Discussion Paper Series No.226

Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination?

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August 2008

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Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination?

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First Draft: November 2005
This Draft: August 27, 2008

Abstract

I extend the Grossman and Lai (2004) model to answer the question, “Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination?” by introducing firm-biased government preferences and trade barriers in the model. I make use of the estimates of the firm-bias parameter from the political economy literature to proxy for the degree of governments’ firm-bias. Then I calculate the range of trade barriers that is sufficient to give rise to under-protection of patents in the global system without international policy coordination in IPR protection. I make the judgement that the true trade barrier between countries very likely falls within this range of under-protection. Therefore, I conclude that there was probably under-protection of patents without international policy coordination in IPR protection. It means that the free-rider problem with a large number of independent players overrides the effects of firm-bias and trade barriers, giving rise to too low a rate of innovation in the world. Allowing for the possibility that countries discriminate against foreign firms in Nash equilibrium does not change this conclusion. The problem can possibly be corrected by international coordination in intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.

Keywords: Intellectual property rights, TRIPS, innovation
JEL Classification Number: F1, O31, O34

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* I would like to thank Costas Syropoulos, participants in seminar in Michigan State University, AEA Annual Meeting 2006 and Otago Workshop in International Economics 2006 for helpful comments. The work in this paper has been supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, China (Project no. CityU 1476/05H) and City University of Hong Kong.
1 Introduction

The global intellectual property rights (IPR) protection system was given a boost by the implementation of the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), which started a gradual process of IPR harmonization in 1995. This agreement effectively requires the strengthening of patent protection of most countries, and forces the world IPR protection policies towards harmonization (albeit a partial one). There have been nothing nearly as powerful as TRIPS in its geographic coverage and its ability to enforce rulings, not least because of the large number of countries involved and the credibility of the threat of punishment through trade retaliation. Given the tremendous repercussions of such a coordinated increase in the strengths of IPR protection, it is fair to ask whether TRIPS is really a solution to a global coordination problem. It is clear that TRIPS has distributive effect between countries.\(^1\) However, the more important question is whether global IPR protection was too weak before TRIPS. If it was, then TRIPS can potentially be welfare-improving from the global point of view, and its inclusion in global trade talks would potentially facilitate negotiations on liberalization of other sectors/areas. For example, if less developed countries (LDCs) lose from TRIPS and developed countries (DCs) gain from TRIPS, but the latter’s gains outweigh the former’s losses, then it can be mutually beneficial for the LDCs to accept harmonization of IPR standards with the DCs in exchange for the DCs’ opening their markets for labor-intensive manufacturing goods or agricultural products from the LDCs. However, if global patent protection was already too strong before TRIPS, then no such synergy exists between talks on trade-related IPR negotiations and other issues/areas of global trade talks.

There is no doubt that some countries attempted to coordinate their IPR policies somewhat even before TRIPS, but empirical studies have shown that even as late as 1990, market sizes and innovative capabilities significantly affect variation in the strengths of

\(^1\)McCalm (2001) has shown that the US was by far the largest beneficiary, followed by Germany and France as distant second and third beneficiaries. On the other hand, the greatest loser was Canada, followed by Brazil and UK.
patent protection across the world, as predicted by non-cooperative game theory.\(^2\) So, I start with the working assumption that the world was in a non-cooperative equilibrium before TRIPS, and then ask, Would global patent protection be too weak when left to individual governments to decide its own level of protection?

To answer this question, we need to (a) have a theory that explains how global patent protection was determined in a non-cooperative equilibrium; (b) have a theory that explains how the optimal global patent protection is determined; and (c) develop a sufficient condition for global under-protection (or over-protection) of IPR. In order to answer (c), we need to explain how a global system of patent protection affects incentives to innovate and how it creates distortions (deadweight losses). Therefore, we need to answer (a) and (b) first. To do so, I modify and extend a model by Grossman and Lai (2004). In Section 2, I shall re-state their theory in a succinct form. Then, I develop an extension that allows us to more realistically evaluate whether non-cooperative equilibrium gives rise to under-protection of IPR.

In the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004), countries play a Nash game in setting the strengths of patent protection. The best response function of a country’s government is obtained by setting the strength of patent protection that equates the marginal costs (deadweight loss due to longer duration of monopoly pricing) and marginal benefits (increased incentives of innovation) of extending protection, given the strengths of protection of other countries. Each country conveys positive externalities to foreign countries as it extends patent protection, since it increases profits of foreign firms in the home market, and increases consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced innovations. As a result, there is under-protection of patent rights in Nash equilibrium relative to the global optimum. In fact, the degree of under-protection in Nash equilibrium increases with the number of independent decision-makers in the patent-setting game.

However, two factors prevents us from directly applying Grossman and Lai’s (2004) basic model to answer the question posed in the title of this paper: “Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination?” First is that governments

\(^2\)See, for example, Ginarte and Park (1997) and Maskus (2000a).
may put extra weight on profits as opposed to consumer surplus (e.g. due to firm lobbying). When governments put more weight on profits, the marginal cost of patent protection decreases since deadweight loss is smaller. Therefore, patent protection in Nash equilibrium is stronger. I shall call this firm-biased preferences of governments. Second is the existence of trade barriers. When a firm has only a fraction of the penetration rate in a foreign market as compared to the domestic market (e.g. due to transportation cost and other trade costs), the positive international externalities of patent protection is diminished. Both factors tend to diminish the degree of under-protection in Nash equilibrium relative to the global optimum. If these forces are strong enough, there may even be over-protection of patents in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, whether or not there was under-protection of patents in the non-cooperative equilibrium is an empirical question. In this paper, I incorporate these two features in an extension of the basic Grossman and Lai (2004) model and derive a sufficient condition for under-protection of patent in the global economy. I then calibrate the model using the firm-bias parameter estimated from the empirical literature and then finding out how small the trade barriers have to be in order for there to be under-protection of patents in Nash equilibrium.

In the basic model, we can find a functional relationship between the global strength of patent protection and global welfare. The same strength of global patent protection creates the same amount of total deadweight losses (what I call static losses) and aggregate flow of new differentiated goods (what I call dynamic gains) in each period. As long as the global strength of patent protection is the same, global welfare is the same, regardless of the combination of individual countries’ strengths of patent protection. Therefore, the global optimum is a continuum of combinations of national strengths of patent protection that maximize global welfare. However, this will not be true in the extended model. In the more general model with trade barriers, there does not exist a scalar measure of the global strength of patent protection such that there is a functional relationship between the global strength of protection and global welfare. Despite this problem, I am able to calculate a sufficient condition under which, starting from Nash equilibrium, global welfare must increase with increases in the strengths of protection in all countries. When this condition is satisfied, we can conclude that there is
under-protection in global IPR protection.

The key results of the extended model are: 1. There is only one single combination, not a continuum, of national strengths of patent protection that maximizes global welfare. 2. Externalities still exist, but their magnitude decreases with trade barriers. Therefore, the degree of under-protection decreases with trade barriers. 3. The degree of under-protection decreases with the firm-bias of governments. 4. Based on the estimates of the firm-bias parameter from the political economy literature, and our judgement of the plausible magnitude of trade barrier, I conclude that under-protection of global patent protection in the non-cooperative equilibrium is very likely.

Some argue that without an international agreement, countries have incentives to discriminate against foreign firms by offering lower patent protection to them. In other words, there is no observance of national treatment in Nash equilibrium. I account for this fact later in the paper. It is found that the condition for under-protection in Nash equilibrium is less stringent than in the case with observance of national treatment in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, allowing for non-observance of the national treatment principle in equilibrium strengthens the argument that there is under-protection without international coordination.

In section 2, I recap the essence of the basic model of Grossman and Lai (2004). In section 3, I extend the basic model to incorporate firm-bias and trade barriers. In section 4, I account for the fact that countries can discriminate against foreign firms in Nash equilibrium. Finally, I conclude in section 5.

2 A basic theory of international protection of IPR

The theory described in this section basically draws from Grossman and Lai (2004).

2.1 Noncooperative Patent Protection

In this section, I study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property in a world economy with imitation and trade. We derive the Nash equilibria of a game in which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and noncooperatively. The
countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and their stocks of human capital. The last of these proxies for their different capacities for R&D. We shall term the countries “North” and “South,” in keeping with our desire to understand the tensions that surrounded the tightening of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the developing countries in the last decade. Keith E. Maskus (2000a, ch.3) has documented an increase in innovative activity in poor and middle-income countries such as Brazil, Korea, and China, so our model of relations between trading partners with positive but different abilities to conduct R&D may be apt for studying the incentives for IPR protection in a world of trade between such nations and the developed economies.\(^3\) But our model may apply more broadly to relations between any groups of countries that have different wages and different capacities for research. Such differences exist, albeit to a lesser extent than between North and South, in the comparison of countries in Northern and Southern Europe, or the comparison of the United States and Canada. We do not mean the labels North and South to rule out the application of our analysis to these other sorts of relationships.

2.1.1 The Global IPR Regime

Consumers in the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the representative consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function. The instantaneous utility of a consumer in country \(j\) is given by

\[
  u_j(z) = y_j(z) + \int_0^{n_S(z)+n_N(z)} h[x_j(i,z)]di,
\]

(1)

where \(y_j(z)\) is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country \(j\) at time \(z\), \(x_j(i,z)\) is consumption of the \(i^{th}\) differentiated product by a resident of country \(j\) at time \(z\), and \(n_j(z)\) is the number of differentiated varieties previously invented in country \(j\) that remain economically viable at time \(z\). There are \(M_N\) consumers in the North and \(M_S\) consumers in the South. While we do not place any restrictions on the

\(^3\)He also shows the extent to which patent applications in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are dominated by foreign firms, a feature of the data that figures in our analysis.
relative sizes of the two markets at this juncture, we shall be most interested in the case where $M_N > M_S$. It does not matter for our analysis whether consumers can borrow and lend internationally or not.

In country $j$, it takes $a_j$ units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous good or to produce one unit of any variety of the differentiated product. New goods are invented in each region according to $\phi_j = F \left( H_j, L_{Rj}/a_j \right) = A \left( L_{Rj}/a_j \right)^b H_j^{1-b}$, where $H_j$ is an input whose quantity determines the innovative capability of country $j$, $L_{Rj}$ is the labor devoted to R&D there. We assume that $a_N < a_S$, which means that labor is uniformly more productive in the North than in the South. We also assume that the numeraire good is produced in positive quantities in both countries, so that $w_j = 1/a_j$ for $j = S, N$, and hence $w_N/w_S = a_S/a_N > 1$. Define $T = (1 - e^{-\tau})/\rho$, where $\tau$ is the product life of a differentiated good.

We now describe the IPR regime. In each country, there is national treatment in the granting of patent rights. Under national treatment, the government of country $j$ affords the same protection $\Omega_j = \omega_j T_j$ to all inventors of differentiated products regardless of their national origins, where $\omega_j$ is the probability that a patent is enforced in country $j$ (or the fraction of country $j$’s market where a patent is enforced) at any moment in time, $T_j = (1 - e^{-\tau_j})/\rho$, and $\tau_j$ is the length of the patents granted by country $j$. In other words, we assume that foreign firms and domestic firms have equal standing in applying for patents in any country and that all patents are subject to the same enforcement provisions. National treatment is required by TRIPS and it characterized the laws that were in place in most countries even before this agreement. In our model, a patent is an exclusive right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a fixed period of time.

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4 We remind the reader that market size is meant to capture not the population of a country, but rather the scale of its demand for innovative products.

5 National treatment is required by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to which 127 countries subscribed by the end of 1994 and 164 countries subscribe today (see http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/paris/index.html). There were, however, allegations from firms in the United States and elsewhere that prior to the signing of TRIPS in 1994, nondiscriminatory laws did not always mean nondiscriminatory practice. See Suzanne Scotchmer (2004) for an analysis of the incentives that countries have to apply national treatment in the absence of an enforcible agreement.
(see Maskus, 2000a, p.36). This means that, when good \( i \) is under patent protection in country \( j \), no firm other than the patent holder or one designated by it may legally produce the good in country \( j \) for domestic sale or for export, nor may the good be legally imported into country \( j \) from an unauthorized producer outside the country. We also rule out parallel imports — unauthorized imports of good \( i \) that were produced by the patent holder or its designee, but that were sold to a third party outside country \( j \).\(^6\) When parallel imports are prevented, patent holders can practice price discrimination across national markets.

We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies once-and-for-all at time 0. These patents apply only to goods invented after time 0; goods invented beforehand continue to receive the protections afforded at their times of invention. So long as the governments cannot remove protections that were previously granted, the economy has no state variables that bear on its choice of optimal patent policies at a given moment in time. This means that the Nash equilibrium in once-and-for-all patents is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game in which the governments can change their patent policies periodically, or even continuously. Of course, the repeated game may have other equilibria in which the governments base their current policies on the history of prior actions. We do not investigate such equilibria with tacit cooperation here, but rather postpone our discussion of cooperation until a later section.

Let us describe, for given patent strengths \( \Omega_N \) and \( \Omega_S \), the life cycle of a typical differentiated product. During an initial phase after the product is introduced, the inventor holds an active patent in both countries which is only partially enforced. The patent holder earns an expected flow of profits of \( \omega_N M_N \pi \) from sales in the Northern

\(^6\)The treatment of parallel imports under TRIPs remains a matter of legal controversy. Countries continue to differ in their rules for territorial exhaustion of IPRs. Some countries, like Australia and Japan, practice international exhaustion, whereby the restrictive rights granted by a patent end with the first sale of the good anywhere in the world. Other countries or regions, like the United States and the European Union, practice national or regional exhaustion, whereby patent rights end only with the first sale within the country or region. Under such rules, patent holders can prevent parallel trade. See Maskus (2000b) for further discussion.
market and an expected flow of profits of $\omega_S M_S \pi$ from sales in the Southern market, where $\pi$ is earnings per consumer for a monopoly selling a typical brand. Notice that monopoly profits per consumer are the same for sales in both markets, because consumers share identical preferences. Also, they do not depend on where a good was invented or where it is produced, because the productivity gap between the countries exactly offsets the wage differential. Each Northern consumer realizes a flow of expected surplus of $\omega_N C_m + (1 - \omega_N) C_c$ from his purchases of the good, where $C_m$ is the surplus that a consumer derives from purchases of a good produced at a cost of $w_j a_j = 1$ and sold at the monopoly price $p_m$ and $C_c$ is the surplus he derives from a product sold for the competitive price of $p_c = 1$. Similarly, a Southern consumer realizes an expected flow of consumer surplus of $\omega_S C_m + (1 - \omega_S) C_c$ from his purchases of the good.

After a while, the patent will expire in one country. For concreteness, let’s say that this happens first in the South. Then the good will be legally imitated by competitive firms producing there, for sales in the local (Southern) market. The imitators will not, however, be able to sell the good legally in the North, because the live patent there, if enforced, affords protection from such infringing imports. When the patent expires in the South, the price of the good falls permanently to $w_S a_S = 1$, and the original inventor ceases to realize profits in that market. The flow of consumer surplus in the South rises to $M_S C_c$.

Eventually, the inventor’s patent expires in the North. Then the Northern market can be served completely by competitive firms producing in either location. At this time, the price of the good in the North falls to $p_c = 1$ and households there begin to enjoy the higher flow of consumer surplus $M_N C_c$. The original inventor loses his remaining source of monopoly income. Finally, after a period of length $\bar{\tau}$ has elapsed from the moment of invention, the good becomes obsolete and all flows of consumer surplus cease.

2.1.2 The Best Response Functions

Consider the choice of patent policies $\Omega_N$ and $\Omega_S$ that will take effect at time 0 and apply to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for the aggregate welfare in country
\( i, \) discounted to time 0, is given by
\[
W_i(0) = \Lambda_i + \frac{w_i L_i}{\rho} + \frac{r_i H_i}{\rho} + \frac{M_i(\phi_S + \phi_N)}{\rho} [\Omega_i C_m + (T - \Omega_i)C_c]
\]
\[
= \Lambda_i + \frac{w_i(L_i - L_{Ri})}{\rho} + \frac{M_i(\phi_S + \phi_N)}{\rho} [\Omega_i C_m + (T - \Omega_i)C_c]
\]
\[
+ \frac{\phi_i}{\rho} \pi (M_S\Omega_S + M_N\Omega_N), \quad \text{for } i = S, N, \quad (2)
\]
where \( \Lambda_i \) is the fixed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in country \( i \) derive from goods that were invented before time 0. The second equality arises from the fact that there is zero profit for each firm, so that \( r_i H_i + w_i L_{Ri} = \phi_i v = \phi_i \pi (M_S\Omega_S + M_N\Omega_N) \), where \( v = (M_S\Omega_S + M_N\Omega_N)\pi \) is the value of a new patent.

