、許認可制から登記制に変わり、また有限責任制が大きく注目されることによって、発展していく時期である。典型的には他国に類を見ない巨大な株式会社としての鉄道会社が多く出現していく時期である。こうした私的株式会社たる鉄道会社が農民を始めとする一般市民の生活に大きな影響力を行使することになり、ややもするとその影響力は負の効果を有していた。その負の影響を払拭すべく、当初は州政府がやがて連邦政府が株式会社に制限を試み始めるのが19世紀後半である。州政府あるいは連邦政府が次第に大きな権力を握始めて、私的株式会社に挑戦するという構図である。その挑戦の過程で連邦政府の権力が私的株式会社の権力を越え始める象徴が、20世紀初頭のモルガン（J. P. Morgan）に対ルーズベルト（T. Roosevelt）の争い、そして独占禁止法の制定・改定である。こうした過程で、民主主義を標榜するアメリカ社会では

49 上掲書、第5章と同じく参照。
岩倉具視使節団とアメリカ写真

V－1 岩倉使節団の記録としての『米欧回覧実記』

前節までに19世紀後半のアメリカ写真情報公開が視覚的説明として多様な制度を育みつつ、他民族の文化を消去する働きを有していたことを検討した。本節では、同様の写真が日本のアメリカ理解を規定した可能性について指摘したい。

実は1872年の1月から2月にかけて、日本の特命全権大使岩倉具視使節団が北アメリカ大陸を、1869年に完成したばかりの大陸横断鉄道を利用して横断しており、その際にわかれが前節までに問題にしたような写真あるいはそれから作成された木版画等を日本に持ち帰った可能性があるのである。すなわち岩倉使節団一行の米欧視察旅行の報告書が、後に久米邦武によって編集され、『特命全権大使 米欧回覧実記』として大政官記録類から明治11年10月に刊行され、博聞社から販売されるが、その中に数多くの銅版画が挿入されており。その銅版画の原版イメージにアメリカの写真が直接・間接に利用された可能性があるのである。もしこうしたことが確認できるならば、当該時代におけるアメリカの写真は、日本にまでその文化的観察を及ぼしていたことになり、久米邦武というフィルターを通して、日本にアメリカ的思考を導入することになったと考えられるのである。さらにいえば、こうした諸外国の観象をみること

50 展開開覧県直後に政府の威信を高めるべく、右大臣岩倉具視を特命全権大使とし、木戸孝允・大久保利通等を副使とする米欧使節団一行が横浜を出港したのが明治4（1871）年11月12日のことである。岩倉使節団の明治史における意義については、本稿では議論しない。もちろん筆者の専門外であるからに他ならない。さああたり脚注4で指摘する文献の第1巻に収められた、田中彰、『解説 岩倉使節団と『米欧回覧実記』』を参照。

51 本稿が参考にしたのは、以下4特典である。久米邦武編。田中彰校注。「特命全権大使米欧回覧実記」、岩波文庫。1977年。

52 久米美術館編。「特命全権大使『米欧回覧実記』銅版画集」(昭和60年10月)。
19世紀後半のアメリカ写真と『米欧回覧実記』

によって、近代国家への展開期の日本人であることを意識したといえよう。

明治4年（1871年）11月、後年日本政治の中心的人物となる伊藤博文、久保利通、本庄孝允、岩倉具視らは、米欧12カ国視察の旅に出発している。まず横浜を出発し、サンフランシスコに上陸し、北アメリカ大陸を横断し、ヨーロッパに渡り、イギリス、フランス、ベルギー、オランダ、ドイツ、ロシア、デンマーク、スウェーデン、イタリア、オーストリア、スイスの12カ国を歴訪し、その後地中海へ向って、アラビア、インドそして中国を経由して、1年10ヶ月後の明治6年（1873年）9月に日本に帰ってきている。その間の一行の記録が、久米邦武によって編まれ、明治11年に太政官から刊行されている。全100巻5冊の『特命全権大使 米欧回覧実記』である。初版は500部で、後に増刷がなされ、計3500部が世に出たことになる。当時はとしては、ベストセラーであっ

たといえよう。

わわれるのはアメリカ写真情報公開研究との関連で関心を引くのは、『実記』に掲載されている図版である。図版のうち風景等の銅版画は、「文明諸国ノ一覧ノ圖人間観覧セメン」、という意図から、銅版図が回覧に際して現地で購入した写生画を模したり、なかには銅版画をそのまま復刻したものもあった」とされる。分けてもわわれるのは、岩倉具視一行がサンフランシスコに到着して、汽船でソルトレイク・シティまで行き、さらにはロッキー山脈を越えるその道中の風景画である。「第5巻 加利福尼（カリフォルニア）州鉄道ノ記」と「第6巻 尼崎市（ネヴァダ）州及に「ユタ」部」に計11枚の銅版画が掲載されている。これらを含めて『実記』に出てくる多くの銅版画は、実質的にアメリカを始め各国各地域が日本に図像的に紹介された最初の文献ではないと考えられるのである。したがって、以後日本の当該地域あるいは文化理解にとって大きな影響力を有していたと考えられる。特に、上に挙げた

53 個末期に西洋式の高度な活版印刷技術が日本に伝えられ、急激に和装本は洋装本に取って代わられた。明治中期には年間数千冊の本が出版されるようになった。ドイツに『実記』は明朝文字の基礎を作った本書の著者作成した活字で印刷されている。

54 『米欧回覧実記』岩波書店、解説、407-408頁。

55 万延元年（1890年）、裁縫の批准書発行のついに、新見徳昌、戸船舟、福沢諭吉らを構成員とする派遣使節団が、アメリカ艦船ホーネット号で合衆国に使い出た。個末期の当該使節団は、能楽が持ち込んだこと等をもって各使節団として、岩倉使節団よりも歴史上有名かもしれない。その際に当該使節団に随行した小倉忠順の従者の一人が記録した日誌『東亜輔相紀行』が残っている。正式に出版されてはおらず、その著作としての影響力は『実記』の比ではない。また万延派遣団が持ち帰った1880年版アメリカ年鑑が『実記』比以上に、広く読まれた、紹介したとも思えない。

さらに個末期には幕府以外もいくらかの藩が、欧米に使節団を派遣しているが、成果の印刷物として出版されているものは皆無に近い。福沢諭吉も1860年のアメリカ視察等を基礎に、アメリカについて文章を残している。『西洋事情』『世界国』である。しかもこれらは、後米邦武が米欧に出発する前に出版されている。しかし筆者が本稿で直接検証の対象としているインディアンについては、『西洋事情』に数行の言及がある程度である。さらに当時の日本の西洋に関する知識の程度については以下の文献が参考になる。関西日本府記念文化事業会編、『明治時代日本人の海外知識—世界地理・西洋史に関する文献編集』原書房、昭和53年、沼田次郎・松沢弘陽編、『西洋見聞集』日本思想家会66、岩波書店、1974年。
地域の図版は、以後そのイメージが頻繁に日本で改定されるほど注目すべき地域ではなく、まさに荒野（wilderness）だからである。それでは、なぜわれわれの研究分野の延長線上に「米欧回覧実記」のそうした銅版画が位置づけられるかといえば、岩倉使節団一行がセントラル・パシフィック鉄道を利用してソルトレイク・シティを経過するのは1871年から1872年にかけてであることがその理由である。詳細に言うならば、前節で指摘したように、1867年から1879年まで大調査隊（Great Surveys）と称される4つの調査隊が当該地域に分け入り、地質調査を行うとともに多くの写真を残していること、また1869年5月に当該鉄道会社がユタ州プロモントリーで最初の大陸横断鉄道を連携・完成させてから僅か3年後のことだということ、従って、当時その領域の写真が大量に当該鉄道会社雇用の写真家によって撮影され残されているということ、ゆえに、それらの写真が何らかの手段で直接間接に岩倉使節団一行によって日本に持ち帰り、日本のアメリカ紹介に利用されたのではないかという認識からである。すなわち、ハーンポルト河領域は、同時期に、複数の西部調査隊が調査に入った時期に相当しているとともに、かつセントラル・パシフィック鉄道の拠点地域として多くの写真が鉄道会社によって撮影されているという意味で、いずれかあるいは双方の写真が何らかの手段で岩倉使節団一行によって持ち帰られた可能性があると考えているのである。いずれにしても、これは北アメリカ大陸で写真情報公開によって推し進められていた文化的観察行為が、期せずして視覚的言説する写真が、日本にまで及んでアメリカに関する日本的言説を発生させることになるのである。

われわれは写真が『実記』に掲載されている可能性があることを思考した。しかしこういうまでもなく、普通毎に写真を印刷できるようになる技術であるハーフトーン印刷技術が世界で始めて発明されるのが1881年であることから、もちろん写真の構図が『実記』への挿入銅版画に参照されたという意味であるが、それとても実は定かではない。すなわち、久米邦武が参照したオリジナル・イメージもアメリカの手になる絵画である可能性が残るからである。しかし、例えばインディアンの銅版画がその疑問に答えてくれる。すなわち、インディアンの銅版画を見ると、描かれているインディアンの眼差しが、見るものの方に一点に集中して向いている。このことはオリジナルのイメージが、写真であることを物語っている。またインディアンのテントの背後に木枠が書き込まれているが、絵画デッサンであるならば必ずしも必要でないとと思われる。オリジナルの写真イメージに写しこまれていたものを省略することなく書き出したと思われる。

こうした類推から結論すると、西部調査隊の写真家として写真を供給できた可能性があるのはワトキンスである。それに対して、鉄道会社雇用の写真家で、撮影した写真が岩倉一行に持ち帰られる時期の可能性の高い写真家は、ハートである。そこで上記したセントラル・パシフィック鉄道写真博物館（Web）の
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ハート／ワトキンス・コレクション（Hart/Watkins Collection）の写真を視察することによって、我々は『実記』に掲載されている銅版画のオリジナル・イメージと思われる写真を探す作業を行った。

昭和60年以後の日本での研究の進展は明らかではないが、久米美術館編、『特命全権大使『米欧回観実記』銅版画集』（昭和60年10月）掲載のデータで、『実記』銅版画のオリジナル・イメージが見出されているか否かを確認した。当該データによれば、『実記』に掲載されている銅版画のオリジナル・イメージが判明しているものは1割程度でしかない。しかも我々が関心を寄せているカリフォルニア州からネバダ州を通るアメリカの鉄道沿線の銅版画は、そのオリジナル・イメージは最終確定できていないことがわかる55。その意味は、オリジナル・イメージの数枚が、久米美術館編、『新訂版久米邦武』（平成9年1月）55頁に掲載されているように、第5、6巻の銅版画については、部分的にはセントラル・パシフィック鉄道の旅行者用地図（traveler’s map）の絵画であるとまでは確定されているが、それら旅行者用地図の絵画をさらにオリジナル・イメージが存在するか否かはこれまで明らかではなかった、ということである。まず、岩倉使節団一行が持ち帰ったセントラル・パシフィック鉄道の旅行者用地図は前述したハートによってデザイン・出版されていることがCPRR（Central Pacific Railroad）写真データベースから判明する（第8図及び第9図を参照）。

第8図：岩倉一行が持ち帰った同地図

[図説]

55 しかも、久米邦武によって持ち帰られた地図は、その周辺を取り囲む絵画が数枚切り取られているが、その完全な形も確認できた。
このオリジナルの地図と久米邦武の持ち帰った地図との比較から、岩倉使節団一一行の持ち帰り地図では欠けていた幾枚かの絵がまず確定できるが、しかもさらに CPRR 写真データベースからは、旅行者用地図の周りを装飾している絵画のすべてが確認できるとともに、そのオリジナルが、ハートの写真であることも指摘されている。そこでこうしたデータで判明する限りで、ハートの写真とオリジナル地図絵画の対応を示しておこう。

第10図で引用した写真は CPRR 写真データベースから転用したものであり、説明文は地図絵の位置を示し、データベース番号は CPRR 写真データベース番号を示している。第10図では、『実記』の中に転用されている絵図と写真の対応は省略している。このことから、地図に使われた木版画（線画）は、ハート自身によって1860年代に撮影された写真イメージが少なくとも部分的には下絵になっていたことは明らかである。さらにいうならば、先に我々も触れた

57 久米邦武が持ち帰った図版と、CPRR の Web サイトの図版を比べると、含まれている図版は同一であると思われる。しかし、掲載位置が異なっているものが数枚確認できる。ハートの旅行者用地図は、いくつかのバージョンがあったことが指摘されていることから、掲載位置の移動は納得できる。  
58 ただし、地図絵すべての写真ネガが確定できたわけではなく、すべての絵がハートの写真を基礎としているとはいえない。また当時セントラル・パシフィック鉄道にはハート以外にも、アングレン、カルパット、ガードナー、ジャクソン、ワトキンス、ライリー、シルビス、サージョンらが撮影した写真が残っているからである。
第10図 旅行者地図（オリジナル）とセントラル・パシフィック鉄道写真の対応

左横上から2番目と対応（ネガ番号340）

下から2段目右から3番目（ネガ番号299）

最下段左から5番目（ネガ番号211）

下から2段目右から5番目（ネガ番号252）
ように下絵となった写真イメージは、主としてハートによってステレオ写真として撮影されたものであることも明らかである。当時ステレオ写真は、通常のカメラよりも横に2倍大きな2つのレンズを持ったカメラで風景を微妙にずらせて2枚同時に撮影し、同様に2つのレンズが組み込まれた観客箱（ステレオ・ヴューアー）を通して2枚のフィルムを同時に見ることによって、立体的に風景を楽しむことができた。そして旅行者用地図に添付された絵画は、そのうちの片側をイメージとして利用しているのである。こうした写真が見世物としても当時人気があったことは、第11図の広告から知ることができよう。

『実記』の銅版画のうちの数枚は、オリジナル写真のアメリカにおける旅行者用地図への木版画複写のさらなる銅版画複写ということになる。写真の日本への紹介は間接的であったといえよう。

『実記』の銅版画のオリジナル・イメージは、ネヴァダ州及びユタ部の写真を基礎にしていることは明らかであるが、その一部は、ハートら鉄道会社に
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雇われた写真家によって撮影されたものであることが確定できたと考える。しかも、踏査隊に関与した写真家（ワトキンス）の名前で発表されたものであったが、その実は鉄道会社の写真家（ハートら）による写真であったことも第Ⅱ節で明らかにした。

V-2 『実記』への図像選択の意図

それでは、次にどうして上で見たような図像が久米邦武によって選択されたのであろうか。この課題に答えることは、アメリカで作成された図像が、日本で公開されたとき、アメリカとは異なる意味を持ちうる可能性が指摘できることにも通じる。そのことを念頭において、『実記』の第5章、第6章に掲載されている鉄道に関する銅版画の選択を検討するとき、岩倉使節団一行というよりも、久米邦武の判断によって、鉄道技術の紹介を主眼として第5章のイメージが採用されたと主張しように。それは『実記』の編者久米邦武が、自らの主観的記述と客観的知識紹介を斬新しているというこれまでの研究の指摘からも言える。すなわち久米は、『実記』の中で、米国の技術や社会システムの記述を詳細に行っているが、その際、自らの主観的論評と解説を斬新する傾向にあり、技術的解説はその裏付けとなる図像を利用したと考えられる。さらにそれを立証する証拠として、ハートの写真としては芸術的に最もよくできた風景写真の一枚がセントラル・パシフィック鉄道の旅行者地図絵画にも転載されているが、『実記』には当該イメージが採用されていない。事実を挙げることができよう（第10図の左上の写真）。むしろ写真という観点からは必ずしも良質ではないイメージが、『実記』第5章には採用されているのである。そもそも、岩倉使節団一行が持ち帰った旅行者地図は、半ば観光者向けに沿線の西部的風景を紹介するべく作成された地図であると考えられる。したがってそうした選考基準から地図添付イメージもまたアメリカでは選択されていないと考えられるが、久米は、その数枚をアメリカの鉄道・土木技術の水準を示す科学技術のデータとして転載していると理解できる。

具体的に見るとならば、まず、山肌を掘削して敷設したと思われる線路のイメージ、「ブローメル」の塗装（「若波文庫」119頁下段）、雪覆い（スノーセット）の内部と外部のイメージ「雪覆ヒノ内景」「シルルラ、ネヴァダ」山鉄道雪覆ヒ（「若波文庫」127頁上段・下段）は、そのオリジナルであるハートの写真撮影動機も、彼が撮影した写真の前後のネガの光景を合わせて判断したとき、工事記録用に撮影したと思われる。当該イメージに対応するハートの写真は写真データベースから見出せることができたが、久米の旅行者地図には切られ

50 田中彰、『解説 岩倉使節団と『米欧回覧実記』』を参照。
第12図 『米欧回顧実記』掲載銅版画（左）とセントラル・パシフィック鉄道
写真（右）の対応

データベース・ネガ番号？

データベース・ネガ番号338
山地 秀俊
たか時刻表のために対応絵が確認できないものもある。雪撚車はネガ番号338のものか、旅行者用地図の絵には対応するが、『実記』に掲載された雪撚車の絵に対応するネガを見出すことはできなかった。しかし同種の雪撚車であることは確認できる。

トンネルのイメージは特に注目する必要がある（『岩波文庫』128頁上段）。スミット隧道（トンネル）（Summit Tunnel）のイメージは、久米が当該隧道の意義を知らなければ掲載されなかったイメージであると考えられる。掲載された隧道の岩盤、そして落石を防ぐための防護柵の敷設、さらには舗装鉄道が路線の脇に積み上げられている様子までが描かれている。このイメージも明らかに写生によるイメージではなく、写真から作成したイメージであることがわかる。当該隧道は、ルイス・クレメント（Lewis Clement）によって設計され、中国人労働者によって掘削された。当時としては工学の最高技術を用いた工事であった。その工事過程を再現するようなイメージである。また当該隧道の完
成によって大陸横断鉄道の完成が可能であったことを考えるとモニュメント的な階級で、その紹介を兼ねている。木口、岩倉使節団一行には、鉄道でソルトレイク・シティへ行く途中に、スミット階級の掘削工事あるいは、プロモントリーで大陸横断鉄道が完成を見たこと等の知識が、アメリカの側から伝えられたと思われる

それに対して、第6章のユタ部周辺の4枚のイメージは、異国の雰囲気を伝えるとともに、アマチュアの要素が含まれたイメージである。セントラル・パシフィック鉄道沿線のハンポールド荒野のインディアンのイメージ、「ハノーパールド」荒野の土著住居」、ハンポールド河谷スカーダ川のイメージ、ソルトレイク・シティ府庁前のイメージ、モルモン教寺院のイメージ（いずれも岩波文庫142-143頁）は、当時の日本の読者にとって感嘆を禁じえない図像であろう。当該イメージのオリジナル写真は現在までのところ見出せることができなかった。しかし、描かれたインディアンと類似したインディアンの集団が写された真実を（ネガ番号382v6）、モルモン教寺院が写った写真（ネガ番号 silvis-scl-tabernacle）を出することは容易である。ただしハートの写真ではない。インディアンやモルモン教寺院あるいはソルトレイク・シティに関して、日本への図像つきの紹介としてはもっとも初期に属するのではないだろうか。

