Title
Unionization Structure and the Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment
Abstract
We examine the effects of unionization in the host country on a firm's
choices of entry mode when serving a foreign market, i.e., its incentives for exporting,
green-field FDI and merger. If, due to government regulations the merged firm must
operate a plant in the host country, we find that the firm does green-field investment
under decentralized unions, but chooses a merger under a centralized union. The
firm's incentive for FDI (either green-field FDI or merger) compared to exporting is
higher under decentralized unions than under a centralized union. In contrast, if the
merged firm can use its plant from any country, a merger may occur even under
decentralized unions, but in this case the merged firm uses the plant in the nonunionized
country. Under a centralized union, merger always arises if the merged firm
can produce in any country, but it chooses to produce in the host country if the market
is small.
Arijit MUKHERJEE
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy
Laixun ZHAO
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration
Kobe University
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe
657-8501
Japan
Phone: (81) 78 803 7036
Fax: (81) 78 803 7059