| 日時： （Date&Time) |
3月14日（金）午後3時30分から （Friday, March 14, 3:30pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
鎰谷 宏一 KAGITANI Koichi |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
神戸大学 Kobe University |
| 論題： （Topic） |
The Number of Firms and the Politics of Export Subsidy
 |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework to understand that
the government's implementation of export subsidy is influenced by the
political pressure from the home firms which can bear the costs of forming
and maintaining a lobby in order to overcome a free-rider problem associated
with lobbying. When the number of the foreign firms is large in comparison
with that of the home firms, the home firms can organize a lobby group
more easily and lobby for higher export subsidy. When the home firms offer
their campaign contribution to the incumbent government, the government
selects the politically optimal export subsidy which is higher than the
welfare-maximizing export subsidy for its own country. The implementation
of politically optimal export subsidy can make the domestic social welfare
far worse than under the free trade. This conclusion can provide a political
economic rationale for multilateral agreement which prohibit export subsidies,
like the Article 3.1(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
|
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教官、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, graduate students, and people with equivalent knowledge |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは開催日の１週間前に研究助成室にご用意いたします。 |