ハンポールド河沿岸を走るセントラル・パシフィック鉄道沿線には、インディアンが多数生活していたようであり、久米も「実記」の中で詳細にインディアンについて記している。その名称のいわゆる、住居の形態、当該地のインディアンの置かれている社会・政治的状況も書かれている。当該地域を列車で過ぎるに際して、「文明開化ノ地ヲス、此地ヲ古来モノヲス、御射ヲ胎内でノネヲ感ヲ増コトモシ」（文庫131頁）。しかし「此辺スヘインディアンノ郎中ノ虛隠ヲシ、近年ニ至リ米人ヲテヲ奪ハシユヘニ、士人ミナ怨恨シ、今ノ報復セントスルノ心ヲハシ、鉄道ノ初テ成リシ頃ハ、土人ヲ集シテ、之ヲ粉砕シ、或ハ大石ヲ圧シ、種々ニ妨害ヲシ、怒レハ毎矢ヲ挙メ、行旅ヲ射ルニ至リ」（131-132頁）というように、当時のアメリカ国家のインディアン政策と成果の対応についても詳細である。因みにハートの撮影した写真ネガ、あるいはそれ以外にも CPRR に雇用されていた写真家が残したネガには、沿線に住む多くのインディアン像が写し込まれている。しかし、必ずしも久米によって選択されたイメージのようなインディアン写真ではなく、民族衣装で正装したイメージも数多く残されている。

久米によって選択された図像とこうした久米の記述が一緒になると、当時の日本人のインディアン理解を規定してしまった可能性がある。まさに言説とな

① 業務で作った会社として「カットリー」太平会社の名前が見られるが（岩波文庫120頁）、セントラル・パシフィック鉄道（Central Pacific Railroad）のことではないかと推察される。
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っている。それも本来アメリカで作成された写真という視覚的言説が、日本に持ち帰られ、異なるコンテクストで公開されることによって、異なる言説と化している①。

勿論、久米邦武自身に対して及ばされたアメリカの映像や文化の影響は大である。「アメリカでの最初の二か月間に、久米はサンフランシスコからニューヨークに向けて大陸横断を果たしているが、その過程で久米の受ける衝撃は、それまでの思想を全面的に改めるに十分であったようだ。具体的にいうならば、久米は様々な人種を統合するためにアメリカ政府が行ってきた同化政策―衣服の同化、食事の同化、身体の同化、思想の同化など一に深い興味を示し、こうした文化的同化政策を通じて、今後日本が中央集権的に国民国家形成を進めていくことが十分可能になるとの結論に達していったと思うわれる②。このことは前述のインディアンに関する記述からは微妙に食い違う。もし一般的の日本人にアメリカのインディアン同化政策を説明するならば、掲載されたような絵を用いることはなかったであろう。しかし、説明的言説とそれ以外の多くの図像と実体験によって総合的に影響された久米には、上記のような影響があったと考えられる。すなわち、選択され、『実記』に掲載され一般の日本人に公開された図像の意味と、アメリカで久米邦武が実際の体験と図像から受けた影響の意味は別のものなのである。

VI 結 語 — 写真と文化的制圧 —

岩倉使節団によって日本に持ち込まれたアメリカに関する図像は、二重の意味を有している言説である。一つは、アメリカの当該地域や風物に関するイメージを日本人に植えつける役目を果たしている。それは多くの可能性のあるイメージからの選択である以上、他のイメージから受ける情報は削除していることになる。今一つは、久米邦武をはじめとする岩倉使節団構成員に与えた影響を考慮する必要がある。それは、明治期の一般的の日本人に与えた影響とは異なり、近代国家日本の形成に影響した可能性がある。しかし「実記」のオリジナル画像を確定することを主眼とした本稿では、この点の考察を十分に行っていない。

① 第三節の議論のように、アメリカでは、インディアンの図像は、その年代とともに当初はウィルダネスを象徴するものであったが、20世紀への転換期に近づくにつれて、西部を観光地としてみせたり、インディアン政策が弱弱に近づいたことを示唆するものでありだった。日本のイメージとはかなり異なる意味を有していた。

② 杉崎隆夫、研究実績報告（立命館大学文学部）、「久米邦武の思想形成における海外体験の影響」より引用。
写真という情報伝達手段に絡まる偶然性と、情報を選択する個人の偶然性によって、情報が表象する対象の理解が大きく変わる可能性がある。

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Chapter 10

The Tricentennial Celebration of Tokyo: Inventing the Modern Memory of Edo

Jason G. Karlin

Throughout the Meiji period, former bakufu retainers (徳川家) resentful of the denigration of the Tokugawa legacy played a central role in opposing the Meiji state through the memorialization and preservation of the cultural memory of the Edo period. The emergence of this oppositional memory was born from the desire to reclaim the past from the ruins of history. Their commemorative activities during the Meiji period sparked a longing for the past that was reflected in the pervasive nostalgia for the tastes and styles of the Edo period (江戸趣味). The Edo period lent itself to the invention of tradition since its history could be easily mobilized into a populist symbol of the nation.1 By increasing awareness of the disappearance of the cultural practices of the past, they gave a new visibility to the experience of everyday life.

The recent interest in everyday life as a category of analysis has arisen from the understanding that modernity disrupts everyday practice by relativizing and demystifying the “taken-for-granted” reality of everyday existence. Scholars such as Agnes Heller see everyday life as the site of potentially humanistic and democratic change.2 Similarly, Henri Lefebvre argues

1. The invention of Edo was the product of two mutually reinforcing ideas. The first defined Edo as a temporal category which corresponded to the period of the Tokugawa bakufu. According to this definition, Edo was the history of Japan prior to the invasion of Western culture. The invention of sakoku was the sine qua non for constructing Edo as the origin of an indigenous national culture. The other defined Edo as a spatial category conforming to the geographical boundaries of Edo proper, which differentiated the distinct customs and manners of Edo from the provincialism of rural Japan. The spatial definition of Edo was contested between the social practices of the samurai class centered on the Yamanote and the commoners (町人) of the Shitamachi.

that everyday life is the plane of cultural revolution where the individual may overcome the alienation, estrangement, and meaninglessness of modern life to discover the potential for radical change and subjectivity.\(^3\) Michel de Certeau invests everyday life with a creative potential that disrupts and reappropriates forms of domination and control.\(^4\) Together these perspectives all share a positive productive view of everyday life as the privileged space of resistance to the dominant cultural economy. Ultimately, this turn towards everyday life is an attempt to locate an authentic level of reality amid the uncertainty of modern identity. Its utopian impulse is suggested by its redemptive potential to redefine the cultural reality that constitutes the structures of power within society.

The invention of Edo shared this utopian impulse to rescue history from the oblivion of modern change and to make everyday life visible for its appreciation. By making the appurtenances and practices of everyday life into objects of contemplation, the distinctiveness of everyday life could be appreciated as an expression of an authentic culture. No longer lost amid the repetition of life’s daily routine, the culture of everyday life became the object of observation, preservation, and appreciation. As former bakufu retainers promoted the congruity of everyday life and national culture, those habits and customs which were once perceived as obstacles to modernization were redefined as objects of inspiration and longing. As such, everyday life became the site of resistance to the Meiji government’s program of civilization and enlightenment, and remembering became a way of defying official narratives of the past. Edo culture’s appearance as a sign of difference from the modern was thus an ineluctable consequence of its construction as a site of opposition.\(^5\) In this way, former bakufu retainers and other critics of the Meiji state invented the aesthetic of everyday life as a cultural tradition to reinforce a shared sense of national identity.

Recently historians have begun to explore the connection between nationalism and celebration by emphasizing the role of commemoration and public ceremonials in the construction of national identity. Celebrations are not only occasions for the simultaneous imagining of the nation, but social events for inventing the past and fashioning national memory. The ceremonies, commemorations, and monuments through which national memory has been elaborated in modern Japan share the purpose of creating a sense of historical continuity amid the contingency and uncertainty of the mod-


ern age. The fabrication of imperial ceremonies and state rituals during the Meiji period was driven by the need to break with the past, and to create a sense of distance between the new imperial regime and the old Tokugawa shogunate. However, as John R. Gillis notes, “modern memory was born not just from the sense of a break with the past, but from an intense awareness of the conflicting representations of the past and the effort of each group to make its version the basis of national identity.” While the Meiji state was active in promoting commemorative activities which would enable the people to experience communion with their emperor, commemorations were also invented to express the memories and experiences of those who shared a different conception of the nation and its history. These activities were born of a commemorative vigilance necessitated by the creation of an official history that consigned the Tokugawa era to the failures and weaknesses of the past.

Official historical scholarship in the early Meiji period celebrated the achievements of the Restoration while denouncing the tyranny of bakufu rule. Japanese scholars of the history of civilization (文明史) such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, who found inspiration in the positivism of Buckle and Guizot, viewed the Restoration as an inevitable consequence of the natural growth of progress and deplored the 250 years of Tokugawa rule as the “depths of stagnation.” In 1884, the historian Fujita Mokichi criticized the bakufu for its suppression of Christianity and Western learning, and lamented the harshness of the bakufu’s policy of national isolation (鎖国). Unlike other bunmeishi historians who wrote in sweeping gestures of the tyranny of the Tokugawa period, Fujita wrote specifically of the suppression of Watanabe Kazan (1793-1841) and Takano Choei (1804-1850) who espoused Western learning and criticized the bakufu’s 1825 policy calling on all coastal domains to attack and repel any encroaching foreign ships. The characterization of the Tokugawa period as a time of “national seclusion” was thus a Meiji period invention which sought to criticize the bakufu’s restrictions on foreign intercourse as a policy adverse to the spirit of civilization and enlightenment. In official historical writings, sakoku highlighted the oppressive and restrictive conditions of Tokugawa rule, and provided an absolute and coherent explanation for Japan’s lack of progress.

One of the first historical works to depart from the official narrative of the Meiji Restoration was Fukuchi Gen’ichiro’s Bakufu suibo ron (幕府衰}

First serialized in Tokutomi Soho’s *Kokumin no tomo* (国民之友) in 1892, Fukuchi titled his work after Edward Gibbon’s *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, for which he hoped to suggest not only the grandeur of the Tokugawa bakufu, but the significance of his own work in revising official histories. Like Gibbon, Fukuchi rejected the search for general laws of causation and suggested that history needs to be appropriate to its subject. Fukuchi claimed that his work was based largely on his own memories and conversations he had with former officials in the Tokugawa shogunate. In the preface to this work, Fukuchi made clear his intentions to write a history that represented the bakufu’s position: “recent historical writings are constantly appearing, and it’s not that there aren’t any works which describe the fall of the bakufu, but rather that these works all center on describing the great achievement of the Meiji Restoration. The bakufu is placed in a secondary position, or is portrayed merely as the enemy. These so-called Meiji Restoration histories (明治維新史) cannot be considered true histories of the ‘decline and fall of the bakufu.’”

Like Fukuchi, Togawa Zanka (Yasuie) (1855-1924) was deeply concerned with preserving the legacy of the Tokugawa bakufu. During the Meiji period, he became one of the leaders of the movement to collect and preserve documents and materials pertaining to the shogunate. Togawa was born in Edo of parents with close ties to the bakufu. Around 1890, Togawa began to regularly contribute short articles and poetry to several magazines. He was active in the literary circles of the mid-Meiji period, and was a promoter of modern poetry (*shintai-shi*) which he often wrote to express Christian themes. Like many mid-Meiji intellectuals and literary figures, Togawa’s belief in Christianity wavered, and he found himself increasingly drawn to the past. His interest in history grew out of literature, but was nurtured by “the constraints of his status as a former bakufu retainer.” With the support of other former bakufu retainers such as Enomoto Takeaki, Kimura Kaishu, Otori Keisuke, and Kurimoto Joun, he began publishing the journal *Kyubakufu* (旧幕府) in April 1897. The contents of the journal included illustrations, historical source material, historical essays, and biographies pertaining to the Tokugawa period, especially that of bakumatsu period and the Restoration. The journal was so well received in intellectual circles that the first issue was reprinted four times to satisfy the interest of readers. The inspiration for the publication of this journal was born from the realization that former bakufu officials and re-


tainers were gradually passing away, and that the memory of the achievements of the *bakufu* would perish unless an effort was exerted to collect historical documents and personal records related to its history.

The efforts of these historians and former *bakufu* retainers to revise the negative view of the Tokugawa shogunate established by *bunmeishi* historians was important for creating an appreciation for the past. Essential to this effort was the historical redefinition of the seclusion policy (鎖国) from a national tragedy to the triumph of cultural uniqueness. By averting Western colonialism, they argued that the *bakufu*’s policy of national seclusion allowed for the development of Japan’s unique cultural traditions. In order to appreciate the Tokugawa period’s historical legacy, it was necessary to reject natural laws of progress, and to make empirical studies of the social features of culture. Implied in this turn toward empiricism was the feeling that the state-initiated reform of customs and manners (風俗改良) of the early Meiji period had proceeded arbitrarily and inflexibly without regard for the reality of “everyday life.” Miyake Setsurei, one of the members of the Seikyosha (政教社) who attacked superficial forms of Westernization, argued that the excesses of the Meiji Restoration needed to be tempered by the social reality of life in Japan. According to Miyake, “we must extricate ourselves from the phantasm of contemporary knowledge and make it more descriptive and empirical.”11 For Miyake, Western knowledge was an illusionary phenomenon lacking permanence and meaning. He felt that history needed to make clear what it meant to be Japanese. Similarly, others in the Seikyosha lamented the destruction of Japan’s indigenous customs (風俗), and wrote of the need to “salvage” Japan’s cultural past.12 From these concerns, there emerged a new interest in the history and study of Japanese customs and manners (風俗史学).

Kurimoto Joun along with a group of mostly former Mito-han retainers joined together in April 1889 to form the Edokai (江戸会) with the aim of preserving the distinct history and customs of Edo. Members of the Edokai included such former *bakufu* retainers as Maejima Hisoka (1835-1919), Kishigami Shitsuken (1860-1907), and Kimura Kaishu (1830-1901) as well as others resentful of the denigration of the period of Tokugawa rule. Most members of the Edokai were born in Edo, and shared a common identity as “Edokko.”13 The historical objective of the Edokai was to salvage the


13. Other prominent members of the Edokai included Takada Sanae (1860-1938), Sekine Masanao (1860-1932), Tsuboi Shogoro (1863-18313), and Naito Chiso (1826-1902).
vestiges of the Tokugawa period from the destruction of the Meiji Restoration in order that the blessings of the Tokugawa period “should be remembered by our children and grandchildren, and recorded for posterity so that it is never forgotten.” Among the activities which concerned the Edokai was the historical preservation of geographic place names, historic landmarks, and scenic spots within Tokyo. In addition, several members of the Edokai diligently collected and published documents pertaining to the Tokugawa bakufu.

In June 1889, the Edokai began publishing the *Edokai zasshi* (江戸会雑誌) which was subsequently renamed *Edokai-shi* (江戸会誌) on the occasion of the tricentennial celebration of Tokyo. This journal provided an intellectual forum for scholars to work together to “enjoy the benefits of examining the traces of the three hundred years of Tokugawa rule.” The *Edokai-shi* focused on nearly all aspects of the Tokugawa period, but its emphasis tended more towards the social and cultural history of everyday life in Edo. The first issue of the *Edokai-shi* proclaimed that “the three hundred years of Tokugawa rule was a time of the most unprecedented progress and development of Japanese civilization (文明), but as a result of the revolution of the Restoration, all aspects of society were transformed. Most of our institutions, literature, and customs were destroyed, and that which survived has become extremely uncommon.” While official histories placed notions of progress and development at the center of its critique of the feudalistic Tokugawa order, here was an attempt to redefine progress in terms of cultural achievement. The essays which filled the pages of the *Edokai-shi* sought to demonstrate that “from painting, sculpture, music, and drama to clothing and playthings, all achieved unparalleled development during the three hundred years of Tokugawa rule.” This definition of progress was part of an emerging consciousness that civilization was no longer a normative category, but a plural category of specific and variable differences. Significantly, the achievements of the Tokugawa period were articulated not in terms of political or economic development, but the advancement of culture.

Like the writing of history, commemorative activity in Meiji Japan was also a contested process that resulted as much from the actions of critics and opponents of the new regime as it did from the “memory machine” of

the Meiji state. Although Takashi Fujitani links commemorative activity in Meiji Japan to the notion of a monolithic state ideology, the tricentennial celebration of Tokyo was planned and organized by a group of former bakufu retainers who hoped to preserve the cultural memory of the achievements of the Tokugawa era. In response to the process of renewal and rapid social change in the early years of the Meiji period, they invented the modern memory of Edo as a way of resisting the acceleration of history and the eradication of the legacy of the Tokugawa era. However, the tricentennial celebration was not merely an act of resistance to state power and official history, but was equally productive of its own national narrative centered on the culture, practices, and tastes of the Edo period. By moving beyond a narrow emphasis on commemorations and celebrations as sites of the production of state ideology, I argue for the continued need to address the multiplicity of actors in the production of national identity.

The tricentennial celebration of the founding of Edo (東京三百年祭) opened in Ueno Park on August 26, 1889. Throughout Tokyo, paper lanterns and flags decorated the city to mark the occasion. The day of the event celebrated the anniversary of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s occupation of Edo castle following the defeat of the Hojo in August 1590. During the Edo period, this day was regularly observed according to the lunar calendar as the celebration of hassaku (八朔) [the first day of August]. After the Restoration no official celebration was held until a group of former bakufu retainers calling themselves the Hassakukai (八朔会) organized preparations for a celebration of the tricentennial. The organizing committee was headed by Enomoto Takeaki (1836-1908), and was composed of such notable figures as Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905), Shibusawa Eichi (1841-1931), and Iwasaki Yanosuke (1851-1928) as well as the heads of the 15 wards of Tokyo. The celebration was supported by numerous private contributions, many from the families of former bakufu retainers. The event’s main activities, which included displays of archery, swordplay, dancing, music, and fireworks, were held on the grounds of the park which were adorned with flags from each of the old daimyo domains. The guest seating area, which was reserved for around 500 distinguished visitors including nobility and members of the Tokugawa family, was designed to resemble Edo castle. Among the centennial’s other activities, the Japan Fine Arts Association (日本美術協会) organized a display of the weapons and armory of Tokugawa Ieyasu as well as other artifacts dating from the same time period.

18. Takashi Fujitani has argued that the modern state in Meiji Japan became a “memory machine” that invented and manipulated imperial rituals, national holidays, and spectacular state ceremonials. According to Fujitani, these activities were part of “the modern governing elites’ energetic creation of a culture of nationalism.” See Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 16.
riot. Altogether around 230 pieces were on display which conveyed the grandeur of Tokugawa Ieyasu and the culture of the Edo period.19

For the citizens of Tokyo, the celebration created an unprecedented feeling of unity. Though festivals were not uncommon in Tokyo, they tended to be confined to one district of the city. The tricentennial celebration was an event that united all the people of Tokyo and contributed to the creation of a municipal identity. The population of Tokyo had been rapidly expanding in the years since the Restoration. However, the natural increase in the population of permanent residents was greatly outpaced by the influx of new residents. The increased urbanization of Tokyo was the result of a rapid influx of people moving to Tokyo to escape the economic crisis in the countryside during the 1880s. The divisions within the city between its old and new residents were profound, but the tricentennial celebration offered a moment of reconciliation. As one member of the Edokai expressed it: “those who in the least bit have the blood of an Edokko, or who live in Tokyo today and enjoy its benefits, should fully devote their spirit to celebrating this event.”20

The selection of Ueno Park as the location for the celebration was determined by the symbolic importance of this site to the veneration of Tokugawa Ieyasu. The park’s interior encompassed the Toshogu shrine located on the grounds of Kan’eiji which was the center of the Ieyasu cult in Tokyo.21 In addition, the tombs of six former Tokugawa shoguns were located near the shrine. Throughout the day, the Toshogu shrine overflowed with worshippers who came to pray to the spirit of Ieyasu. Like the famous shrine in Nikko, the Toshogu shrine in Ueno was built to venerate Tokugawa Ieyasu. It was established in 1627, but remodeled in 1651 during Tokugawa Iemitsu’s great Nikko expansion project which created replicas of the Nikko Toshogu shrine throughout Japan. This outpouring of reverence for Tokugawa Ieyasu was the outcome of a cult of worship which developed out of what Herman Ooms describes as the “systematic sacralization” of Ieyasu during the early Tokugawa era.22 This process began with Ieyasu’s own last testament in which he expressed his desire to be venerated as a guardian deity (鎮守). Though Ieyasu himself had throughout his life sought to legitimate his authority by appropriating religious symbols, it

19. For a complete listing of the items on display, see Otsuki Shuji 大槻修二, ed., Tokyo kaishi sanbyaku-nen sai 東京開市三百年祭 (Tokyo: Otsuki Shuji, 1890).
21. The term Toshogu (東照宮) for the name of Ieyasu’s shrine was derived from Ieyasu’s sacred title Tosho daigongen (東照大権現) or “Great Incarnation Shining over the East” which was conferred upon him in 1617.
was Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604-1651) who promoted the cult of Ieyasu by posthumously inventing his grandfather as the “divine founder” of the Tokugawa regime. Iemitsu oversaw the rebuilding of Ieyasu’s shrine in Nikko and ordered the construction of Ieyasu shrines throughout Japan. As a consequence, Ieyasu came to be revered as a protector deity.

