| 日時： （Date&Time) |
2009年1月16日（金）午後2時から (Friday, January 16, 2009, 2:00pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Dimiter IALNAZOV |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
京都大学大学院経済学研究科 （Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
東欧におけるコーポレート・ガバナンス  Corporate Governance in Eastern Europe |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
In the presentation I examine how corporate governance (CG) in Eastern Europe has developed since the end of the communist regime in 1989-1991. I discuss in detail two main factors that, in my view, have shaped that development, e.g. the variety of privatization methods (cash sales to outside investors, mass privatization, and MEBO) and the transfer of Western (in particular, US and Western European) legal rules into national legislation. In comparison with the Czech Republic and Russia, countries that used mainly the mass privatization and the MEBO methods, corporate governance worked much better in countries such as Hungary and Estonia that sold large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to strategic outside investors (mostly Western multinationals). Furthermore, all Eastern European countries have massively imported legal rules from advanced market economies but the effectiveness of these formal institutions has varied considerably across countries. I believe the main cause of that variation is the ability of the state to protect property rights, enforce contracts and ensure the rule of law. Compared to the Central Eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, that ability has been much weaker in South Eastern Europe (for example, Bulgaria and Romania) and in the CIS (Russia and Ukraine). That's why the most severe CG problems have occurred in the 1990s in the South Eastern and CIS countries. Since 2000, there has been a significant improvement in corporate governance in the region. In Russia, the improvement was driven in part by learning from the failures during the 1990s, as well as the recovery of state capacity under Putin's presidency. In Bulgaria and Romania, the impact of EU accession played a similar role. More importantly, the incentives of dominant shareholders have changed in the direction of complying, at least formally, with the CG related legal rules. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
日本語 Japanese |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意いたします。 |