We are now ready to derive the best response functions for the two governments. The best response expresses the strength of patent protection that maximizes a country’s aggregate welfare as a function of the given patent policy of its trading partner. Consider the choice of \( \Omega_S \) by the government of the South. This country bears two costs from strengthening its patent protection slightly. First, it expands the fraction of goods previously invented in the South on which the country suffers a static deadweight loss of \( M_S(C_c - C_m - \pi) \). Second, it augments the fraction of goods previously invented in the North on which its consumers realize surplus of \( M_S C_m \) instead of \( M_S C_c \). Notice that the profits earned by Northern producers in the South are not an offset to this latter marginal cost, because they accrue to patent holders in the North. The marginal benefit that comes to the South from strengthening its patent protection reflects the increased incentive that Northern and Southern firms have to engage in R&D. If the welfare-maximizing \( \Omega_S \) is positive and less than \( T \), then the marginal benefit per consumer of increasing \( \Omega_S \) must match the marginal cost, which implies
\[
\phi_S(C_c - C_m - \pi) + \phi_N(C_c - C_m) = \frac{\gamma_S \phi_S + \gamma_N \phi_N}{v} M_S\pi [C_m\Omega_S + C_c(T - \Omega_S)], \quad (3)
\]
where \( \gamma_j \) is the responsiveness of innovation in region \( j \) to changes in the value of a patent (in elasticity form), i.e. \( \frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial v} = \gamma_j \frac{\phi_j}{v} \).

Similarly, in the North, the marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection must match the marginal cost at any interior point on the best response curve. The marginal
cost in the North is different from that in the South, because the North’s national income includes the profits earned by Northern patent holders but not those earned by Southern patent holders. The marginal benefit differs too, because the effectiveness of patent policy as a tool for promoting innovation varies according to the importance of a country’s market in the aggregate profits of potential innovators and because the surplus from a typical product over its lifetime depends upon a country’s patent regime. The condition for the best response of the North, analogous to (3) above, is

\[
\phi_S(C_c - C_m) + \phi_N(C_c - C_m - \pi) = \frac{\gamma_S \phi_S + \gamma_N \phi_N}{v} M_N \pi \left[ C_m \Omega_N + C_c (\bar{T} - \Omega_N) \right]. \tag{4}
\]

Noting that \(\gamma_S = \gamma_N = \gamma\), the two best response functions can be written similarly as

\[
C_c - C_m - \mu_i \pi = \gamma \frac{M_i \Omega_i}{M_S \Omega_S + M_N \Omega_N} \left[ C_m + C_c (\bar{T} - \Omega_i) \right] \quad \text{for } i = S, N, \tag{5}
\]

where \(\mu_i = \phi_i / (\phi_S + \phi_N)\) is the share of world innovation that takes place in country \(i\). Moreover, \(\mu_i = H_i / (H_S + H_N)\) for this research technology. Thus, both \(\mu_i\) and \(\gamma\) are independent of the patent policies in the Cobb-Douglas case. It follows from (5) that the best response functions are linear and downward sloping in this case, and that the best response function for the South is steeper than that for the North, when the two are drawn in \((\Omega_S, \Omega_N)\) space.

Thus, the patent policies of the two countries are strategic substitutes. To understand the strategic interdependence between the governments in choosing their policies, consider the choice of patent protection by the South. Suppose the North were to strengthen its patent protection; i.e., to increase \(\Omega_N\). This would shrink the fraction of total discounted profits that an innovator earns in the South and so, ceteris paribus, reduce the responsiveness of global innovation to patent policy in the South. Moreover, the increase in \(\Omega_N\) would draw labor into R&D in the North and South. If \(\beta < 0\), the

\[\gamma_i = \frac{b}{(1 - b)} \quad \text{for all } i\]
elasticity of innovation with respect to patent value would fall. The South would find
that its market is relatively less important to potential innovators and that these innov-
vators are less responsive to its patent policy. For both reasons, the marginal benefit
to the South of strengthening its patent protection would fall and so the government
would respond to the increase in $\Omega_N$ with a reduction in patent length or an easing of
enforcement.

It is easy to show using (5) that the best response curve for the South must have a
slope that is everywhere greater in absolute value than $M_S/M_N$, while the best response
curve for the North must have a slope that is everywhere smaller in absolute value than
$M_S/M_N$.\(^8\) It follows that the curve for the South must be steeper than that for the
North at any point of intersection. This guarantees uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
and ensures stability of the policy setting game.

We summarize the most important findings in this section as follows.

**Proposition 1** Let the research technology be $\phi_j = A (L_{Rj}/a_j)^b H_j^{1-b}$ in country $i$, for $i = S, N$. Since the two patent policies are strategic substitutes in both countries, there exists a unique and stable Nash equilibrium of the policy setting game.

\(^8\)We have not discussed the shape of the best response functions where they hit the axes or where the constraint that $\Omega_i \leq \bar{T}$ begins to bind. The best-response curve of the South becomes vertical if it hits the vertical axis at a point below $\Omega_N = \bar{T}$. It also becomes vertical if the South’s best response is $\bar{T}$ for some positive value of $\Omega_N$. Similarly, the best-response curve for the North becomes horizontal if either it hits the horizontal axis before $\Omega_S = \bar{T}$ or if the North’s best response is $\bar{T}$ for some positive value of $\Omega_S$. Thus, the best response curve for the South must be steeper than that for the North at any point of intersection, even if these additional segments of the best response functions are taken into account.
2.2 International Patent Agreements

In this section, we study international patent agreements.\(^9\) We begin by characterizing the combinations of patent policies that are jointly efficient for the two countries.\(^{10}\) Then we compare the Nash equilibrium outcomes with the efficient policies, to identify changes in the patent regime that ought to be effected by an international treaty. Finally, we address the issue of policy harmonization. By that point, we will have seen that harmonization is neither necessary nor sufficient for global efficiency. We proceed to investigate the distributional properties of an agreement calling for harmonized patent policies and ask whether both countries would benefit from such an agreement in the absence of some form of direct compensation.

2.2.1 Efficient Patent Regimes

We shall begin by showing that the sum of the welfare levels of the two countries depends only on a measure \(Q\) of the overall protection afforded by the international patent system. This means that the same aggregate world welfare level can be achieved with different combinations of \(\Omega_S\) and \(\Omega_N\) that imply the same overall level of protection. One particular level of \(Q\)—call it \(Q^*\)—maximizes the sum of the countries’ welfare levels. For a wide range of distributions of world welfare, efficiency is achieved by setting the individual patent policies so that the overall index of patent protection is \(Q^*\).

In particular, let \(Q = M_S \Omega_S + M_N \Omega_N\). This measure of global patent protection weighs the degree of patent protection in each country by the size of the country’s market. A firm that earns a flow of expected profits of \(\omega_S M_S \pi\) for a period of length \(\tau_S\) in the South and a flow of expected profits of \(\omega_N M_N \pi\) for a period of \(\tau_N\) in the North earns

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\(^9\)See also McCalman (2002), who discusses globally efficient patent policies in his two-country extension of the Nordhaus (1969) model. Lai and Qiu (2003) consider whether the joint welfare of the two countries would be increased if the South were to extend its patents so as to be equal in length to those chosen by the North in a Nash equilibrium.

\(^{10}\)Ours is a constrained efficiency, because we assume that innovation must be done privately and that patents are the only policies available to encourage R&D. We do not, for example, allow the governments to introduce R&D subsidies, which if feasible, might allow them to achieve a given rate of innovation with weaker patents and less deadweight loss.
a total discounted sum of expected profits equal to $Q \pi$. Thus, $Q$ governs the allocation of resources to R&D in each country, regardless of the particular combination of patent policies in the separate countries.

Consider the choice of patent policies $\Omega_N$ and $\Omega_S$ that will take effect at time 0 and apply to goods invented thereafter. Summing the welfare expressions in (2) for $i = S$ and $i = N$, we find that

$$\rho [W_S(0) + W_N(0)] = \rho (\Lambda_{S0} + \Lambda_{N0}) + w_S(L_S - L_{RS}) + w_N(L_N - L_{RN})$$

$$+ (M_S + M_N) \bar{T}(\phi_S + \phi_N)C_c - Q(\phi_S + \phi_N)(C_c - C_m - \pi) \quad (6)$$

Since $v_S = v_N = \pi Q$, $L_{RS}$ and $L_{RN}$ are functions of $Q$.\textsuperscript{11} The same is true of $\phi_S$ and $\phi_N$. It follows that different combinations of $\Omega_S$ and $\Omega_N$ that yield the same value of $Q$ also yield the same level of aggregate world welfare.\textsuperscript{12}

If international transfer payments are feasible, then a globally efficient patent regime must have $M_S \Omega_S + M_N \Omega_N = Q^*$, where $Q^*$ is the value of $Q$ that maximizes the right-hand side of (6).\textsuperscript{13} Notice that a range of efficient outcomes can be achieved without the need for any international transfers. By appropriate choice of $\Omega_N$ and $\Omega_S$, the countries can be given any welfare levels on the efficiency frontier between that which they would achieve if $\Omega_S = 0$ and $\Omega_N = Q^*/M_N$ and that which they would achieve if $\Omega_S = Q^*/M_S$ and $\Omega_N = 0$.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11}In country $i$, the allocation of labor to research is determined by

$$\pi Q F_L(L_{Ri}/a_i, H_i) = 1/a_i.$$  

\textsuperscript{12}This result is anticipated by a similar one in McCalman (2002), who studied efficient patent agreements in a partial equilibrium model of cost-reducing innovation by a single, global monopolist.

