| 日時： （Date&Time) |
2月14日（月）午後1時30分から （Monday, February 14, 1:30pm〜） |
| Session 1 | |
| 座長： （Chair） |
神谷 和也 （東京大学） KAMIYA Kazuya (The University of Tokyo) |
| < 1:30- 2:45pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Vladimir PETKOV (Victoria University of Wellington) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Equity-based compensation and intertemporal incentive in dynamic games
 |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
This paper studies the equilibrium formation of intertemporal incentives in dynamic oligopolistic interactions. We analyze a delegation game in which principals entrust decision making to managers whose pay structure is designed to maximize lifetime profits. If firms compete in strategic substitutes, patience can serve as commitment tool that provides a competitive advantage. A similar effect can be achieved if decision-making is delegated to agents whose compensation contracts link contemporaneous remuneration to future performance through stock ownership. Dynamic pay formation will typically induce time inconsistencies. Thus, managerial decisions will incorporate internal as well as external strategic considerations. In equilibrium owners will choose compensation structures with management ownership above the incentive alignment level. |
| < 2:45-4:00pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
清水 崇 (関西大学) Takashi Shimizu (Kansai University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
On the Role of the Tax-Subsidy Scheme in Money Search Models |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
This paper investigates the role of policy in money search models with divisible money. Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found both in specific and general search models with divisible money. Thus if we assume the divisibility of money, then it is quite difficult to make accurate predictions of the effects of simple monetary policies. Instead, we show that some tax-subsidy schemes select a determinate efficient equilibrium. In other words, for a given efficient equilibrium and for any real number $\delta>0$, there exist a tax-subsidy scheme that makes an equilibrium with the tax-subsidy scheme locally determinate, where it is in the $\delta$-neighborhood of the given equilibrium. |
| < 4:00-4:15pm > Break | |
| Session 2 | |
| 座長： （Chair） |
下村 耕嗣（神戸大学） Koji Shimomura (Kobe University ) |
| < 4:15-5:30pm > | |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Jacek Krawczyk (Victoria University of Wellington) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Markovian Payoff Allocation in Dynamic Bilateral Monopolies |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室
（新館2階） Meeting Room at RIEB (New Building 2nd floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
英語 English |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |