Title
Regulation on Gene Diagnosis and Non-Existence of Equilibrium in the Life/Medical Insurance Market
Abstract
This study is based on the assumption that in future, genetic
testing will create a situation where people can tell whether
they are predisposed to certain diseases including cancer, but
utilization of such genetic testing is banned for the purposes
of medical examination of insurants. What, then, would be the
response of people to genetic testing from an economics perspective?
The Human Genome Project has made it possible to decode DNA base
sequences, creating a significant impact not only in the biological
and medical fields but also on our society as a whole. This paper
is an analysis of equilibrium in the life/medical insurance market
on the assumption that limits are imposed on the utilization of
genetic testing for medical examination of insurants, and shows
the possibility that no equilibrium exists in the market, thus
drawing a counterintuitive conclusion. Furthermore, this paper
also shows that utilization of genetic testing for insurance purposes
would, in fact, economically benefit insurants.
Nobuyuki SOGA
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration
Kobe University
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe
657-8501 Japan
Phone: (81) 78 803 7036
Fax: (81) 78 803 7059