\textsuperscript{13}The first-order condition for maximizing $\rho [W_S(0) + W_N(0)]$ implies

$$C_c - C_m - \pi = \gamma \left\{ C_m + C_c \left[ \frac{(M_S + M_N) \bar{T} - Q^*}{Q^*} \right] \right\} .$$

The second-order condition is satisfied at $Q = Q^*$ when $\beta \leq 1/2$.

\textsuperscript{14}This statement ignores the ceiling on patent lengths imposed by the finite economic life of differentiated products. A more precise statement is that a range of distributions of maximal world welfare can be achieved by varying $\Omega_S$ between $\Omega_S = \max\{0, (Q^* - M_N \bar{T})/M_S\}$ and $\min\{Q^*/M_S, \bar{T}\}$.
Although aggregate world welfare does not vary with the national policies $\omega_i$ and $\tau_i$ as long as $M_S \Omega_S + M_N \Omega_N = Q^*$, the countries fare differently under the alternative combinations of policies that can be used to achieve global efficiency unless compensating transfers take place. In particular, the welfare of the North increases and that of the South decreases as $\Omega_S$ is increased and $\Omega_N$ is decreased in such a way as to keep the weighted sum constant. It follows that, absent any international transfer payments, the countries have a strong conflict of interest over the terms of an international patent agreement.

2.2.2 Pareto-Improving Patent Agreements

How do the efficient combinations of patent policies compare to the policies that emerge in a noncooperative equilibrium? The answer to this question — which informs us about the likely features of a negotiated patent agreement — is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure depicts the best response functions and the efficient policy combinations on the same diagram.

In the figure, the efficient policy combinations are depicted by the line $QQ^{15}$. We show this line being situated to the right of the $SS$ curve and above the $NN$ curve, which is a general feature of our model. The reasons are clear. Starting from a point on the South’s best response function, a marginal strengthening of IPR protection in the South increases world welfare. Such a change in Southern policies has only a second-order effect on welfare in the South, but it conveys two positive externalities to the North. First, it provides extra monopoly profits to Northern innovators, which contributes to aggregate income there. Second, it enhances the incentives for R&D, inducing an increase in both $\phi_S$ and $\phi_N$. The extra product diversity that results from this R&D creates additional surplus for Northern consumers.

while varying $\Omega_N$ between $\Omega_N = \min \{Q^* / M_N, \bar{T}\}$ and $\max \{0, (Q^* - M_S \bar{T}) / M_N\}$ in such a way that $M_S \Omega_S + M_N \Omega_N = Q^*$.

15If international transfer payments are infeasible, the set of Pareto efficient policy combinations includes the segment of the vertical axis above its intersection with $QQ$ and extending as far as the point $(0, \bar{T})$ and the segment of the horizontal axis to the right of its intersection with $QQ$ and extending to $(\bar{T}, 0)$. 

14
By the same token, a marginal increase in the strength of Northern patent protection from a point along $NN$ increases world welfare. Such a change in policy enhances profit income for Southern firms and encourages additional innovation in both countries. It follows, of course, that the $QQ$ line must lie outside the Nash equilibrium. We record our finding in

**Proposition 2** Let $(\Omega_S, \Omega_N)$ be an interior equilibrium in the noncooperative policy game and let $(\Omega^*_S, \Omega^*_N)$ be any efficient combination of patent policies. Then $M_S\Omega^*_S + M_N\Omega^*_N > M_S\Omega_S + M_N\Omega_N$.

The proposition implies that, starting from any interior Nash equilibrium, an efficient patent treaty must strengthen patent protection in at least one country. It also implies that the treaty will strengthen global incentives for R&D and induce more rapid innovation in both countries.
2.3 Patent Policy with Many Countries

In this section, we extend our analysis to a trading world with many countries. Our main finding is that adding countries exacerbates the free-rider problem that plagues the noncooperative policy equilibrium. Small countries are inclined to allow others to provide the incentives for innovation so as to avoid the deadweight losses in their home markets. In the limit, as the number of countries grows large and each one is small in relation to the world economy, the unique Nash equilibrium has universal patents of strength zero. Then, a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for private innovation.

We assume that there are \( J \) countries, and that country \( i \) has market size \( M_i \), human capital endowment \( H_i \), and labor productivity \( 1/a_i \). The research technology in country \( i \) is \( \phi_i = F \left( H_i, L_i/a_i \right) = A \left( L_i/a_j \right)^b H_i^{1-b} \). All consumers share the preferences given in (1).

Suppose that there is no cooperation between nations in setting their patent policies. In country \( i \), either \( \Omega_i = 0 \) and the marginal cost of providing the first bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal benefit, \( \Omega_i = \bar{T} \) and the marginal benefit of providing the last bit of patent protection exceeds the marginal cost, or \( 0 < \Omega_i < \bar{T} \) and the marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection equals the marginal cost. Equality between marginal benefit and marginal cost implies

\[
C_c - C_m - \mu_i \pi = \frac{M_i}{Q} \gamma [\Omega_i C_m + C_c (\bar{T} - \Omega_i)],
\]

where \( Q = \sum_j M_j \Omega_j \) measures the strength of global patent protection in the Nash equilibrium.

Observe first that as \( \mu_i \to 0 \), the left-hand side of (7) approaches \( C_c - C_m \); a small country captures virtually none of the monopoly profits from innovative products, so the marginal cost of a patent per consumer and product is the difference between the competitive and monopoly levels of consumer surplus. But as \( M_i \to 0 \), the right-hand side of (7) approaches zero, because a small country provides innovators with virtually none of their global profits and so worldwide innovation is hardly responsive to a change.
in such a country’s patent policy. It follows that a small country will set its index of patent protection equal to zero in a Nash equilibrium.

If all countries choose positive patent strengths that are less than \( \bar{T} \), equation (7) holds for every \( i \). Then we can sum (7) across the \( J \) countries, which gives

\[
J (C_c - C_m) - \pi = \gamma \left[ C_m - C_c + \frac{C_c \left( \sum_j M_j \right) \bar{T}}{Q} \right].
\] (8)

Then, for a given size of the world market, \( Q \) depends only on the number of countries \( J \) and not on the distribution of consumers and human capital across countries. Moreover, the greater is the number of countries, the weaker are the global incentives for innovation in a noncooperative equilibrium. As the number of countries grows large (holding constant the size of the world market), the aggregate incentives for innovation approach zero.\(^{16}\) Evidently, the free-rider problem becomes increasingly severe as the number of independent decision makers in the world economy expands.

Finally, note that the requirements for global efficiency do not depend on the number of countries. Again, the sum of all national welfare levels is a function of the aggregate world incentive for innovation. This sum is maximized when

\[
C_c - C_m - \pi = \gamma \left[ C_m - C_c + \frac{C_c \left( \sum_j M_j \right) \bar{T}}{Q^*} \right].
\] (9)

Thus, if international compensation is possible, an efficient global patent treaty will have \( \sum_j M_j \Omega_j = Q^* \), where \( Q^* \) is solved from (9). Notice that \( Q^* \) must exceed \( Q \), the aggregate patent protection in the Nash equilibrium. Even if international compensation is not feasible, an efficient agreement will have \( \sum_j M_j \Omega_j = Q^* \) for a range of distributions of world welfare.

\(^{16}\)Suppose \( Q \) were to approach a finite number as \( J \to \infty \). Then \( \gamma \) would approach a finite number as well, and the right-hand side of (8) would be finite. But the left-hand side of (8) approaches infinity as \( J \to \infty \).
3 Extended model with trade barriers and firm-bias

The conclusion that global IPR protection is too weak in the absence of international agreement can be met with skepticism. Many people point to the strong pharmaceutical lobbies in Washington to justify why they think global patent protection before TRIPS must have been already too strong rather than too weak. Moreover, the existence of trade barriers weakens the international spillovers that one nation confers on foreign countries when it strengthens domestic IPR protection. Therefore, I address here two key simplifications of the basic model: that governments put equal weights on consumer welfare and firm profits and that there are no trade barriers. In reality, governments are often biased in favor of domestic firms and trade barriers are non-trivial. Omitting these factors can bias the conclusion that global IPR protection is too weak in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Obviously, whether the conclusion of the basic model can be overturned depends on how large are the magnitudes of these two effects. The analytical task is to find out what values of firm-biasedness and trade barriers can sustain the original conclusion that there is under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium, and then judge whether these values are plausible.

