| 日時： （Date&Time) |
10月22日（金）午後1時40分から （Friday, October 22, 1:40pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Chongwoo CHOE |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
University of New South Wales/大阪大学(Osaka University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies  |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority is optimal, using a model of a firm with three parties: the principal, the manager and the worker. In centralization with two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the principal directly contracts with a delegated agent who, in turn, contracts with the other agent. We identify an environment where the principal can benefit from delegating authority to the manager, but not to the worker. Beneficial delegation arises endogenously when delegation motivates the manager to acquire valuable information, which is used for better decision-making and more efficient incentive provision to the worker. We also show how total surplus is distributed in delegation vis-à-vis centralization, document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and the distribution of total surplus, and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室 （新館2階）
Meeting Room at RIEB (New Building 2nd floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
英語 English |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |