RIEB セミナー （科学研究費補助金基盤（A）共催）
RIEB Seminar （Jointly supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) ）
| 日時： （Date&Time) |
2009年10月26日（月）午後2時から （Monday, October 26, 2009, 2:00pm〜） |
| ＜2:00pm〜3:00pm＞ | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
齋藤 哲哉（SAITO Tetsuya） |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
ニューヨーク州立大学バッファロー校経済学部大学院（Department of Economics, SUNY at Buffalo） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
A Market Model of WTO-DSU for Freemasonry Amongst Developed and Developing Countries 先進国と途上国間の相互理解に向けたWTOにおける貿易紛争 の需要供給モデル |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
WTO faces lots of difficulties especially after the second millennium by misunderstandings amongst developed and developing countries. Applying some techniques of the market model of crime, this paper reconsiders what are the affirmative gains from WTO-affiliation especially for developing countries that typically possess smaller bargaining power. In the analysis, the dispute settlement mechanism is considered as the comparative advantage of WTO. Then we find proper operations of the dispute settlement process improve the bargaining power of small countries. In addition, we also find some controversial issues such as Safeguards, Anti-dumping, GATS and TRIPs can be justified by the reciprocity rule. |
| ＜3:00pm〜4:00pm＞ | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
趙 来勲（ZHAO Laixun） |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
神戸大学経済経営研究所（RIEB, Kobe University） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Incentives and Team Competition under Sequential Tasks |
| ＜4:00pm〜5:00pm＞ | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
花薗 誠（HANAZONO Makoto） |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科（Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Option Package Bundling オプションパッケージの抱き合わせ |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
Option package bundling problems arise if there is an optional good, which is valuable only if a certain (non-optional) base good is consumed together. A firm that produces both types of goods then faces the decision of whether to sell them only in a package (pure bundling), or to sell base goods both with or without optional goods, leaving the choice of consuming them together to buyers (mixed bundling). We study a model of a monopolist’s option package bundling problem, in which the monopolist produces base and optional ones, with no marginal costs, and buyers’valuations are independently and uniformly distributed. We derive the optimal bundling prices, and verify that mixed bundling outperforms pure bundling if and only if the range of optional good valuation exceeds a certain size. We argue that the result is robust except in the case where the marginal cost is higher than the lowest valuation for an optional good. This suggests an interesting testable implication: the smaller the diversity of the valuation of an optional good, the more likely that the monopolist adopts pure bundling. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 共同研究室 （第4学舎2階）
Research Room at RIEB (Building No.4, 2nd Floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
日本語 Japanese |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |