兼松セミナー（六甲台セオリーセミナー共催）
Kanematsu Seminar　(Jointly supported by Rokkodai Theory Seminar)

日時：
(Date&Time)		 2009年11月24日（火）午後3時15分から（Tuesday, November 24, 2009, 3:15pm〜）
報告者：
(Speaker)		 中山　幹夫（NAKAYAMA Mikio）
所属：
(Affiliation)		 慶應義塾大学経済学部
（Department of Economics, Keio University）
論題：
(Topic)		 On Coalitional Strategic Games
概要：
(Abstract)		 In a strategic cooperative game, we consider four cores alpha, beta, gamma, and the one we call delta which is essentially the same to conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that if every player has a dominant strategy, the beta core includes the gamma core, and therefore that the four cores refine themselves in the greek alphabetical order. Two examples will be examined to see how the refinement is realized. While no strict refinement is attained at all in the pure exchange game, a radical reduction of the alpha core is obtained in the commons game, a simple version of the Cournot game, bringing about a single strategy profile as the delta core.
会場：
(Place)		 神戸大学経済経営研究所　調査室 （兼松記念館1階）
Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor)
対象：
(Intended Audience)		 教員，院生，学部生，および同等の知識をお持ちの方
Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and People with Equivalent Knowledge
使用言語：
(Language)		 日本語
Japanese
備考：
(Note)

論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。
Copies of the paper are available at Research Assistant Room.