From the moment a celebration was planned, much debate arose over the meaning of the event. Some argued that the focus of the celebration should be on the city of Tokyo and its future prosperity. Others felt that the event should celebrate Tokugawa Ieyasu’s achievement in laying the foundation for the city’s greatness. This controversy spilled over into a dispute over what to name the celebration. Although the date was remembered as the “tricentennial of Ieyasu’s founding of the bakufu,” government officials pressured committee members to rename the event the “Tokyo tricentennial celebration.” This contradiction was not lost on the residents of the city who could not understand the reason for celebrating the three hundred year anniversary for Tokyo when the new capital’s name had only been in use for just over 20 years. An editorial which appeared in *Choya shinbun* the day before the celebration criticized this decision to rename the celebration:

> The Imperial Household has nothing to fear from Tokugawa Ieyasu who completed the great task of bringing about order and stability, and who has loyally served the imperial family. We can not at all understand why the protestors so detest the name of Ieyasu that they advocate a Tokyo tricentennial festival, but will not allow us to call it the Ieyasu tricentennial commemoration. Since this matter has already been decided, there’s perhaps no reason to even mention it. Still, the city’s residents who have enjoyed the benefits and prosperity of Ieyasu’s rule should, regardless of what it is called, celebrate the event as a commemoration expressive of their adoration for the merits of Ieyasu’s three hundred year legacy as a military commander and political leader.23

The first issue of the *Edokai-shi*, whose publication was timed to correspond with the tricentennial celebration, joined in the criticism by noting that there never would have been a Tokyo were it not for Tokugawa Ieyasu’s occupation and establishment of a castle at Edo three hundred years earlier.24 During the celebration, these deep divisions were enacted on the streets of Tokyo where supporters of a celebration for Ieyasu’s founding of the bakufu hung paper lanterns displaying the hollyhock crest of Tokugawa Ieyasu. Others displayed lanterns of the rising sun to show their

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unity with the imperial family.\(^{25}\) The Meiji government’s apprehension about allowing the event to be named in honor of Tokugawa Ieyasu is a reflection of the degree to which the state and the Imperial Household carefully policed commemorative activity that challenged its authority.

On the day of the celebration, merchants lining the streets leading towards Ueno Park sold various commemorative items, including patent medicines that invoked the protectoral spirit of Ieyasu the Great Incarnation. Other items included portraits of the image of Tokugawa Iesato (1863-1940), who was the successor to the Tokugawa house after Tokugawa Keiki (Yoshinobu) was deposed in the Meiji Restoration.\(^{26}\) The portraits of Tokugawa Iesato were sold mounted in ornately decorated glass albums. Shopkeepers throughout the city observed the anniversary by setting up temporary storefront shrines (神門) built from long curtains enclosing gold folding screens (屏風). The object of these temporary shrines would vary depending upon the occasion, but were typically dedicated to popular deities. For the tricentennial celebration, the people of Tokyo enshrined photographs of Tokugawa Iesato (1863-1940) within the altar of these storefront shrines. The official portrait of Tokugawa Iesato was taken by Uchida Kuichi who also served as the photographer for the first photographic portraits of the Emperor Meiji in 1872 and 1873.\(^{27}\) In contrast to Uchida’s seated portraits of the Meiji emperor, Iesato is pictured standing at attention. As was common for portraits of members of the nobility, Iesato posed wearing the ceremonial dress appropriate to his rank in the nobility.\(^{28}\)

Beginning with photographs of the emperor and members of the imperial family, merchants first appeared around 1874 who specialized in selling photographic reproductions of the portraits of public figures, military


\(^{27}\) For a discussion of the imperial portrait as a token of Western diplomacy and a symbol of national unity, see Taki Koji, Tenno no shozo (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988), pp. 111-154 and 197-234. The Meiji government first began distributing portraits of the Emperor to display in government and military facilities from around 1882. The preparation of the imperial portrait for public consumption was timed to coincide with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in February 1889. With the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, copies of the Rescript along with portraits of the emperor were distributed to elementary schools throughout Japan.

\(^{28}\) At the time of the photograph, Tokugawa Iesato held the rank of duke in the nobility. He was granted this title with the issuing of the Kazoku-rei in 1884. The ceremonial dress for members of the nobility varied in design and color depending upon one’s rank.
heroes, and famous prostitutes. While it was common for members of the nobility to have photographic portraits taken as family mementos, the portrait of Tokugawa Iesato was one of the few to circulate as an object of religious veneration. Like the image of the emperor, the portrait of Tokugawa Iesato was iconic of Tokugawa sacred authority. It served as a material symbol in religious rituals and ceremonies by substituting a photographic image of the body of the Tokugawa heir for the sacred authority of the Tokugawa name. These images, through their likeness to the person represented, became a tangible presence of his sacro-religious authority. As Taki Koji argues the context of the consumption of images of the emperor were central to his construction as an object of national idolatry. Japanese religious practices rooted in an iconophilic use of images became wedded to modern ideology to promote a political idolatry centered on competing images of national authority.

In his address during the opening ceremony, Enomoto paid tribute to Tokugawa Ieyasu by describing the development of the city since its founding, and by calling upon its citizens to remember this day as the “birthday of Tokyo.” Enomoto concluded by stating that he hoped for the further spread of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s legacy, but he was careful to note that this legacy had been Ieyasu’s way of revering the emperor. By carefully subordinating Ieyasu to the emperor, Enomoto sought to avoid any perception of lese-majesty. At the conclusion of his speech, the excited audience threw their hats into the air and cheered “Tokugawa banzai!” During a reception afterwards, guests greeted Tokugawa Iesato with banzai salutes. As one journalist wryly observed, “some call this tricentennial anniversary a festival of Edo, while others call it a celebration of Tokyo. Listening to all this, I get the strange feeling that if the tricentennial anniversary is in fact a celebration of the Great Incarnation’s occupation of Edo castle, then perhaps there are some who are seeking the revival of Edo castle.”

Although the celebration lasted for three days, it did not approach the

30. Taki, pp. 183-196. According to Taki, the portrait of the Emperor was contextualized differently from that of Western monarchs in the modern period. Whereas Western monarchs became increasingly secularized with the rise of civil society, the image of the Japanese emperor was sanctified through ceremony and worship. Although the portraits themselves were consistent with late nineteenth century European practices which were relatively straight-forward and uncoercive, the images were placed in a context of public consumption wherein they became symbols of the Emperor’s sacred authority.
scale of the festivities that accompanied the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in February 1889. Most notably, the tricentennial celebration was only observed within the capital. In fact, much of the debate regarding the naming of the event was related to defining the spatial boundaries of the celebration. A celebration of Ieyasu’s founding of the bakufu suggested a national scale that was unacceptable to the Meiji leadership. By naming it the tricentennial of Tokyo, they succeeded in limiting its geographic focus and weakening its nationalistic assertion.

Despite these efforts, the state failed to curtail the growth of a popular historical consciousness that celebrated the culture of the Edo period. The popularization and commercialization of Edo culture in modern Japan developed in conjunction with the tricentennial celebration of Edo. This moment of reflection on the legacy of the Tokugawa era generated an intense enthusiasm for the tastes of the Edo period. Throughout the middle Meiji period, antique stores flourished among collectors of Edo period art and utensils. This commercialization of tradition, which helped to reinforce a sense of “authentic” connection to the past, was contingent upon the rise of an affluent class of collectors whose taste for antiquities rendered the past fashionable. Popular interest in the culture of the Edo period included the revival of fashions and styles from the pleasure quarters and an heightened appreciation for the Genroku period. During the tricentennial celebration, several prostitutes within Tokyo revived Genroku period fashions as a lure to male customers. Owing to the proprietary role that prostitutes and geisha played in shaping social tastes in the early Meiji period, Edo fashions soon spread throughout Tokyo and Japan. In particular, a distinct style of Edo period parasol became popular in the years immediately following the tricentennial celebration. Thereafter, the Genroku period soon became a marker of all that was fashionable.

In conclusion, the invention of Edo as the essence of Japanese cultural identity was the product of the commemorative activities and preservationist movements of former bakufu retainers embittered by the denigration of the achievements of the Tokugawa era. Because the habitual and quotidian practices of everyday life were defined as the unchanging patterns of tradition, their presumption as an authentic reality contrasts with the ephemerality and contingency of modern experience. However, the relationship between everyday life and modernity is not oppositional but mutually reinforcing. As Lefebvre notes, “the quotidian and the modern mark and mask, legitimate and counterbalance each other.” Without modernity, there is no

34 Hiraide Kojiro 平出際二郎, Tokyo fuzoku shi 東京風俗史 (Tokyo: Yasaka shobo, 1991), p. 182. These rush-woven umbrellas with red handles that were originally popular during the Edo became known as Genroku kasa.
35. Lefebvre, p. 25.
everyday life since it is the rapid social changes of modern life that create
a new awareness of the quotidian. Everyday life is a distinctly modern
phenomenon that only emerges with the awareness of its disappearing
forms. With the experience of modernity, everyday life becomes the object
of representation in art, literature, and history. It is at this moment that
everyday life breaks free from its aesthetically impoverished existence. No
longer the domain of undifferentiated repetition and “taken-for-
grantedness,” everyday life has become the source of invention and mystifi-
cation. Through the aestheticization of everyday life, the discourses of the
modern invent the nation as the ethos of the ordinary.
Chapter 11

Osaka versus Tokyo:
The Cultural Politics of Local Identity
in Modern Japan

Jeffrey E. Hanes

In 1994, Professor Ôtani Kôichi published the first in a series of books on the subject of Ōsakagaku, or what he translated as “Osakaology.” From the moment he began working on the subject for an undergraduate course at Tezukayama Gakuin Daigaku, Ôtani set out self-consciously to pioneer a new “field of study” (gakumon). According to the none-too-humble professor himself, Osakaology was something utterly new: a gakumon so thoroughly defined by place that the place name (chimei) described it. Ôtani tells us that he worked up this “unprecedented” new field of study from scratch—first by identifying notable “phenomena” (genshô) associated with Osaka, then by investigating these phenomena “through and through.” Anxious to raise Osakaology to the level of a social science, Ôtani earnestly strove to objectify his findings: through quantification (or seeking sûji, as he rather inelegantly put it) and by steering clear of questionable evidence derived from “subjective impressions” (inshô) or “regional chauvinism” (okuni jiman). By examining Osakan phenomena from “every conceivable angle,” the professor confidently asserted, he would ultimately be able to ascertain their “provenance” (yûrai).

Ôtani soon discovered, however, that it would not be easy to reach his student audience. Met with yawning disinterest in the subject matter, he resolved to find a way of working the crowd. As he explains the pedagogical turn that followed: “The focus of my concern was Osaka in and of itself. Yet, given that it was my ultimate goal to comprehend Osaka, I realized I could make things more understandable and more interesting by comparing Osaka to Tokyo. Thus, unexpectedly, the focus of my discourse became the [two distinct] cultures of Eastern and Western Japan.” Denying any

2. Ibid., p. 4.
impulse to “stipulate which was good and which was bad”—that is, eschewing value judgments and thus casting himself squarely in the role of the social scientist—Ôtani trumpeted his scholarly objectivity. His sole concern, he insisted, was to tease out the salient cultural characteristics of the city and its inhabitants.

Beneath this veneer of dispassionate objectivity, however, lurked the soul of a cultural partisan. As Ôtani steadily catalogued the cultural differences between Osaka and Tokyo, he expected to reveal the timeless cultural essence of Osaka. He witnessed the depth of his belief in place-centered cultural essentialism in the published version of his lectures, where he lamented the need to follow orthographic convention, and thus to distinguish early modern Osaka (written 大坂) from modern Osaka (written 大阪). While he could conveniently elide this historical distinction in his classroom lectures by speaking the city’s name aloud—in both cases, pronounced “Osaka”—the book forced him into a conceptual compromise. Rather than running the risk of looking “ludicrous” by contriving a “standardized” written form that projected his belief in place-centered, transhistorical cultural continuity, he protested aloud before biting the bullet.4

Unabashedly proud of his own trailblazing as the father of Osakaology, Ôtani praised it as a means of grasping Osakan culture in its totality. “All in all, in this single book, I should be able to accurately capture Osaka in its entirety,” claimed the author, “and [thus] present Osaka as a [distinct] body of knowledge.”5 To the degree that Osakaology was premised on Ôtani’s unexamined faith in the primacy of place, it was a social science built on quicksand. In the end, Ôtani managed to do little more than produce a pseudo-scientific essentialization of Osakan culture that sanctified cultural stereotyping. Not surprisingly, following the completion of Ôtani’s trilogy on the subject of Osakaology—Osaka gaku (Osakaology, 1994), Zoku Osaka gaku (Osakaology: The Sequel, 1994), and Osaka gaku: sesô hen (Osakaology: On Customs, 1998)—other Osaka partisans followed suit, proudly waving the cultural banner of their beloved city. One such group, led by a band of journalists from the Asahi Shinbun, published a series of articles, interviews, and roundtable discussions of Osakaology. And whom did they ask to write the preface? None other than the irrepressible Ôtani Kôichi. In his rousing introduction to Osakagaku: 21 seiki hen (Osakaology: The 21st Century Edition), the self-declared father of Osakaology threw down the gauntlet: “What will become of Osaka in the 21st century? We all want to know. Toward this end, needless to say, we must thoroughly examine, document, and analyze Osaka. It all begins with this. We don’t have any need for ungrounded theories or ideas that do not issue

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
from [experience of] the place itself.”6 Ōtani’s rousing declaration to the contrary, however, theories and ideas are exactly what these Osakaologists reproduced. The inductive process they promoted—namely, the collection and analysis of local data in an effort to identify and catalogue local characteristics—was really intended to reveal the immanent cultural identity of Osaka and its inhabitants. Not to put too esoteric a spin on their work, they clearly aimed to capture something akin to the auratic identity of the place.

I have begun this essay with a rather lengthy commentary on the recently pioneered field of Osakaology not merely to expose the chauvinistic underbelly of what we might call “Osakaism” (Ōsakashugi), but to launch a broader investigation of the cultural politics of local/regional identity in modern Japan. This is a pilot study, then, in the form of a case study; and it should be added that it is cast every bit in the mold of the ethnographic case studies that have come to characterize Ron Toby’s pioneering scholarship.

Viewed from the local perspective, Osakaology is merely the most recent counteroffensive mounted by chauvinistic Osakans in their city’s ongoing urban rivalry with Tokyo. Yet, far from revealing the intrinsic identity of Osakans, Ōtani and other self-styled Osakaologists have actually constructed a composite identity for them. What they have characterized as Osaka Tradition with a capital “T,” tracing the formation of that Tradition to a steady accretion of place-bound habits and customs passed down from generation to generation, is actually an intoxicating cultural cocktail whipped up from a suspicious variety of ingredients, including folk wisdom, anecdote, superstition, nostalgia, and stereotype. One of the most telling characteristics of this pseudo-social science—and the one that concerns us most directly here—is its spurious identification of discrete cultural “phenomena” as objective manifestations of innate cultural traits. While some Osakaologists seem to believe that Osakan culture flows in the veins of the inhabitants, and others that it is stamped on their DNA, all Osakaologists work from the same shared assumption: that Osakans bear the indelible imprint of the place they inhabit.

By why is it, we should ask, that Osakaologists intent upon conjuring the aura of Osaka spend so much time comparing the city to Tokyo? Ōtani would have us believe that it is because the ongoing discourse about the cultural differences between Eastern and Western Japan illuminates the respective cultural character of these two cities, and promises thereby to pique our interest in his city specifically. But the fact that Osakaologists direct their gaze mainly toward the distant capital, and not to nearby Kyoto or Kobe, should give us pause. Ōtani to the contrary, I would argue that

Osakaologists are drawn to the Osaka-Tokyo comparison primarily because it resonates with their cultural politics. Further, I would argue that their own identity as prideful Osakans has caused them to neglect the historical dimension of this ongoing discourse. The discourse that Ōtani treats as timeless is actually a linked set of discourses that tend to overlap, but which have also changed dramatically over time. Whereas this discourse once broadly evoked the regional rivalry between the Kanto and the Kansai, it later narrated the narrower first city/second city rivalry between Tokyo and Osaka. The former discourse boasts a long, distinguished history, extending back to the Tokugawa era and before, of benign comparison between the distinctive customs of two distant regions. The latter discourse is of recent historical vintage, on the other hand, and casts the two major cities within these regions into a sharp binaristic rivalry. Arguably blinded by their belief in the primacy of place and their faith in the cultural supremacy of Osaka, Osakaologists such as Ōtani have read the latter rivalry back into the former, conjuring the illusion of a unitary, ongoing discourse of regional cultural competition. In the process, they have forged a palpably false foundation for the place-centered social science that they claim to have pioneered.

The distinctive cultural “phenomena” elicited by Osakaologists are hardly proof positive of basic cultural traits intrinsic to native Osakans; more often than not, in fact, they are *epi*phenomenal evocations of the modern historical rivalry between Tokyo and Osaka. Rather than continuing to mystify the cultural distinctiveness of Osaka by imagining an unbridgeable cultural gap with Tokyo that has existed from time immemorial, I propose to place the Osaka-Tokyo rivalry in historical perspective as a striking example of cultural politics in the modern Japanese nation-state. Cultural characteristics that Osakaologists today tend to identify as timeless traits of Osakaism, I will treat as symptoms of the modern politico-cultural rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo. This rivalry, which was initially brokered by Japan’s national leadership following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, began with the reinvention of Edo as the national capital of Tokyo and the attendant relegation of Osaka to the status of “second city.”

In the course of the Meiji era, as the Japanese nation-state engineered a unipolar concentration of political power and cultural hegemony in the newly anointed capital of Tokyo, this rivalry steadily heated up. The driving force behind this cultural rivalry between the nation’s capital and its second city was state-sanctioned Tokyo centrism. As the capital of a modern nation-state, Tokyo was the symbolic embodiment of national political

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and cultural authority. Not only was it the seat of the family-state (kazoku-kokka), it was the symbolic embodiment of the national family. If we were to imagine the “state as a city,” to paraphrase Michel Foucault, then the capital would be its “main square.” Once Tokyotites embraced their symbolic status as the guardians of Japanese Tradition—traditions, we might add, that were largely invented by the modern state to promote national cultural homogeneity—ideologues began to step up onto their soapboxes in Japan’s “main square” and to point out the deficiencies of its “second city.”

