| 日時： （Date&Time) |
9月6日（金）午後3時30分から （Friday, September 6, 3:30pm〜） |
| 報告者： （Speaker） |
小幡 績 （OBATA Seki） |
| 所属： （Affiliation） |
一橋大学経済研究所 （Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University） |
| 論題： （Topic） |
Pyramid Group, Financial Distress, and Investor Protection  |
| 概要： （Abstract） |
Business groups are a prevalent form of corporate organization in developing countries around the world. A family often controls all firms in such groups via a pyramid structure. I present a model in which the ultimate owner of a group of firms may prop up a firm experiencing financial distress. I show that the propping up function of a group is enhanced under a pyramid ownership structure. However, the effect of the pyramid structure is weaker in countries with effective investor protection. In the absence of good investor protection, pyramids can prop up financially distressed firms at expense of minority shareholders. My predictions are supported by the data on East Asian firms from 1995 to 1999. While financially distressed firms with group affiliation have higher valuation than non-affiliated firms when cash flow rights are aligned with control rights, they have the lower valuation than non-affiliated firms when there is a separation of ownership from control. |
| 会場： (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 調査室 （兼松記念館1階） Seminar Room at RIEB (Kanematsu Memorial Hall 1st Floor) |
| 備考： (Note) |
本報告は共著者の太田浩先生（青山学院大学）との共同報告の形をとります。 |