概要:
(Abstract) |
When modeling vertically related markets, most of the literature on trade and
industrial organization assumes a fixed-coefficient technology. This paper shows
that optimal policies may be reversed if the fixed-coefficient technology
assumption is relaxed. The model is based on three countries with the home
country importing an intermediate good from a foreign monopolistic supplier,
manufacturing the entire final product at home, and then exporting it to another
foreign market in which it has monopoly power. When the technology is of
Cobb-Douglas type, exhibiting a strongly diminishing return to scale, it is
shown that the optimal trade policy is one of subsidizing either the import of
the intermediate good, or the export of the final good.This result runs contrary
to the findings of Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) in which fixed-coefficient
technology was assumed. Moreover, the welfare level under the optimal import
policy is higher than (equivalent to) that under the optimal export policy when
the technology in question exhibits increasing (constant) returns to scale,
whilst the welfare ranking is, in general, reversed, where the returns to scale
are diminishing. |