Thus placed under the wilting “gaze” of Tokyo-based representatives of the central government and soon subjected as well to the dismissive “gaze” of chauvinistic Tokyotites, the beleaguered inhabitants of the once-great commercial entrepôt of Osaka slowly adopted a siege mentality. If the cultural rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo simmered steadily in early Meiji, however, it came to a boil later on. Flaunting its cultural hegemony by late Meiji, Tokyo stereotyped Osaka, then dressed down its natives, and ultimately dismissed Osaka culture as inferior and even deviant. Even as Tokyo thus endeavored to reinforce its national political and cultural supremacy, however, Osaka was steadily establishing national economic supremacy. Increasingly confident in its modern identity, Osaka rose to the challenge both politically and culturally.

By the 1910s, Osakans had begun to reverse the “gaze” from Tokyo, asserting their city’s cultural autonomy from and superiority over the capital. The burgeoning rivalry that now pitted Japan’s second city against its first city at first took the form of name-calling, but soon escalated into a war of words. No sooner did the Great Kanto Earthquake (Kantô Daishinsai) level Tokyo in 1923 than the cultural tables were turned. Suddenly overshadowed by Japan’s second city, which continued to prosper and progress, the destroyed and debilitated first city was at pains to sustain its national cultural supremacy. From the mid-1920s, what had once been a healthy (if also catty) rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo rapidly devolved into cultural warfare. The sudden reversal of fortunes that befell Tokyo and Osaka in the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake called into question the Tokyo-centric model of national cultural hegemony promoted by the Meiji state. Prompting paranoid cultural critics to project a topsy-turvy world in which Osakans were poised to seize the upper hand, this new state of cultural affairs was met with a combination of fear and loathing in the capital.

By the late 1930s, Tokyo had renewed its political dominance and restored its cultural hegemony. In the postwar era, it went on to establish economic dominance as well, of course, ushering in the age of unfettered Tokyo centrism. Nevertheless, as the cultural sniping by Ôtani and other

local chauvinists illustrates, the rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo persists to this day. One pithy example among many of its enduring cultural poignancy is the recent release of a hip-hop recording by the previously unknown, Osaka-based group West End X Yuki, entitled “So. Ya. Na” (“I guess that’s how it is”). This song, issued in response to a hit song by the Tokyo-based group East X Yuri, entitled “Da. Yo. Ne” (“I guess that’s how it is”), pointedly substituted Osaka dialect for the Tokyo dialect of the original, and thus threw Tokyo’s national cultural pretensions back in its own face. Although Osaka no longer holds a cultural candle to Tokyo, so to speak, and isn’t any longer even the nation’s second city (that distinction having been passed to Yokohama), still local chauvinists sing Osaka’s praises vis-à-vis Tokyo. If Osaka chauvinism rings a bit hollow now—seemingly little more than a name-calling game of tit for tat—ironically the threat of creeping Osakaism still has the capacity to raise the hackles of Tokyoites. As recently as the year 2000, an outbreak of Osaka dialect (Osaka-ben) in Tokyo was treated by some opinion leaders as if it were a communicable linguistic disease.

In the coming pages, I hope to suggest why the bitter rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo remains capable to this day of attracting combatants and even of inciting hysteria. I will not argue that Ōtani and his fellow Osakaologists fantasized the cultural gap that separates Osakans from Tokyoites; rather, I hope to show that they have misapprehended its provenance and thus inadvertently distorted its meaning and significance. Whereas Ōtani depicts the cultural relationship between Osaka and Tokyo as a place-based cultural rivalry whose roots extend back into the mists of time, I will portray it by contrast as a series of parries and thrusts in a cultural duel that threw the minions of the modern nation-state into a defensive posture from 1923. The cultural warfare between Osaka and Tokyo, once Osakans reversed the “gaze” and Tokyoites wilted beneath it, did not also result in a reversal of the vectors of cultural (no less political) power. To the contrary, Osaka won a few battles only to lose the war. But the second city’s battles with the first city do teach us some important historical lessons, not the least of which is that nation-states aspire to the creation of national cultural hegemony and that the Japanese nation-state arguably fought and won that war when Tokyo prevailed over Osaka.

Before we begin our examination of the interwar cultural rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo, it is important to address several salient theoretical issues. First, on the subject of cultural stereotyping, I would like to

9. I am indebted to Brian Chaney for this information.
draw some insights from the stimulating work of Michael Pickering.  

Pickering begins by observing—correctly, I think—that scholars too seldom deconstruct stereotypes analytically, preferring instead to dismiss them as irrational or malevolent. Given their ubiquity in modern life, however, stereotypes obviously deserve our attention; and Pickering makes several suggestive points about them that help us to better understand the Osaka-Tokyo rivalry. Firstly, Pickering points out that stereotypes are “typifications” that are “simplifications,” usually created by a dominant “we” to pigeonhole an exploited “them.” Yet, although stereotypes usually assert who “they” are, implicitly stereotypes actually tell us who “they” are not. Without this us/them dynamic, suggests Pickering, stereotyping simply doesn’t take place; and, equally important, stereotypes are not created before the fact of a relationship between two groups, but only as a way to justify some preexisting pattern of exploitation. Secondly, says Pickering, “Stereotyping always operates in relation to what is culturally ambivalent and theoretically contradictory within everyday life, and does so as a common-sense rhetorical strategy of naturalizing order and control. Stereotypes operate as socially exorcistic rituals in maintaining the boundaries of normality and legitimacy.” Despite their pretensions to “timelessness,” stereotypes “do not exist as common-places for all time,” continues Pickering. “They have a historical basis...[S]tereotyping is always a part of ongoing cultural processes and shifting symbolic relations.” He concludes with an observation that is particularly germane to the present study: “When a social category becomes a stereotype it takes on the aura of myth...Stereotypes are history in drastic reverse.”

While I cannot demonstrate categorically that there was no stereotyping before the advent of the nation-state, I am convinced that conditions were ripe for the practice from the advent of the modern era. Where Japan is concerned, this means the Meiji era, during which time the nation’s leaders strove to invent national traditions. Among other things, this entailed the creation of a purposefully packaged pastiche of social customs—strategically exaggerated, distorted, and exalted—that could be presented as Japanese national tradition with a capital “T.” As Stephen Vlastos observes in the introduction to his collection of essays on the subject, in this process of invention the critical distinction between “tradition” and “custom” was elided. Defining “tradition” as something primarily “identified with superstructural institutions and elites,” Vlastos contrastingly characterizes “cus-

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12. Ibid., pp. 47-78.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 48.
as "popular and capable of being mobilized by groups at society's base." Paraphrasing Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, he observes that "traditions impose fixed practices, [while] custom is flexible, capable of accommodating a certain amount of innovation while still providing the sanction of 'precedent, social continuity, and natural law expressed in history.' Accordingly, the invention of tradition functions 'to structure at least some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant.' Finally, invented traditions are distinguished from other (genuine?) traditions by the fact that continuity with a historical past is largely fictitious."17 I have quoted Vlastos at some length here because the distinction that he highlights between "custom" and "tradition" is precisely the one that was obscured by Meiji leaders in Tokyo anxious to promote national cultural hegemony and is now being obscured by Osakan chauvinists anxious to shake off the Tokyo cultural yoke. In both cases, the result is stereotyping —through what Pickering calls the "politics of representation"—and it is my intention here to unpack the respective stereotypes of Osaka and Tokyo in the interest of understanding the historical dynamic of their modern rivalry between these two cities.18

Before I lay out the background of the modern feud that later grew into a cultural duel between Osaka and Tokyo, allow me to touch briefly upon the subject of cultural difference and custom in Japan. While it is my contention that the binaristic cultural rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo is modern in origin, I do not mean to suggest that it is the source and inspiration of all the cultural differences that divide the proud inhabitants of these two places. Since their establishment toward the end of the sixteenth century, these distant cities have traced widely divergent historical trajectories. Osaka’s urban identity as the central commercial entrepôt of the Tokugawa regime, and Edo’s as its political capital, triggered the development of two very different ways of life in two very different urban settings.

In terms of their social and cultural customs, these early modern cities could hardly have been more different. Let us briefly historicize their cultural differences. As the capital of a "centralized feudal" regime ruled by the Tokugawa shoguns, Edo was in an urban class all its own. From the perspective of Osakans and others, it was the undisputed fount of political power and authority. Yet, unlike its modern incarnation, Tokyo, Edo was not also conceived as the fount of Japanese culture. The Tokugawa regime had neither the motive nor the means to establish the sort of central cultural authority that would later be engineered by the leaders of the modern nation-state. After all, national cultural hegemony is a distinctly modern aspiration that reflects the peculiar concerns of centralizing nation-states.

The Meiji oligarchs, for their part, deliberately invented traditions conceived to promote national cultural hegemony. Not only did they do so because the modern nation-state demanded cultural homogenization, however, but because the early modern nation had never achieved anything approaching it.

When the Meiji leaders looked back on the early modern Japanese nation, what they saw was not the national cultural uniformity to which they aspired but such local/regional cultural diversity as constituted a clear and present danger to that very objective. Although Edo-era Osaka was thus compelled to acknowledge the political hegemony of Edo, it was relatively free to celebrate its cultural distinctiveness. This unrivaled port city, colorfully referred to as Mizu no Miyako (the Capital of Water), was crisscrossed by canals and rivers spanned by the legendary “myriad bridges” (happyakuya bashi). As the central commercial entrepôt of the Tokugawa regime, Osaka rapidly gained a reputation as the land of plenty. People everywhere spoke of it as Tenka no Daidokoro (the Pantry of the Realm), where such a panoply of potables and comestibles were marketed and consumed that it was possible to “eat ’til you dropped” (kuidaore).

Writers such as Ihara Saikaku brought Edo-era Osaka to life with gripping stories of the lives of its townspeople (chônin); Kabuki and Bunraku dramatists similarly staged plays that evoked the ethos of urban life; and foreign visitors such as the German doctor Engelbert Kaempfer testified with their own eyes that the city was a “universal theater of pleasures and diversions.” While all this lent a certain mystique to Osaka’s vibrant ethos, it did not impel anyone in Osaka (or elsewhere) to imagine the city as Edo’s rival. While Edokko (the native sons and daughters of Edo) reputedly looked down their noses at Osakans as “country bumpkins,” the term they used to put them down was “Kamigata zeiroku.” Rather than singling out Osakans for cultural disdain, that is, they lumped Osakans together with Kyotoites and thus extended the criticism to all who inhabited the Kamigata region (i.e., the Osaka-Kyoto area). This sort of equal opportunity insult leveled by Edokko at their urban cousins to the west illustrates two things: first, that cultural difference had yet to rise anywhere near the level of cultural conflict; second, that cultural rivalry with Edo, such as it was, was waged on a regional level.

For their part, Edo-era Osakans themselves seem to have been far more concerned with their reputation in the Kansai region than their status vis-à-vis Edo. When Osakans represented their city to outsiders, they played up an element of their urban identity that meant little to Edokko. On maps and in tourist guidebooks, they commonly referred to Osaka by its ancient name, Naniwa. With this specific appellation, Osakans forged a nostalgic association with their city’s distant past, recalling the by-gone day when Osaka had been the site of an imperial capital. That Osakans thus tacitly compared their city to the neighboring cities of Kyoto and Nara, with their
rich imperial histories, should give us pause. What this suggests is that Osaka strove mightily to distinguish itself as a distinct urban culture—and that it went so far as to compare itself with important cities nearby—but that Osakans did not see the point in distinguishing their city from Edo.

Come the Meiji era, however, all bets were off in Japan’s urban cultural sweepstakes. The complex early modern rivalries that we have described were recast by a single epochal event: the establishment of the modern nation-state. From 1868 forward, all eyes were trained on Tokyo. Equally important, however, the Wilting gaze of Tokyo was soon trained directly on Osaka. In the first instance, this was arguably the result of Osaka’s ill-fated bid, spearheaded by the redoubtable Meiji oligarch Ōkubo Toshimichi, to be named the Japanese national capital. Describing Osaka as a port whose “maritime avenues led directly to foreign intercourse,” Ōkubo made his plea primarily on economic grounds. In the end result, his plan was done in by a fellow oligarch. Maejima Hisoka, in his critique, observed that Osaka was nowhere near the center of Japan geographically and that its harbor could not accommodate seagoing ships. Adding that the city was excessively small, that its streets were too narrow, and that it possessed no palaces or public buildings to speak of, he concluded that Osaka was an utterly inappropriate choice for capital-dom. Interestingly, however, Maejima offered one last, prophetic justification for his position: that Edo, deprived of its political identity, might wither and die, but that Osaka was a commercial dynamo whose future was assured. On the latter count, as is well known, Maejima was right as rain. Following some years of expensive port improvement and audacious industrial development, Osaka transformed itself into a commercial and industrial metropolis. While the city thus proved itself up to the challenge of capitalism—and though its leadership doubtless recognized this as vindication of its failed bid to be named the nation’s capital—there was no singing in the streets. For, despite the city’s successes, Osakans discovered that the national leadership had consigned their city to second fiddle in the national urban band.

As if to remind Osakans of their proper place in the modern national urban hierarchy, in 1893 the Tokyo-based publication Shōgyō shiryō (Commercial Papers) printed a list of things not found in Osaka—among them, aristocrats, big spenders, gentlemen, libraries, gas lamps, two-horse carriages, and women in western dress. If this publication is to be believed, in fact, Osaka was missing virtually all of the accouterments and icons of modern Civilization that the capital alone possessed. Some years later, in

a similar vein, the Tokyo-based Board of Tourist Industry for the Japanese Government Railways produced a guidebook for foreign tourists that identified as Osaka’s greatest attraction its convenience to other more interesting places: “By far the greatest attraction of Osaka, from a tourist’s viewpoint, is that it is so near to many lovely cities and interesting places, within a few hours by motor train such as Kyoto (26 miles), Kobe (20 miles), Nara (18.8 miles) and a host of others celebrated for their exquisite scenery and historical associations. Osaka’s notoriety as an ideal city to get away from rests largely on this fact.”22 This was how modern Tokyoites “dissed” their urban cousins in Osaka: by reminding them of who they were not.

This strangely dismissive promotion of Osaka was entirely consistent with the historical agenda of Tokyo-centered national cultural hegemony (and also resonates, obviously, with Pickering’s observations about cultural stereotyping). Having invented traditions conceived to propagate a homogeneous Japanese national culture under the progressive rubric of “Civilization and Enlightenment” (bunmei-kaika), the Meiji leaders tacitly commissioned the inhabitants of the nation’s capital as cultural exemplars and moral arbiters. Yet, once Osaka rose to urban economic supremacy toward the turn of the century, Osakans suddenly began to talk back. In 1899, Nakahashi Tokugorô, one of the city’s most prominent adoptive sons, went so far as to revisit the idea that Osaka should be declared the national capital. Noting that it was the “undisputed pivot of imperial commerce,” this president of the Osaka Shôsen shipping company maintained that Osaka alone among Japan’s major cities possessed the combined infrastructural strength of international shipping routes and domestic railway lines to become a “metropolis” (tokai) in the truest sense of the word.23

By the mid-1910s, as Osaka’s economy boomed and Osakan self-confidence boomed with it, sarcasm gave way to criticism in the ongoing cultural rivalry between Japan’s first and second cities. One poignant example of this shift in tone can be heard in a spontaneous public exchange mediated by the Osaka Asahi Shinbun in September 1916. On the English-language page of the newspaper, where social commentary frequently could be found, appeared a curious series of editorials on the subject of “Osakism.” The first author, who identified himself only as a “Tokyo Man,” got right to the point. Bluntly asserting that “the brains [of Osakans] are imbued with a strong desire for thrift and economy,” he cited as evidence the fact that they routinely insisted on carrying doggie bags home from dinner parties. Osakans, he concluded, were “clever in making money

and turning everything to good account.” This editorial repeated a hackneyed cultural stereotype: Osaka as an irredeemably commercial and commercialized city, so utterly crass that merchants greeted one another each day not with a cheery konnichiwa (“good day”) but with a rousing môkari-makka (“So, are ya makin’ money”).

Given the editorialist’s gracelessness and tastelessness, not to mention his hubris as a “Tokyo Man” coming down on Osakans in an Osaka-based newspaper, it will come as no surprise that his comments sparked heated debate in subsequent issues. Over the following month, the character of Osaka came under intense scrutiny. The first rebuttal to “Tokyo Man” came from a proud regional ally of Osakans: a self-declared “Kobe Man,” who entitled his contribution “Osakaism Misinterpreted.” Singing the praises of Osakans, the author pointedly called them “Osakakko,” thus representing them as the dignified counterparts of “Edokko,” the venerable sons and daughters of old Tokyo. Blanching at this comparison of Edokko to Osakans, “Another Tokyo Man” went on to reiterate an observation made by his comrade-in-arms (and words). Not only did Osakans “set store by wealth above all things,” exhibiting a notorious lack of “moral culture,” but they were in imminent danger of going the way of the Jews or the Chinese.

This ad hominem attack on Osakans (not to mention Jews and Chinese), which tacitly identified them as a distinct ethnic group, sparked an equally unrestrained reply. A writer who went only by the initials “J.P.S.” first rose to the defense of the city and its inhabitants. He identified Osaka as “one of the most important commercial and industrial centers of the Far East” and went on to praise Osakans as an extraordinarily “independent people.” Rather than stopping here, however, “J.P.S.” went on the offensive, and pretty offensively at that. Bristling with righteous resentment at the Tokyo writers who had assassinated the character of his beloved Osakans, he dismissively characterized Tokyoites as their mirror opposites: people hopelessly “dependent upon the influence of the Government for the consummation of any enterprise, public or private.”

Seemingly in an effort to neutralize the cultural vitriol that had been heaped upon Osakans, then later upon Tokyoites, one final editorialist diplomatically declared the exchange one huge misunderstanding. He took the onus off Osakans and their alleged Osakaism by placing the blame for their seeming crassness on the excesses of a small, unrepresentative minority of selfish materialists who had perpetuated what he conveniently labeled Ultra-Osakaism.

25. Ibid. (10 September 1916).
26. Ibid. (17 September 1916).
27. Ibid. (21 September 1916).
28. Ibid. (24 September 1916).
It is no accident, of course, that this controversy over “Osakaism” broke out when it did. In 1916, Japan was in economic boom mode, and Osaka was booming biggest of all. The new found wealth and *nouveau* ways of the infamous *narikin* (nouveaux riche) and their hangers-on was met with a mixture of envy, dismissiveness, and resentment by Tokyoites. At this historical juncture, the incipient cultural rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo rose to a new level—as a sort of sibling rivalry between the *chônan* (first son) and the *jinan* (second son) of Japan’s modern urban family. Little did anyone suspect that this rivalry would soon be ratcheted up to a new level—as something that could truly be described as “ultra-Osakaism.” When this full-blown cultural stereotype next took hold of the popular imagination, it gripped people’s attention. For, almost unbelievably, Osakaism appeared next as a transgressive force that threatened to topple Tokyoism and to seize national cultural hegemony.

