| 日時： （Date&Time) |
11月9日（火）午後2時30分から （Tuesday, November 9, 2:30pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Savas ALPAY |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
TOBB Economy and Technology University |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Environmental Regulations, International Trade, Innovation and Strategic
Behavior  |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
In this paper, the issue of strategic behavior in the presence of environmental regulations and international trade is investigated. In a two-country, one-good, two-producer model as in Ulph (1996), we analyze the Nash equilibrium of the game where governments may behave strategically in choosing their environmental policies, and producers may behave strategically in choosing their R&D investments. In the simultaneous-move game, there is a unique equilibrium and both governments and producers act strategically. In the sequential-move game, two equilibrium sets of actions are present; however, one of them welfare-dominates the other: first-moving government acts strategically, the follower government will not act strategically, and none of the producers will behave strategically. Some of our results are in contrast with the implications of earlier papers in this literature. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室 （新館2階） Meeting Room at RIEB (New Building 2nd floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
英語 English |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |