RIEB セミナー （RIEB Seminar）
| 日時： （Date&Time) |
1月24日（金）午後3時30分から （Friday, January 24, 3:30pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
Piero GOTTARDI |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
ベニス大学 （Universita’Ca’ Foscari di Venezia） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading
|
| 共著者： （Co-author） |
Roberto SERRANO |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. The outcome with n sellers depends both on the structure of sellers' information and the intensity of competition among them allowed by the market rules. We show that the latter plays an even more important role. With intense competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, both when all sellers are informed and when only one seller is informed. On the other hand, with a less intense form of competition (presence of clienteles), collusive equilibria, where information is never revealed, also exist, whatever the number of sellers. Moreover, when only one seller is informed, for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, for any n. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室 （兼松記念館 新館2階） Meeting Room (New Building 2nd floor) |
| 対象： （Intended Audience) |
教官、院生、および同等の知識をお持ちの方 Faculty, graduate students, and people with equivalent knowledge |
| 備考： (Note) |
論文のコピーは開催日の１週間前に研究助成室にご用意いたします。なおこの論文は< http://helios.unive.it/~gottardi/papers.html >でダウンロードできます。 |