The catalyst for this devolution of cultural relations between Osaka and Tokyo was a historical event that was entirely unanticipated: the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. No sooner did this horrible disaster lay Tokyo to waste than it also called into question the hierarchical relationship between the nation’s capital and its second city. By at least three significant measures—population, physical size, and economic wealth—Osaka would become Japan’s biggest city by the 1920s and would remain so until 1936. The huge government investment in post-earthquake reconstruction reassured Tokyoites that their city would be restored to its former glory. Amidst the dislocation caused by the earthquake, however, a number of Tokyoites relocated to the Osaka area. Perhaps the most prominent of these was the writer Tanizaki Junichirô, who immediately made it his business to highlight the cultural gulf that separated Tokyo from his “temporary” new home.

In his first essay about his new home in the Kansai, published in the literary journal *Bungei shunjû* in 1925, Tanizaki attested to a feeling of severe culture shock. His pointedly sarcastic “record of personal experience in the Hanshin [area]” began with a disdainfully essentializing flourish.29 “The people of Osaka are the sort of people who, as a matter of course, allow their children to piss on the train,” he wrote incredulously. “Were one to relate this to people from Tokyo, they would surely be surprised. But it’s nothing to scoff at. Indeed, twice with my own eyes, I have seen such spectacles.”30 Tanizaki went on to describe other disturbing scenes: such as a couple on the train who placed their one-year-old child in the *amidana*, or net luggage rack, apparently for their own amusement, or the countless passengers who refused to make room for their fellow travelers, in some

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cases going so far as to place packages on the seat next to them. “Compared to Tokyoiotes,” asked Tanizaki rhetorically, “can it not be said that the citizens [of Osaka] on the whole lack public virtue (kotokushin)?” The writer then wrapped up his remarks with a thinly veiled insult: “Having written previously about Kamigata cuisine, I have made an effort this time to write about [local] people. But I have to say that the people are certainly lower class than their food.”

Tanizaki’s remarks were likely met by Tokyoiotes with ribald laughter punctuated by sighs of relief. But, if Tokyoiotes remained remarkably sanguine in 1925 about their cultural superiority, some had begun to waver and worry by the end of the decade. By then, the cultural backwater of Osaka so humorously described by Tanizaki seemed to be washing over the capital. Or so thought the Tokyo-based, but Osaka-born, cultural critic, Ōya Sōichi. In an essay written in 1929 for the Osaka Asahi Shinbun, this astute cultural observer first provided a description of the vibrant new cultural ethos of Osaka, then went on to contrast this ethos to the moribund mood of Tokyoiotes. Following a brief guided tour of his birthplace, which left him feeling like an étranger (a stranger in his own native land), Ōya found himself transfixed by the “modernist” spirit of the city. He identified this “modernism” with the “new consumer philosophy” and “new consumer lifestyle” that had taken root in Osaka during the boom years of the First World War. Memorably labeling Osaka the “America of Japan” (Nippon no Beikoku), Ōya thus compared Osaka with the western fount of mass culture and consumerism in the capitalist age.

Ōya went on to trace the consumerism of America, and by extension that of Osaka, to the “gospel of efficiency.” Adapted by white-collar workers (sarariiman) to the rigors of daily life—namely, to the basic demands of food, clothing, and shelter—this “practical philosophy” had rapidly become the creed of capitalist consumers. Committed to deriving the greatest benefit possible from their limited income, the sarariiman endeavored not simply to maximize the efficiency of basic daily consumption but to extend this principle to the pursuit of pleasure and enjoyment (kyōraku seikatsu). Even in the recession-ridden world of 1929, marveled Ōya, “young gentlemen (wakadanna) and white-collar workers (sarariiman) continued to sing and dance in Osaka’s cafes and dance halls” as if yearly bonuses were somehow automatic.

For Ōya and others, what threw the actions of Osaka’s wakadanna and sarariiman into high relief was the sharp contrast with life among their peers in Tokyo. Making note of the widening “difference in lifestyle be-

31. Ibid., pp. 64-67.
33. Ibid.
tween the middle classes (chûkan kaikyû) of eastern and western Japan,” Ôya traced the disparity primarily to historical happenstance. Ever since the Great Kanto Earthquake, he observed, Tokyo’s “middle classes” had steadily been thrust into a “desperate situation.” Gripped with fear that they might lose their jobs at a moment’s notice, the city’s sarariiman had become so anxious about their daily lives that they thought twice about investing in monthly commuter rail passes. In an effort to draw out the contrast between the middle-class lifestyles of post-earthquake Tokyo and Osaka, respectively, Ôya tellingly likened life in Tokyo to life in postwar Germany. Much as the First World War had driven Germany to its knees and raised America to its feet, the Great Kanto Earthquake had reduced Tokyo to a shadow of its former self—enabling Osaka to step into the cultural void. Whereas the sarariiman of Osaka continued to dance in the city’s entertainment districts, observed Ôya, those of Tokyo “danced boisterously” but to a very different tune: the “uneasiness” of hopelessness.34

More than a tad alarmed at the rise of Osakan “modernism,” Ôya decided to carry his cultural analysis one step further. His research left him so apprehensive of Osaka’s burgeoning “consumer culture” (shôhi bunka) that he began to trace its wider impact on Japanese society as a whole. In a second article, written in 1930, Ôya again shared his bleak findings with the readers of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun. Ominously titled “The Tokyo-ization of Osaka and the Osaka-ization of Tokyo (“Ôsaka no Tôkyôka to Tôkyô no Ôsakaka”), his article described the steady insinuation of the Osakan lifestyle into the Tokyo way of life. While Osaka dialect had once been a source of dismissive laughter in the capital, he noted, it could now be heard everywhere. Not only did it ring out in cafes and dance halls, the castles of consumer culture, it could be overheard in railway stations downtown, at “high-collar culture houses” (haikara bunka jutaku) in the suburbs, and on the team benches of elite college baseball teams. In the vaudeville houses and movie theaters of Tokyo—that is, in the meccas of modern media culture—Ôya anxiously observed that it was impossible to appreciate any entertainment at all without some knowledge of Osaka dialect.35

Having thus elicited evocative examples of the Osaka-ization of Tokyo, Ôya strove to shock Tokyoites out of their cultural complacency. He reminded them, first of all, that times had changed. Prior to the Great Kanto Earthquake, when Tokyo had been “the fount of Japanese culture” and Tokyoites had represented “all the people of Japan,” Osakans had been disdainfully derided as mimics who did their best to replicate the culture of Tokyo, but never managed to come close. In those by-gone days, it

34. Ibid.
seemed as if the “cultural supremacy” of Tokyo was unchallengeable. But those days were gone, wrote Ōya ominously: “Osaka has gradually achieved industrial and economic supremacy. Now, as its consumer culture is similarly achieving supremacy, Osaka threatens first to place Tokyo, then all of Japan, under its influence.”

Following six months of meditation on Osaka’s consumer culture, punctuated by several visits to the site of his waking nightmare, Ōya found himself at an editorial crossroads. What he had once considered an amusing cultural development centered in Osaka, and had then recast as a national cultural trend spearheaded by Osaka, he had finally come to identify as an ominous new cultural ethos mediated by Osaka. Spinning out his new thesis in a long Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun article entitled “The Conquest of Japan by Osakan Culture,” Ōya bluntly predicted that Osaka’s “newly-risen culture” (shinkō bunka) would soon achieve national cultural hegemony. With obvious ambivalence, he told the story of Osaka’s growing cultural influence—in the course of which its Americanesque culture had acted as the vanguard of a cultural revolution, just a step away from “conquering Japanese culture” as a whole.

Placing this development in historical perspective, Ōya recalled that the Kansai area (and Osaka within it) had dictated the terms of Japanese culture up through the Edo era. Indeed, during the over thousand-year reign of urban Kansai as a virtual “museum of Japanese culture,” Edo had subsisted as one its “colonial cities.” According to Ōya, however, all this changed in the Meiji era. With the introduction of a modern “Western culture” based on “technological civilization,” cultural hegemony had shifted from the Kansai to the Kanto. Ōya observed that this new modern culture, explicitly modeled on the West, was brokered by the Japanese state from and within the Japanese capital of Tokyo. In 1923, when the Great Kanto Earthquake literally destroyed this “cultural core,” it was as if “the entire nation had lost its brain.” Given that the First World War had earlier destroyed the British, French, and German civilizations on which Japan had modeled its modern culture, argued Ōya, the Japanese nation was thus hit with a double whammy. Even if the state had been able to immediately resuscitate Tokyo after the quake, there was no longer a model of European culture to emulate.

In the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake, which came on the heels of the First World War, Japan found itself in the grips of a cultural crisis. Globally, claimed Ōya, two new “cultural types” (bunka no kata) had come to the fore: the “social culture nurtured by Soviet Russia” and the

36. Ibid.
“100 percent capitalist culture produced by America, the world’s greatest nouveau riche nation (narikin koku).” In Japan, with the ascendency of Osaka, American capitalist culture had seized the day. Having imported and steadily cultivated American culture, Japan’s second city now stood in a position to launch its capitalist values into the cultural void left by the destruction of its first city.

Ôya described Osaka’s American culture as a “lifestyle culture” (sei-katsu bunka) based on consumer economics—one that “shone forth as a new wonder [of the world]” in the electric urban nightscape of cafes, dance halls, and department stores—but he ultimately attributed this culture to the unique “enterprise of people from the Kansai” (Kansaijin no jigyô). Singling out the Kansai’s suburban train network as a prime example of “structure, planning, and investment,” Ôya praised it as a model of economy, comfort, and efficiency. In short, he represented it as the iconic embodiment of Osaka’s core cultural values. He contrasted this “superb” railway system, in turn, to Tokyo’s extensive but woefully inadequate one, reasoning that it was only a matter of time before his fellow Japanese jettisoned the “idealistic, decorative culture” of Tokyo and embraced in its stead the “practical, utilitarian culture” of Osaka.

Ôya went on portentously to observe that Osaka was investing heavily in Tokyo’s reconstruction and was thus accomplishing the de facto “Kansai-ization” of the Kanto. Equally important, however, he noted that Osaka was using the media to orchestrate this takeover—offering us an interesting twist to Benedict Anderson’s argument about the role of newspapers in creating the “imagined community” of the nation-state. Taking advantage of their position at the center of Japan’s modern print culture, the nationally-circulated Osaka Asahi and Osaka Mainichi newspapers were propagating Osakan values; and American-modeled, Osaka-based illustrated mass magazines such as the Sunday Mainichi were splashing Osaka’s new “lifestyle culture” across their colorful pages. “Before long,” predicted Ôya, “Japanese will embrace an outlook on life commensurate with that of a capitalist [consumer] society.” Labeling this development “Americanism/Osakaism,” he declared it a “cutting edge culture” (sentan bunka) that threatened first to “conquer and control” Tokyo, then to “subjugate the rest of Japan”—unless and until Tokyo and Tokyoites reassumed their rightful position of national cultural hegemony.

Ôya was joined in his escalating anti-Osakaism by the film director Mizoguchi Kenji, among others, whose classic melodrama “Osaka Elegy” (“Naniwa Ereji,” 1936) depicted the city as a capitalist dystopia where men and mammon ran rampant, corrupting the future mothers of the nation by

39. Ibid., p. 154.
40. Ibid., pp. 156-158.
41. Ibid.
making them into *moga* (modern girls). In the last analysis, I would argue, Ōya, Mizoguchi, and other critics like them succumbed to a kind of cultural paranoia, or what Pickering calls “moral panic”. Taken aback by Osaka’s sudden rise to prominence, they allowed their fears to get the best of them. Rather than projecting a pluralistic model of national culture that acknowledged the history and customs of the nation’s second city, they resorted to a defense of the metropole that portrayed its invented traditions as universal and absolute.

Whereas Ōya and Mizoguchi shrank from the prospect of a multicultural nation, choosing instead to exaggerate the binaristic cultural rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo and to throw their weight behind the metropole, one other, equally influential opinion maker suddenly reversed his field. Admitting to the error of his ways, Tanizaki Junichiro openly confessed his earlier “antipathy” (*hankan*) toward the Kamigata area (and more specifically toward Osaka) and resolved to put things right. This acerbic critic, who had once declared Osakans a people devoid of “civic virtue,” professed a retraction in 1932. In an article entitled, “Osaka and Osakans Observed,” published in the national journal of opinion *Chūō Kōron*, the writer confessed to his foibles as an Edokko. Noting trenchantly that Kyoto was commonly considered the mistress of Osaka, he hastened to add that Tokyoites vilified Osaka less out of contempt for its deficiencies than out of fear of its strength as a “metropolis” (*dai tokai*) that threatened the very identity of the capital. Indeed, insisted Tanizaki, there was an argument to be made that the Kansai rather than the Kanto was most typically Japanese and that Osakans truly embodied the spirit of the nation.

Tanizaki, who had once portrayed himself as a stranger in a strange land, now declared Osaka his “second homeland” (*dai ni no furusato*). Admitting that he had earlier succumbed to the deep-seated chauvinism of the Edokko, Tanizaki redeemed himself by turning the cultural tables on Tokyo. Whereas he had earlier played up his old identity as a native son of Tokyo, providing examples of crass Osakan behavior, the expatriate now produced positive portraits of Osakan life conceived to burst the self-righteous bubble of Tokyoites. Tanizaki noted that Osaka’s dense urban

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44. Ibid., p. 352.
45. Ibid., pp. 394-395.
46. As Ken Ito compellingly argues, however, what Tanizaki really discovered was a “a home that was another world.” See Ken K. Ito, *Visions of Desire: Tanizaki’s Fictional Worlds* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 110-111.
neighborhoods provided a sense of community that Tokyo’s sprawling ones discouraged; that the local custom of exchanging newspapers (leaving one’s own behind for others to read) was not a sign of parsimony, but of rational, efficient, egalitarian behavior; and that the much-reviled Osaka intelligentsia was infinitely more manly and progressive than its pallid Tokyo counterpart.47 If Tanizaki thus took some of the sting out of Ōya’s and Mizoguchi’s intemperate criticism of Osakan culture, he hardly put an end to the bitter binaristic rivalry that they helped whip up. Fatefully, instead, this rivalry was simply removed to the proverbial back burner in the coming years—as nationalism trumped all forms of regionalism and the state impressed a transcendent form of cultural hegemony on the nation as a whole.

No sooner did the Pacific War end, however, than Osakans and Tokyoites were once again at one another’s throats. In answer to the negative cultural stereotyping to which Osakans were again subjected, the popular Osaka writer Oda Sakunosuke took to composing increasingly elegiac portraits of the city. In one, pointedly entitled “City of Trees” (“Ki no Miyako”), he confronted those who would put down his beloved city as a lifeless, gray, industrial metropolis.48 Tragically, according to the urban legend that even today allegorizes Oda’s life, this proudest of Osakan native sons was done in not merely by the tuberculosis that wracked his body, but by the cold indifference of those who failed to relieve his pain. As the Osaka bundan (literary world) spun the story of his death, Oda’s collapse from tuberculosis on a Tokyo commuter train in 1947 only resulted in death because the attending Tokyo physicians were uncaring and incompetent. Or, as one proud Osaka partisan allegedly put it, “Tōkyō no yatsura ni korosareta”: Oda was “done in by those guys from Tokyo.”

In 1961, as Japan’s postwar economic miracle materialized, some Tokyoites briefly, if also nervously, fretted about the resurgence of Osaka dialect as a fad.49 But Tokyo’s postwar rise as the nation’s undisputed political and cultural epicenter, combined with its new status as a “world city,” seems to have left Tokyoites largely disinterested in the cultural rivalry that once seemed to dominate their politics of local identity. The same cannot be said of Osakans, however, and certainly not of Osakologists: Tokyo remains their bête-noire. The cover of Ōtani Kōichi’s recently-published sequel, Osakaoology: On Customs, says it all. The conventionalized manga that graces the cover, drawn by the cartoonist Ishii Hisaichi,

47. Tanizaki, “Watashi no mita Ôsaka oyobi Ôsakajin,” passim.
49. I am grateful to Jayson Chun for alerting me to this fact. See Suesugi Setsuko, “Ôsaka ben bûmu.” Shisô no kagaku, 27 (March 1961), pp. 54-57.
depicts an ethnographer (Ôtani himself?) asking three caricatured foreign informants for their impressions of Osaka. The first offers the opinion that “Osaka closely resembles New York,” the second that “it is just like Hong Kong,” and the third that “it also resembles Damascus, as a matter of fact.” Taken up short, the ethnographer stares intently at his notes. “So,” he blurts out in Osaka dialect, “I guess the only place that Osaka doesn’t resemble is Tokyo.”

Paradoxically, in this humorous scenario, Osaka, not Tokyo, is the true “world city”—so cosmopolitan that it recalls New York, Hong Kong, and Damascus. In the introduction to his book, in fact, Ôtani goes to identify Osaka as the nation’s true metropole: “The subject of this book is Osaka, but this encompasses more than the theme suggests. Naturally, we will go inside Osaka, but the reason for focusing on Osaka is simply to narrow the view. This book might as well be called ‘Japanology: On Customs.’” Not able realistically to challenge the cultural hegemony of Tokyo, Ôtani and his fellow Osakaologists have altered the thrust of their argument about place-based cultural identity. They have convinced themselves (and are out to persuade us as well) that, culturally speaking, Japan is Osaka (not Tokyo) writ large. This latest conceptual twist is both stunning and satisfying in its dismissal of the cultural hegemony of the capital, and it is certainly tempting to mount a Spivakian defense of the move in the spirit of “strategic essentialism.” But, in the final analysis, Ôtani’s claim to Osakan superiority is no less culturally arrogant in its way than the Tokyo centrism it rebuffs.

No more “natural” than the Tokyo-centric national culture that it rejects, the Osaka-centered regional culture that Osakaologists champion is a pastiche of local customs passed off as timeless Tradition. Still, it is hard not to feel some sympathy for the cultural underdogs, whose benign delusion of cultural superiority has, after all, been bent to the worthy cause of local cultural autonomy. In the stale cultural atmosphere of the postwar Japanese nation-state, where Tokyo centrism both reigns and rules, Osakaology might also be regarded as a welcome strategy of resistance.

50. Ôtani Kôichi, Ôsakagaku: sesô hen, cover.
51. Ibid., p. 3.
Chapter 12
Inventing Jazztowns and Internationalizing Local Identities in Japan*

E. Taylor Atkins

I Introduction

Ronald Toby’s accomplishments and contributions to Japanese studies are so intimidatingly abundant, it would be all but impossible either to enumerate or to digest them all. There is little doubt that his debunking of the sakoku myth will be his most readily remembered legacy, for thereby he placed a country previously regarded as peculiarly aloof and isolationist squarely within the sweep of early modern world history. Each of the contributors to this volume has been influenced by particular aspects of his work. In my own case, I have found his virtuosic use of (for lack of a better term) “non-verbal” sources (e.g., woodblock prints, pictorial encyclopedias, maps, etc.) to be particularly instructive and inspiring. Utilizing materials that had previously been the exclusive domain of art historians, aesthetes, and connoisseurs, Professor Toby has taught us many lessons about how Japanese of various social categories imagined themselves in relation to their immediate neighbors in East Asia and myriad peoples in more distant lands. His example made it seem all the more feasible for me to pursue research on Japanese notions of identity by using musical evidence. In much the same way that Professor Toby has mixed traditional historical methods with anthropological theories and fieldwork (including personal observations of festivals in which participants masqueraded as early modern Koreans), the essay that follows employs an eclectic evidentiary base to understand how Japanese imagine themselves in relation to their fellow

*I read an earlier draft of this essay in 1995 at the Ph.D. Kenkyūkai at International House of Japan, Tokyo, and at the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. I am grateful for comments received at both meetings.
countrymen, their immediate neighbors, and the wider world, via the art of jazz.

