| 日時： （Date&Time) |
2006年3月28日（火）午後1時30分〜午後5時40分 （Tuesday, March 28, 2006, 1:30 - 5:40pm） |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室 （新館2階） Meeting Room at RIEB (New Building 2nd floor) |
| ・< 1:30-2:50pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） 所属： （Affiliation） |
宮際 計行 (MIYAGIWA Kazuyuki) エモリー大学 （Emory University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, trade sanctions, and unobservable technology
 |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
Consumers often boycott imported goods because they do not approve the way they are manufactured, e.g., children are employed or animals are killed. We examine the effect of boycotts and trade policy in influencing the way the goods are manufactured when domestic consumers cannot observe the actual production. We find that boycott threats can give the manufacturer the incentive to choose the production mode consumers prefer. If boycotts have a negligible demand effect, tariffs and quotas can reinforce the boycotts. However, if boycotts have a substantial demand effect, the imposition of ad valorem tariffs yields the opposite outcome. |
| ・< 2:50-4:10pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） 所属： （Affiliation） |
Larry QIU 香港科技大学 (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Technology Transfer and the South’s Participation in an International Environmental Agreement |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
We develop a North-South model of international trade and transboundary pollution to analyze the relationship between environmental technology transfer and the South’s incentive to join an international environmental agreement (IEA). We find necessary and sufficient conditions under which technology transfer will increase the South’s incentive to join the IEA. We also find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the South’s participation in the IEA will increase the market incentive for technology transfer. Results have clear policy implications for (i) the sequence of technology transfer and the South’s IEA membership and (ii) the legitimacy of the South’s subsidies for technology transfer. |
| ・< 4:20-5:40pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） 所属： （Affiliation） |
神事 直人 (JINJI Naoto) 岡山大学 (Okayama University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, FDI, and Process Innovation in North-South Trade |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
I examine the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection policy by a Southern country when it affects technological spillovers. A Northern firm, which conducts cost-reducing R&D, chooses exporting or FDI to serve the Southern market. Spillovers occur only under FDI. I show that under low efficiency of R&D, with the optimal tariff, the Southern government chooses a stringent IPR policy to induce the Northern firm's FDI or an even more stringent IPR policy to stimulate its incentive for a higher level of R&D. For some parameter values, however, a lax IPR policy is chosen to induce exporting by the Northern firm. |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員，院生，および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students, and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
英語 English |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |