COE/RIEBセミナー (IEFS Japanセミナー共催）
COE/RIEB Seminar (Jointly supported by IEFS Japan Seminar)
| 日時： （Date&Time) |
9月17日（金）午後1時30分から （Friday, September 17, 1:30pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
大西 一弘 （大阪大学経済学博士） OHNISHI Kazuhiro (Ph.D., Osaka University) |
| 論題： （Topic） |
A Unilateral Pricing Policy and the Stackelberg Equilibrium |
| 概要： (Abstract) |
Cooper (1986) examined the equilibrium of the retroactive most-favored-customer pricing policy by using a two-period duopoly model. He showed that the most-favored-customer policy enables both firms to offer higher prices and to enjoy higher profits. Neilson and Winter (1992) showed that even if one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts the most-favored-customer policy, the equilibrium does not coincide with the Stackelberg solution. This paper introduces a pricing policy by using a one-period two-stage model and shows that if one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts this policy, then the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教員、院生および同等をお持ちの方 Faculty, Graduate Students and People with Equivalent Knowledge |
| 使用言語 （Language) |
日本語 Japanese |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは研究助成室にご用意しております。 |