If it were possible to be in more than one place at one time, then early October would be an opportune moment to be a jazz fan in Japan. On the same autumn weekend, the Yokohama Jazz Promenade and the Köbe Jazz Street, two of the East Asian archipelago’s biggest jazz festivals, attract hundreds of musicians and thousands of enthusiasts to swing with abandon, while marinating in the unique local auras of these self-styled “exotic” port cities. But the fortuitously omnipresent jazzbo would doubtless discern dissonance in the historical narratives presented in the advertising for these respective events: while Promenade promotions declare, “Now, as always, jazz is Yokohama” (ima mo, mukashi mo, jazu wa Yokohama), Köbe ads proclaim their city to be “the cradle of Japanese jazz” (Nihon no jazu no hasshōchi).

Jazz reached Japanese shores at roughly the same time that the first American jazz recordings were made. The music rapidly entranced urban mods but also sparked outrage among those determined to protect native social and aesthetic mores from its influence. Jazz was, simply put, a major source of contention, exacerbating generational, socioeconomic, and aesthetic cleavages in a century of continual upheaval. But as the curtain closed on that most remarkable of centuries, several Japanese cities actively embraced and promoted jazz as an essential ingredient of their distinctive local auras. As municipalities since the 1970s have sought to identify, preserve, and promote local identities, and thereby attract tourists, Yokohama, Köbe, and Yokosuka, in particular, have embellished their respective places in Japan’s jazz history and developed competing events and festivals that celebrate local jazz heritage.

Elsewhere I have argued that jazz artists and aficionados developed a variety of musical and discursive strategies to authenticate a foreign art form performed and appreciated by Japanese. Here I investigate the ways in which local governments and citizens’ groups have used jazz to authenticate their local identities and their place in a national narrative of internationalization (kokusaika). The appropriation of jazz—hailed by so many as the quintessential global music—as an integral element of local identities is indicative of a number of important themes in contemporary Japanese experience: the quest to define distinctive local identities, in spite of (if coincident with) the ubiquity of totalizing notions of Japanese national homogeneity; the centrality of cosmopolitan experience to that process of local, identity formation.

indigenous identity formation; and the concomitant aesthetic, social, and institutional legitimization of an art once regarded as emblematic of cultural imperialism and the annihilation of indigenous social and aesthetic values.

The process by which local identity, community pride, and sense of place are created and commodified through music is by no means unique to Japan. Both New Orleans and Kansas City boast jazz museums testifying to their importance in the music’s history; St. Louis purportedly gave us ragtime, while Chicago and Helena, Arkansas, claim blues as distinctive local products; and Memphis portrays itself as the maternity ward where “the blues had a baby and they named it rock and roll.” These appropriations—designed to engender pride of place in locals and to render place into product for the tourists—necessitated significant reevaluation of the musical styles involved and the people who created them. Jazz, originally blasting from the bordellos of Storyville, was a source of shame to respectable New Orleans until its value as consumable curio became apparent. In all of these cities, the African Americans responsible for creating so much of the music did so as literal outsiders, whose homes, schools, businesses, and night spots were spatially and symbolically segregated from the rest of town. The appropriation of their music as a distinctive local commodity entailed retroactively embracing them as native sons and daughters, giving them and their art a legitimacy few of them lived long enough to enjoy. By the 1970s, Lawrence Levine writes, a critical consensus not only acknowledged jazz as a legitimate art, but also conceded that jazz had “transformed our sense of art and culture,” and “bridged the gap between all of the categories that divided culture; a music that found its way through the fences we use to separate genres of expressive culture from one another.”

In the context of Jim Crow America, the appropriation, assimilation, and legitimation of African American music by municipal governments and cultural institutions invariably dominated by white Americans was every bit as sensational a gesture as their Japanese counterparts’ embrace of jazz as indigenous cultural commodity. Still, it remains remarkable that a music that most Japanese have long regarded as alien maintains any authentic potency at all for evoking a sense of “native place” (furusato). It is said that


enka, the maudlin genre that most Japanese of the first postwar generations would consider to be the musical expression of the nation’s soul, most effectively conjures nostalgic longings for native place. Urban Japanese detached from their rural roots can, through enka, vicariously return to unspoiled landscapes marked with “forested mountains, fields cut by a meandering river, and a cluster of thatched-roof farmhouses,” thus recapturing a “desirable lifestyle aesthetic” of “artlessness and rustic simplicity.” Though musically enka is an eclectic genre, its lyrics evoke a pure, unaffected, insular, and quintessential Japaneseess, spatially rooted in the mountain hamlets and fishing villages which many believe are their true “native places.” Furthermore, in much the same way that American rappers must demonstrate their “street cred,” and country and western singers are obliged to exemplify a folksy “downhome” quality, successful enka singers are likewise compelled to establish a “continuing link” to the provincial furusato.

But jazz as indigenous cultural artifact suggests an alternative view of furusato and of modern Japanese experience: native place need not be pure and sequestered; it can also be the site where alien cultures are encountered, debated, tamed, and assimilated. The enka narrative is one of loss and cultural atrophy: Christine Yano refers to enka as “Japan’s internal monologue,” which seems to say, “We long for our Japanese selves.” But this depiction of modern Japanese experience is inverted in the jazzy narrative to valorize the “progress” and cosmopolitan awareness of kokusaika. Jazz thus authenticates the experience of those Japanese to whom enka does not speak, for whom an artless village life holds neither meaning nor attraction, to whom “native place” is where they became acclimated to exoticism, and to whom authentic “Japaneseness” means openness and eclecticism rather than insularity and purity.

What follows is a description and analysis (based on fieldwork conducted primarily in Yokohama in the mid-1990s) of this process by which local identity is established in Japan through the invention of “jazztowns.”

II Sinking Roots

In the early 1980s, the Yokohama City Planning Bureau unveiled its ambitious machi-zukuri (“town building”) plan, a blueprint to guide and

promote the economic and social development of each ward for the twenty-first century. The cardinal principle of machi-zukuri—a variation of the catchphrase furusato-zukuri—in Yokohama was to shape the port city’s future in a manner congruous with its unique heritage as the “window” through which western European and North American cultures blew into Japan. Like most Japanese cities, Yokohama has had to define itself in relation to Tokyo and to contend with the capital’s seemingly irresistible gravitational pull, which sucks all political and economic function into its own core. Yokohama is particularly cursed by its proximity to the monstrous metropolis, effectively rendering the port city—with a population roughly that of Chicago’s—into a “bedtown” for commuters to the capital. Little wonder then that Mayor Takahide Hidenobu urged Hamakko (Yokohama natives) to work for the realization of a “New City Yokohama,” a town in which “anyone can be proud and happy to live.”

Similarly jinxed by the nearness of Osaka, Kobe seems to have pursued a furusato-zukuri strategy similar to that of Yokohama: playing up its historical status as a kokusai toshi (“international city”), the place where foreign influences in technology, arts and architecture, business practices, and so on, were first introduced and applied. Were it not for the active ports of Yokohama and Kobe (whose name translates as “Sacred Door”), local historians and city promoters tell us, Japan would not have ice cream, gaslights, railroads, beer, or jazz. Neither city has allowed the sites of their respective former foreign settlements to deteriorate or go unrecognized: Yokohama’s Bluff and Kobe’s Kitano-cho are among the cities’ most lovely and frequently-visited districts; both cities also boast prominent Chinatowns. Tokyo and Osaka may imagine themselves to be the most internationalized of Japanese cities, but Yokohama and Kobe both claim much of the credit for making them that way: indeed, Asami Shigeki’s lengthy list of Yokohama innovations is subtitled “reading Yokohama, one can see Japan.” If modern Japanese have been open to foreign ideas and influence, it is because they have followed the examples set by Hamakko and their Kobe counterparts, who first lived with the foreign devils, played with their toys, and danced to their music.

In playing up their “exotic” histories of cohabiting with aliens and ingesting their cultures, Yokohama and Kobe promoters were consistent with major trends in domestic tourism campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. As
described by anthropologist Marilyn Ivy, the 1970s witnessed the Japan National Railway’s “Discover Japan,” which encouraged a nativist “(re)discovery” of provincial roots; but this campaign was supplanted in the following decade by the “Exotic Japan” project, which portrayed “all of Japan—whether pristinely native or recently imported” as a “montage of exotic [and consumable] objects.”¹¹ But whereas much of the imagery employed in the campaign to exoticize the national homeland evoked Japan’s ancient links to exotic continental (Indian and Chinese) civilizations, the Yokohama and Kōbe efforts address much more recent history, exoticizing those Western-derived commodities and customs which most Japanese take for granted as part of their everyday existence. In their respective attempts to define and valorize native place, Yokohama and Kōbe promoters must remind native and newcomer alike that beer and baseball, jitterbugging and jazz came from somewhere else, sinking roots locally before sweeping the nation.

III The Cutting Contest

In the last two decades, jazz seems to have become a particularly prominent element of this furusato-as-kokusai toshi self-image, no doubt because prominent civic positions are filled by jazz fans determined to advocate the music they love and raise its profile. It is also likely that the appropriation of jazz as local cultural artifact is the result of both the music’s stabilized status as a legitimate art and avocation, and the rising profile of individual Japanese artists in the international jazz scene, in the last three decades of the twentieth century.

From the time of its introduction in the 1920s, through the years of militarism, “spiritual mobilization,” and total war, and well into and beyond the Occupation era, jazz occupied an ambiguous cultural space that Japanese found irresistably fascinating yet undeniably frightening. The tensions that tore at modern Japanese society—nativism vs. cosmopolitanism, purity vs. hybridity, social stability vs. upheaval, and aesthetic edification vs. degradation—were acted out on the dance floors, on the bandstands, and in vigorous “jazz debates.” Young urban modernites enjoyed the sense of personal liberation and smug hipness the music conferred, while their parents, social scientists, and government officials fretted that jazz encouraged frivolity, licentiousness, and individualism, effectively rending Japan’s social fabric. But by the 1970s some three generations had grown up with jazz; rock and roll had stolen its thunder as a vehicle for adolescent discontent; and jazz was deemed no more responsible for the erosion of native social

and aesthetic mores than were industrial capitalism, political democracy, and militant feminism. Less than three decades after an official wartime government ban made Japan hell for jazz fans, Japan was internationally renowned as “jazz heaven” (jazu tengoku, or as France’s Jazz Magazine declared in 1975, the world’s nouveau paradis du jazz), a place where underappreciated American and even European artists could record and gig in a climate of respect, historical awareness, and quiet awe.

Moreover, after decades of suffering a reputation as singularly imitative and unimaginative poseurs, a handful of Japanese jazz artists emerged in the sixties and seventies who developed national and international reputations as original and uninhibited improvisors and composers. Elvin Jones, Sonny Rollins, and Art Blakey recruited Japanese sidemen; Boston’s prestigious Berklee School of Music welcomed promising youngsters from the East Asian archipelago on a regular basis (it is said that in the 1990s Japanese regularly constituted ten percent of the Berklee student population);12 and individuals such as Akiyoshi Toshiko, Watanabe Sadao, Hino Terumasa, Aki Takase, Watanabe Kazumi, Tiger Okoshi, Matsumoto “Sleepy” Hidehiko, Kawasaki Ryō, and Yamashita Yōsuke were regularly invited to record and perform in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Americas. Akiyoshi’s triple victory in the 1980 Downbeat poll (in the big band, composer, and arranger categories), the year after Ezra Vogel’s Japan as Number One put the western world on economic alert, signified that Japanese could create exemplary jazz and even best their American counterparts.

The legitimation of jazz as a pure art and benign social force, and the legitimation of native sons and daughters as superlative jazz artists, were perhaps necessary preconditions for the official appropriation of the music as a municipal symbol with community-building potential. In this climate of acceptance, Yokohama and Kobe both advanced claims as the “cradle of Japanese jazz” (Nihon no jazu no hassōchi)—each apparently ignoring the pretensions of the other—and used local cultural media to retell the music’s history in Japan in a manner magnifying local contributions. Furthermore, each city developed public festivals to celebrate local jazz heritage and thus enhance their respective self-images as the vanguards of internationalization in Japan.

Hamakko appear to have been the more aggressive claimants to jazz, if at times overplaying their hand in the “cutting contest” to own the music. The inaugural issue (December 1991) of the free culture monthly Yokohama bunka jōhōshi was devoted to claiming jazz as a distinctive local product. Recounting the story of ocean liner bandsmen who traversed the Pacific in the 1910s and 1920s, explored San Francisco’s music halls and

instrument stores, "traded their violins for saxophones," and brought rag-time, fox trots, and jazz back to Japan, the article's anonymous author leaves little room for doubt that Yokohama was peculiarly "blessed as the soil on which jazz was raised." Subsequent issues of Yokohama bunka jō-hōshi (as well as other local bulletins such as Yokohama no tayori, Yokohama Echo, Hamajazz, and Kōhō Yokohama) reiterated that "jazz came by ship" (jazu wa fune ni notte yattekita); though not neglecting to list Kōbe as one of the stops on the ocean liner routes that connected San Francisco and Seattle to Manila, Shanghai, and Yokohama, the narrators of the "Yokohama Jazz Story" (Yokohama jazu monogatari) present their city as chronologically the first and sole port of entry for jazz.

The relationship between Hamakko and jazz deepened with the years, we are told. The first commercial dance hall, Kagetsuen, opened in the Tsurumi district in 1920, followed by several others so that by 1930 the city boasted a half dozen such establishments. Composer Hattori Ryōichi (1907-1993) was reportedly inspired to write his first "Japanese blues" (1938's "Wakare no burūsu") while nursing a drink in a bar in the Honmoku district. The unusually heavy concentration of African American soldiers in Yokohama during the Occupation (1945-1952) made the port city a jazz "boom town," where aspiring Japanese beboppers could develop "hip chops" on the bandstand with jazz greats like Hampton Hawes and Harold Land. Japan's oldest jazz cafe, Chigusa, founded in 1933 and resurrected from the ashes of war in the late 1940s by Yoshida Mamoru (1913-1994), became the hangout/schoolroom where rising stars such as Watanabe Sadao, Moriyasu Shōtarō (1924-1955), and Akiyoshi Toshiko studied the latest US recordings. Years after Yoshida (recipient of the Yokohama Culture Prize in 1986) died, Chigusa remains a monument to the local roots of jazz, drawing aficionados from around the country on

what writer Hiraoka Masaaki calls “jazz café pilgrimages” (jazu kissa junrei). All of this evidence is invoked to appropriate jazz as a Yokohama “trademark,” to remap the city as the “native place of jazz” (jazu no furusato).

The “Yokohama Jazz Story” is challenged (albeit usually indirectly) by other municipalities claiming credit for jazzing Japan. Often dubbed Japan’s “gateway to Asia” (in contrast to Yokohama, the “gateway to the West”), Köbe stakes its own claim as the “cradle” or “seismic center” (shingenchi) of jazz. Although one local writer concedes that “where jazz chronologically first landed in Japan, Köbe or Yokohama, is unknown,” proponents point out that the first “real,” improvised jazz was performed by Filipino emigres in Köbe hotels and ballrooms, and that the first Japanese to attempt “ad lib” solos followed their example. The Laughing Stars, regarded by many as the first “professional” Japanese jazz band, was based in Köbe and sponsored by a local music dealer. Moreover, they say, the 1923 Kantō Earthquake that leveled much of Tokyo and Yokohama provoked a mass migration of musicians and entertainers to western Japan, shifting innovations in popular entertainment away from the capital region to the Kansai region, where dance halls and cafes proliferated along the route between Köbe and Osaka.

My observations are related principally to Yokohama and Köbe, but it is worth mentioning in passing the claims of other aspiring jazztowns, though they have not always poured as much energy into appropriating jazz as Köbe and Yokohama have. Osakans insist that their city—in Oya Sōichi’s wry estimation, “the America of Japan”—was the “jazz mecca” of the 1920s. One local encyclopedia maintains that “jazz came from Osaka” (jazu wa Osaka kara): “The modern city of Osaka was the base where cultures were imported from overseas, and disseminated to the interior.” Early jazz stars Nanri Fumio and Hattori Ryōichi were native sons, and Osaka earned renown in the postwar period as the “hot jazz” capital (a distinction

Kōbe also claims), the place where the trad style thrived in spite of the predominant modern jazz movement.25

Yokosuka, a city south of Yokohama that was home to a major Japanese naval base before World War II and a US naval station since then, also commemorates its jazzy heritage with three statues of jazz musicians. Decorating the sidewalks in the Americanized section of town near the base, the sculptures memorialize those Japanese musicians who performed in US servicemen’s clubs during and after the Occupation. Even the northern provincial city of Sendai makes a modest claim. “It is not well known,” Kikuda Susumu wrote in the Nihon keizai in 1995, “but in the early 1950s Sendai was a jazz town [jazu no machi].” At the “dawn of Japanese jazz” several “first-rate West Coast pros” were among the US GI’s stationed there, Kikuda maintains, leaving “footprints” in “furusato Sendai.”26

IV Festive Histories

Aside from historical writing, the jazz festival has proven to be a popular and effective way of creating a sense of community jazz heritage. The New City Yokohama plan urged citizens and city officials to collaborate in the creation of “events” that promote the city’s kokusai toshi legacy, and jazz festivals fit the bill. Promotions for Yokohama’s many jazz fest—the Asahi Jazz Matsuri, Kōhoku New Town Summer Jazz, the Ōkurayama Jazz Society concerts, and the Honmoku Jazz Festival (which since its 1981 debut is said to draw jazz fans “from Hokkaidō to Okinawa”—invariably attempt to persuade audiences that “the sound of jazz suits Yokohama” and always has.27 In 1993 the city sponsored the first Yokohama Jazz Promenade, a weekend-long pub crawl featuring headliners who started their professional careers in Yokohama’s ubiquitous US servicemen’s clubs, such as Akiyoshi Toshiko and Hara Nobuo. Advertising blitzes repeatedly stressed the suitability of jazz to the city’s international character and historical role. In case anyone missed the message, festival planners mounted an impressive exhibit at the Port Opening Memorial Hall, with photographs and artifacts testifying to a seventy-year love affair between Hamakko and jazz.

The precedent for the Promenade, however, was Kōbe’s Jazz Street, first held in 1982. Both festivals take attendees on a tour of local jazz spots and

concert halls for a plethora of performances of all styles of jazz. The largest number of performance sites are concentrated in the so-called “foreign” districts of each city—Kitano-chō in Kōbe and the Port Town (the area extending south from Yokohama Station to the Yamate Bluff) in Yokohama—where most of the old dance halls, servicemen’s clubs, and cabarets were located historically. Moreover, the Promenade’s final acts perform aboard the Hikawa maru, an ocean liner docked at Yamashita Park, reminding attendees that “jazz came by ship.” Thus performance sites are carefully selected not only to acquaint natives and newcomers with the current scene but also to infuse them with a sense of jazz’s local historicity.

Recent ethnographic scholarship argues that municipal festivals (matsuri) have an “authenticating effect” on their communities, rooting them in a consensual vision of the past and defining their unique qualities. Jennifer Robertson observes that the city-wide matsuri in Kodaira is “perceived as a particularly cogent symbol of and condition for an ‘authentic’ community.” Likewise, Theodore Bestor contends that the “social and symbolic meanings” of the Miyamoto-chō matsuri are manipulated by planners and participants to invest the community with a historically rooted “aura of community identity and autonomy.” Redraw our borders if you will, local celebrants say to city planners through the matsuri, but we are still who we are and who we have always been. Bestor notes that in the case of Miyamoto-chō, the narrative of communal cohesion and distinctiveness is at best an “invented history,” but one to which the “traditional” custom of the matsuri lends credence.28

Of course the symbolic content of the matsuri described by Robertson and Bestor differs significantly from that of the Kōbe and Yokohama jazz fests: they utilize Shinto symbolism, traditional costume and music, and the o-mikoshi to establish the boundaries of native place and the continuity of indigenous traditions, local variations of a pure, essential “Japaneseness.” In contrast to the purportedly pure, timeless, and indigenous traditions valorized in the matsuri, the jazz festivals celebrate a legacy of modern cosmopolitanism and cultural hybridity: being modern is the tradition here, celebrants say. Yet nonetheless the jazz festivals function the same way as the matsuri, inventing a narrative of a seamless, continual, and felicitous relationship between jazz and the local population, thereby establishing a distinctive community identity.

This raises a couple of points worthy of note. First, the invented histories of these jazztowns are clearly purged of the turmoil and divisiveness jazz actually inspired. Consumers of these festive histories are led to believe that, even if jazz was controversial outside of its “native place”

(whether Yokohama or Kōbe), it always had a home here. This in spite of the fact that Kōbe, in November 1928, was the first municipality to enact and enforce draconian measures, architectural codes, and zoning restrictions designed to contain the moral contamination of the dance halls where jazz reverberated; Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, and every other city infected with “dance fever” (dansu netsu) lost little time following suit.29 The association of jazz with undesirable social elements of the post-World War II era—gangsters, pan-pan girls, juvenile delinquents, and arrogant American servicemen—likewise goes unmentioned. The local media and festivals produce “history lite,” portraying jazz as a benign sociocultural phenomenon that captivated and thus distinguished the locals.

This brings me to a second point, that jazz contributes to and characterizes an essential civic unity which in reality is fictive. All efforts to define local or national character necessitate the erasure of difference and conflict; thus the invented histories of jazztowns imply that jazz was something that all Hamakko or Kōbekko could and did embrace because of their distinctively tolerant, cosmopolitan natures. This in spite of the fact that jazz has always effectively functioned as a marker of class or status, within the jazztowns no less than without. Simply put, cosmopolitan airs were and remain expensive, and not all residents of either port city have had equal access to the social connections and financial resources necessary to put on such airs (Yokohama jazz historian and cafe proprietor Yoshida Mamoru frequently remarked on the high price of dance hall admission and imported records, in effect suggesting that jazz was available only to select groups of Hamakko).30 Yet promoters of the Yokohama-as-jazu no furusato image express a naive belief in the power of jazz to unify diverse classes of people, and thereby to construct communities, a belief at odds with the historical record.

V Inventing Jazztowns as Furusato-zukuri

Robertson remarks that all efforts to define and construct native place (furusato-zukuri) occur in a context in which the “dominant metropole” of Tokyo always serves as the principal referent: furusato and Tokyo operate as antonyms; furusato is everything Tokyo is not, and vice versa: furusato signifies the pure, the indigenous, the time-honored and traditional, while Tokyo represents the hybrid, the alien, and the modern and globalized.31 However, furusato-zukuri (or machi-zukuri) campaigns in Yokohama and Kōbe, while retaining Tokyo as the principal referent, attempt something else altogether: to out-Tokyo Tokyo by claiming credit for initiating Ja-

With regard to jazz, official appropriations of the music as municipal soundtrack occur in the context of Tokyo’s dominance of the jazz scene. Tokyo is, quite simply, one of the world’s most vibrant jazz capitals, boasting a staggering wealth of clubs and “live houses.” It lures rising stars away from respectable jazz scenes in Osaka, Kyōto, Nagoya, and Fukuoka, for aspiring Japanese jazz musicians go to Tokyo to “make it” in the same manner that their American counterparts try to break into the dominant New York jazz scene. The invention of jazztowns is supposed to serve as a corrective by providing historical perspective which suggests that jazz has a local (read: non-Tokyo) pedigree. The invention of jazztowns thus contributes to the broader effort of engendering local identity and pride of place by claiming innovations (koto hajimete) wrongfully credited to the gluttonous capital.

Robertson also writes that “Furusato-making and internationalization are two mutually constitutive modalities of modernity: the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ recuperate each other and converge in the latest contemporized version of postwar modernity. The conception of eternal recurrence (‘tradition’) and the belief in progress (‘internationalization’) are complimentary if refractive.” While she thus notes the irony that native place-making (furusato-zukuri) and internationalization (kokusaika) depend on each other for self-definition, she nonetheless is bound by her data base (in small villages, towns, and hamlets) to conceive of them as opposing processes. They remain discursive opposites. However, furusato-zukuri and kokusaika are never more “complimentary” than in the port cities under scrutiny here: promoters of Kōbe and Yokohama as kokusai toshi need not pose the “native” and the “international” against each other, for the “international” is what constitutes the “native.” Native place in this case is not defined in opposition to the alien or the international, because the whole basis for distinctive local identity rests on a historical legacy of appropriating the alien and international and transmitting it to the rest of the nation.

Moreover, by thus defining their respective native places as the legacy of kokusaika, Yokohama and Kōbe residents offer a vision of furusato that directly opposes the exalted rural ideal commonly enshrined in the term. The placid, cyclical, rural existence usually valorized in furusato discourse is subverted in an alternative conception that celebrates the dynamic, progressive, urban experience “native” to them. For these people, native place resides in a space somewhere between “Japan” and “the world,” and they legitimize and authenticate its location by using the term furusato, which

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33. Potter, p. 158, observes a similar “process of constructing local identity in international terms” in the Tōhoku region.
others use to designate a more hidebound and insular space.

My argument here is that in the last two or three decades jazz has become the most important artistic signifier of this alternative conception of "furusato as kokusai toshi." Historically a source of major discord in Japanese society, jazz has emerged as an aesthetically respectable and socially legitimate expression of local distinction, civic unity, and international awareness. Much history needs to be swept under the rug in the process of inventing jazztowns, but jazz aficionados are unlikely to complain, as their beloved music attains a public profile unimaginable two generations ago.
I Introduction

A major theme running throughout Ron Toby’s work has been the problem of identity, specifically how ethnic identity has been represented by Japanese people in efforts to distinguish themselves from Koreans, among others. *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan* (1984) can be, and often has been, read merely as a case study in diplomatic history that challenged standard assumptions about how “closed” Japan was during the Edo period. Yet, it should be clear from Toby’s earlier work—and especially from his many publications since—that the main thrust behind this work was not so much diplomatic or political history, but an anthropological concern with how different groups of people construct collective, especially ethnic, identities. While *State and Diplomacy* is undeniably concerned with a theory of the “state” (a question Toby returned to most recently in his 2001 “Rescuing the Nation from History”—an article which I will take up below), it did so less from traditional political theory than from an anthropological interest in strategies for dealing with ethnic “Others.” In that work, Toby’s conclusions that the Bakufu qualified as a kind of “state” and that it was not a “closed” one both stem from the primary argument about the presence of Asians (especially Koreans) within the social consciousness of Edo-period Japanese. Not only does much of Toby’s subsequent work (especially after his overt “anthropological turn”) but even some of his earlier work reveal this ethnic and national concern.

Seen in the broad context of his entire oeuvre to date, *State and Diplomacy* may not be the best place to unpack the meaning of Toby’s contributions to our understanding of Japanese history. Rather, a shorter—and truly seminal—piece published ten years earlier tells us much more, both about the concerns that underwrote *State and Diplomacy* and the subse-
quent trajectory of Toby’s work. The article in question is the often unjustly overlooked “Education in Korea under the Japanese: Attitudes and Manifestations.” Although short (the entire essay is less than ten pages), it identifies the key problem of (ethnic) national consciousness (minzoku ishiki) in modern Japan’s relations with other Asian peoples, notes how a multi-ethnic empire sought to contain the threat to multi-ethnic empires posed by this kind of national identity, and calls for more attention to “the motivation and philosophy of Japanese colonial administration in Korea.”

This was truly a far-sighted call, as it took most historians of Japan at least ten more years to recognize the importance of Japanese colonial policy as a source, not simply of economic or political structures of oppression, but of a cultural form of intervention with and against the claims of ethnic identity. What Toby understood far earlier than most was that the discourse on “minzoku” was more than a simple reflection of “the way the Japanese are” (as one senior American scholar of Japan once told me, by way of discounting the importance of ethnicity in nationality theory). On the contrary, what emerges from any careful reading of Toby’s work is that representations of ethnic identity are far more than mere reflections of a supposed social reality and, in fact, are important strategies of cultural intervention that convey, implicitly and explicitly, specific political values.

It is, I believe, for this reason that the problems of ethnicity and the question of national or state formation run like a basso ostinato throughout the entire range of Toby’s work. The issue of ethnic identity is raised in sharp relief in his lead chapter on “Three Realms/Myriad Countries: An ‘Ethnography’ of Other and the Re-bounding of Japan, 1550-1750” in a book I edited with former Illinois colleagues. When I first read Toby’s manuscript, I couldn’t help but notice that he had provided the cultural material for the argument against sakoku which he had introduced almost twenty years earlier in *State and Diplomacy*. Not only was Japan not closed to Asia (and its very concept of “Asia” transformed by Western cartographic imaginations), but the West was now “within” Japan in very profound ways. The *Bankoku sozu*, a world map published in Nagasaki in


2. Consider that it was over twenty years later that a new generation of scholars brought these issues of colonialism and ethnicity to the forefront. Cf. Komagome Takeshi, *Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka tōgō* (Iwanami Shoten, 1996); Yasuda Toshiaki, *Teikoku nihon no gengo hensei* (Seori Shobo, 1997); and ‘Gengo’ no kōchiku: Ogura Shinpei to shokuminchi Chōsen’ (Sangensha, 1999). My own contributions in this vein include “Colonialism and Ethnic Nationalism in the Political Thought of Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961),” *East Asian History*, no. 10 (December 1995).
1647, marked the very clear presence, not of “red-haired” or “white” foreigners, but of a diverse ethnic panoply of identities that transformed the earlier more vague “Three Realms” consciousness of self and other.\(^3\) Thereafter, an ethnography of difference entered into Japanese conceptions of identity. Yet Toby was wise not to base his argument too closely on the language of identity that was actually employed, for he knew that the key concept of ethnicity had not been registered in the Japanese vocabulary.

The argument presented in “Three Realms/Myriad Countries” contrasts on this point with Toby’s recent review essay on “Rescuing the Nation from History.” Here, in order to rebut Mark Ravina and Luke Roberts’s challenge to his thesis that the Tokugawa bakufu was the Japanese (national) state, Toby relies on the use and significance of political terminology, both his and theirs. This attention to terminology includes both words used during the Edo period (eg., takokumono, wagakuni, kokka) and definitions provided by the contemporary dictionary, Kojien. Toby’s conclusion (“to confine kuni or kokka to any single meaning... is to blind ourselves to the way people in Edo-period Japan saw their world”)\(^4\) is at once unobjectionable, indeed commonsensical. Yet, this insight invites serious mis-interpretation, and therefore deserves further analysis. It would be a mistake to deduce from this important warning that we should not try to understand what people mean by the terms they employ, or that language usage is not central to identity assertions. No one who gives the kind of serious attention to primary sources that Toby does could discount the importance of the exact language employed in the sources as an important tool for understanding how people conceive the world they experience. I believe Toby’s point here is that we must capture the significance of identity through the terms people actually use themselves, and not impose our own preconceptions on them. This does not mean we should ignore the specific language through which people express and contest their identities, or worse that we should intentionally obfuscate such language in keeping with post-structuralist pronouncements on the opacity of language. Surely we are not to conclude that words resist retrievable historical meanings, or that a word has so many meanings that any effort to restrict its unlimited free-play of meaning is misguided. In order to read Toby here fairly, we must first recognize his prior assumption that Edo period Japanese did not restrict the meaning of kuni or kokka to refer only to a single, centralized


state. He is in fact inviting us to take the next step and interrogate how these important terms were employed in struggles over political and cultural identity.

In short, I believe Toby is offering here, not a post-structuralist posture that takes language as an unreliable indicator of social reality (and thus a position that only language itself can serve as an object of serious study), but a call for more serious, historically informed research into the language of identity that will help us understand better the reality of national identity as it takes shape in Japanese history. Indeed, that is in fact what much of my own research has been concerned with over the last ten years (i.e., mainly years when Ron Toby and I were colleagues at the University of Illinois). What I intend to present below is my own kind of tribute to the influence Toby’s work has had on me and my own thinking about these matters. For the better part of that decade, we’ve both shared an interest in questions of national and ethnic identity and an understanding that such identities were represented in Japanese historical and anthropological discourse. Whereas his focus has been mainly on the Edo period, before the concept of minzoku was widely used, I have been looking at how the introduction and dissemination of the concept of minzoku (nation, ethnicity) transformed the ways in which national identity was understood and articulated in modern Japan. These different temporal frames lead us to different emphases, but the fundamental point—how to create the conditions for a more tolerant, multi-ethnic society—is very much our common ground.

Let me begin to unpack some implications of ethnic (minzoku) identity for a liberal democratic Japan by beginning with the relationship of history to the nation. In the review cited above, Toby calls us to “rescue the nation from history,” a not too thinly veiled reference to (and inversion of) Prasenjit Duara’s argument that we should “rescue history from the nation.” In a sense, I agree with Toby that it is more important to rescue the nation from history than to rescue history from the nation, especially if our concerns are to enhance democratic society. Indeed, Duara’s argument is open to criticism on these grounds. The general problem he raises on narrativity, that is, the relationship of narrative to national identity, needs to be reconsidered when calls for rescuing history from the nation end up separating history from the state only to leave the nation and history in an even tighter embrace. At that moment, we need to seriously interrogate the meaning of this nation that has been left, often silently, in history’s embrace while the state, we suppose, just withers away. As we have seen in the former Yugoslavia, rescuing an ethnicized nation out from under a multi-ethnic state may not be in the best interests of democracy, pluralism or tolerance.

5. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.)
Perhaps we should begin with Duara’s argument that a specific form of evolutionary History has served to reinforce the sense of the nation-state and its “dubious claim to an evolving, monistic subjecthood.” Duara’s attention to the variety of alternative identity claims that often challenge the homogeneity of nationalist ideologies is important, as it reminds us that national identity always remains a contested practice. Yet Duara’s argument that nationalist ideologies tend to conflate the distinction between the nation and the state under the weight of modern, linear historical time can yield the impression that the problem of a distinctive national culture is merely displaced by History onto the particularism of a trans-national East against the universality of the West. Ironically, imperialism and colonialism in East Asia lose their historical particularity as they are reduced to derivative forms of a Western model of imperialism, and the nation appears less as a site where East Asian ways of being modern were negotiated and more as an imitation of modern identity forms spawned by the West.

But a closer look at the function of historical narratives in Japanese imperialism might question whether history should be reduced to Western forms of universal time, or whether from a postcolonial perspective, the nation should be “rescued from History.” Does this mean the nation should only be rescued from the Westernized state and not from an ethnic national identity? Or does it mean history should also be rescued from all homogenized, nationalized forms of cultural or racial identities? An emphasis on the historical specificity rather than the (Western) sameness of all national identities exposes certain limitations to the project of rescuing history from the nation—even if the nation can be equated with the state—within the context of colonialism in East Asia. Before concluding that “history must be rescued from the nation” or “the nation must be rescued from history,” we first need a better understanding of the actual ways in which nation and state have been mobilized as distinctive identity claims in modern East Asia. Lacking this understanding, we might very well rescue the nation from history only to put the nation at the mercy of ethnology, thereby playing into the hands of ethnic nationalists like Milosevic and others. Such a scenario is not merely a hypothetical possibility, but a rather precise summary of what happened in Imperial Japan during the late 1930s.

If we are to grasp the full potential of historical narratives as national forms of identity, then we also need to de-couple the presumed connection between national and ethnic identity. Today, it may be fashionable in some academic circles to speak of the slipperiness of the concept of nation—or

6. Duara, 16.
7. Duara, 29.
even the polysemy of the nation (as it is of the concepts of “race” and “ethnicity”). But it would be more accurate to say that the global discourse on nationality in the twentieth century was marked less by “polysemy” than by a remarkable degree of agreement as to what the nation is and what its distinctive identity claims (separate from those of the state) are.

This is especially true in East Asia, where a common political vocabulary drew a clear distinction between the nation as an ethnic people (minzu; minzoku; minjok) and the state (guojia; kokka; kukka). Korean nationalists under Japanese imperialism were especially sensitive to the differences between their ethnic nationality as Koreans (minjok) and their status as nationals (kokumin) of the Imperial Japanese state. Writing on the problem of nation and historical narrative under Japanese colonialism, Korean historians like Ch’oe Namsôn (1890-1957) and Sin Ch’aeho (1880-1936) sought not to rescue the nation from history, but to rescue history from the Imperial Japanese state by associating historical narratives with the Korean minjok, or ethnic nation. All across the East Asian region, the last hundred years of political struggle have been shaped in fundamental, although varying, ways by the intersections between the distinctive national claims made by the modern state and the ethnic nation. Without a clear awareness first of how national identity was conceived as distinct from the state in East Asian political discourse, we run the risk of failing to understand the political dynamics that informed imperialism, colonialism, and nationalist liberation movements throughout the region.

To truly appreciate the ironies involved in these missions to rescue the nation, the state, or history, we need to reflect more deeply on theories of national and ethnic identity. This does not necessarily mean that national identity itself should be represented as an abstraction, or that the important forms of difference lie more in a constantly shifting personal identity than they do in the claims of the collective. But it would certainly help to start by recognizing the artificiality of the very concept of ethnicity itself. As Naoki Sakai has argued, “Since it is generally accepted that the nation (kokumin) is a Gesellschaft, an associative community mediated by the rationality of the state, whereas the ethnos (minzoku) is a Gemeinschaft, a natural community prior to state mediation, few historians have taken into serious consideration the view that such a natural community as the ethnos is also manufactured in modern discourse.” Sakai is right to draw our attention to the invented nature of these ethnic identities. Yet, this naturaliza-


tion of ethnicity (or “ethnos”) as distinct from the invention of the nation and the state often invites a different and paradoxical claim that separating ethnicity from the political state liberates one from nationalism, when in fact such a gesture may simply enhance the legitimacy of ethnic nationality as, ironically, a more natural identity. By pausing a moment before we embrace ethnic identity, we may find ourselves concerned rather than cheering when, in the post-Yugoslavian world, we witness celebrations of the withering away of the multi-ethnic state and its replacement by sometimes diasporic, sometimes territorialized, forms of collectivized, ethnic identities.

The distinction between ethnicity, nationhood and the state is neither merely of historical interest, nor a pedantic concern. Rogers Brubaker has uncovered the limitations of approaching national identity as simply the result of a boundary consciousness that merely reflects the ideology of the territorial state, and he has called attention to the ways in which nationhood as a marker of shared ethnic identity has functioned within the territorial state, even while often hostile to the state. The functions of this ethnicized nationhood have rarely yielded a more democratic society. At stake in the debates over national identity are competing forms of citizenship, with different implications for immigration policies and the relationship between different kinds of national identities. Moreover, Brubaker’s insights into the relationship between the “homeland nationalism” of diasporic ethnic groups and the nationalizing nationalism of certain postcolonial nation-states suggests that the dynamics of modern imperialism cannot be fully comprehended without an awareness of how ethnicity itself has provided the foundations for a sense of nationhood that has functioned independently from the state itself.11 “Diaspora,” it turns out, is not the eruption of difference on the homogeneous map of modernity that it often pretends to be. It is more often the return of the repressed sameness of collective ethnic nationality whose distance from the conventions of citizenship and the state seduces individuals away from a more direct confrontation with their anxieties over the unsettling conditions of modern life.