Let \( y \) be the probability that an invention by a domestic firm is sold in a foreign market (call it the “import penetration rate”). This is an inverse measure of foreign trade barriers. Let \( 1 + a \) be the weight a government puts on domestic profits when a weight of one is put on domestic consumer surplus in its objective function. The parameter \( a \) measures the firm-bias of governments. Note that this approach of assigning additional exogenous weight to firms as opposed to consumers is similar to what is done by Bagwell and Staiger (2002). They essentially put a weight of \( 1 + a \) on firms in the government’s objective function, which they treat as a reduced form derived from the analysis of a political-economy equilibrium a la Grossman and Helpman (1994). Let \( v_i \) be the expected value of a patent of an invention by a firm in country \( i \). Therefore, \( v_i = \pi \left[ \sum_{k \neq i} (y M_k \Omega_k) + M_i \Omega_i \right] \).

It is useful to consider a multi-country setting, as the number of independent decision-making governments plays a crucial role in whether there is under-protection of IP in
Nash equilibrium. Let there be \( J \) countries in the set \( \mathcal{N} \) of countries in the world. In a multi-country setting, the best-response function of country \( i \) is

\[
y \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j \right) (C_c - C_m) + \phi_i (C_c - C_m) - \phi_i (1 + a) \pi \]

\[
= \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\gamma \phi_j}{v_j} \right) y^2 \pi M_i f_i + \frac{\phi_i}{v_i} \pi M_i f_i
\]

where \( f_i \equiv C_c T - (C_c - C_m) \Omega_i \) is the present discounted value of per-person consumer surplus derived from a differentiated good over its product life. The left-hand side of the above equation is, in fact, the marginal cost per consumer in country \( i \) of strengthening IPR there. The first term is the loss in consumer surplus attributed to inventions from firms outside country \( i \); the second term is the loss of consumer surplus attributed to inventions from country \( i \); and the third term is the offsetting of the losses of consumer surplus by gains in profits of firms in country \( i \). The right-hand side is the marginal benefit per consumer in country \( i \). The first term is the increase in consumer welfare in country \( i \) due to increases in flows of innovations from firms outside country \( i \); the second term is the increase in consumer welfare in country \( i \) due to the increase in flow of innovation from country \( i \). If I define the left-hand side as \( MC_i(a) \) and the right-hand side as \( MB_i \), then

\[
\frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial a} = MB_i - MC_i(a),
\]

where \( W_i(a) \) is the Government i’s objective function. (Hereinafter, I put an argument ‘\( a \)’ after the name of a function if firm-bias affects the value of the function.)

It can be easily shown that the first-order condition for global welfare maximization with respect to the choice of \( \Omega_i \) is given by

\[
MC_i(a) + \pi a \phi_i - y \pi \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j \right) =
\]

\[
MB_i + \sum_{k \neq i} \left( \sum_{j \neq k} \frac{\phi_j}{v_j} \right) y^2 \pi M_k f_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \frac{\phi_k}{v_k} y \pi M_k f_k
\]

The left-hand side of this equation is the marginal global cost borne by each consumer in country \( i \) of strengthening IPR protection in that country. The second term is the
welfare that will not be taken into account when IPR protection in country i is chosen to maximize global welfare instead of to maximize government i’s firm-biased objective (therefore it is an addition to marginal cost); the third term reduces the global marginal cost as it takes into account the increases in profits of firms outside of country i. The right-hand side is the marginal global benefit (per consumer in country i) of strengthening IPR there. The second term and the third term are both increases in welfare of consumers outside of country i. The second term is due to faster foreign innovations, while the third term is due to faster domestic innovations. (“foreign” and “domestic” here are relative to each country outside of country i.) The cross-border externalities of IPR protection are captured by the third term on the left hand side plus the second and third terms on the right hand side. It is apparent that since an increase in trade barriers (a decrease in \( y \)) leads to less international spillovers, the likelihood of under-protection of IPR in equilibrium is lower. Likewise, an increase in firm-bias (an increase in \( a \)) reduces the gap between marginal global benefit and marginal national benefit, making under-protection of IPR less likely.

Let us define the left hand side of the first order condition above as \( MC_{i}^{w} \) and the right hand side of the equation as \( MB_{i}^{w} \). It follows that \( \frac{1}{M_{i}} \frac{\partial W^{w}}{\partial A_{i}} = MB_{i}^{w} - MC_{i}^{w} \), where \( W^{w} \) is world welfare (without bias towards firm profits).

In the basic model, we can find a functional relationship between the global strength of patent protection and global welfare. The same strength of global patent protection creates the same amount of total deadweight losses (what I call static losses) and aggregate flow of new differentiated goods (what I call dynamic gains) in each period. As long as the global strength of patent protection is the same, global welfare is the same, regardless of the combination of individual countries’ strengths of patent protection. Therefore, the global optimum is a continuum of combinations of national strengths of patent protection that maximize global welfare. However, this will not be true in this extended model. In this more general model with trade barriers, there does not exist a scalar measure of the global strength of patent protection such that there is a functional relationship between the global strength of protection and global welfare. Despite this problem, I am able to calculate a sufficient condition for global under-protection of
I define under-protection as a situation when, starting from Nash equilibrium, global welfare increases as a result of some positive changes in all \( \{ \Omega_i \}_{i \in N} \) (where the magnitudes of increase are not necessarily equal). The point of the analysis is to come up with a sufficient condition under which, starting from Nash equilibrium \( \{ \Omega_i^E \}_{i \in N} \), some coordinated increases in IPR protection of all countries is globally welfare-improving. Note that an increase in the strength of protection in all countries raises the values of all patents. This increases the global deadweight losses, but gives a boost to the rate of innovation. To simplify the analysis, I focus on changes in \( \{ \Omega_i \}_{i \in N} \) such that \( M_i d\Omega_i = d\Omega_i \) for all \( i \). I want to find a sufficient condition under which such changes lead to an increase in global welfare. In other words, I seek a condition under which the marginal global benefit outweighs the marginal global cost.

Bear in mind that equation (10) is equivalent to \( \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0 \), and equation (11) is equivalent to \( \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i^w}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0 \). Summing the left-hand side and the right-hand side of equations (10) over all \( i \) as well as both sides of (11) over all \( i \), and comparing the two ensuing equations, it can be shown that

\[
(J - 1) y > a
\]

is a sufficient condition under which, starting from Nash equilibrium, small increases in \( \Omega_i \) such that \( d\Omega_i = \frac{\partial \Omega_i}{\partial \Omega_i} \) is globally welfare-improving, i.e. \( \frac{dW_i^w}{d\Omega_i} > 0 \). The proof is given below (and the appendix).

First I prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 1.** A sufficient condition for under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium is
\[
\sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i^w}{\partial \Omega_i} > 0 \quad \text{for all } \{ \Omega_i \}_{i \in N} \text{ such that } \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0.
\]

**Proof.** A sufficient condition for under-protection is

\[
\sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i^w}{\partial \Omega_i} > 0 \quad \text{in Nash equilibrium } \{ \Omega_i^E \}_{i \in N}
\]

This is true because \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i^w}{\partial \Omega_i} > 0 \) implies that if we increase each \( \Omega_i \) in \( \{ \Omega_i^E \}_{i \in N} \) such that \( M_i d\Omega_i = d\Omega_i \ \forall i \), then \( dW^w = \left( \sum_i \frac{\partial W_i^w}{\partial \Omega_i} d\Omega_i \right) = \left( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i^w}{\partial \Omega_i} \right) d\Omega_i > 0 \). That
is, global welfare increases as each $\Omega_i$ increases slightly such that $\frac{\partial \Omega_i}{\partial f_j} = M_j$ for all $i \neq j$. This clearly indicates under-protection at Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since $\frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0$ for all $i$ in Nash equilibrium, $\sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0$ includes the Nash equilibrium as a special case. ■

To understand Lemma 1 better, let us consider a two-country case. First refer to Figure 2 for an idea of the relationship between Nash equilibrium and global optimum. In that diagram, point E is the Nash equilibrium while point G is the global optimum. BRF-S and BRF-N are the best response functions of South and North respectively. Point G is at the intersection of the curves $\frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0$, which are not shown. Note that the slopes of the iso-global-welfare lines $W^w = W$ are always equal to $\frac{M_S}{M_N}$ at their intersection with the line $\frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0$. This is because, along $W^w = W$, $\frac{\partial \Omega_N}{\partial \Omega_S} = -\left( \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} / \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} \right)$. But at any point on the curve $\frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0$, we have $-\left( \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} / \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} \right) = \frac{M_S}{M_N}$. Consequently, it is not hard to see that starting from any point on the iso-global-welfare line to the left of GG, any small increase in $\Omega_S$ and $\Omega_N$ such that $\frac{\partial \Omega_N}{\partial \Omega_S} = \frac{M_S}{M_N}$ would increase $W^w$. In the context of Figure 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for there to be under-protection in Nash equilibrium is that point E is to the left of the curve GG. Lemma 1 says that the sufficient condition for point E to be on the left of GG is that

$$\left( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_i} \right) > 0 \text{ for all } \{\Omega_i\}_{i \in N} \text{ that satisfy } \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0.$$ 

