神戸大学金融研究会（RIEBセミナー共催）
Monetary Economics Seminar of Kobe University (Jointly supported by RIEB Seminar)
| 日時 (Date&Time) |
2016年1月23日（土）午後2時00分から (Saturday, January 23, 2016, 2:00pm-) |
|---|---|
| 会場 (Place) |
神戸大学経済経営研究所 会議室（研究所新館2階） Meeting Room at RIEB (Annex, 2nd Floor) |
| 対象 (Intended Audience) |
基本的に会員制の研究会ですが、非会員で関心のある方の参加も歓迎します。 The seminar is primarily for the workshop members. But non-members are also welcome to attend. |
| 備考 (Note) |
論文のコピーは共同研究推進室にてご用意いたします。 Copies of the paper will be available at the Office of Promoting Research Collaboration. セミナー後に懇親会を予定しております。セミナーへ参加を希望される方はお手数ですが、懇親会へのご出欠と併せご氏名、ご所属、ご連絡先（メールアドレス）を開催日の1週間前までに共同研究推進室へご連絡下さい。なお、懇親会の詳細については追ってご連絡いたします。 There will be a reception held after the seminar. If you would like to attend this seminar, please email us at Office of Promoting Research Collaboration your name, affiliation, email address and whether you will attend the reception or not, by a week before the workshop. Details will be notified later. |
2:00pm～3:30pm
| 報告者 (Speaker) |
小倉 義明 氏 (Yoshiaki OGURA) |
|---|---|
| 所属 (Affiliation) |
早稲田大学政治経済学術院 (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University) |
| 論題 (Topic) |
Network-Motivated Lending Decision |
| 概要 (Abstract) |
We theoretically and empirically demonstrate that monopolistic or collusive banks will keep lending to a loss-making firm at an interest rate lower than the prime rate if the firm is located in an influential position in an inter-firm supply network. An influential firm generates a positive externality, and its exit damages the sales in the supply network. To internalize this externality, the banks may forbear on debt collection and/or bail out such influential firms when the cost to support the loss-making influential company can be recouped by imposing high interest on less influential companies. The analytical model shows that such forbearance can improve welfare. Our empirical study, performed using a unique dataset containing information about inter-firm transactions, provides evidence for such network-motivated lending decisions. In particular, this effect is more clearly observed at less credit-worthy firms whose main bank is a regional bank. Notably, we observe that such banks are often dominant lenders in the local loan market, and most of their clientele do not have direct access to the stock and bond market. |
3:45pm～5:15pm
| 報告者 (Speaker) |
井上 仁 氏 (Hitoshi INOUE) |
|---|---|
| 所属 (Affiliation) |
札幌学院大学経済学部 (Faculty of Economics, Sapporo Gakuin University) |
| 論題 (Topic) |
Unviable Relationship and Bank Lending: Evidence from Loan-level Matched Data |
5:30pm～
| 懇親会 (Recepetion) |
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