兼松セミナー（六甲台セオリーセミナー共催）
Kanematsu Seminar (Jointly supported by Rokkodai Theory Seminar)
| 日時： (Date&Time) |
2009年6月1日（月）午後3時10分から（Monday, June 1, 2009, 3:10pm〜） |
| 報告者： (Speaker) |
国本 隆（KUNIMOTO Takashi） |
| 所属： (Affiliation) |
マギル大学経済学部 （Department of Economics, McGill University） |
| 論題： (Topic) |
Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
While monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for Nash implementation and often a demanding one, almost any (non-monotonic, for instance) social choice rule can be implemented using undominated Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium. By requiring solution concepts to have closed graph in the limit of complete information, Chung and Ely (2003) show that only monotonic social choice rules can be implemented in the closure of the undominated Nash equilibrium correspondence. In this paper, we show that only monotonic social choice rules can be implemented in the closure of the subgame perfect equilibrium/sequential equilibrium correspondence. Our robustness result helps understand the limits of subgame pefect implementation, which is widely used in applications. We also argue that static mechanisms might outperform sequential mechanisms when one insists on robustness. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象： (Intended Audience) |
教員，院生，学部生，および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students, Undergraduates, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語： (Language) |
英語 English |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しておりします。 |