Figure 3 shows the relationship between the curves $\frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0$ (GG) and $\frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W_S(a)}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W_N(a)}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0$ (EE). The curves FOC-S and FOC-N are the first order conditions for maximization of global welfare with respect to the choice of $\Omega_S$ and $\Omega_N$ respectively. In the context of Figure 3, the above condition is equivalent to saying that the curve EE is to the left of curve GG. If this condition is satisfied, at any point that lies on EE (including the Nash equilibrium point E), any small change in $\Omega_S$ and $\Omega_N$ such that $M_S d\Omega_S = M_N d\Omega_N$ would increase global welfare, since $\frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} > 0$.\footnote{Note that if point E is to the right of GG, then any simultaneous small decrease of $\Omega_S$ and $\Omega_N$ such that $\frac{\partial \Omega_N}{\partial \Omega_S} = \frac{M_S}{M_N}$ would increase $W^w$.}
Proposition 3 below basically provides a sufficient condition for the EE to be on the left of GG.

Therefore, our next step is to prove the following proposition:

**Proposition 3.** A sufficient condition for under-protection of IPR in Nash equilibrium when there are trade barriers and firm-bias is $(J-1)y > a$.

**Proof.** See the appendix.

Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition for under-protection in the sense that starting from each $\Omega_i$ being at the Nash equilibrium level, small increases in $\{\Omega_i\}_{i \in N}$ such that $
abla \Omega_i / \nabla \Omega_j = M_i / M_j$ for all $i \neq j$ leads to an increase in global welfare. Proposition 3 says that $(J-1)y > a$ is a sufficient condition for lemma 1 to hold. Therefore, it is exactly the condition we are looking for. To check that this is a reasonable condition, note that in the special case of the basic model, when there are two countries ($J = 2$), $y = 1$ and $a = 0$, the condition is satisfied. Moreover, it accords with the intuition that the free-rider problem gets more serious when there are more countries playing the patent-setting game, for a larger $J$ leads to more under-protection. It also is consistent with the notions that trade barriers weaken the cross-border externality of IPR protection, because a smaller $y$ leads to less under-protection, and that stronger government bias towards patent-holding firms tends to strengthen patents, for a larger $a$ leads to less under-protection.\[18\]

What is a reasonable value for $a$? In the political-economy literature (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Maggi and Goldberg 1999), researchers have tried to estimate the weight the U.S. government puts on campaign contributions when it puts a weight of unity on welfare. They rarely come up with a number more than 0.5. Since this is a preference parameter, it should be the same in the context of patent protection. Suppose there is a patent lobby, and suppose there is no consumer lobby, nor is there lobbying from other

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\[18\] As an additional check, one can examine the symmetric case where $M_i = M_j$ and $H_i = H_j$ for all $i \neq j$. It can be shown that the same sufficient condition is obtained.
sectors of the economy. Based on these suppositions, the appendix shows that the value the government puts on campaign contributions is exactly the same as \( a \) in our model.

What is a reasonable value for \( J \)? This is the number of independent government decision-makers in the patent-setting game. Thus, it is the number of countries in the world that consume and trade patent-sensitive goods, and that adopt neither zero nor full patent protection. To be conservative, let \( J = 5 \).

When \( a = 0.5 \) and \( J = 5 \), a sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium to be under-protecting patents is \( y > 0.1 \). I believe that this condition is likely to be satisfied for most products. So, based on this rough calculation, I conclude that global patent protection in the absence of international coordination is probably too weak.

Some people argue that the set of globally optimal levels of patent protection should take into account the politically-augmented objective function of each national government, as these functions reflect the preferences of each government, which represents each country in international coordination efforts. If maximizing the sum of the politically-augmented objective functions is the goal of international coordination, then the first order condition (11) becomes

\[
MC_i(a) - y\pi \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j \right) =
MB_i + \sum_{k \neq i} \left( \sum_{j \neq k} \gamma \frac{\phi_j}{v_j} \right) y^2 \pi M_k f_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \gamma \frac{\phi_k}{v_k} y \pi M_k f_k
\]

In this case, it is clear that there is under-protection of patents in each country, as the marginal global cost is lower while the marginal global benefit is higher. There is unambiguous positive cross-border externalities as the profits of foreign firms and the increases consumer surplus of foreign consumers due to induced innovations are not taken into account as \( \Omega_i \) increases, just like in the basic model. The spillovers are smaller in this case, as there are trade barriers.
4 No National Treatment in Nash Equilibrium

One may argue that in a non-cooperative equilibrium, there is no incentive for a country to offer national treatment. One response to this criticism is that, before the TRIPS Agreement was signed and implemented, many countries were already members of WIPO and the Berne and Paris Conventions. These treaties required their members to adopt national treatment. A critique of this response is that these treaties were so loosely enforced that countries did not really abide by that commitment. Does the main conclusion that there is under-protection continue to hold if I relax the assumption of national treatment? It turns out that the answer is, “yes”. Moreover, the results in the basic model, such as: A larger country has incentives to offer more IPR protection, and the positive cross-border externalities of strengthening domestic IPR protection, continue to exist.

I first compute the Nash equilibrium. I continue to assume the existence of trade barriers and firm-bias. Let $\Omega_{kj}$ be the strength of protection offered by country $k$ on goods invented by country $j$, where $k, j = \mathcal{N}$. The value of a patent of a good invented in country $j$ is therefore given by $v_j = \pi \left( M_j \Omega_{jj} + \sum_{k \neq j} yM_k \Omega_{kj} \right) = \pi Q_j$ where $Q_j \equiv M_j \Omega_{jj} + \sum_{k \neq j} yM_k \Omega_{kj}$ is the global patent protection provided to each differentiated good developed in country $j$. Focusing on the protection of goods invented by country $j$, the best-response function of that country gives the optimal choice of $\Omega_{jj}$ given that each country $i$ (where $i \neq j$) chooses $\Omega_{ij}$. That function is

$$
(C_c - C_m) - (1 + a) \pi = \frac{\gamma M_j f_{jj}}{M_j \Omega_{jj} + \sum_{k \neq j} yM_k \Omega_{kj}}; \quad (13)
$$

where $f_{jj} \equiv C_c \mathcal{T} - (C_c - C_m) \Omega_{jj}$; while the best-response function of country $i$, selecting its best choice of $\Omega_{ij}$ given that country $j$ chooses $\Omega_{jj}$ and each country $k$ in the rest of the world (where $k \neq i, j$) chooses $\Omega_{kj}$, is

$$
C_c - C_m = \frac{\gamma yM_i f_{ij}}{M_j \Omega_{jj} + \sum_{k \neq j} yM_k \Omega_{kj}} \quad \text{(There are $J - 1$ such equation)} \quad (14)
$$

where $f_{ij} \equiv C_c \mathcal{T} - (C_c - C_m) \Omega_{ij}$.

Note that the innovative capability of a country does not affect its equilibrium strength of IPR protection when countries can optimally choose to offer differential
treatments to domestic and foreign firms. If one adds equations (13) and the $J - 1$ equations (14) for all $i \neq j$, we have

$$J (C_c - C_m) - (1 + a) \pi = \frac{\gamma}{Q_j} \times \left[ T C_c \left( \sum_{k \in N} M_k \right) - (C_c - C_m) Q_j \right]$$

(15)

Therefore, the global patent protection $Q_j$ provided to all differentiated goods are the same regardless of where they are developed. As $v_j = \pi Q_j$, the equilibrium value of a patent is independent of where the good is invented. Since $v_i = v_j$ for all $i \neq j$, we can infer from (13) that a country with a larger domestic market tends to protect the IPR of domestically-invented goods more than one with a smaller domestic market. Moreover, (14) implies that a country with a larger domestic market tends to protect the IPR of foreign-invented goods more than one with a smaller domestic market. Finally, if we compare the best response function for the choice of $\Omega_{jj}$ with that for the choice of $\Omega_{ji}$, we can easily infer that a country always protects domestically invented goods more than it does foreign-invented ones (i.e., $\Omega_{jj} > \Omega_{ji}$ for $i \neq j$).

The globally efficient combinations of $\Omega_{jj}$ and $\Omega_{ij}$ for all $i \neq j$, on the other hand, are determined by the following equation

$$C_c - C_m - \pi = \frac{\gamma \left( M_j f_{jj} + \sum_{i \neq j} y M_i f_{ij} \right)}{M_j \Omega_{jj} + \sum_{i \neq j} y M_i \Omega_{ij}}$$

$$= \frac{\gamma}{Q_j} \times \left[ T C_c \left( \sum_{k \in N} M_k \right) - (C_c - C_m) Q_j \right]$$

(16)

Like in the basic model, instead of being unique, there is a continuum of globally optimal combination of levels of patent protection. Considering the two-country case, it is clear that harmonization (in the sense that $\Omega_{ii} = \Omega_{jj}$) is certainly not sufficient for global efficiency. Neither is it necessary, since $Q_j$ can be at the efficiency level with $\Omega_{ij}$ small and $\Omega_{jj}$ large, or with $\Omega_{ij}$ large but $\Omega_{jj}$ small. Similarly, $\Omega_{ii}$ can be either large or small to attain global efficiency. Therefore, there is no need for $\Omega_{ii} = \Omega_{jj}$ to reach global efficiency. Along similar lines, it is easy to see that national treatment is neither necessary nor sufficient for global efficiency.

Comparing equations (15) and (16) can give us a sufficient condition for global under-protection in Nash equilibrium. We state the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. A sufficient condition for under-protection when there are trade barriers, firm-bias and no requirement of national treatment in Nash equilibrium is $J - 1 > a$.

Proof. Unlike in the case where national treatment is observed in Nash equilibrium, the strength of global patent protection is the same regardless of the combination of individual countries’ strengths of patent protection. This is like in the basic model. To compare the equilibrium global strength of patent protection with the globally optimal one, we simply compare equations (15) and (16). It is easy to see that the necessary and sufficient condition for global under-protection of patents is

$$J (C_c - C_m) - (1 + a) \pi > C_c - C_m - \pi$$

$$\iff (J - 1) (C_c - C_m) > a \pi$$

$$\implies J - 1 > a \quad \text{since} \quad C_c - C_m > \pi$$

This is a less stringent condition than (12).\(^{19}\) Interestingly, the condition is independent of $y$.

To conclude, the non-observance of national treatment in non-cooperative equilibrium will make it even more likely that there is under-protection of patents in the global economy.

5 Conclusion

I extend the Grossman and Lai (2004) model to answer the question, “Would global patent protection be too weak without international coordination?” by introducing firm-biased government preferences and trade barriers in the model. I make use of the estimates of a parameter from the political economy literature to proxy for the degree of

\(^{19}\)If we assume that $a$ and $y$ are both country-specific so that in general $a_j \neq a_k$ and $y_j \neq y_k$ for $j \neq k$, then the sufficient condition for under-protection becomes

$$J - 1 > a_j$$

This, again, is a less stringent condition than (12).
governments’ firm-bias. Then I calculate the range of trade barriers that is sufficient to give rise to under-protection of patents in the global system without international policy coordination in IPR protection. I make the judgement that the true trade barrier between countries very likely falls within this range of under-protection. Therefore, I conclude that there was probably under-protection of patents without international policy coordination in IPR protection. It means that the free-rider problem with a large number of independent players overrides the effects of firm-bias and trade barriers, giving rise to too low a rate of innovation in the world. Allowing for the possibility that countries discriminate against foreign firms in Nash equilibrium does not change this conclusion. The problem can possibly be corrected by international coordination in intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.
References


Appendix

A The firm-bias parameter and political economy

In this appendix, we try to justify using the parameter estimated from the political economy literature (in particular lobbying as per Grossman and Helpman 1994) as a proxy for the firm-bias parameter $a$ in our model. We analyze lobbying when there are two or more countries, which trade freely with each other and set their national patent policies non-cooperatively. We introduce the “rest of the world” to a generic country $j$. For ease of exposition, we only focus on the case with free trade, i.e. $y = 1$. The case with $y < 1$ has the same expressions for the marginal cost, which is the focus of what we want to show here. Therefore, there is no loss generality by assuming $y = 1$ here.

The setup in this appendix is based on what we presented in Section 2. Here, we extend the model by considering the possibility that interest groups lobby the government to set policy in their favor. In particular, the IPR industry has a strong self-interest in obtaining extensive IPR protection. We follow the recent “protection for sale” literature\textsuperscript{20} in modelling the interaction between the IPR-lobby and the government. That is, we set up a lobbying game that is based on the menu auction approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986): In such a game, the IPR lobby submits a contribution schedule $C_{IP}(\tau)$ to the policy-maker who then chooses the optimal patent length $\tau$.

Let us start with a closed economy. The IPR-lobby represents the interests of the owners of human capital $H$ that, in the Grossman-Lai model, is employed exclusively in the production of new designs of differentiated goods. Defining $r$ as the returns to human capital, the income of these capital owners is $rH$, which is the residual of the revenue from IPR-sensitive products minus the labor costs necessary to produce them:

$$rH = M\phi\pi\Omega - wL_R,$$

where $M$ is the number of consumers, $\phi$ is the flow of new inventions, $\pi$ is the instantaneous profit per product, $\Omega \equiv (1 - e^{-\rho \tau}/\rho)$ is the present discounted value of a flow of

\textsuperscript{20}See the seminal contribution by Grossman and Helpman (1994) that represents the starting point of this literature.
one dollar during the patent life $\tau$ of the product, $w$ is wage, and $L_R$ the labor employed in the R&D sector. In this appendix, we assume that patents are perfectly enforced so that patent length completely captures the degree of patent protection. The IPR lobby thus faces the following gross pay-off function:

$$W_{IP} = \frac{rH}{\rho} = \frac{M_\phi \pi \Omega - wL_R}{\rho},$$

which is the discounted present value of its flow of profits. Note that we consider neither a labor union nor a consumer lobby. Workers in this framework are paid their marginal product and thus have no surplus to lobby and we could not find any empirical evidence for the role of consumers’ interests.

Taking into account the contribution schedule of the IPR-lobby, it is the government that will set policy. Its objective function takes the following form:

$$W(a) = W(0) + a C_{IP}(\tau).$$

As usual in the “protection for sale” literature, the government’s objective is a weighted sum of social welfare and contributions. The first term represents social welfare and can be written more explicitly as follows:

$$W(0) = \frac{M_\phi \pi \Omega - wL_R}{\rho} + \frac{M_\phi [C_m \Omega + C_c (T - \Omega)]}{\rho},$$

where $T \equiv (1 - e^{-\rho \bar{\tau}}/\rho)$ is the present discounted value of a flow of one dollar during the economic lifetime $\bar{\tau}$ of the product. The second term in equation (18) represents the influence of the lobbying contribution and $a$ indicates the importance of this channel.

Now let us consider an open economy with free trade. In an open economy, the patent-lobby in each country $j$ now seeks to maximize the following objective function:

$$W_{IP}^j = \frac{\phi_j (\Omega_j M_j + \Omega_{-j} M_{-j}) \bar{\pi}}{\rho} - \frac{w_j L_{R,j}}{\rho},$$

The set $\{-j\}$ represents the rest of the world, which consists of more than one country. In that case, all variables with a subscript $“-j”$ are vectors that represent the values of the variable of the rest of the world, with the number of rows equal to the number of countries in the rest of the world. Note the additional middle term in the above equation
represents the profits from the foreign market. Next, let us redefine \( W_j(0) \), which now contains several foreign terms:

\[
W_j(0) = w_j(L_j - L_{Rj}) + \phi_j(\Omega_j M_j + \Omega_{-j} M_{-j}) \pi + \frac{(\phi_j + \phi_{-j}) \Omega_j M_j C_m}{\rho} + \frac{(\phi_j + \phi_{-j}) M_j (\bar{T} - \Omega_j) C_c}{\rho}
\]

As in the closed economy case, the government in country \( j \) maximizes a weighted sum of (appropriately modified) social welfare \( W_j(0) \) plus the contributions it is offered:

\[
W^j(a) = W_j(0) + a C_{IP}^j(\tau_j)
\]

We use the menu auction approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), in particular, conditions 2 and 3 of (their) Lemma 2:

ii) \( \tau^0 \in \arg \max_{\tau_j} W_j(0) + a C_{IP}^j(\tau_j) \)

iii) \( \tau^0 \in \arg \max_{\tau_j} W_j(0) + a C_{IP}^j(\tau_j) + W^j_{IP} - C_{IP}^j(\tau_j) \)

Using in addition the standard assumption that the contribution schedule \( C_{IP}^j(\tau_j) \) is differentiable, we can combine ii) and iii) as follows:

\[
\frac{\partial W_j(0)}{\partial \tau_j} + a \frac{\partial W^j_{IP}}{\partial \tau_j} = 0
\]

The resulting best-response function of country \( j \)'s government can be written as:

\[
\phi_j(C_c - C_m) - (1 + a) \phi_j(\pi) + \phi_{-j}(C_c - C_m) = \frac{\gamma_j \phi_j + \gamma_{-j} \phi_{-j}}{v} M_j \pi [C_m \Omega_j + C_c (\bar{T} - \Omega_j)]
\]

where \( v \) is the value of a global patent. Note the similarity with equations (3) and (4), with additional weight given to the IPR-sensitive sector’s profits. In our model, this extra weight arises as the result of lobbying.

Taking into account the property that \( \gamma_j = \gamma_{-j} = \gamma \) under a Cobb-Douglas innovation function, the following best response function implicitly defines the Nash equilibrium:

\[
C_c - C_m - (1 + a) \mu_j \pi = \gamma \frac{M_j \Omega_j}{M_j \Omega_j + M_{-j} \Omega_{-j}} \left( C_m + C_c \frac{\bar{T}_j - \Omega_j}{\Omega_j} \right), \quad (19)
\]
where \( \mu_j \equiv \phi_j / (\phi_j + \phi_{-j}) \) is the share of world innovation originating in country \( j \). Note the similarity with equation (5).

B Proof of Proposition 3

From (10), we know that along the curve \( \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W_i(a) / \partial \Omega_i = 0 \),

\[
\begin{align*}
&\left[ y \sum_j \phi_j + (1-y) \phi_i \right] (C_c - C_m) - \phi_i (1+a) \pi \\
= &\gamma \left[ y \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j \frac{y_j}{v_j} \right) \pi M_i f_i + \phi_i \frac{1}{v_j} \pi M_i f_i \right] \\
< &\frac{\gamma}{\pi y Q} \left[ y \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j y_j \right) \pi M_i f_i + \phi_i \pi M_i f_i \right] \text{ since } \pi y Q < v_j \ \forall j, \text{ where } Q \equiv \sum_k M_k \Omega_k \\
= &\frac{\gamma}{\pi y Q} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \pi M_i f_i + \phi_i \left( 1-y^2 \right) \pi M_i f_i \right]
\end{align*}
\]

Summing over \( i \), we know the following must be true along the curve \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W_i(a) / \partial \Omega_i = 0 \):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\left\{ y J \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) + \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) (1-y) \right\} (C_c - C_m) - \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) (1+a) \pi \\
< &\frac{\gamma}{\pi y Q} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \pi \left( \sum_i M_i f_i \right) + \left( 1-y^2 \right) \pi \left( \sum_i \phi_i M_i f_i \right) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

(20)

Recall that equation (10) is equivalent to \( \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W_i(a) / \partial \Omega_i = 0 \) while (11) is equivalent to \( \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W(a) / \partial \Omega_i = 0 \). We have established in Lemma 1 that a sufficient condition for underprotection is \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W(a) / \partial \Omega_i > 0 \) for all combinations of \( \{\Omega_i\}_{i \in N} \) that satisfy \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W_i(a) = 0 \). From equations (10) and (11), we know this condition is equivalent to

\[
\begin{align*}
&\sum_i \left\{ \pi a \phi_i - y \pi \left( \sum_{j \neq i} \phi_j \right) \right\} \\
< &\sum_i \left\{ \sum_{k \neq i} \left( \sum_{j \neq k} \gamma \frac{\phi_j}{v_j} \right) y^2 \pi M_k f_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \gamma \frac{\phi_k}{v_k} y \pi M_k f_k \right\}
\end{align*}
\]

(21)

for all combinations of \( \{\Omega_i\}_{i \in N} \) that satisfy \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \partial W_i(a) = 0 \).
The above inequality is equivalent to

\[
\pi (a + y) \left( \sum_i \phi_i \right) - y \pi J \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) < y^2 \pi \left( \sum_j \frac{\phi_j}{v_j} \right) (J - 1) \left( \sum_k \gamma \phi_k M_k f_k \right) + y (1 - y) \pi (J - 1) \left( \sum_k \frac{\phi_k}{v_k} M_k f_k \right)
\]

for all combinations of \( \{\Omega_i\}_{i \in N} \) that satisfy \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0 \).

Since \( \pi Q > v_j \ \forall j \), a sufficient condition for the above is

\[
\theta_2 \left\{ (a + y) \left( \sum_i \phi_i \right) - y J \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \right\} < \frac{\gamma}{\pi Q (C_c - C_m)} \left[ \left( \sum_j \frac{\phi_j}{v_j} \right) y^2 \pi (J - 1) \left( \sum_k \gamma \phi_k M_k f_k \right) + y (1 - y) \pi (J - 1) \left( \sum_k \frac{\phi_k}{v_k} M_k f_k \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{\gamma (J - 1)}{Q (C_c - C_m)} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_k \gamma \phi_k M_k f_k \right) + y (1 - y) \left( \sum_k \frac{\phi_k}{v_k} M_k f_k \right) \right] \quad (22)
\]

for all combinations of \( \{\Omega_i\}_{i \in N} \) that satisfy \( \sum_i \frac{1}{M_i} \frac{\partial W_i}{\partial \Omega_i} = 0 \).

Recall equation (20), and define

\[
\Psi \equiv \frac{y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_i \gamma M_i f_i \right) + (1 - y^2) \left( \sum_i \phi_i M_i f_i \right)}{y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_k \gamma M_k f_k \right) + y (1 - y) \left( \sum_k \phi_k M_k f_k \right)}.
\]

We know \( 1 < \Psi < \frac{1}{y} \) since \( \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_k M_k f_k \right) > \sum_k \phi_k M_k f_k \). So, \( \frac{1}{\psi} > y \). Therefore,
based on the definition of $\Psi$ above, we have, along $\sum_i \frac{1}{m_i} \frac{\partial W_i(a)}{\partial \lambda_i} = 0$,

$$\frac{\gamma}{Q (C_c - C_m)} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_i M_i f_i \right) + y \left( 1 - y \right) \left( \sum_k \phi_k M_k f_k \right) \right]$$

$$= \frac{\gamma}{\Psi Q} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_i M_i f_i \right) + (1 - y^2) \left( \sum_i \phi_i M_i f_i \right) \right] \frac{1}{C_c - C_m}$$

$$> y \frac{\gamma}{Q} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_i M_i f_i \right) + (1 - y^2) \left( \sum_i \phi_i M_i f_i \right) \right] \frac{1}{C_c - C_m}$$

as $\frac{1}{\Psi} > y$

$$> y^2 \left\{ y J \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) + \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) (1 - y) - \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) (1 + a) \theta_2 \right\} \text{ according to (20)}$$

Using the above inequality to substitute for

$$\frac{\gamma}{Q (C_c - C_m)} \left[ y^2 \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \left( \sum_i M_i f_i \right) + y \left( 1 - y \right) \left( \sum_i \phi_i M_i f_i \right) \right] \text{ in (22), we get a sufficient condition for there to be under-protection in Nash equilibrium as}$$

$$\theta_2 \left\{ (a + y) \left( \sum_i \phi_i \right) - y J \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) \right\}$$

$$< y^2 (J - 1) \left\{ y J \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) + \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) (1 - y) - \left( \sum_j \phi_j \right) (1 + a) \theta_2 \right\}$$

which is equivalent to

$$\theta_2 [(a + y) - Jy] < y^2 (J - 1) [Jy + (1 - y) - (1 + a) \theta_2]$$

a sufficient condition of which is

$$(a + y) - Jy < y^2 (J - 1) [Jy - (a + y)] \text{ since } \theta_2 < 1$$

which is equivalent to

$$(J - 1) y > a$$

which is the same as (12).
Figure 2

\[ \frac{\partial W_S(a)}{\partial \Omega_S} = 0 \text{ BRF-S} \]

\[ \frac{\partial W_N(a)}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0 \text{ BRF-N} \]

\[ \frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0 \]

\[ W^w = \overline{W} \]

Slope = \( M_S / M_N \)

45 degrees
\[ \frac{\partial W_S(a)}{\partial \Omega_S} = 0 \quad \text{BRF-S} \]

\[ \frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W_S(a)}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W_N(a)}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0 \]

\[ \frac{\partial W_N(a)}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0 \quad \text{BRF-N} \]

\[ \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} = 0 \quad \text{FOC-S} \]

\[ \frac{1}{M_S} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_S} + \frac{1}{M_N} \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0 \]

\[ \frac{\partial W^w}{\partial \Omega_N} = 0 \quad \text{FOC-N} \]

Figure 3