Rather than escaping from the alienation of modern life to the promised land of ethnicity, democratic concerns today invite us to separate ethnic claims and nationhood claims. It should not be surprising then to find that Bluntschli’s distinction between nation and state resonated widely in a discourse that was truly global by the early twentieth century. Similarly, Ramsay Muir’s theories on the nation, although often forgotten today, had a considerable influence in these global theories of national difference. Muir wrote: “What do we mean by a nation? It is obviously not the same thing as a race, and not the same thing as a state. It may be provisionally defined as a body of people who feel themselves to be naturally linked to-

11. See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 55-76.
gether by certain affinities..." For Muir, the nation was a condition of being defined by the ways identity claims were enacted by its members. To be sure, those within the nation were distinguished from those without, but the nation as a whole could also liberate its members from larger identity claims of common race, creed, or language. Yanaihara Tadao, a liberal and influential interwar Japanese theorist on colonialism and nationalism, echoed the same distinction between nation, state and race, making a further distinction between the ethnic nation (minzoku) and the political nation (kokumin), the state (kokka), and race (jinshu). Yanaihara went so far as to repeat almost verbatim Bluntschli’s etymology of the word nation in the Latin word “natio” (even though, without a common etymological source between the Japanese term minzoku and the Latin natio, Yanaihara’s argument itself risked incoherence.) To simply suggest that it is the function of narrative itself that collapses this distinction between nation and state into a single subjectivity (the “nation-state”) not only undertheorizes the problem of nationality but also requires us to overlook the history of how the nation and the state actually have been understood by many people in Japan. In important ways, it also obscures the historical relationship between nation, state and the problem of imperialism in modern East Asia.

II The Nations of the Far East

Certainly I cannot do justice to the complex relationship of nation, state and imperialism in East Asia in this short essay. The best I can do is signal the importance of a distinction between ethnic nationality, political nationality and the state, while trying to provide a historical context for the significance of that debate. I wish to do so by drawing attention to a remarkable text, The Nations of the Far East, published in 1916 with furigana and simple syntax, rendering it accessible not only to Japanese but to non-native readers of Japanese (i.e., colonials) . It employed historical narrative to convey its point about national identity, but it did not introduce a particularly original view of history. Perhaps most important, this

14. The only information about the author given in the text is that he was a “Nakamura, Bachelor of Literature, who is conversant in history, and who currently lectures on Oriental history at the Tokyo Higher Normal School” (“Preface,” Kyokutô no minzoku, 3). After an exhaustive search, and textual comparison with Nakayama Kyûshirô (1874-1961)’s Tôyôshi kôza dai-ni-ki zenpen (Tokyo: Yûzankaku, 1940), I have concluded that the two were most likely one and the same. Nakayama, born Nakamura, was a renowned historian of China who graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1899, studied in Germany, and was a lecturer at the Tokyo Higher Normal School around 1910. He received his Ph.D. in 1925.
text was part of an encyclopedia series oriented toward a broad reading public, and as such it popularized among the masses certain assumptions about nationality that were common among many historians, political scientists, ethnologists and others in Japan at the time. *The Nations of the Far East* provides clear evidence that the nation (minzoku) was defined ethnologically, and distinct from the state, in Japan around the time of the First World War. But to fully appreciate the significance of this text, it needs to be set in the context of historiographical shifts in Japan during the early twentieth century, including how non-academic historians, especially those affiliated with the Min’yu¯sha publishing house that published the book, had been grappling with the problem of nation and state for several decades. It is important to remember that attitudes which would shape Japanese understanding of Chinese nationality developed within the domestic context of antagonistic relations between the Japanese people and their multi-ethnic state and subsequently those attitudes (and the liberationist dreams they inspired) were projected onto others outside of Japan.

*The Nations of the Far East* is of interest not because it expressed the brilliant originality of a single author (indeed the identity of the author remains uncertain), but precisely for its lack of originality. It embodies certain assumptions about national identity that reveal a deep rift within Japanese intellectual culture between ethnicity and political institutions, between the people and their state. These ideas were already gaining widespread currency in early twentieth century Japan, and Japanese historians were projecting them onto their own image of Asia. Shiratori Kurakichi, professor of Chinese history at Tokyo Imperial University was a leading player in this field of tôyôshi, or oriental history. He was a member of the second generation of the tôyôshi scholars that Stefan Tanaka has identified as key players in the development of a new, ideological use of Chinese history for Japanese imperialism. And, if the author of *Nations of the Far East* was indeed the historian Nakamura Kyûshirô, it is important to note that Nakamura was a student of Shiratori. Placed in that context, the views expressed in this text are not so much those of an original or even eccentric scholar, as they are emblematic of a rather systematic effort to reconfigure the field of Chinese studies in Japan to meet the demands of imperialism for a modern, scientific historiography.

Shiratori had organized the Asia Society (Ajia Gakkai) in 1905, along with Torii Ryûzô, in order to bring together scholars on “oriental history” around an activist program of re-shaping East Asia after Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese war.¹⁵ The problem of ethnic nationality (minzoku) was not peripheral to these concerns: it was central. Torii himself published a book in 1925 called *Far Eastern Nations* (Kyokutô minzoku) that almost

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¹⁵. Tanaka, 234-6.
literally repeated the title of Nakamura’s book, and Torii played a key role in the contribution of Japanese ethnology to this imperialist discourse on ethnic identity. Given these modernizing trends in the field, it would be misleading to characterize Nakamura’s approach as “conservative” or “indigenous.” Nakamura followed Shiratori in trying to bring modern Japanese historiography in line with the most recent developments in the West. But of all Shiratori’s students (and there were many), Nakamura’s particular contribution may lie in his combination of historical scholarship, policy concern, and a popularizing impulse.

Nakamura was well-known for writing works that were marketed to middle-brow readers, and this gave his historical interpretations a broader influence than his more academic colleagues had over the Japanese reading public. It also made him an easy target for his critics. Hirano Yoshitarô, still in his prefascist, Marxist days, singled out Nakamura as an “imperialistic” historian who “used research merely as an embellishment of [a] policy... [of] seeking the reform of China through dismemberment”. Yet, in one significant way, Hirano and Nakamura’s differences were not so great. Hirano, too, found the concept of ethnic nationality (minzoku) central to his own understanding of East Asia, which he envisioned as a political union of the various ethnic nations of the region. Hirano shared with Nakamura a definition of national and cultural identity along ethnic lines, and the sense that one political state (Japan) should manage the financial, military and diplomatic affairs of the region. This common belief in the nation as an ethnic, rather than necessarily a political, body contributed to the “common discourse [that] helps to explain why imperialists and Marxists could work side by side” in research on Chinese history. It was also the bridge for Hirano’s move from marxism to national socialism at the height of the Pacific War.

The rise of the new field of tôyôshi may have provided the matrix for this historiographical approach to the study of China, but it alone cannot explain the 1916 book The Nations of the Far East. For that we must also give some attention to the ideological mission of the Friends of the Nation Society (Min’yûsha) that published the book. The mission of this association is all the more important, since Nakamura’s name did not appear on the book’s cover (he is only partially identified in the editor’s preface) or title page. On the title page, one finds only the names of Tokutomi Sohô, the series editor and head of the Friends of the Nation, and Yoshino Sakuzô, editor of the 1916 volume. Yoshino was the leading populist intel-

lectual of the day, an advocate of “people-centered” (minponshugi) government who had taken to an ethnic (minzoku-teki) definition of nationhood in his writings. Tokutomi was a leading populist nationalist who had founded the Friends of the Nation Society in 1887, taking the name from the characters in the journal the association founded that year, The Nation’s Friend (Kokumin no tomo). Nationalism was a central concern from the founding of the Min’yūsha, but it was a self-consciously populist nationalism that sought to emulate the approach taken by the American leftist journal The Nation. Although some historians have emphasized Tokutomi’s nationalist conversion from around the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, his early sense that nationalism needed to be brought in line more with popular aspirations provided significant lines of continuity in his thinking, and that influence is clear in his preface to The Nations of the Far East.

There are at least two reasons this text claims our attention: its clear distinction between the ethnic nation and the state, and the way in which ethnic nationality displaced the state as the subject of Japanese historical narratives on China. Nakamura argued that the outbreak of the World War revealed that the problem of ethnic nationality had not been successfully handled by the prewar international system that was based on relations among territorial states. He noted that the postwar interest in ethnic nationality presented both opportunities and dangers for Imperial Japan, since Japan alone in East Asia was both an independent state and a member of the Western Powers. Imperial Japan’s ambivalent position with regard to both East and West offered advantages in re-evaluating the significance of the modern state to national identity in East Asia. Nakamura was conscious of the dangers ethnic separatism could pose for the Japanese empire, and he recognized that the empire’s subjects included those, like Koreans, who were not ethnically Japanese. Underlying Nakamura’s explicit reference to how the Japanese political state, as an empire, included Korea was a specific imagination of the Far East as a field of competing nationalities in which ethnicity was a historical and dynamic marker of non-Western identity in contrast to the Western privileging of the territorial state as the fundamental unit of modern national identity. This was a theory of imperialism that promoted ethnic identity, rather than one that sought to exterminate or suppress ethnicity.

This imagination of the Orient as a field of ethnic nationhood in contrast to the Western concept of the territorial state was no primordial or tradi-

20. On the connection between ethnic nationalism and Tokutomi’s Friends of the Nation Society, see Oguma, 98-103.
tional Asian view: after all, as State and Diplomacy reminds us, East Asia had seen various forms of the territorial state in its long history. Rather, Nakamura’s understanding of ethnic nationality as competing with the territorial state over national identity was indebted to recent advances in the theory of nationality made by Western scholars. Nakamura had just returned from two years’ study in Germany a decade earlier, and whether directly or indirectly, he clearly had been influenced by Bluntschli’s distinction between “the state” and “the Volk”.22 After World War I, there was a broad, international turn toward this Volksch, or ethnic, sense of nationhood as a challenge to the political nationalism centered on the state. Nakamura joined wholeheartedly in this “ethnic turn,” noting that the Great War had exposed the weakness of the boundary approach to identity in imperial states and in contrast exposed the relative strength of ethnic national identities.

Nakamura began with definitions of the key terms he would employ in his narratives: the ethnic nation (minzoku), the political nation (kokumin) and race (jinshu). He began with a lengthy exegesis of the term minzoku that would provide the foundation for his and many subsequent imaginations of national identity in 20th century East Asia. He explained that the term “the ethnic nation” (minzoku) was a neologism, like “The Far East” (kyokutô), and captured certain aspects of the English word “nation,” the French word “peuple,” and the German word “Volk,” all of which originally had different emphases but which had recently coalesced around the concept of a distinct national people who shared certain attributes. Nakamura listed these attributes as (1) a common ancestral blood lineage; (2) historical and spiritual unity; (3) common culture; (4) common religion; (5) common language and customs; (6) a sense of community or shared economic interest; (7) a common state structure that increases the sense of shared economic interests; (8) a sense of economic or industrial community. Nakamura listed these attributes in a roughly developmental order, but his point was to place primary emphasis on the premodern, ethnic origins of the nation:

To summarize the above eight elements of a nation (minzoku), the most important ones are the first (racial community) and the second (historical and cultural community, especially linguistic or literary community).... Thus, we can see that the nation (minzoku) is a grouping of humanity that has shared a continuous common spirit. Its union is not at all an accident, but is the result of an unbreakable communal grouping that possesses common relations handed down historically from ancient times. It is a solid, eternal union. Happenstance groupings or disbandings can never be nations.23

22. Kyokutô no minzoku, 10.
Nakamura’s definition of the nation is not at all an idiosyncratic one. It closely follows Joseph Stalin’s 1914 definition of the nation (“a historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”) which provided the foundation for many early twentieth century theorists of the nation.24 But whereas Stalin utilized this list of national characteristics to emphasize the contingency of this national formation and to undermine its natural racial bonds, Nakamura did not. He shifted the focus to the collective social markings of race and culture which traditionally have provided the defining elements of ethnicity.25 Distinguishing between ethnic nationhood and biological race was important to Nakamura, a student of Chinese history who wanted to emphasize the historical and cultural differences between the Japanese and Chinese peoples.

But more important than the differences between Stalin and Nakamura’s definitions of the nation was their common attempt to alienate (“rescue”) the nation from the (“capitalist” “Western”) state. Nakamura drew from this tradition of conceptualizing the nation as separate from the state, and he arrived at a concept of the nation that Brubaker, Connor and others have identified as the “ethno-nation” or the ethnic nation. While most theorists of the nation emphasized that no element or combination of elements could determine what a nation was in all cases, this concern with defining the nation itself was a response to Ernest Renan, who as early as 1882, tried to find a definition of the nation that was not identical to either the political state or biological race.26 These formative elements, along with Nakamura’s insistence that the ethnic nation (minzoku) must be distinguished from the legal-political concept of the political nation (kokumin) and the state (kokka) mark out a concept of ethnic identity as a distinct form of national identity.27 Although Nakamura never used the English word “ethnic,” it is essential in translating his concept of minzoku since he meant by that term a kind of nationality that was based in blood and culture, and which he distinguished both from biological “race” and the political or civic kinds of national identity that were formed in a closer relation-

27. Cf. “The (ethnic) nation [minzoku] approaches things from a blood-and-cultural perspective; the (political) nation (kokumin) approaches things from a political and legal perspective: the two are not the same thing.” Kyokutô no minzoku 10.
Moreover, his concept of nationality was a widely shared one during the interwar period, a reflection of the problems posed by such collective identities as the Germans, the Irish and the Serbians—identities that today we recognize as ethnic ones.

III The Ethnic Phantasm in the Post-Colonial Present

Through *The Nations of the Far East* we are able to link a domestic discourse that posited an ethnic nationality distinct from the state with an imperialist rhetoric that negated the very idea of an independent Chinese state. China was deemed not to be a state, merely a realm of competing ethnic nationalities. At the same time, by narrating Chinese history in ethnic terms, *The Nations of the Far East* revealed how history could be rescued from the state only to promote a national identity premised on an ethnic principle that might undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Republic and perpetuate Japanese imperialism. This text reminds us that Japanese imperialism, a combination of Japanese dominance in East Asia and a rhetoric of liberation from the West, cannot be comprehended simply in terms of anti-ethnic policy. By separating ethnic nationhood from the concept of the sovereign state, Japanese imperialists enforced a singular discursive regularity on the nation in both foreign and domestic contexts that located primary allegiance in the ethnic group, and only then considered the question of the state in the context of Japan’s privileged position in the region. To be sure, the text’s narratives rescued Chinese history from the state, but only by, at the same time, “rescuing” a sense of ethnic nationhood, both as a means of undermining a multi-ethnic Chinese state and of legitimating a domestic Japanese discourse on ethnic identity that set itself against Western, liberal beliefs in a multi-ethnic civic nation. This discourse on ethnic nationality as a modern construct enabled simultaneous calls for the absorption of Korean ethnicity into Japanese ethnicity and for the assertion of a distinctive Manchu ethnicity to be expressed in an independent Manchu state. These were distinct, but not necessarily contradictory, visions of the nation.

Space does not permit a complete treatment of this discourse on ethnic nationality as it unfolded in imperial Japanese discourse. Nor is the history of that discourse per se my primary concern here. Rather, what I want to highlight by way of conclusion is the intersection of the kind of historical narrative one finds in Nakamura’s text with the emergence of a specific ethnological approach to nationality in Japanese discourse. This complementary relationship between history and ethnology was a significant element in Japanese imperialist ideology.

In the years following the publication of *The Nations of the Far East*, this emphasis on ethnicity as the basis of national identity was reinforced by new developments in the field of anthropology. The 1920s brought out
a sharp division in Japan between those practicing formal anthropology and those who espoused cultural anthropology, which eventually meant ethnology. Formalists like the physician Nagai Hisomu moved towards a racial, eugenic interpretation of ethnicity (*minzoku*), while their views were contested by mainstream anthropologists in Japan who emphasized the plasticity and contingency of ethnos (*minzoku*) as a cultural phenomenon. The culturalists banded together under Yanagita Kunio and Oka Masao to emphasize ethnicity as a composite identity that results from cultural and racial changes, and they even founded a journal called *Ethnos* (*Minzoku*) in 1925 to convey their culturalist position. While this fascinating debate over the meaning of “*minzoku*” (itself evidence that ethnicity was slowly becoming independent of the concept of “race”) has yet to be studied in depth, here I can only suggest the ways that this culturalist, and self-consciously liberal, approach to ethnicity played a major role in imperialist and even fascist ideology in wartime Japan. Surprisingly, it was not the eugenicists or the “racial” theorists who played the leading role in Japanese imperialist ideology but the culturalists. Oka brought together dozens of Japan’s leading ethnologists under the umbrella of the state-supported Institute for Ethnic Nationality in Tokyo in the early 1940s where he propagated the fascist theories on Volk identity that he had learned while a student of ethnology in Vienna during the 1930s. The Institute was only the most visible instance of a broad discursive regularity in imperial Japan that supported ethnic identity as a composite form of cultural identity that was invested neither in the rights of citizenship nor in the political state.

In their war to “overcome modernity,” these imperialist ethnologists prefigured more contemporary postmodern imaginations of diasporic ethnic identities that allegedly float above and across territorial states. For anyone concerned with the conditions of democracy in today’s post-colonial (if not yet postmodern) world, the lessons of Japanese anti-Western imperialism are an important challenge to broaden our understanding of what a nation can mean and what relationships have existed between ethnicity, nations, states and historical narratives. How these distinct concepts of the ethnic

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30. On Oka’s role in founding the Institute on Ethnic Nationality and especially the influence of Nazi theories on the Volk in his understanding of ethnicity, see Nakao Katsumi, “*Minzoku kenkyūjo no soshiki to katsudō*” *Minzokugaku kenkyû*, vol. 62, no. 1 (June): 47-65. pp. 50-51. In English, see my “Building National Identity through Ethnicity.”
nation and the political state were used varied, but the basic vocabulary was shared by intellectuals in East Asia across the political spectrum who embraced the same terminological distinctions in their attempts to represent their identities and political aspirations. In particular, Nakamura’s narratives of Chinese history provide a useful reminder of how, “outside of the West,” narratives of ethnic nationhood have often been mobilized against (“Westernized”) states and their attempts to use history for their own purposes—which can be to construct a sense of community in multi-ethnic societies as well as for the more familiar repressive purposes of erasing local and other identities.

Today, some anthropologists and social theorists invoke free-floating ethnic identities as postmodern traces of social identity after the presumed demise of the modern, multi-ethnic state. Yet, the possibilities of these visions of ethnic diaspora serving merely as sites for what Brubaker has called “nationalism reframed” remain serious and often unchallenged. What frequently gets erased in neo-realist championings of ethnic groups are the alternatives held out by different kinds of national narratives, and the different kinds of states—some more democratic than others—they can support. Before we can decide whether the nation should be rescued from history (even “History” with a capital H), we need to know what kind of nation is implied. At the very least, the different kinds of national identity (ethnic, civic, statist) should give us reason to pause when we are asked, in the name of liberty and progress, to undermine the state, and with it, its potential for framing the specific kind of civic community that one regularly encounters in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies. Sameness can be asphyxiating, but difference can be downright murderous.